Al-Sharaa’s Visit to Moscow: A Path of Normalization and a New Russian-Syrian Strategy
The visit of Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa to Moscow and his meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on October 15, 2025, generated widespread discussion and debate about its underlying motives and political implications. The timing was particularly significant, coming at a critical geopolitical juncture for both Syria and the wider region. The visit coincided with an accelerating Arab and international normalization process with Damascus and a gradual recognition of the legitimacy of the current transitional government. It also took place less than two weeks after the tenth anniversary of Russia’s military intervention in Syria, rekindling debates about the enduring legacy of that intervention and its far-reaching consequences for Syria’s present political landscape.
The visit’s symbolic and strategic weight, combined with its sensitive timing, raised questions regarding the true agenda behind both Moscow and Damascus. Central among these were inquiries into the future of bilateral relations and Russia’s role in Syria’s upcoming transitional phase. Within this context, the issue of handing over Bashar al-Assad and remaining figures of the former regime dominated both popular and political discussions surrounding the visit—part of a broader debate concerning transitional justice and the extent of Russia’s involvement in shaping new political and regional arrangements after more than a decade of conflict.
The visit can be analyzed from two interrelated perspectives—Russian and Syrian. From the Russian viewpoint, the Kremlin appears eager to reassert its influence in the Syrian arena following a period of relative decline, largely due to its preoccupation with the war in Ukraine and the ensuing economic and political fallout. This retrenchment had allowed other actors—regional powers such as Turkey and international players like the United States—to expand their roles in managing the Syrian file. For Moscow, therefore, the visit represented an opportunity to reposition itself as an indispensable actor in determining Syria’s future trajectory.
“Damascus seeks a balanced partnership with Moscow rather than dependency, while Russia strives to consolidate its influence despite its relative decline.”
From the Syrian side, the visit appears to represent an attempt to redefine the relationship with Moscow in light of the profound transformations that followed the collapse of the Assad regime and the rise of the new transitional government led by Ahmad al-Sharaa. Today, Damascus seeks to balance its relations among international and regional powers and to transition from the dependency relationship institutionalized under Assad toward a more reciprocal and pragmatic partnership based on mutual interests rather than mere political and military protection. In this sense, the meeting with President Putin can be viewed as an early test of the emerging framework of Syrian-Russian relations, and of Moscow’s willingness to accommodate Syria’s evolving role and position within the region’s shifting alliance system.
Redefining the Moscow–Damascus Relationship
The military agreements between Syria and Russia have long served as the cornerstone of Russia’s enduring presence on Syrian soil. They have profoundly altered regional power balances and redrawn the map of influence in the Middle East. The Hmeimim Agreement, signed in August 2015, granted Moscow the right to use the airbase in Latakia province without charge or time limitation, accompanied by full customs and tax exemptions and comprehensive diplomatic immunity for Russian personnel and assets. This effectively transformed the base into a central command hub for Russian military operations in both Syria and the wider region.[1]
This military foothold was later reinforced by another accord in January 2017, which granted Russia use of the Tartus naval port for a renewable 49-year period. Together, the Hmeimim Airbase and Tartus Naval Facility became strategic pillars of Russia’s military deployment in the Eastern Mediterranean, serving as permanent gateways for Moscow’s projection of power and influence within regional security dynamics.
Historically, Syrian-Russian relations have been characterized by depth and complexity, dating back to the 1950s, when the Soviet Union emerged as Damascus’s principal political and military ally against Western influence. Yet the defining shift occurred with the Russian military intervention of 2015, initiated at Iran’s request, which rescued the Assad regime from imminent collapse but, in turn, cemented Syria’s near-total dependency on Moscow. Russia became the regime’s economic and political lifeline, its primary supplier of arms, grain, and oil, and a key destination for Syrian educational exchanges—gradually transforming Moscow from an ally into a de facto custodian of Syrian decision-making.
Although both capitals sought to institutionalize their alliance through processes such as the Astana talks (2018), the fall of the Assad regime in late 2024 opened the door to a comprehensive reassessment of the relationship. The new government under Ahmad al-Sharaa now aims to pursue a more balanced foreign policy, recognizing Russia’s strategic importance while also striving to reduce subordination to its dominance and redefine the partnership on sovereign and mutually beneficial terms.
Finally, al-Sharaa’s recent visit to Moscow can be viewed as the culmination of a long sequence of reciprocal diplomatic initiatives between Syrian and Russian delegations, laying the groundwork for new principles of normalization between Moscow and Syria’s transitional government. This comes after a period of quiet tension, during which interactions between the two sides markedly declined following the regime’s fall—characterized by the absence of joint projects, minimal diplomatic contact, and a notable cooling in bilateral engagement.
