Morocco on the Threshold of the 2026 Elections: Between a Crisis of Trust and the Reordering of the Political Landscape
Executive Summary
Morocco’s legislative elections are set to take place on 23 September 2026 in a context markedly different from that of the 2021 elections. Inflation fell from 6.6% in 2022 to 0.8% in 2025, yet this decline has not dispelled public perceptions of eroding purchasing power. Unemployment stands at around 13%, rising to 37.2% among young people. The electoral context is further shaped by the “Gen Z 212” protests in the autumn of 2025, the mass crossing crisis into Ceuta in July 2026, as well as the politically salient issues of normalization and the Western Sahara dispute.
The central question is not limited to which party will emerge as the leading electoral force and be constitutionally mandated to form the government. It also concerns the scope available to the next government within a system in which the monarchy retains decisive powers over foreign policy, defence, religious affairs, and strategic direction, as well as the extent to which the elections can restore the trust of a younger generation that has grown increasingly disengaged from political parties.
The paper offers a qualitative assessment, contingent on voter turnout, suggesting that the contest for the lead is likely to be confined to the parties of the outgoing governing coalition, with a relative advantage for the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), followed by the Istiqlal Party and the National Rally of Independents (RNI). It also suggests that the Justice and Development Party (PJD) will improve its position without competing for the lead.
The paper proposes assessing the results through five indicators: voter turnout, particularly among young people; the distribution of seats among the main political forces; the extent to which the PJD recovers its parliamentary representation; the influence of local notables and money in rural constituencies; and the composition of the governing coalition and its capacity to translate electoral promises into measurable policies.
Constitutional Framework and the Stakes of the Election
In Morocco’s fourth legislative elections since the adoption of the 2011 Constitution, voters will elect the 395 members of the House of Representatives: 305 from 92 local constituencies and 90 from 12 regional constituencies, whose candidate lists are reserved for women. The Justice and Development Party (PJD) came first in the 2011 elections, winning 107 seats, and again in 2016, with 125 seats, before falling to just 13 seats in 2021. That election was led by the National Rally of Independents (RNI), which won 102 seats, followed by the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) with 87 seats, the Istiqlal Party with 81, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP) with 34, the Popular Movement (MP) with 28, the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS) with 22, and the Constitutional Union (UC) with 18. Voter turnout stood at 50.35%.[1]
Article 47 of the Constitution stipulates that the King appoints the Head of Government from the political party that comes first in the elections to the House of Representatives, and appoints the members of the government on the Head of Government’s proposal.[2] The experience of 2016, however, revealed the limits of this constitutional arrangement. In March 2017, following five months of stalled coalition negotiations, the King relieved Abdelilah Benkirane of his duties as designated Head of Government and appointed Saadeddine Othmani, from the same party, to form a government that included the political forces Benkirane had refused to bring into the coalition.
The more important question, therefore, is not whether the leading party can assemble a numerical majority—coalitions generally form around the electoral winner—but the extent to which it and its coalition partners can translate the electoral outcome into effective governing authority. In other words, the central issue is the scope available to the government in policy areas managed outside the party-political sphere. The literature on Morocco’s political system characterizes elections as a mechanism for redistributing positions within a political structure in which the monarchy retains an arbitral role, rather than as a mechanism for redefining that structure.[3]
The Moroccan experience remains a Arab reference point for reform from within the political system: constitutional reform, followed by a decade of Islamist-led government, and then the Islamists’ electoral exit from power.
The paper draws on three levels of evidence: electoral and institutional data, including the 2021 election results and Ministry of Interior data on the electorate and the 2026 electoral lists; economic and social indicators published by the High Commission for Planning, alongside findings from the Afrobarometer survey; and, finally, the movement of candidates and local notables between political parties, announced party platforms, and developments over the course of the electoral campaign. The paper distinguishes between what the data establish, what the indicators suggest, and what the analysis offers by way of interpretation.
