The Pragmatic Infiltration of Left-Ideology States

Many observers of the ongoing war between Iran, the United States, and Israel have been questioning the positions of China and Russia-to which one may add the position of Vietnam. Yet the prevailing Arab political culture-often adorned with notions such as honor, solidarity, and standing with the “just cause”-reflects a persistent conflation between political values and individual moral values, making it difficult to transcend this perspective.

The situation becomes even more complex when viewed through the prism of the ideological legacy-particularly the Marxist tradition-shaped by slogans such as those of Mao Zedong, who famously described imperialism as a “paper tiger,” the declaration by Nikita Khrushchev that “we will bury you,” and the revolutionary calls of Ho Chi Minh emphasizing the inevitability of supporting oppressed peoples. Yet these three states have undergone profound transformations in their hierarchies of values, most notably through the gradual infiltration of a pragmatic outlook that measures the validity of ideas not by their ethical coherence but by the practical benefits they generate.

All three countries maintain both legal and practical recognition of Israel and sustain multifaceted relations with it across various sectors, despite the fact that Israel itself is widely regarded as a product of imperial geopolitical processes. Jewish migration from Russia to Palestine continued during both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. Russian cooperation in the region has even reached the level of strategic bargaining-particularly regarding the Syrian political order and the preservation of Russian military bases. Israel also occupies a strategically significant position within China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Meanwhile, Vietnam-associated historically with figures such as Vo Nguyen Giap-ranks among the leading purchasers of Israeli weaponry.

In practice, these states have set aside ideological commitments in favor of direct strategic benefit, even when such calculations unfold against the backdrop of the Palestinian tragedy. Indeed, all three rank among the lowest contributors globally in terms of financial assistance to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and other international organizations supporting Palestinians.

Consequently, inquiries about the positions of Russia, China, and Vietnam in the war involving Iran often rely on a historical memory saturated with ideological expectations. Yet China’s “Four Modernizations,” institutionalized during the reforms following the Eleventh Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, symbolically captured this transformation through the well-known maxim associated with Deng Xiaoping: “It does not matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.” In Russia, from the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev onward, pragmatic orientations have deepened steadily. Even the Russian geopolitical theorist Alexander Dugin tends to view Iran primarily through the lens of strategic utility within broader geopolitical struggles-particularly the contest with maritime powers and the consolidation of a Eurasian geopolitical bloc.

Dugin’s contacts with certain Jewish movements since the late 1990s-including networks associated with Israeli political circles-illustrate the pragmatic flexibility underpinning these geopolitical calculations. Likewise, he has expressed understanding toward the Turkish position regarding Israel, arguing that Turkey’s strategic interests often outweigh purely ideological or religious considerations-once again reinforcing a pragmatic interpretation of international conflicts.

Vietnam offers another instructive example. Long regarded as an inspirational model by various Arab political elites, Vietnam nevertheless recognized Israel in 1993, despite its full awareness that the state had emerged on Palestinian land and at the expense of Palestinian national rights. Since that recognition, economic, technological, and military cooperation between Israel and Vietnam has expanded steadily, culminating in the signing of a bilateral free trade agreement in 2024.

At the same time, these three countries maintain constructive relations with Iran. Vietnam opened its embassy in Tehran in 1997-more than eighteen years after the Iranian Revolution, despite having recognized the revolution earlier. China and Russia likewise maintain advanced and multifaceted relations with Iran, including participation in various geopolitical frameworks. Iran has even been accused of supplying drones to Russia during the ongoing war in Ukraine.

What, then, does this signify?

The behavior of these three states can largely be explained through what may be termed “de-hyphenation diplomacy”-a strategy grounded in pragmatic calculation. This diplomatic approach, frequently discussed among Indian strategic thinkers, prioritizes the preservation of interests with competing actors simultaneously, rejecting the sacrifice of one relationship for the sake of moral or ideological alignment. For example, India maintains extensive labor ties with the Gulf states-hosting nearly 9.5 million workers in the region-while simultaneously cultivating close relations with Israel and sustaining cooperation with Iran.

Applied to Russia, China, and Vietnam, this approach implies a deliberate effort to avoid sacrificing relations with Israel in favor of Iran, while likewise refraining from jeopardizing ties with Iran for the sake of Israel. Within such a framework, traditional concepts such as international law, moral obligation, and normative justice become secondary to calculations of strategic interest.

For Arab policymakers, the implication is clear: international politics is not governed by emotional impulses of solidarity or moral valor but by carefully calibrated calculations of interest. Consequently, Arab states may need to adopt a comparable form of de-hyphenation diplomacy-guided not by emotional reflexes but by rational strategic planning. This requires organizing interests according to two central strategic principles:

First, defining Arab interests on the basis of the priorities of society and the state, rather than the narrow interests of governing regimes. While many Arab policies historically prioritize regime survival, other states place the interests of society and the state at the forefront of their strategic calculations.

Second, constructing alliances with central powers in the international system on the basis of strengthening the interests of society and the state-not merely with actors who guarantee the political survival of ruling elites regardless of the broader benefit to national development.

Such a diplomatic approach requires extraordinarily precise calculations-what Vladimir Lenin once metaphorically described as calculations conducted with the care of “counting eggs like ants.” It demands careful strategic thinking rather than the emotional outbursts of what might be called the geopolitical subconscious.