Asaad al-Shibani’s Visit to Beirut: Toward a Redefinition of Syrian–Lebanese Relations
The visit of Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani to Beirut in October 2025 marked a pivotal political moment in the trajectory of relations between the two countries. It was not a conventional diplomatic visit; rather, it represented the first practical test of the evolving relationship between the “new Syria” and Lebanon after two decades of transformation and discontinuity.
The visit carried multiple layers of meaning. On the symbolic level, it signified a renewed recognition between two official institutions that had long been divided politically yet bound by geography. On the practical level, it reflected a shared will to move beyond a period defined by mistrust and the heavy historical memory that accompanied years of estrangement.
Since the fall of the former regime in Damascus and the rise of President Ahmad al-Shar‘a’s administration, the Syrian leadership has adopted an approach centered on gradually restoring its network of regional relations through formal state institutions rather than security intermediaries. Within this framework, Lebanon has been designated as “the neighbor that cannot be circumvented”—a country whose inclusion is indispensable in any process of internal or regional stabilization.
This shift in Syrian conduct reflects more than a tactical adjustment; it stems from Damascus’s broader need to rebuild its Arab and regional ties after years of isolation, coupled with a growing awareness that Lebanon constitutes a vital political and economic gateway to the wider world. Conversely, Lebanon has viewed Syria’s renewed openness as an opportunity to contain its own escalating security and social crises—chief among them the refugee issue and the economic challenges linked to porous borders, rampant smuggling, and administrative disorder.
Unlike the largely ceremonial visits that had characterized bilateral relations in the past, al-Shibani’s trip to Beirut was conducted under a clear mandate from the Syrian president and a focused agenda built around three principal issues: addressing the situation of Syrian detainees in Lebanese prisons, organizing security and border cooperation, and formulating a political–administrative mechanism for the return of refugees.
The discussions held in Beirut between the Syrian delegation on one side and Lebanese President Joseph Aoun, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, several ministers, and senior security officials on the other were marked by a calm and precise tone. Al-Shibani was careful to emphasize that Damascus sought no influence over Lebanese decision-making; its primary objective, he asserted, was to establish a “cooperative” relationship that would serve the mutual interests of both states.
This approach received a measured welcome from the Lebanese leadership, which viewed the visit as an opportunity to address long-standing issues within a clearly institutionalized framework that defined responsibilities and commitments—moving away from the reactive and emotive discourse that had dominated earlier exchanges.
On the issue of Syrian detainees, al-Shibani expressed his country’s readiness to sign a bilateral judicial agreement allowing for the exchange of convicted prisoners and the settlement of cases involving detainees who do not pose a security threat. He presented updated lists of detainees’ names and proposed the establishment of a joint judicial committee to implement the agreement gradually.
Lebanon, for its part, responded positively in principle, driven by humanitarian and economic considerations related to overcrowding in prisons and the administrative costs of managing the detainee file. Concerning borders and smuggling, both sides agreed on a field-level cooperation plan between the relevant agencies, including real-time information sharing and the creation of a joint coordination room to monitor unauthorized border crossings. During the discussions, a shared awareness emerged that smuggling had evolved beyond an illicit economic activity into an integrated system that now constitutes a direct threat to national security in both countries.
On the refugee issue, the Syrian side proposed a “Safe Voluntary Return” program, affirming that Damascus was prepared to receive successive groups of refugees, provided the process was managed directly between the two governments without external interference.
In addition to these three files, the meetings addressed the reactivation of economic cooperation—particularly in transport, energy, and trade. The Syrian delegation suggested reopening border crossings to restore Lebanese transit routes toward Jordan, Iraq, and the Gulf, as well as reactivating the cross-border electricity line. This dimension was interpreted as an “economic incentive” tied to the success of subsequent political understandings.
The Syrian delegation also raised a highly sensitive issue concerning the movements of certain security and business figures associated with the former regime who currently reside in Lebanon. These individuals are accused of reorganizing financial and security networks in coordination with factions of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Reports of their meetings and movements in Beirut and the Beqaa Valley have aroused serious concerns that such groups might be reactivated within Syrian territory—particularly in the coastal region and Homs—in an effort to destabilize the country’s internal security. This message carried a dual intent: a warning to Lebanon about the need to contain such activities, and a political reminder that Damascus closely monitors Lebanese developments and regards any negligence in this matter as an infringement upon its national security.
The deepest meaning of Asaad al-Shibani’s visit lies in the transition of Lebanese–Syrian relations from the realm of memory to that of reality. For years, official Lebanon had avoided direct engagement with Damascus, fearing both international and domestic backlash. This time, however, Beirut tested a different approach—one based on administrative coordination rather than political alignment.
Syria, for its part, presented itself for the first time as a state seeking to rebuild trust with Lebanon, distancing itself from the language of dominance and coercion that had long characterized the relationship.
At its core, the visit represented a political experiment—an examination of intentions: Could Beirut manage its relationship with Damascus within the bounds of national interest without succumbing to external or internal pressures? And could Damascus, in turn, treat Lebanon as a fully sovereign partner rather than a subordinate entity?
One of the most striking aspects of the meetings was the transformation of language. The old vocabulary—phrases like “Syrian national security” and “one people in two states”—was notably absent. In its place appeared new terms such as “institutional complementarity” and “shared interests.” This shift in discourse does not necessarily signal a complete change in practice, but it does reflect an evolution in perception: both sides now recognize that the cost of ongoing tension has become higher than that of managing the relationship within defined limits.
This renewed opening faces a series of intertwined challenges. The first is Lebanon’s internal political fragmentation, which constrains the government’s capacity to advance any meaningful understanding with Damascus. Some factions argue that engaging Syria prematurely could destabilize the fragile domestic balance, while others view coordination with Damascus as an unavoidable security and economic necessity.
The second challenge concerns the absence of a comprehensive legal framework following the expiration of the mandate of the former Lebanese–Syrian Higher Council. Current relations thus unfold without an institutional umbrella, rendering any agreements vulnerable to political suspension or obstruction, even if they are managed directly by the relevant ministries and agencies.
The third challenge lies within the sensitive files themselves—most notably the refugee issue, which requires a stable Syrian environment and massive logistical capacity that neither country currently possesses. Consequently, any organized return will remain contingent upon regional and international support that neither Beirut nor Damascus can shoulder alone.
Despite these constraints, the visit succeeded in repositioning the relationship onto an administrative track capable of gradual development. If the joint committees achieve tangible progress—particularly in the detainee file or in securing border crossings—this would suffice to consolidate the trust necessary for deeper cooperation. Conversely, failure or delay could revive the old negative discourse, in which each side perceives the other as a source of threat rather than a partner in stability.
Ultimately, Asaad al-Shibani’s visit to Beirut embodied a blend of realism and symbolism, laying the foundations for a relationship potentially distinct from that which governed the two countries in past decades. Damascus—redefining itself as a state emerging from division and war—has chosen Beirut as the first laboratory for its new regional posture. Lebanon, striving to assert its sovereignty amid delicate internal balances, now regards Syria as the neighbor that cannot be ignored but also cannot be re-embraced in the old way.
The visit did not close the files; rather, it opened the door to a new phase defined by the management of complexity rather than its evasion. Lebanese–Syrian relations will not return to what they once were—but they will not remain as they are either. They are entering a stage of “long testing,” in which both countries will be measured by their capacity to act with the logic of statecraft rather than the memory of conflict.