More than 80 days after the war on Gaza, or what is known as the events of “October 7th”, questions still hover around the implications of that event which seemed to carry many variables on the Palestinian scene and the conflict with Israel, and on the regional scene in general. It appears that the scene in the region before October 7th is not the same as after, especially since these events have created more foggy atmospheres in the region and strengthened the state of “uncertainty”.
Before the war on Gaza, the region witnessed a notable regional movement, closer to a new arrangement; recently, there was a Saudi-Iranian agreement under Chinese sponsorship, and a Saudi-Israeli dialogue that had reached an advanced stage under American sponsorship, along with the announcement of huge economic projects such as the economic corridor project between India, the Arabian Gulf, and Europe. This made regional and Palestinian parties feel that the region is approaching the settlement of the Palestinian issue. However, the operation “Al-Aqsa Flood” and the subsequent war on the Gaza Strip were enough to shuffle some cards, which could lead to a new arrangement of the scene.
The scenes of the war, which left tens of thousands of dead and wounded, raised questions and scenarios related to the paths of the ongoing war and the future of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in terms of geography and demography, amid varying expectations about the emergence of any upcoming political peace process, in addition to its implications and the extent of its impact on the regional environment politically and security-wise, and the role of regional players, whether states, specifically those most engaged with the Palestinian issue, or non-state actors who are witnessing a notable rise in front of the role of the nation-state.
Amid these accumulating questions and the dynamic scene, the Politics and Society Institute, in partnership with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Middle East Program) and the Omran Center for Strategic Studies, held a closed workshop in the Jordanian capital, Amman, to discuss the implications of the war and its outcomes on the Palestinian scene, the regional scene, and the upcoming scenarios. The workshop included a number of Arab researchers and experts, and the report reviews the most important opinions and trends presented.
Implications for the Palestinian Scene
The events of October 7th put everyone in shock, unveiling an unexpected scenario. Israel, already grappling with an internal crisis, found itself in a severe military impasse. Despite Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s efforts to turn the situation into an opportunity, the military infiltration persisted, marking more than two months since the operations began. This impasse wasn’t limited to Israel but also encompassed most of the involved parties, particularly Palestinians. They faced a future fraught with uncertainty, with scenarios once considered improbable now becoming a reality. This complex situation also involved Arab nations deeply engaged in Palestinian affairs.
Prospects for the Peace Process
With the continuation of Israeli air and ground operations, which still receive American and Western political cover, the chances of discussing any upcoming political peace process are diminishing. According to participants, a serious political process should at least include 3 elements:
1. The United States, or the party leading the political process, should declare that the ultimate goal is to end the Israeli occupation within a specified timeframe.
2. The United Nations should decide to recognize the Palestinian state now, before negotiations begin, based on the 1967 borders.
3. Once these steps are achieved, the necessary steps to reach these goals can be discussed.
However, it seems that the United States itself is not serious and is not seeking to carry out this process, especially as it enters an election year and thus does not want to add any pressure on Israel. The Democratic administration does not want to show any divergence between it and the Republican Party in supporting Tel Aviv. On the other hand, Israel is not seeking to create a new division among its political forces, though the division is limited to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his ruling coalition, and not in relation to ending the occupation and annexing Palestinian territories. Additionally, a legitimate Palestinian leadership is also not available, and any legitimate Palestinian leadership must come through elections. According to participants, it seems that the Palestinian Authority is not keen on conducting them.
Amid the escalating war in the Gaza Strip and its uncertain future in the context of the unclear military situation and the proposed political solutions, and with the intensification of Israeli bombardment on populated areas in Gaza, participants view the scenario of displacement as increasingly likely for the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip. This comes in light of clear policies aimed at creating a situation on the ground that diminishes the Palestinians’ hope for endurance. These policies began with the imposition of the blockade on Gaza and have led to dire humanitarian conditions. Alongside the military path pursued by Israel, it was initially expected to limit its control to the northern territories of the Strip. However, reality indicates that the Israeli military’s operations have now reached the Khan Yunis area in the south of the Strip and are bombing the border city of Rafah. This escalates the possibility of a displacement scenario. Despite Arab countries, notably Egypt and Jordan, bringing this issue to the international front, the potential realities that may unfold on the ground could impose new facts amidst the worsening humanitarian situation. Arab states have announced their readiness to offer investments to revive areas in Egyptian Sinai to accommodate those displaced from the Strip or to open employment opportunities for them.
