The Islamic Movement within the Sudanese Conflict: Reengineering Influence
Since the outbreak of armed confrontations between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Sudan has been experiencing a complex conflict that goes beyond a direct military struggle for power. Rather, it reflects a deeper structural crisis rooted in the nature of the state itself and its symbiotic institutional formation. While the majority of analyses focus on the two warring parties as the primary actors, such readings often overlook the role of informal actors-most notably the Sudanese Islamic Movement-which possesses a long-standing legacy of reshaping the state’s internal structure and mechanisms of governance.
Historically, the Sudanese Islamic Movement was not merely a transient symbiotic organization; rather, over more than three decades it developed into a deeply intertwined ideological and power-based network embedded within the civil, military, and security institutions of the state. This entrenchment enabled the movement to endure as an influential actor even during periods of its overt retreat from formal authority. Its political conduct has been characterized by a high degree of pragmatism and a preference for operating behind the scenes to advance its political objectives, while remaining acutely aware of the surrounding international environment. This pattern was notably evident during the 1989 coup, which in its initial days appeared to be purely military in nature-indeed, leading figures of the Islamic Movement were temporarily imprisoned to reinforce this perception-only for the movement to later reassert and reproduce its influence in subsequent phases.
To understand this role, it is necessary to revisit the nature of the Islamic Movement’s emergence. Its origins date back to 1949, when it began as small Islamic groups composed primarily of students at the University of Khartoum who had arrived from Egypt and were deeply influenced by the ideas and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood there. These groups sought to counter communist dominance within the university’s student milieu and were initially known as the Islamic Liberation Movement. In 1954, the movement underwent a significant transformation, publicly adopting the name the Muslim Brotherhood.
In practice, the Islamic Movement was not confined to religious preaching and educational activities alone; rather, it evolved into a comprehensive Islamic symbiotic project capable of active engagement in political life. The movement was neither static nor rigid, but instead functioned as a continually adaptive system. This dynamism enabled it to sustain political activity despite persistent repression, and it is precisely this characteristic that distinguished it from many other Islamic movements in different national contexts.
The Sudanese Islamic Movement crystallized through multiple organizational trajectories by establishing a series of political parties, all founded under the leadership of Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, the movement’s principal figure. These began with the Islamic Charter Front, followed by the National Islamic Front, and later the National Congress Party. In 1999, a major schism occurred, after which Hassan al-Turabi broke away from the National Congress to establish the Popular Congress Party.
Since the 1970s, the Islamic Movement had sought to gain access to power. However, Hassan al-Turabi’s reading of the Arab and international context-marked by broad resistance to Islamic rule, as evidenced in several Arab cases-led him to conclude that a conventional path to power was untenable. This assessment prompted years of strategic planning for what would later be known as the “Salvation Revolution,” executed through a military coup.
Despite the success of the coup, internal divisions within the movement emerged more rapidly than the realization of its intended objectives. Turabi, who had championed the coup, envisioned the construction of a modern Islamic state, emphasizing intellectual renewal, a free-market economy, and the empowerment of women in society. In contrast, Omar al-Bashir-whom Turabi accused of being driven primarily by a will to power-pursued a path centered on security and military dominance. Under Bashir, the project shifted from a reformist call to an authoritarian order, governing through the same coercive strategy for three decades.
Today, as the conflict in Sudan intensifies, the Islamic Movement appears to be reverting to the same tactical approach, seeking to preserve its influence within the structures of power without placing itself visibly at the forefront. In doing so, it seems to be reviving its earlier method of exercising sustained influence from behind the scenes, operating without an official or formal position yet maintaining a tangible impact on the course of events.
This paper is premised on the hypothesis that the current Sudanese conflict cannot be fully understood without considering the Islamic Movement’s attempts to reengineer its influence within the state through indirect leverage over the military and the utilization of the ideological and power-based structures it accumulated over decades of its “Islamic Empowerment” project. Accordingly, the paper aims to analyze how the Islamic Movement has repositioned itself within the ongoing conflict, deconstruct the tools it employs to shape the course of the war and decision-making processes, and anticipate the implications of this role for the future of the Sudanese state and the prospects for a transition toward a civilian-led system.
The paper adopts an analytical approach that integrates both ideological and structural power dimensions to understand the behavior of the Islamic Movement as an informal political actor, and its role in reproducing patterns of authority within the context of a fluid armed conflict.
Ideological Dimension: Examining the historical formation of the Sudanese Islamic Movement reveals that it does not fully align with the categorization of other Islamic movements. The movement began as a religiously oriented Islamic organization, bringing together university students and intellectuals, before evolving into a political Islamic organization. It later transformed into a broad network in which political, organizational, and military dimensions became deeply intertwined. The Islamic Movement perceives itself as a complement to the religious state. As noted by Mahboub Abdel Salam in his book The Sudanese Islamic Movement… Spotlight, Threads of Darkness: Reflections on the First Decade of the Salvation Revolution, Bashir’s coup-referred to as the “Salvation Revolution”-was accompanied by the phrase “the first Islamic movement to attain power in the Sunni world,” drawing a comparison with the Iranian Revolution a decade earlier, which had established a Shiite republican system. In this framework, the objectives of the Islamic Movement-or the so-called Sudanese National Islamic Congress, which seeks to secure strategic positions of power through various mechanisms regardless of prevailing circumstances and conflicts-mirror, in some ways, Iran’s strategy of penetrating African states to establish spheres of influence, effectively extending Tehran’s geopolitical reach.