“Russia recalibrates the balance of power in the South and North to secure its presence as a stabilizing force, while Damascus pragmatically capitalizes on this role without direct confrontation.”
From the February 2025 phone call between Presidents Putin and al-Sharaa, to Foreign Minister al-Shaybani’s visit to Moscow on July 31, followed by the official visit of the Russian Deputy Prime Minister to Damascus on September 9, and finally the October 2 meeting between the Syrian Chief of Staff and a Russian military delegation, al-Sharaa’s visit represented the culmination of a gradual, carefully engineered diplomatic process. Moscow had initially been expected to host the Arab–Russian Summit, but the event was postponed to November following the Gaza ceasefire agreement, adding a regional dimension to the visit and underscoring Russia’s rising role in Arab and Syrian affairs. However, according to the state-backed RIA Novosti, several Western outlets interpreted the delay as evidence of Moscow’s weakening regional position, citing Arab leaders’ reluctance to attend—particularly after Trump’s perceived success in Gaza—which paradoxically gave al-Sharaa’s visit added importance as a showcase of Russia’s enduring political presence and coordination capacity in the region.[2]
The New Security Architecture: The South, the SDF, and Power Balances
The security–military portfolio dominated the agenda of al-Sharaa’s visit, consistent with the security-oriented nature of the preparatory meetings that preceded it. The talks are believed to have focused primarily on the future of Russian bases in Syria, the training and modernization of the Syrian army, and the revitalization of the national defense structure. Indirectly, the discussions likely also addressed broader regional security concerns, including the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), southern Syria, and Israel.
At the forefront was the issue of Russia’s two strategic bases—Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia and the Tartus Naval Facility.[3] These sites carry critical geopolitical significance as Russia’s only permanent military footholds beyond its immediate borders, aligned with its self-image as an Eurasian power seeking to reshape global and regional power equilibria.[4] Losing these assets would mean a sharp decline in Moscow’s influence in the Mediterranean and would undermine its status as a global power with access to warm waters and key maritime routes.
While Moscow is determined to retain these bases,[5] it faces the challenge of managing its presence amid regional competitors—chiefly Israel and Turkey—while preserving its interests without direct confrontation. Both Damascus and Ankara appear generally unopposed to Russia’s continued presence, whereas Ukraine and Germany have publicly called for the expulsion of Russian forces.[6] Interestingly, reports suggest that Israel urged Washington not to pressure Russia to abandon its Syrian positions, viewing Moscow as a counterbalance to Turkish influence.[7]
In southern Syria, several reports indicated that Moscow was exploring new security arrangements,[8] potentially involving the redeployment of Russian military police to deter Israeli operations and the rejection of Tel Aviv’s proposal for a large demilitarized buffer zone. Such measures would position Russia as a security guarantor in any future settlement involving Israel.
These moves came in response to intensified Israeli incursions aimed at imposing new security realities in Quneitra and Daraa, exploiting local fragmentation to expand influence at Syria’s expense. Moscow’s diplomatic stance,[9] however, has consistently emphasized respect for state sovereignty—in contrast to U.S. and European tolerance of Israeli strikes under the pretext of curbing Iranian influence and neutralizing Islamist militant threats, particularly following Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham’s rise to power.
Nevertheless, Russia’s policy remains highly pragmatic: it avoids direct confrontation with Israel and relies on the 2018 de-confliction mechanism, which has since prevented air incidents and facilitated operational coordination. This arrangement has made the Russian presence in southern Syria acceptable—even beneficial—from Israel’s perspective, as it contributes to stability and border control.[10] For Moscow, it provides strategic flexibility, while for the Syrian government, it offers a pragmatic security buffer—leveraging Russia’s mediating role to manage the southern front without sliding into direct confrontation with Israel.
In northeastern Syria, Russia’s footprint remains limited in scale but strategically decisive. Concentrated mainly around Qamishli and its environs, Russian forces operate an airbase and several coordination points that enable direct communication with the SDF and facilitate security understandings among Ankara, Damascus, and Kurdish forces.
Although Turkey maintains the largest foreign military presence in northern Syria—deploying over 20,000 troops across 100+ sites—Russia serves as the main guarantor of equilibrium, particularly as Iran’s influence wanes and U.S. involvement steadily diminishes. The SDF, in turn, views Moscow as a potential strategic alternative in the event of an American withdrawal, while Russia uses these ties as a negotiating instrument, reinforcing its role as a regional arbiter capable of managing tensions without direct confrontation.
