“Monopolizing Arms” in Iraq: Official Promises versus the Capacity to Implement

The Iraqi government has recently intensified its rhetoric about its intention to “restrict arms to the state” once the withdrawal of the US-led international coalition forces from Iraq is completed by September 30 of this year, alongside Baghdad’s repeated rejection of Iraq being used as a launchpad for attacks on regional states or as an arena for proxy war. These statements and pledges, made by Prime Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces Ali al-Zaidi—echoing similar promises made by his predecessors—come amid ongoing attacks carried out by armed Iraqi factions targeting sites both inside Iraq and in neighboring states.

It was notable that Saudi Arabia, for the first time, acknowledged striking military positions inside Iraq belonging to armed factions/the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in coordination with the US Central Command (CENTCOM), in response to attacks on Saudi energy facilities and on US forces stationed in the Middle East. Those strikes reportedly killed armed operatives, Iranian advisors, and a member of Yemen’s Houthi Ansar Allah movement, in addition to damaging logistical sites and weapons depots. Yet the significance of these developments extends beyond that single strike: it reflects the broader predicament Iraq faces in managing its security file and its relations with its regional environment, amid warnings reportedly received by Baghdad from Arab neighbors such as Jordan and Syria about the possibility of taking steps similar to Riyadh’s, following information suggesting intentions to target their territories from within Iraq.

Since the start of the US-Israeli war on Iran, Baghdad has been navigating a complex—though not entirely new—equation: an official government position calling for self-distancing (al-nay bi-al-nafs), a security reality in which armed factions operate according to a logic that appears to exceed the state’s capacity to control the pace of events, and regional and international powers that treat Iraq as part of their own security and strategic calculations. This naturally affects how the state responds to its domestic and external environment, with all the opportunities and challenges that entails.

Iran views Iraq as a final stronghold for its strategic project and as the vital artery sustaining its relations with allies and proxies across the region—one that has supported Tehran through periods of isolation and economic siege. The United States, for its part, which wields sensitive political and economic leverage, recognizes the importance of the more than 1,500-kilometer border between Iraq and Iran, and understands that neutralizing Iran regionally requires dismantling its presence within Iraq at every level, before integrating Iraq into regional projects—whether with Syria and Turkey, or later with the Arab Gulf states.

Amid the repeated efforts undertaken by Iraqi authorities, a fundamental problem lies first in defining which actors are actually implicated in uncontrolled weapons. Although the Iraqi actors most involved in the region’s ongoing war are those affiliated with what is known as the “Islamic Resistance,” US strikes—and now Saudi strikes as well—have targeted numerous brigades affiliated with the PMF. This stems from the structure of Iraq’s security and military apparatus and the dilemma of dual function and composite identity: the PMF is, on one hand, an official institution that merged with the Iraqi Armed Forces in 2016, while on the other hand, Resistance factions act as actors operating beyond state authority, affiliated with the Iran-led “Axis of Resistance” in the region. Figures from these factions hold senior positions within PMF leadership yet consider themselves not bound by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, with some openly declaring doctrinal allegiance to Iran’s Supreme Leader. Alongside these are so-called “shadow” or “front” factions—as researchers term them—whose founders and command hierarchies remain unknown, yet which claim responsibility for military attacks inside and outside Iraq.

It is worth noting that the demand to “restrict arms to the state” is also a domestic Iraqi demand, one that emerged clearly during the 2019 “Tishreen uprising,” against the backdrop of accusations that armed factions targeted protesters, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of injuries, alongside repeated encroachments on state sovereignty and influence that appeared deeply entrenched within political, economic, and security institutions. It is likewise an international and regional demand, one linked to the threats posed by weapons operating outside the framework of the state in Iraq, as well as to the broader confrontation with Iran, given the military and security role these factions are accused of playing in directing attacks against regional states and managing extensive cross-border smuggling operations.