In the absence of published nationwide opinion polls on voting intentions, the ranking presented below should be understood as a qualitative assessment contingent on voter turnout and on the parties’ ability to translate their organizational networks into votes, rather than as a statistical projection of seat shares. The margin of uncertainty is particularly wide among the three closely matched parties, as the electoral quotient in place since 2021 is calculated on the basis of registered voters rather than votes cast. This makes the geographic distribution of votes a decisive factor and limits the ability of any party to win more than one seat in a single constituency.[4]
Context: Three Pressing Transformations
The first of these transformations is the “Gen Z 212” protest movement, whose name refers both to the generation born between the late 1990s and the beginning of the second decade of this century and to Morocco’s international calling code. The movement emerged online on 27 September 2025 following the deaths of pregnant women at a hospital in Agadir, amid protests over deteriorating healthcare and education and the massive expenditure associated with major sporting events, including the 2030 FIFA World Cup. Three people were killed by gendarmerie gunfire in Lqliâa, near Agadir, and around one thousand people were arrested.[5]
The movement encompasses a range of positions, from social criticism and demands for social justice to left-wing perspectives and positions not aligned with any political party. It is therefore difficult to reduce it to a single political orientation or to translate its digital presence into predictions about specific electoral behaviour. More importantly, the movement revealed a shift in the criteria by which political authority is assessed: while older generations tend to evaluate the present against the pre-1999 period, younger Moroccans judge state performance in terms of employment opportunities, the quality of public services, and the right to a dignified life. Only around one-third of Moroccans aged 18 to 35 express trust in parliament, the government, and political parties.[6]
The second transformation concerns the public image of the party leading the government. Assessments of the government’s performance became closely associated with Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch, a businessman whose Akwa Group owns Afriquia, Morocco’s largest fuel distribution company. The combination of his position as Head of Government and his business interests in the sector meant that every increase in fuel prices could be interpreted through the lens of a potential conflict of interest. This perception was particularly salient after the Competition Council imposed fines totalling approximately MAD 1.84 billion on fuel distribution companies, including Afriquia, in November 2023 for anti-competitive practices.[7]
As rising prices in 2022 coincided with the Russia-Ukraine war, fuel prices became a focal point of political accountability. The government also struggled to communicate its narrative regarding its economic and social achievements, creating greater space for the opposition and protest-oriented discourse to shape interpretations of its policies. In January 2026, Akhannouch announced that he would step down as party leader and would not stand for re-election. Mohamed Chaouki succeeded him in February.[8] The National Rally of Independents (RNI) thus entered the election under new leadership, but carrying the record of the outgoing government.
The third transformation is the Ceuta crisis. In late July 2026, around 60,000 people, most of them young, crossed within a matter of days into the Spanish-administered city, with the majority subsequently returning. International sources reported at least 67 to 72 deaths, while Morocco’s Ministry of Interior stated that around 40,000 people had attempted the crossing and reported 11 deaths. Moroccan sources also circulated an unverified figure of approximately 140 people who had drowned.[9] The Spanish Prime Minister described the events as “a violation of Spain’s territorial sovereignty,” while Italy reinstated border controls with Spain.
Four competing narratives emerged to explain the events. The official Moroccan account attributed them to online disinformation and human-trafficking networks. A social explanation linked them to the lack of prospects facing young people. A third narrative questioned whether the authorities had deliberately been lenient, invoking the precedent of May 2021, when around 10,000 people crossed into Ceuta at the height of a diplomatic crisis. The official Spanish position, meanwhile, stated that there was no evidence that Rabat had orchestrated the events.
The hypothesis that Morocco was seeking to exert pressure is less compelling than it was in 2021, given that, since March 2022, Madrid has supported Morocco’s autonomy proposal as “the most serious, realistic and credible basis” for resolving the dispute. Morocco has opened an investigation, while Benkirane called on the King to establish a fact-finding commission.[10] The available evidence does not allow for a definitive determination of the motives behind the events. Their electoral significance, however, is clear: they brought migration and social marginalization back to the forefront of public debate and exposed the gap between the narrative of economic improvement and the lived experience of broad segments of Moroccan youth.
The Economic Paradox: Improving Macroeconomic Indicators, Limited Gains in Living Standards
At the macroeconomic level, the picture appears positive in a country of approximately 36.8 million people. Economic growth reached around 4.9% in 2025, following years weighed down by drought, while inflation fell to 0.8% in 2025. In January 2026, consumer prices declined by 0.8% year-on-year,[11] despite Morocco importing more than 90% of its energy needs.