A particularly notable aspect of the visit was al-Sharaa’s request for Russian military training programs for the Syrian army—even as Turkey currently leads similar initiatives. This reflects a deliberate balancing act: integrating both Russian and Turkish expertise while maintaining strategic flexibility. The move signals Damascus’s pragmatic approach to rebuilding its armed forces—linking national sovereignty with selective engagement of external support.[11]
Syria’s defensive infrastructure and armament systems, largely developed and maintained by Russia, also featured prominently in the discussions. These systems form the backbone of Syria’s deterrent capacity, offering high operational readiness without costly new investments—an essential advantage amid ongoing Western sanctions. By relying on Russian defense frameworks, Damascus can sustain military efficiency while mitigating economic and political vulnerabilities.
As the military dimension of Russian–Syrian relations gradually recedes, the center of gravity in their partnership is shifting from battlefield coordination to political management. Russia’s influence is no longer measured solely by its troops or bases in Hmeimim and Tartus but increasingly by its capacity to shape Syria’s sovereignty, justice process, and post-war legitimacy.
Thus, Moscow’s role is evolving from that of a security guarantor to a political stakeholder, making the upcoming political files—especially transitional justice and the fate of former regime figures—the true test of the new Russian–Syrian partnership.
Justice and Sovereignty: Testing the Russian–Syrian Partnership After Assad
The most sensitive and high-profile issue during al-Sharaa’s visit was undoubtedly the question of handing over the deposed president Bashar al-Assad and members of his former regime within the broader transitional justice framework. Both Syrian society and the international community are demanding tangible progress in this process.[12]
Moscow looms as a decisive actor in shaping this stage. According to a Syrian government source cited by Agence France-Presse, President al-Sharaa was expected during his first visit to Russia to formally request the extradition of Bashar al-Assad and those implicated in war crimes—a symbolic yet momentous step signaling Syria’s determination to close the chapter of authoritarianism and redefine its sovereignty through justice.
“The Assad Extradition File Tests the New Government’s Independence and Moscow’s Position Between Interests and Legitimacy”
This issue represents one of the most delicate and politically charged files in Russian–Syrian relations following the regime’s collapse. It places Moscow before a complex equation—between safeguarding its strategic interests and maintaining its image as a loyal ally on one side, and accommodating the new legitimacy in Damascus and responding to international pressures on the other.
For Russia, Bashar al-Assad’s person no longer constitutes a strategic priority after the downfall of his regime. What truly matters is the preservation of its political and military foothold in Syria and the continuity of long-term agreements concluded over the past decade. Yet, extraditing Assad would undermine Moscow’s credibility as a protector of its allies, potentially unsettling other partners who view Russia as a shield against Western intervention. Consequently, Moscow is expected to pursue a policy of calculated procrastination—formally endorsing the principles of transitional justice while circumventing any direct accountability for former regime figures.
For the new Syrian government under Ahmad al-Sharaa, raising the extradition issue during his Moscow visit serves as a litmus test for national independence and legitimacy. Domestically, it signals a definitive rupture with the legacy of the previous regime; internationally, it aims to attract diplomatic and financial support by demonstrating a credible commitment to justice and accountability. Within this context, Russia attempts to position itself as a mediator, not an obstructer, of transitional justice—proposing political compromise formulas that balance justice and stability, such as a negotiated political exit for Assad in exchange for international immunity guarantees. However, this balancing act remains fragile, as Moscow’s ultimate position will depend on Western pressures and potential gains from the new government. Thus, the Assad file has effectively become a major bargaining chip in Moscow’s efforts to secure its influence and shape Syria’s post-war order according to its strategic calculus.
Despite the prominence of this issue, al-Sharaa’s visit notably omitted any reference to Russia’s documented violations, including aerial bombardments and destruction of Syrian towns that killed thousands of civilians.[13] This omission reflects Damascus’s pragmatic prioritization of restoring strategic cooperation with Moscow, while relying on Russia as a partner capable of mitigating sanctions and securing supportive positions in the UN Security Council. Al-Sharaa’s broader diplomatic objective is to reintegrate Syria into the international arena, leveraging Moscow’s backing to remove his government from terrorism watchlists and facilitate economic normalization.
Yet, no sustainable Russian–Syrian rapprochement can be achieved without serious engagement with transitional justice. This file remains the foundation for rebuilding trust between the state and society and for addressing the legacy of war crimes and external interventions, including Russia’s own. Failure to advance this process risks undermining domestic stability, eroding institutional credibility, and fueling social resentment, while also jeopardizing Syria’s ability to attract reconstruction aid. Transitional justice, therefore, stands as the cornerstone for a stable and legitimate long-term partnership between Damascus and Moscow.