Beyond this, Baghdad’s position remains unclear regarding US demands that go beyond simply halting factional attacks, extending toward calls for dissolving the PMF structure itself—understood as absorbing the factions currently operating under the PMF umbrella into Iraq’s formal security institutions, rather than maintaining an “independent” official body that not only commands armed personnel but has also built a network of political, economic, and social interests and plays both domestic and regional roles. The PMF system “inside” Iraq rests on several pillars:

• Security-military: Some of these factions operate under what is known as the “Islamic Resistance,” while simultaneously using the PMF—as an official government body affiliated with the Armed Forces—as official cover and a source of material support.
• Political: The political arms of many of these factions form part of Iraq’s ruling Coordination Framework. As guardians of the status quo, these factions grant their affiliated parties significant influence over domestic and foreign policy decisions, ministerial administration, and control of state imports and exports.
• Economic: The factions manage an extensive network of economic interests, running projects through major companies and smuggling operations, alongside economic offices in a number of Iraqi provinces—all of which generates substantial revenue, giving them the financial capacity to manage their interests independently.
• Social: Built on a patronage system, PMF membership exceeds 250,000 personnel who draw salaries from the state treasury, making the interests of this vast number of members contingent on the survival of the PMF institution, which is currently seeking passage of a new service and retirement law.
• Ideological investment: through the deployment of sectarian rhetoric for internal mobilization, clearly evident in successive regional events in recent years, most recently the Saudi strikes.

All of this raises significant doubt about the government’s capacity either to restrict arms to the state or even to dismantle the factional system, particularly given indications that al-Zaidi appears to be adopting an approach based on “surrendering weapons in exchange for political and economic privileges.” Some armed factions playing a leading role in directing military attacks have already declared their rejection of this approach and refused to surrender their weapons, while two factions—Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali—have announced their willingness to respond to such calls, likely influenced by their engagement in political life and their desire to be removed from US sanctions lists. They are joined by Saraya al-Salam, affiliated with the leader of the Shiite National Movement, Muqtada al-Sadr.

The overall picture appears divided between two scenarios, though not evenly. The first is al-Zaidi succeeding in restricting arms to the state—contingent on the state’s ability to monopolize the use of force and impose the rule of law, amid growing concern over the possibility of a halt to financial flows into Iraq, given that Iraqi oil revenues are deposited with the US Federal Reserve, which effectively determines the volume of funds reaching Iraq. Washington has repeatedly threatened to halt this flow and impose further sanctions on Iraqi political, economic, and armed figures and entities should Baghdad fail to take serious steps to rein in factional weapons. This scenario also depends on the state’s ability to persuade armed factions to relinquish their weapons in exchange for economic and political privileges.

The second—and more likely—scenario rests on maneuvering between symbolic acceptance and outright rejection, depending on the trajectory of the war. Amid the current conflict, the Iraqi arena remains a critical space in the broader management of the war and a persistent source of concern, given Iraq’s geopolitical position and its strategic importance in the calculations of Iranian decision-makers. The maneuver thus takes the form of official commitments, limited concessions, and symbolic achievements whose actual impact on the ground falls short of official portrayals—intended to project government seriousness, secure the continued flow of hard currency into Iraq (which moves under US banking restrictions), and limit external military strikes as much as possible. Outright rejection, meanwhile, as adopted by armed factions such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Harakat al-Nujaba, among others, is premised on ensuring the withdrawal of US forces from the region, undermining Arab efforts to build bridges with Iraq, and preserving the economic gains these factions provide to Iran through certain financial channels and various mechanisms used to circumvent international sanctions.

In conclusion, the timeline set by Ali al-Zaidi—September 30, 2026—does not appear commensurate with the difficulty of the task, nor has the government presented a clear action plan or implementation mechanism for restricting and collecting weapons from the factions. This suggests that maneuvering is likely to prevail, in the hope of emerging from both the Trump-era pressure and the current regional conflict at the lowest possible cost.

Yet even if al-Zaidi’s steps receive external backing—and assuming that support proves genuine and effective, which would naturally carry weight—the file of “restricting arms to the state” is not limited to factions comprising armed personnel deployed in barracks or military detachments. It is tied to a far broader system and an intricate network of domestic and regional interests, making its dismantlement an exceptionally complex process requiring gradualism and sustained effort. Should the al-Zaidi government fail, this would expose Iraq to further regional and international pressure. The overarching task lies in the state’s ability to subject these factions to its authority; failing to monopolize domestic security decision-making leaves Iraq trapped in a cycle of attrition, unable to manage the fallout of its highly sensitive geopolitical position, perpetually exposed to external targeting, and incapable of controlling the rhythm of its own internal affairs.