While one group of participants sees the displacement scenario as a possibility, another group believes it is still unlikely, based on several factors. First, the Palestinian resilience and the experience of the Nakba have made Palestinians more determined to hold onto their land. This was demonstrated by the ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, which witnessed attempts by Gazans to return to the northern part of the Strip despite the destruction in those areas. Second, the official “declared” American position opposes displacement and favors unifying the authorities of the West Bank and Gaza. Third, there is a categorical refusal from the Egyptian side of any displacement scenario, as it is seen as a threat to its national security. While there have been instances of smuggling across the Egyptian border with the Strip, these cannot be interpreted as a sign of political acceptance, as there is a distinction between individual or weapons smuggling and a policy of acceptance.
The scenario of displacement is not limited to Gaza but may extend to the West Bank. This explains the Jordanian stance, which considers displacement tantamount to a “declaration of war.” The conditions for displacement in the West Bank may not be entirely ripe (on a collective level), However, from the perspective of some participants, this does not prevent the possibility of Israel creating such conditions in the future. The Israeli side, which finds itself facing demands for the establishment of a Palestinian state and the demographic majority of Palestinians, might seek to evacuate these areas and create humanitarian crises. The recent encroachment and expansion of settlements in the West Bank, along with the arming of settlers, coupled with the economic and social situation — notably the Ramallah authority’s inability to pay all employee pensions, ongoing security coordination, and a wave of arrests — all these factors heighten the likelihood of at least voluntary displacement.
Palestinians of 1948
Perhaps one of the most significant consequences of the Nakba faced by the Palestinian people is the fragmentation and absence of a unified leadership and political project. This situation, either directly or indirectly, led to the marginalization of the Israeli Arab Palestinians, or the “Palestinians of 48”. Their case is one of the most complex on the Palestinian scene, even though they represent 20% of Israeli society. However, this significant group has not been isolated from the repercussions and effects of the war on Gaza in terms of Israeli measures from the authority itself and the Israeli public, and in terms of a renewed deep crisis in the question of identity, which emerges every time with renewed tension between Palestinians and Israelis.
The Israeli government implements numerous security measures and arrests against Israeli Arabs, along with firing many of them from their jobs and expelling hundreds of students from universities. There is also increasing pressure from Israeli society, which accuses the Palestinians of 1948 of collusion and siding with Hamas and other Palestinian factions. These reasons collectively have led to the absence of any mass movements coming from Arab Israelis, Although there have been some political statements from parties representing Palestinians, there is a strong awareness that the Israeli right ultimately seeks to displace them, following the same projects it wants to implement in Gaza and the West Bank. The increase in discriminatory practices and apartheid-like treatment against them has relegated them to a lower class within Israeli society.
The frustration among Palestinians of 1948 is intensifying due to the lack of prospects for a peaceful political process and the absence of a unified Palestinian political project. Their exclusion from discussions regarding the Palestinian issue places them in greater existential danger within their own territory. This is compounded by the extensive mobilization campaigns conducted by Israeli official authorities, political forces, and citizens against the Palestinians of 1948, especially during the ongoing conflict. These campaigns further marginalize and target Palestinians of 1948, exacerbating their sense of isolation and vulnerability.
Implications at the Regional Level
The events of October 7th might have triggered a certain phenomena that requires a deeper analysis and post-war study in Gaza, assuming that changes will occur in some of the dynamics that existed before that date. This is relevant both at the level of state and non-state actors, whose role is increasingly prominent against the backdrop of weakening national states in the Arab world.
One regional phenomenon is the exposure of the nature and effectiveness of Iranian roles. This has led some participants to discuss a clear disruption of what is known as “the unity of battlefields.” Amid a state of restraint followed by Iran, which has traditionally propelled the Axis of Resistance forward geo-strategically, additionally Hezbollah opened a “solidarity” front. This front remains limited and has not deviated from the rules of limited engagement, despite the escalation of the war. This has raised questions and doubts about whether the calculations are genuinely shared. However, the future of this axis suggests its continuation and attracts more popularity within Arab public opinions, especially amid the fragmentation of the official Arab stance.