Reaffirming the Alliance Amid Recalibration
For Russia, the visit served to reaffirm the endurance of the alliance with Damascus, yet it also signaled a phase of strategic recalibration. Since its 2015 military intervention, Moscow succeeded in positioning itself as the primary guarantor of regime survival and the principal arbiter of military and political balances in Syria. However, the war in Ukraine and its attendant economic and political repercussions have led to a relative decline in Russia’s capacity to manage the Syrian file with the same vigor. This vacuum has enabled other regional powers—chiefly Iran and Turkey—to expand their footprint within Syrian territory. Hence, Moscow now seeks through this visit to reassert itself as an indispensable actor in any forthcoming settlement of the Syrian conflict.
Beyond Syria itself, Russia views its presence there as a geopolitical asset, not merely an alliance. Moscow manages its involvement through a logic of transactional geopolitics, employing the Syrian arena as a bargaining tool in its dealings with Ankara, particularly on issues related to the Black Sea and Ukraine, and as leverage against Washington in the broader East–West confrontation. Simultaneously, Syria serves as a carefully managed coordination field with Iran: while both countries share an interest in sustaining a pro-Damascus order, their long-term ambitions diverge, prompting Russia to maintain an independent margin of maneuver to avoid becoming subordinate to the Iranian axis.
From a wider foreign-policy perspective, the visit carried symbolic significance extending beyond Syria’s geography. It reaffirmed that the Kremlin retains its ability to project influence in the Middle East despite being preoccupied in Eastern Europe and that it intends to prevent any strategic vacuum that Western or regional rivals could exploit. In this sense, the visit can be read as a political message: that Moscow continues to regard Syria as a cornerstone of its regional power architecture and remains capable of using its influence there as a negotiating instrument against Western sanctions and diplomatic isolation.
From Dependency to Smart Influence: The Future of Russia’s Role in Post-2025 Syria
Al-Sharaa’s Moscow visit reflects a dual-level negotiation dynamic unfolding under tight domestic and external constraints. Damascus is practicing a form of strategic hedging, aiming to neutralize Russia’s obstructive tendencies without rupturing the partnership—implicitly trading continued Russian privileges in bases and economic sectors for more responsible Russian engagement in managing northern and southern Syria and the transitional justice track.
Moscow, for its part, operates through a model of networked security governance, balancing Israeli acceptance of its stabilizing role in the south, managed coordination with Ankara and the SDF in the north, and the preservation of its image as a reliable ally. The causal mechanism underpinning this balance rests on trading influence for legitimacy: the more long-term guarantees Russia secures for its military and economic presence, the more willing it becomes to make incremental concessions on sensitive issues.
The success of al-Sharaa’s visit will thus be measured by tangible outcomes—such as implementation protocols for base agreements, joint monitoring arrangements in northeastern Syria, reduced friction in the south through de-confliction mechanisms, and verifiable progress in transitional justice (including limited extraditions, archival access, or joint investigative committees).
In this light, the visit does not signify a rupture or a return to dependency, but rather a codified pragmatic transformation—an evolving Russian–Syrian relationship shaped by mutual adaptation to a complex regional security architecture, enabling Damascus to expand its negotiating leverage without incurring the costs of direct confrontation with Moscow.
“Russian Influence Shifts from Military to Political–Economic, While Damascus Constructs New Balances to Safeguard Its Sovereignty”
In sum, the visit can be interpreted as a turning point in redefining Syrian–Russian relations after a decade of near-total dependency on Moscow’s strategic and military policies. The new Syrian government is not seeking to dismantle the historic alliance as much as it aims to re-engineer it on the basis of sovereignty and parity, capitalizing on a changing international order characterized by multipolarity and the gradual erosion of Russia’s coercive capacity due to its prolonged entanglement in the Ukrainian war. This transformation provides Damascus with a rare window to reclaim national decision-making and redistribute external power influence on its soil in a way that aligns with its sovereign interests, without forfeiting the security and political advantages accrued through years of coordination with Moscow. Thus, the relationship is evolving from a model of “security dependency” into a negotiated partnership—one that balances the need for Russian military and economic support with Syria’s aspiration for genuine strategic autonomy in managing domestic and regional affairs.