During the outgoing government’s term, compulsory health insurance was extended nationwide as part of the social protection reform launched by the King in 2020. A direct social assistance programme was also introduced, reaching approximately 3.9 million households and providing monthly payments ranging from MAD 500 (around USD 50) to MAD 1,350.[12]
This positive picture, however, is tempered by unemployment, which stood at 13% in 2025, rising to 37.2% among those aged 15–24 and 20.5% among women, equivalent to approximately 1.62 million unemployed people.[13] Meanwhile, net job creation over the government’s term amounted to only around 95,000 jobs, against the pledge made in 2021 to create one million.[14]
Macroeconomic gains translate into political capital only when they are reflected in incomes, employment opportunities, and public services. The elections will therefore test the government’s ability to turn its record into a convincing political narrative, as well as the opposition’s capacity to offer an alternative interpretation of citizens’ everyday experience. The issue is further complicated by the fact that some within the party elite regard social policy as a royal initiative that stands above electoral competition. As a result, the government cannot claim full credit for it, while the opposition does not have complete latitude to hold the government accountable for it.
Morocco’s trade unions challenge common generalizations about the weakness of civil society in the Arab world. They led the general strikes of 1981 and 1990, as well as a nationwide general strike in February 2025 against the law regulating the right to strike. Through the “social dialogue” process, they also secured the April 2024 agreement, which increased public-sector employees’ salaries by MAD 1,000 and raised the minimum wage by 10%, bringing it to MAD 3,422 by January 2026.[15]
The Party Landscape and the Structure of Competition
Morocco’s party landscape can be divided into four tiers and is characterized more by fragmentation than by the bipolar competition that became a common characterization of the political scene after 2011.[16]
The first tier comprises the major parties. The National Rally of Independents (RNI), which leads the government, has traditionally been associated with business circles. The Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) combines authenticity and modernity in its political narrative, while its political literature leans toward progressive positions. However, its establishment in 2008 at the initiative of Fouad Ali El Himma, a royal adviser since 2011, has allowed its opponents to continue portraying it as the “party of the palace.” The Istiqlal Party, Morocco’s oldest political party, is led by Nizar Baraka and draws its strength from its local networks, affiliated organizations, and dominant presence in the southern regions, particularly Laâyoune-Sakia El Hamra and Dakhla-Oued Ed-Dahab.
The Justice and Development Party (PJD), the leading opposition party, also belongs to this tier. It is predominantly urban, with its support concentrated in Tangier, Tetouan, Salé, Rabat, Fez, and Casablanca, reflecting its reliance on the educated middle class and on the networks of the religious movement from which it emerged.
The second tier comprises the historic left. It includes the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), the leading opposition force under King Hassan II and the party that led Morocco’s 1998 consensus-based alternance government, which has since declined to 34 seats; and the Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), with 22 seats, the successor to the Moroccan Communist Party.
The third tier consists of the radical left, which maintains a visible media presence and a following among intellectual elites but has a limited electoral base. It includes the Federation of the Democratic Left (FGD), alongside the Democratic Labour Way, which boycotts elections.
The fourth tier comprises parties historically associated with what became known as the “administrative parties”—parties backed by the Ministry of Interior—including the Popular Movement (MP), with 28 seats, and the Constitutional Union (UC), with 18. This tier also includes small parties with limited constituencies whose primary function is to provide party nominations to candidates unable to secure them from other parties.
Cutting across these four tiers is the influence of local notables: prominent local figures, including large landowners, businesspeople, and leading family and tribal figures, who command networks of influence independent of political parties. They move between parties and are elected more on the basis of their personal recognition among voters and their ability to deliver services than on their ideological affiliation. Some are also associated with clientelist practices, such as distributing money or promising employment.[17]
As a result, the period preceding each election becomes a contest among parties to recruit these local notables. The rules of the electoral system themselves also shape the relative weight of programmatic parties compared with parties that rely on local networks.[18] Clientelism does not, however, eliminate programmatic competition at the national level—a feature that distinguishes Morocco from some other Arab contexts. This requires distinguishing among three levels of electoral capacity: a party’s ability to articulate a national political discourse, a candidate’s ability to build a local network, and the organization’s ability on election day to convert these resources into votes.