The political discourse of the Sudanese Islamic Movement is marked by a strong ideological orientation. A review of the speeches of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir reveals this clearly, as he frequently described the Sudanese state as an Islamic state, using expressions such as “this state belongs to the Islamic Movement,” “the Muslim Brotherhood is present in all branches of the state,” and “we are a fully-fledged Islamic movement.” Similar language was employed by other members of the Islamic Movement within Bashir’s government to construct a narrative linking the legitimacy of authority with religious governance. This discourse reshaped political relations within the framework of a duality between the Islamic Empowerment project and its opponents in power, reflecting a Foucauldian understanding of discourse as a tool for social control and organization. Accordingly, the speeches of the movement and its leaders reflect an ideological conception of the state aimed at consolidating its presence within institutions, thereby enhancing its capacity to influence the trajectory of the conflict.
The other dimension centers on “structural authoritarianism.” The Islamic Movement pursued a tightening of control over state institutions through its Solid Structure project. Upon assuming power in 1989, the government dismissed thousands of civilian employees across public sectors, implementing what was termed the “General Reform” policy, and replaced them with personnel loyal to the Islamic Movement. This measure enabled the movement to consolidate authority from the grassroots level to the highest echelons of the state.
From the perspective of Richard Snyder, Professor of Political Science at Brown University, who identifies a set of key variables affecting all political systems-such as the president’s network, state institutions, and more-the Islamic Movement in Sudan managed over three decades to reshape the structure of the state’s political and economic institutions, business networks, charitable organizations, as well as security and military institutions. Notably, it restructured the security and intelligence apparatus according to a specific ideological framework, enhancing the regime’s capacity to manage coup threats through the redesign of military and security institutions and ensuring control over the levers of state power. In contrast, in Egypt’s bureaucratic system, the January 25 Revolution succeeded in preventing the Muslim Brotherhood from consolidating power, largely because the military remained the dominant institution. In Sudan, however, the Muslim Brotherhood has historically held significant influence within the military, forming an integral part of the movement’s long-standing network of control.
Certain indicators suggest that Islamists remain an integral part of the political-institutional environment surrounding decision-making and the decisions of Army Commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Despite losing their formal positions following the fall of the Bashir regime in 2019, the movement has reorganized its presence through administrative networks and military cadres, extending its influence and embedding itself within the environment where key decisions are made.
Recent developments-such as the reappointment of figures aligned with the Islamic current-demonstrate the potential expansion of their presence within governing institutions. First, al-Burhan reinstated several Islamists to positions of power, including Justice Minister Abdullah Mohamed al-Darif, a longtime activist in the National Islamic Congress who previously held multiple posts in Bashir’s government. Second, he restored all employees to the Constitutional Court who had been dismissed during the transitional government under Abdullah Hamdok, lifting prior sanctions against them. Additionally, al-Burhan refused to hand over wanted Islamists, including former President Omar al-Bashir, to the International Criminal Court. Finally, statements by Abdel-Hay Youssef explicitly assert the Islamic Movement’s influence over al-Burhan’s decisions, declaring that “this war is willed by God to restore the Islamic Movement’s prestige and strength.” Many Sudanese analysts and political actors interpret Youssef’s statements as a discursive indicator that certain Islamist factions perceive the conflict as an opportunity to reassert symbiotic influence. Consequently, they call on civil forces to form a political/civil alliance to limit the resurgence of Islamist power in the conflict and counter what they describe as the Islamic Movement’s strategic plan.
While al-Burhan initially agreed to the outcomes of the Djibouti summit, aimed at halting the war and enabling a political process for reconstruction, the Sudanese Foreign Ministry openly and explicitly rejected these outcomes. More recently, al-Burhan also rejected the latest proposal for a three-month ceasefire, even as the Rapid Support Forces militias approved it. This sequence of positions suggests the presence of indirect influence by networks close to the Islamic Movement on the decision-making margins of the military institution.
Within this context, the Islamic Movement faces organizational challenges and internal divisions as it seeks to reconstruct itself as an effective political force. These divisions are primarily split between two factions: the first, based in Turkey, includes Omar al-Bashir, Ahmed Haroun, and a group associated with Ali Karti; the second, headquartered in Sudan, is led by Mohamed Atta. Although both factions share the overarching objectives of the war, their tactical disagreements have created internal rifts that affect all decision-making processes. Consequently, the conflict may either lead to the complete fragmentation of the movement or further exacerbate divisions within Sudan. Moreover, the movement has increasingly relied on its security forces-many of whom are sanctioned by the United States-over political figures. The Islamic Movement continues to struggle with the gap between theory and practice; its cadres’ lack of practical political experience, despite their military and religious influence, has resulted in confusion in the management of state institutions.
Conclusion
Sudan is currently at a critical juncture, as attempts to reintegrate the Islamic Movement under the auspices of the Sudanese military threaten the fragile prospect of building a modern civilian state. Over the past thirty years, the movement has failed to maintain state cohesion; instead, divisions and conflicts have deepened, compounded by economic and social deterioration. The problem does not lie in the movement’s approach to seizing power per se, but in its management of state institutions: it remains confined to ideological discourse and military-security dominance, lacking practical political and diplomatic expertise. Undoubtedly, al-Burhan’s continued maneuvers with the Islamic Movement in the international arena risk exposing the country to further sanctions, political isolation, and internal collapse, potentially reproducing elements of the previous governance model-militarization, securitization, and political exclusion-with its attendant economic and social costs.
Accordingly, the Islamic Movement views the current ceasefire as an opportunity for international actors-the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE-to sideline the Sudanese military from power. This would effectively end the Islamic Empowerment project, posing a direct threat to the long-established position of Islamists. The movement perceives the ongoing conflict as a strategic chance to reposition itself and reassert its influence within the structures of authority.