At the regional and international levels, the visit signals that the new Syria seeks to consolidate its position as a balanced actor in the Middle East’s evolving power matrix, managing a multi-directional web of relations involving Moscow, Ankara, Tel Aviv, and Washington without aligning fully with any single axis. Despite its weakened posture, Russia still wields distinctive assets—its military bases, connections with local factions, field experience, and capacity to mediate between rival actors. Conversely, Damascus represents a testing ground for a new model of international relations rooted in pragmatic adaptation rather than ideological alignment. Hence, the success of the Moscow visit cannot be measured by rhetoric or ceremony, but rather by the ability of both sides to translate it into a flexible strategic pact that secures mutual interests and lays the foundation for a “multi-equilibrium” phase in post-conflict Syria.
From a forward-looking perspective, Russia’s role in Syria over the next five years is likely to shift from military dominance to strategic repositioning, prioritizing the preservation of its core gains since 2015—most notably its military bases, energy agreements, and status as an accepted intermediary among regional stakeholders. This transformation will mark a gradual transition from a model of military hegemony to one of political–economic influence constrained by negotiated deals, under the mounting pressures and financial strain of the Ukrainian war.
Moscow is also increasingly aware that its continued relevance in Syria depends on its ability to adapt to the country’s renewed sovereignty dynamics and to engage with broader regional arrangements involving Turkey, Israel, and select Arab states interested in reconstruction and normalization. This evolution will likely reshape the nature of Russian influence in the Middle East—making it more realistic, flexible, and less hegemonic—anchored in a framework of “smart influence” that relies on mediation, investment, and shared interests rather than heavy military presence.
In this light, the future of Russia’s role in Syria will be defined by its capacity to convert the legacy of its military intervention into diplomatic and economic capital, and by its willingness to transition from a “guardian power” to a “partner–guarantor” within the emerging Middle Eastern order. This pragmatic reconfiguration, if successfully institutionalized, would signify the maturation of Syrian–Russian relations from asymmetric dependency toward a flexible, interest-driven partnership consistent with Syria’s evolving sovereignty and the broader realignments of global power.
References
[1] Al-Ghad Newspaper. “Major Syrian–Russian Agreements after the Fall of the Assad Regime.” Al-Ghad (Jordan), October 17, 2025. https://alghad.com/story/2050741.
[2] Akopov, Petr. “Опять мимо: Путин потерял, а Трамп нашел.” RIA Novosti, October 16, 2025. https://ria.ru/20251016/putin-2048467957.html.
[3] Reuters. “Russia Gambles on Keeping Its Military Bases in Post-Assad Syria.” Reuters, March 2, 2025. https://bitly.cx/SUCTA.
[4] Enab Baladi. “Germany Urges Russia to Shut Down Its Bases in Syria.” Enab Baladi, October 17, 2025. https://www.enabbaladi.net/734514.
[5] Reuters. “Israel Presses U.S. to Allow Russian Bases to Remain in ‘Weakened’ Syria, Sources Say.” Reuters, February 28, 2025. https://bitly.cx/XHq3.
[6] Al-Asaad, Abdullah. “Will Russian Military Police Return as a New Separation Force in Southern Syria?” Syria TV, October 18, 2025. https://www.syria.tv/333025.
[7] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). “Russia Redeploys Military Police to Southern Syria.” Operational Environment Enterprise, October 2025. https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/product/russia-redeploys-military-police-to-southern-syria.
[8] Lavrov, Sergey. “Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at the Press Conference Following the High-Level Week of the 80th Session of the UN General Assembly.” Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, September 27, 2025. https://russiaun.ru/en/news/270925.
[9] Winter, Lucas. “Russia Using the Kurds to Restore Regime Influence in Eastern Syria.” New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy, September 18, 2020. https://newlinesinstitute.org/strategic-competition/russia/russia-using-kurds-to-restore-regime-influence-in-eastern-syria/.
[10] Rudaw News Agency. “Russia Views SDF–Damascus Agreement as a Step Toward Stabilizing Syria.” Rudaw English, March 13, 2025. https://www.rudaw.net/english/world/130320251.
[11] Jaber, Hasan. “Syria and Russia: The Fall of the Ally and the Collapse of the Idea?” Institute of Politics and Society, December 14, 2024. https://wp.me/pdSIuF-2Ka.
[12] Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). “On the 10th Anniversary of Russia’s Military Intervention in Syria.” SNHR Report, September 30, 2025. https://bitly.cx/oGXoY.
[13] Kremlin Press Office. “Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov Declines Comment on Whether Assad’s Extradition Was Raised During Syrian–Russian Talks in Moscow.” Kremlin.ru, October 2025.