The Electoral Campaign and the Reshaping of Political Competition
Purchasing power and living conditions dominated the campaign, which began on 10 September, while party platforms assumed greater prominence than in previous elections. In its 2026–2031 platform, “Dignity and Opportunities for All,” the National Rally of Independents (RNI) pledged to raise the minimum wage to MAD 5,000 and create one million jobs. The Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) presented a programme estimated to cost MAD 350 billion, while the Istiqlal Party focused on purchasing power, housing, water, and combating rent-seeking. The Justice and Development Party (PJD), for its part, proposed 467 measures.[19]
The RNI’s opponents responded to its pledges by questioning why these measures had not already been implemented while the party was leading the government. The exchange combines substantive policy debate with competitive political bidding, but it also points to an electoral reckoning over the government’s record. The relevant measure, however, is not the number of promises made, but whether they can be translated into adequately funded policies with measurable implementation indicators.
The pre-election period also saw an exchange of accusations within the governing coalition itself, with the National Rally of Independents (RNI) accusing its coalition partner, the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), of seeking to recruit its elected representatives.[20] Against this backdrop, Fouzi Lekjaa, Minister Delegate in charge of the Budget and President of the Royal Moroccan Football Federation, joined PAM’s Political Bureau. Contrary to earlier reports, however, he did not stand as a candidate in Berkane; his wife instead headed the party’s regional list in the Oriental region.[21]
The significance of Lekjaa’s move lies primarily in its symbolic value: it gives the party a prominent figure associated with Morocco’s football achievements and signals a repositioning of part of the country’s technocratic elite. The conversion of sporting capital into political capital has precedents both in Morocco and internationally, exemplified by Silvio Berlusconi, who combined ownership of AC Milan with serving as Italy’s prime minister.
Assessment of Voting and Turnout Trends
Under its baseline scenario, the paper assesses the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) as likely to emerge in first place, followed by the Istiqlal Party and the National Rally of Independents (RNI), then the Justice and Development Party (PJD), and subsequently one of the two parties of the historic left. This assessment is based on the 2021 results; the movement of local notables toward PAM ahead of the submission of candidate lists; the Istiqlal Party’s deeply rooted historical networks and strong presence in the southern regions; and the political cost of the outgoing government’s record borne by the RNI, despite its substantial organizational and financial resources.
The gap among the three leading parties is, however, narrow enough for their order to change with even a modest shift in voter turnout or in the distribution of votes across constituencies. It is therefore more accurate to view the contest for first place as open among three parties, with PAM holding a relative advantage.
The Souss-Massa region provides a particularly revealing indicator. With a population of nearly three million, it stretches from the Agadir coastline to the fringes of the Sahara and encompasses cities, mountainous rural areas, and oases, capturing much of Morocco’s geographic and social diversity. Agadir was once a stronghold of the Justice and Development Party (PJD) when the party led nationally, before the National Rally of Independents (RNI) swept the city in 2021. Akhannouch has also served as president of Agadir’s municipal council since that year. The region subsequently witnessed the most intense episodes of the “Gen Z 212” protests.
Its electoral results will therefore provide an indication of the extent to which the RNI’s support has eroded in one of its strongholds. They should, however, be interpreted within the broader national picture rather than treated as a substitute for it.
The Justice and Development Party (PJD), meanwhile, is likely to make tangible gains without seriously competing for first place. Its decision to campaign on the issue of normalization presents a paradox: its former Secretary-General, Saadeddine Othmani, was the Head of Government who signed the tripartite declaration with the United States and Israel in December 2020, and since Benkirane’s return to the party leadership, the PJD has not undertaken a comprehensive reassessment of its experience in government.