In the Context of the Arab Region, during the Gaza war, the Arab region can be divided into three areas:
A) The Arabian Gulf region, which has a different approach to interpreting the events. This region might be seeking a new regional arrangement and exploring new roles. It tends to marginalize traditional political solutions to the Palestinian issue in favor of previously proposed economic and livelihood settlements.
B) The Maghreb region, composed of divided states with varying narratives: Tunisia with a populist discourse, Algeria with a different form of populism, and Morocco, which has been almost completely silent, despite traditionally being vocal in similar past situations.
C) The region directly affected by the Palestinian issue, including Egypt and Jordan, which speak of dangers to their national security. The situation is more complex in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, due to the multiplicity of parties and fragmentation of internal fronts as a result of the rise of non-state actors and semi-state actors. This rise is happening at the expense of the role and presence of the national state.
This isn’t the first time Jordan has escalated its diplomatic and political rhetoric against the Israeli war on Gaza, calling for a ceasefire and condemning military operations. Similar stances were taken in previous conflicts with Gaza. However, this time, Jordan’s language has been notably more forceful and vehement in denouncing Israel’s actions, with significant escalation from King Abdullah himself and the Foreign Minister, Ayman Safadi. Safadi’s continuous efforts and unprecedented (in Jordanian terms) diplomatic confrontation with Israel were instrumental in drafting the United Nations resolution (number A/ES-10/L.25), calling for an immediate ceasefire.
Additionally, the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalled its ambassador from Tel Aviv and requested the Israeli ambassador not to return to Jordan. The return of the ambassadors was made conditional on the cessation of the Israeli war on Gaza. Jordan also announced the cancellation of a summit (scheduled to be held in Amman on 18/10/2023 with U.S. President Biden, and in the presence of the Egyptian and Palestinian Presidents) due to the massacre at the Baptist Hospital.
Meanwhile, Jordan’s focus has been on the issue of the forced displacement of Palestinians. King Abdullah and Foreign affairs Minister Ayman Safadi have unequivocally rejected any scenario of Palestinian displacement to Sinai. However, the Jordanian discourse has also extended this concern to the West Bank, which is not directly involved in the current conflict.
There appears to be a strategic Jordanian reading of an Israeli project aimed at forcibly displacing the West Bank’s inhabitants to Jordan. Jordan considers the developments in Gaza as a precursor and groundwork for the West Bank situation. The demographic burden of Palestinians in the West Bank is seen as a more significant issue for Israelis, reflecting their ongoing attempts to rid the area of Palestinians, fully control the West Bank, and nullify any hope of establishing a sovereign Palestinian state.
These events and stances have raised questions among participants about the future of Jordanian-Israeli relations post-war, and how Jordan will manage its relationship with Israel, particularly following the escalation led by King Abdullah himself, who described Israel’s actions as “genocide”. Queen Rania’s statements, labeling Israel as an apartheid state, along with official positions expressed by the Prime Minister, his deputy, and the Foreign Minister, also play a role in shaping this dynamic. The potential repercussions for Jordan amid escalating tensions and the continuation of the war are a concern. Key questions include:
– Will Jordan maintain its firm and explicit stance? If not, how will it backtrack, assuming the security relationship continues?
– If Jordan maintains its current position, how will it manage its relationship with the United States?
These questions highlight the complexities and potential diplomatic challenges Jordan faces in navigating its relationships with both Israel and the United States in a tense and evolving regional context.
What if the scenario of displacement from the West Bank materializes? Will Jordan prevent the entry of Palestinians coming from there? Assuming that if Jordan does not prevent their entry, it could be seen as contributing to the resolution of the Palestinian issue, and if it does prevent them, it faces a moral dilemma and humanitarian considerations imposed by the war.
Participants believe that these questions cannot be addressed by the official Jordanian authorities alone. They cannot make these decisions independently; the matter requires a national dialogue. This should be facilitated through a committee similar to the National Charter Committee, encompassing all segments of the country. The decision should be a national one, clarifying the implications and costs and not attributing responsibility to any specific party. This approach would ensure a more comprehensive and inclusive handling of these critical and complex issues.