Three factors constrain its prospects. The first is dissatisfaction with the performance of some PJD-led municipal councils in cities that gave the party substantial support in 2011 and 2016, including Agadir and Marrakesh. The second is the continuing attribution of responsibility to the Benkirane government for the liberalization of fuel prices in 2015. The third is the concentration of the party’s support in major cities, where turnout tends to be lower, while it faces two formidable party organizations—PAM and Istiqlal—with extensive experience in mobilizing voters.
A realistic objective for the PJD is to cross the twenty-seat threshold required to constitute a parliamentary group, which would provide it with additional resources and instruments of parliamentary oversight. Reaching forty seats, however, would be regarded as a personal political success for Benkirane. An alternative reading places the PJD in second or third position, on the grounds that it is virtually the only party to have engaged with issues that other parties have tended to avoid, including the events in Ceuta. This scenario becomes more plausible if urban voter turnout rises unexpectedly.
The greatest challenge, however, remains voter turnout. The number of registered voters fell from 17.98 million in 2021 to 15.8 million in July 2026, after around two million names were removed from the electoral rolls, primarily due to deaths and changes of residence, while fewer than half a million new voters were registered.[22] Those aged 18–24 account for only 4% of the electorate, compared with more than 29% for those over the age of sixty.
These figures alone, however, are not sufficient evidence of young people’s rejection of politics, as registration patterns and demographic changes are also at play. Because turnout is calculated as a proportion of registered voters, a contraction in the electoral rolls could mechanically raise the turnout rate without any actual expansion in the number of people casting ballots.
The available indicators point to a close contest among the parties of the outgoing governing coalition, with the Justice and Development Party (PJD) potentially improving its parliamentary representation. Voter turnout and the geographic distribution of votes, however, remain the principal sources of uncertainty.
Normalization and the Western Sahara Issue in Electoral Behaviour
Public opinion is characterized by a prevailing duality: dissatisfaction with normalization alongside an understanding of the state’s position because of its linkage to the Western Sahara issue. Morocco’s resumption of relations with Israel in December 2020 came in conjunction with U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This was followed by expressions of support from Spain, France, and the United Kingdom for Morocco’s autonomy proposal, and subsequently by UN Security Council Resolution 2797 of 31 October 2025, which made the proposal the basis for negotiations.[23]
Unlike Egypt and Jordan, where normalization has largely remained at the official level without gaining comparable societal traction, Morocco occupies a more ambiguous space in which the scope of cooperation has continued to expand.
This duality was put to the test one week before the vote. On 16 September 2026, following a trilateral meeting in New York between Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita, his Israeli counterpart Gideon Sa’ar, and the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, an agreement was announced to upgrade diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level. The following day, the Justice and Development Party (PJD) reiterated its “firm” opposition to normalization, while at the same time calling on its members to remain focused on the electoral campaign.[24]
Thus, no party openly embraces normalization, but neither does any party make it a central electoral battleground.
This is largely because foreign policy is conventionally regarded as a domain reserved for the monarchy within Morocco’s constitutional practice. Most parties therefore express reservations about normalization, only to qualify them by adding that they “understand” the state’s position. As a result, attitudes toward normalization translate into voting behaviour primarily among those who approach the issue from an ideological or doctrinal standpoint. The largest demonstrations against normalization have taken place in Tangier and Tetouan, where the Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Justice and Spirituality Movement, and Salafi currents have a significant presence.
For the broader electorate, however, voting choices are shaped primarily by prices, wages, and public services. This does not imply any decline in the place of the Palestinian cause in public sentiment.
Conclusion: What Will the Ballot Box Produce?
Morocco’s experience points to a gradual transition toward more regular elections, while debate persists over electoral financing, the influence of local notables, and the neutrality of the territorial administration—that is, the Ministry of Interior and its territorial representatives, including walis and governors. The central concern lies not primarily in the direct manipulation of ballot boxes, but in sources of influence that operate before election day and outside programmatic competition, including wealth, family and tribal ties, and proximity to local authorities.
Electoral integrity, in this sense, encompasses the conditions under which political competition takes place before the vote, rather than merely the integrity of the voting process on election day. For the 2026 elections, a Central Commission for Election Monitoring was established, jointly chaired by the Minister of Interior and the President of the Public Prosecution.[25]
From this perspective, Moroccan elections, like most elections in the Arab world, function as a mechanism for redistributing participation in political power rather than redefining the political system itself. What distinguishes the Moroccan case, however, is that electoral outcomes determine which party leads the government and shape the balance within the governing majority, giving voters a meaningful capacity to hold incumbents electorally accountable, as occurred with the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in 2021.
Once the results are announced, the analysis should move beyond the question of “Who won?” to ask instead, “What did the victory produce?” Five key indicators should guide this assessment: voter turnout and whether it falls below 42%, particularly among young people; the distribution of seats among the four main political forces, including the result in Souss-Massa as an indicator of the erosion of support for the party leading the government; whether the Justice and Development Party (PJD) crosses the threshold required to constitute a parliamentary group; the influence of money and local notables in rural constituencies; and, finally, the composition and programme of the next governing coalition.
Under the paper’s most likely scenario, the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) would lead a government with the Istiqlal Party and potentially the National Rally of Independents (RNI), while the opposition would be led by Islamist forces with greater parliamentary representation than in 2021.
Two alternative scenarios remain possible. The first would see the RNI retain first place on the strength of its resources and organizational networks despite the political cost of its record in government, allowing the current coalition to continue under a different internal balance. The second would see the Istiqlal Party emerge in first place if its strength in the southern regions and rural areas offsets lower voter turnout in the cities.
Across all three scenarios, the government would likely be formed by the same three parties, or by two of them. The substantive difference would therefore lie more in which party holds the leadership position and how ministerial portfolios are distributed than in the overall direction of public policy.
Over the medium term, the impact of the election will depend on how the new government uses the space available to it. If public policy continues to fall short on employment, healthcare, and education—the issues that have driven young people either to protest or to disengage—then the elections will have merely rearranged parliamentary seats without addressing the crisis of representation. If, however, these demands are translated into measurable policies and parliament is empowered to exercise meaningful oversight, the elections could have an impact that extends beyond the composition of the House of Representatives.
In a system in which the Palace retains a central position, the scope for governmental and parliamentary action—and the limits of that scope—becomes the most accurate measure of what the ballot box has actually produced. Ultimately, the final test will be the ability of those who participate in governing to respond to a generation that no longer accepts comparison with the past as a sufficient measure of satisfaction.
Selected Academic References
Clark, Janine A. Local Politics in Jordan and Morocco: Strategies of Centralization and Decentralization. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.
Daadaoui, Mohamed. “Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco: Limited Elections as Positional Strategies.” Middle Eastern Studies 46, no. 2 (2010): 195–219.
Liddell, James. “Notables, Clientelism and the Politics of Change in Morocco.” The Journal of North African Studies 15, no. 3 (2010): 315–331.
Lust, Ellen. “Competitive Clientelism in the Middle East.” Journal of Democracy 20, no. 3 (2009): 122–135.
Pellicer, Miquel, and Eva Wegner. “Electoral Rules and Clientelistic Parties: A Regression Discontinuity Approach.” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8, no. 4 (2013): 339–371.
Szmolka, Inmaculada. “Bipolarisation of the Moroccan Political Party Arena? Refuting This Idea through an Analysis of the Party System.” The Journal of North African Studies 26, no. 1 (2021): 73–102.
Tozy, Mohamed. “Morocco’s Elections: Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace.” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1 (2008): 34–41.
Wegner, Eva. Islamist Opposition in Authoritarian Regimes: The Party of Justice and Development in Morocco. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2011.
[1] Moroccan Ministry of Interior, Final Results of the Election of Members of the House of Representatives, 8 September 2021; on the 2026 constituencies, see “Report: 23 September Elections—395 Seats and 1,850 Lists in an Increasingly Complex Electoral Landscape,” Fes24, September 2026.
[2] Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco (2011), Article 47.
[3] Mohamed Daadaoui, “Rituals of Power and Political Parties in Morocco: Limited Elections as Positional Strategies,” Middle Eastern Studies 46, no. 2 (2010): 195–219; Mohamed Tozy, “Morocco’s Elections: Islamists, Technocrats, and the Palace,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1 (2008): 34–41.