Egypt’s relationship with the Gaza Strip differs from its connection with the broader Palestinian territories. For successive Egyptian governments and key decision-making institutions like the Presidency, and the military and security establishments, the Gaza Strip is a national security issue. Despite limited social interaction between Egyptians and Gazans, there are deep and often tense historical and political ties, such as the relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood. The main question is how Egyptian decision-makers perceive the ongoing conflict rounds between Hamas, Israel, the Egyptian negotiations, settlements, and humanitarian aid. Some participants mentioned that Egypt had been preparing areas in Sinai before the war for the construction of industrial, investment, and tourist zones with the support of Arab Gulf countries, aimed at attracting Gazans for employment due to high unemployment and poor economic conditions in the Strip.
Another viewpoint among participants is that Egypt is managing a crisis not necessarily in one. The scenario of displacement is rejected by Egypt. The smuggling activities of weapons and individuals along the troubled border with Gaza do not necessarily indicate a political will or acceptance of a displacement scenario. However, ongoing escalation in southern Gaza, especially in Rafah, increases pressure on the Egyptian border, leading Egypt to potentially face the challenge of large gatherings at its borders through a proactive plan.
Another consideration is the lack of discourse on the post-war scenario in Gaza. The persistence of the current state of tension, violence, bloodshed, and limited humanitarian aid might push Egypt, in light of its national security interests, to confront a situation akin to Afghanistan on its borders. This could lead to increased smuggling of goods and weapons and a potential rise in radical elements. This is particularly concerning given Egypt’s previous success in quelling extremist armed groups in Sinai, raising the possibility of these dangers re-emerging.
In terms of diplomacy and foreign policy, Egypt also views Gaza as an opportunity to reassert its role in the region. The systematic marginalization of the Palestinian issue had negatively impacted Cairo’s regional influence, leading to a noticeable decline as Gulf Arab states rose in their regional roles. Through the current conflict, Egypt’s decision-makers might seek to revive Egypt’s influence by playing a more active diplomatic role.
Regarding public sentiment, there hasn’t been the same level of popular empathy as seen in other countries, despite the official stance being very close to, and possibly representative of the public’s views, the Egyptian public is certainly concerned about the Palestinian and Gaza situation, but this concern hasn’t translated into actions in the public sphere. This could be due to the overall political and economic conditions in Egypt, but it doesn’t necessarily indicate a disconnect between the official and public positions.
In the efforts for resolution, Egypt rejects the presence of international or multinational Arab or international forces. It supports the return of the Palestinian Authority to govern the Gaza Strip through two measures: firstly, encouraging the conduct of legislative and presidential elections in the near term, and secondly, initiating a Palestinian national dialogue for consensus on a Palestinian vision. This dialogue would involve the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and other active Palestinian parties, aiming to incorporate and integrate the Palestinian voice into discussions at the regional level.
Since the onset of the conflict, Syrian territory has witnessed numerous attacks by Israeli aircraft and the international coalition on vital sites claimed to be linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. The airstrikes also targeted civilian airports in Damascus and Aleppo, rendering them out of service. Conversely, Syria also serves as a launchpad for attacks by armed factions against U.S. bases in Syria and for firing rockets towards Israel.
The Syrian parties’ positions on the war in Gaza vary. The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in eastern and northeastern Syria condemned Hamas on October 7. In contrast, the Syrian political opposition, such as the Syrian Negotiations Commission, the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, and the Interim Government in northwest Syria, issued separate statements expressing solidarity with Gaza and the civilian victims. They emphasized the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002 while avoiding mention of Hamas. On the other hand, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which controls Idlib, was the most responsive, leading donation campaigns and exploiting the war in its narrative, celebrating the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation and Hamas, considering it a model in “renewing methods of confrontation.”
In Damascus, alongside the regime’s escalation of its political rhetoric against Israel and the utilization of the war in its narrative, which views conspiracy and anti-Western sentiment as key elements, the regime has avoided any actual movement on the ground. This is due to the understanding that a regional expansion of the war would not be in its favor. The regime did not express reservations about the statement of the Arab extraordinary summit, unlike Tunisia, Iraq, and Algeria, but maintained its heightened rhetoric as part of the “Resistance Axis.”
In terms of repercussions, the war might lead to an expansion of Arab normalization with Syria and efforts to engage with it to neutralize its role in the conflict. This is especially pertinent given the recent notable developments in Syrian-Arab relations, highlighted by Damascus appointing an ambassador to Riyadh.
However, with the war continuing, the situation in Syria is likely to become more fragmented. The escalation of challenges to internal security in Syria is occurring in a context where the Syrian issue is declining in international and regional priority. The crowded scene of international and regional actors involved in Syria, each with differing interests, and the entrenched role of non-state actors, both local and foreign, exacerbates the complexity and lack of a clear solution. This situation strengthens the state of intractability and the absence of a clear path to resolution.
Since the beginning of the war, discussions have been ongoing about the potential for its expansion on a regional scale or its containment within the Gaza Strip and Palestinian territories. A key determinant in this context is the Lebanese front, where Hezbollah emerges as a major player influencing the direction of the conflict.
On the Lebanese domestic front, there is a general rejection of expanding the conflict to include Lebanon, especially given Lebanon’s ongoing severe economic and financial crisis. The Lebanese economy has significantly contracted in recent years, particularly affected by the current war and the damages it has inflicted on the tourism sector; tourism is crucial for Lebanon, as it not only employs a significant workforce but also is a major source of foreign currency influx.
Additionally, the agricultural sector has suffered considerable damage, particularly with the destruction of tens of thousands of olive trees. This has resulted in the displacement of approximately 20,000 farmers from these areas, who are now seeking compensation. These economic and social challenges further emphasize Lebanon’s general reluctance to get involved in the conflict and the desire to avoid further exacerbating its already critical situation.
In Lebanon, the war and its trajectory are fundamentally linked to the country’s internal political context. So far, the conflict, particularly in southern Lebanon, appears geographically limited, a situation seemingly influenced by Hezbollah’s desire to avoid inflicting significant losses on the Israeli side, despite the substantial disparity in casualties suffered by the party compared to Israeli deaths.
Israel, on the other hand, is currently advocating for an amendment to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 from 2006. This amendment would grant international forces in southern Lebanon freedom of movement without coordination with the Lebanese army. There are indications that Israel might conduct military operations on the Lebanese front under new rules of engagement that were not in place before October 7, even if Hezbollah commits to a ceasefire. This raises questions about how Hezbollah will respond to this scenario, particularly if Hamas is forced to retreat completely to southern Gaza, suffers defeat in northern Gaza, and sees its capabilities to strike Israel diminished.
Notably in Lebanon, there has been a revival of Hamas’s role abroad post-Gaza war. The movement is attempting to extend its activities outside Palestinian territories and specifically outside Palestinian camps in Lebanon. This is achieved by capitalizing on the shifting public opinion towards Palestinian resistance, encompassing the Arab world, including Lebanon, or at least parts of its population and various communities. The focus is on resistance against Israel rather than religious conversions or confronting Arab regimes. Notably Hamas has gained dominance over the Lebanese Islamic Group affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, rearming it and reviving its military wing to participate in military operations. Through these steps, Hamas has managed to integrate the discourse of resistance within the Sunni community in Lebanon.
Since the events of October 7, Iraq has seen significant official,public, and factional engagement with the unfolding events. Responses have varied, ranging from diplomatic efforts and speeches delivered by Iraqi representatives at Arab and international forums, to demonstrations in various Iraqi cities and universities.
Armed factions have carried out attacks on bases hosting U.S. forces, some of which are on advisory missions as part of the international coalition against ISIS in both Iraqi and Syrian regions. These actions include targeting the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, an act described by the Iraqi Prime Minister as a “terrorist” act.
Approximately 10 days after the events of October 7th, Iraqi factions began targeting U.S. bases with rockets and drones as a reaction to the Baptist Hospital incident and in response to Washington’s support for Tel Aviv in the war on Gaza. Although these attacks resulted only in injuries to dozens of soldiers, most of whom returned to service, the U.S. forces retaliated by targeting faction sites, resulting in the deaths of more than ten members and injuring dozens. This situation posed a significant challenge for the government of Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani, testing its ability to navigate a dilemma that his predecessors failed to resolve: creating a balance between the interests of the factions and Iraq’s external relations.