[4] Organic Law No. 04.21 amending and supplementing Organic Law No. 27.11 concerning the House of Representatives (2021), which introduced the calculation of the electoral quotient on the basis of the number of registered voters in the constituency.
[5] Human Rights Watch, “Morocco: Protests Met with Repression and Violence,” 15 October 2025.
[6] “Morocco Elections 2026: A Test of Political Trust and Engagement,” Al Jazeera English, 17 September 2026, citing the Afrobarometer survey of Moroccan youth (March 2026).
[7] Competition Council, communiqué on the settlement agreement with fuel distribution companies, November 2023.
[8] “Akhannouch: I Will Not Run in the 2026 Elections,” Hespress English, 11 January 2026; “Mohamed Chaouki Elected New President of the National Rally of Independents, Succeeding Aziz Akhannouch,” Yabiladi, 7 February 2026.
[9] “60,000 Crossed and Most Returned: Details of the Large-Scale Movement from Morocco to Ceuta,” Al Jazeera Net, 30 July 2026; “Italy Suspends Freedom of Movement with Spain: Is Schengen Facing a Crisis after Ceuta?” Al Jazeera English, 4 August 2026; “First Official Position on the Ceuta Events: Ministry of Interior Reveals the Role of Digital Disinformation and Human-Trafficking Networks,” Maghreb Media, 2 August 2026. The reported figure of 140 people who drowned has circulated in Moroccan sources but could not be independently verified.
[10] “Morocco Informs Spain of Investigation into Ceuta Events as Sánchez Reiterates That There Is No Evidence of Rabat’s Involvement,” Ashtari24, August 2026; “Mixed Reactions after Benkirane Calls on the Moroccan Monarch to Clarify the Circumstances of the Ceuta Events,” Al-Quds Al-Arabi, August 2026.
[11] High Commission for Planning, Consumer Price Index for 2025 (January 2026) and Consumer Price Index for January 2026 (February 2026).
[12] “Direct Social Support: 3.9 Million Beneficiary Households,” La Vie Éco (in French), 19 May 2026.
[13] High Commission for Planning, “The Labour Market Situation in 2025,” 3 February 2026.
[14] “Morocco’s Ruling Allies Turn on Each Other Ahead of Election Campaign,” Al Jazeera English, 3 September 2026.
[15] “Minimum Wage Reaches 3,422 Dirhams as of January 2026,” Innovant Magazine (in French), January 2026.
[16] Inmaculada Szmolka, “Bipolarisation of the Moroccan Political Party Arena? Refuting This Idea through an Analysis of the Party System,” The Journal of North African Studies 26, no. 1 (2021): 73–102.
[17] James Liddell, “Notables, Clientelism and the Politics of Change in Morocco,” The Journal of North African Studies 15, no. 3 (2010): 315–331.
[18] Miquel Pellicer and Eva Wegner, “Electoral Rules and Clientelistic Parties: A Regression Discontinuity Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8, no. 4 (2013): 339–371.
[19] Al Jazeera English, 17 September 2026, previously cited; National Rally of Independents, 2026–2031 Electoral Programme, “Dignity and Opportunities for All.”
[20] Al Jazeera English, 3 September 2026, previously cited.
[21] “Lekjaa Reveals Details of His Relationship with El Mansouri, the Reasons for Not Running in Berkane, and Responds to Talbi Alami,” Siyassi, 14 September 2026.
[22] “Ministry of Interior: Nearly Two Million Names Removed from Electoral Rolls Ahead of the 2026 Legislative Elections,” Badil, July 2026; “Laftit: Deaths and Slum Housing among the Main Reasons for Removal from Electoral Rolls,” Zenq20, 2026; “Women Represent 46% of the Electorate: What Do the 2026 Election Figures Show?” Aldar, September 2026.
[23] Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, “UN Security Council Resolution 2797: Background and Implications for the Future of Western Sahara,” November 2025.
[24] “Israel and Morocco Agree to Upgrade Diplomatic Relations,” The National, 17 September 2026; “Justice and Development Party Rejects Upgrade of Moroccan-Israeli Relations,” Yabiladi (English edition), 17 September 2026.
[25] Badil, July 2026, previously cited.