The stance of armed factions in Iraq has been divided between those who limited their response to propaganda and media mobilization and those who engaged in military attacks on bases hosting U.S. forces, using drones, rockets, and targeting the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Notably, the factions that adopted the propaganda and media approach are more involved in the political process and are part of the governing coalition in Iraq, such as the Badr Organization and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. It was apparent from their positions and the challenging conditions they set for engaging in military activity that they were not interested in escalating the situation. This reluctance is due to several internal considerations, including preserving the political gains achieved under the Sudan government, maintaining economic interests amidst Iraq’s dollar crisis, and their ongoing participation in the provincial council elections scheduled for December 18. Initially, they even saw organizing demonstrations on the Iraqi-Jordanian border as a way to morally justify their stance to their supporters, despite having other open fronts towards Palestine.
On the other hand, the most prominent factions choosing confrontation, like Hezbollah Al-Nujaba, are less or not at all involved in the ruling coalition. While some, such as the Iraqi Hezbollah Brigades, have a number of deputies in the Iraqi parliament, they have a significant record of cross-border armed activity and extensive economic interests in Iraq, but naturally, they do not seek political gains like the others. This division in reactions has sparked charged debates among the armed factions about the identity of “resistance” in Iraq and its representation. This has even led to media exchanges between these factions, although not explicitly naming each other. Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, indirectly hinted that the strikes by armed factions were trivial!
These events place the government of Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani at a crossroads. Amid the heated political landscape, there’s a risk of being unable to control the security situation and the expansion of the conflict area, a dilemma that is not unique to his administration but has been recurrent for his predecessors. However, in Al Sudani’s first year, this issue was temporarily halted due to the pragmatism practiced by the factions involved in the ruling coalition; they did not want to jeopardize their gains and focused on internal competition with other Shiite forces, such as the Sadrist movement.
Ultimately, Iraq continues to face the challenge of integrating armed factions into official security apparatuses and restricting their arms to state control. The factions, whether fully involved, partially involved, or not involved in the political process, have yet to adopt state-like behavior. Their current conciliatory behavior could change at any moment if their gains are threatened, and they are still not prepared to relinquish their arms or operate within the state framework.
The events of October 7th have created a murky landscape for the future of the Palestinian cause and an unclear vision for the regional future. Discussing a peace process amidst the ongoing war and Israeli intentions seems premature, particularly as one of Israel’s primary goals through its military operation is to restore deterrence as a key element in its national security. This aim, combined with a lack of serious American interest in radically changing its stance on the war or challenging Israel, and the approach of the presidential elections, makes the situation more complex. The Palestinian context is also not ready for such a process due to the eroding legitimacy of the current Palestinian Authority and the lack of a unified vision among Palestinian factions, alongside an absence of any strong Arab insistence on a peaceful political solution for the Palestinians.
The scenario of displacement remains a possibility despite the lessons of the Nakba and the firm rejection by Egypt and Jordan. Yet, Israel has so far created a humanitarian situation that could force Palestinians to consider this option. The presence or exit of a significant population bloc from the sector could determine the future direction of the Palestinian issue. The most likely scenario to date is the continuation of the conflict and tension, with ongoing Israeli military operations and Palestinian factions continuing to defend amidst a large population.
Regionally, the impact of the war on Gaza varies. Although recent events have put the Palestinian issue back on the front of the international and regional agendas, the level of impact seems more limited among parties most engaged with the Palestinian issue. They range between those who see these events as an opportunity to play a larger regional role and those who see them as entrenching a state of intractability. However, these parties sense an imminent danger to their national security due to the war.
The current events represent a critical juncture for the future of non-state actors amid the fragility of the national state in the Arab region. If Hamas manages to survive the post-war period, it will strengthen such actors, especially semi-state ones with military and governance wings. In contrast, a defeat could have significant repercussions for Palestinians and the region. These actors often focus their narrative on sacrifice against the demonization of the state, attributing defeat to it. This coincides with a renewed Arab consciousness among the new generation regarding the Palestinian issue