The war between Hezbollah and Israel, and the maps of alliance and enmity within Lebanon
The historic turning point Hezbollah is experiencing today extends far beyond the scene of its ongoing, intermittent war with Israel, which has continued for nearly three years (with the exception of the ceasefire period and temporary truce, which was never a full truce but rather closer to de-escalation, particularly from the Israeli side). Another challenge, no less significant or dangerous for the party, lies in its increasingly strained relationship with domestic forces, the Lebanese government, and the presidency-especially following the Lebanese government’s decision to enter direct negotiations with Tel Aviv, a step that has indeed taken place under American sponsorship in Washington.
Lebanon’s internal tensions are neither new nor sudden; rather, they are an inseparable part of the country’s historical and political condition. What is new today, however, is that Hezbollah-which often held the upper hand domestically due first to its military arsenal, second to its substantial influence within the political system, and third to its regional backing through what is known as the “Axis of Resistance”-now faces a reassertion of external factors, as has often been the case in Lebanon, in reshaping the country’s internal equation and balance of power. This shift follows the collapse of Hezbollah’s Syrian strategic depth represented by Bashar al-Assad’s regime, Iran’s deep preoccupation with defending itself, and the Trump administration’s strong alignment with Benjamin Netanyahu in seeking to close off all avenues before Hezbollah. These developments helped facilitate the formation of a government and the selection of a president after such processes had often been difficult or deadlocked in the past.
These Lebanese divisions became clearly visible during the first phase of the war in 2023, but they have emerged even more sharply during the current U.S.-Iran confrontation, particularly after Hezbollah’s decision to enter the war. This was a move that Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam were unwilling to accept, leading them to pursue direct negotiations with Israel. Their stated rationale was to spare Lebanon from a major catastrophe on one hand, and to reject the notion that decisions of war and peace should remain in Hezbollah’s hands or be tied to Iranian interests on the other. As a result, relations between Hezbollah and the majority of other Lebanese political forces have reached an advanced stage of crisis and tension-a reality clearly reflected in Lebanese media discourse, as well as in the sharp polarization and mutual accusations exchanged between the two sides.
From this perspective, it becomes critically important to examine and analyze the positions of Lebanon’s various political forces toward Hezbollah on one hand, and toward the current war on the other. These positions carry important indicators and implications regarding the other difficult battle Hezbollah is fighting-one whose dynamics may accelerate in the coming phase between the party and these domestic actors, potentially forcing Hezbollah into difficult and unconventional strategic choices.
This article therefore seeks to monitor, interpret, and analyze the positions of the principal forces within Lebanon’s political equation regarding the current war between Hezbollah and Israel, given the important signals these positions provide about Lebanon’s present internal landscape and its likely future dynamics.
Amal Movement: Between Supporting Confrontation and Containing Escalation
Amal Movement’s position on the war largely reflects the structural nature of its placement within Lebanon’s political system more than it represents an independent political choice. Under the leadership of Nabih Berri, the movement operates within the framework of the “Shiite duality” alongside Hezbollah,[1] a reality that imposes clear constraints on its ability to formulate a distinct stance. In this context, it becomes difficult for Amal to adopt a publicly differentiated position toward the war, as any visible divergence could be interpreted as a threat to the unity of Shiite representation-an outcome carrying political costs that extend beyond the bilateral relationship itself to affect the sect’s broader standing within Lebanon’s political order.
Within this framework, the alliance between Amal and Hezbollah appears less as an alliance of choice than as an alliance of necessity. Amal recognizes that the imbalance of power in Hezbollah’s favor-particularly on the military level-significantly limits its ability to compete with the party or present itself as a viable alternative within the Shiite community. Accordingly, any weakening of Hezbollah is not necessarily perceived as a gain for Amal; rather, it could primarily translate into a broader weakening of Shiite political influence. Preserving this alliance therefore becomes a preventative mechanism aimed at avoiding two central risks: first, internal fragmentation within the Shiite base; and second, a decline in the relative political weight of the Shiite sect within Lebanon’s wider sectarian balance.
Against this backdrop, Nabih Berri’s role emerges less as that of a confrontational actor or political rival and more as a channel or bridge of communication. Berri does not seek to challenge Hezbollah for leadership of the Shiite street; instead, he aims to consolidate his position as an intermediary between Hezbollah and other Lebanese political forces, as well as between the logic of the state and the logic of resistance. This role grants him important political maneuverability, but it also requires him to maintain a carefully balanced discourse-one that prevents Amal from becoming directly embroiled in escalation while simultaneously preserving open communication channels with multiple actors.[2]
Regarding the war itself, a form of undeclared reservation can be observed within Amal’s posture. Available indicators suggest that Nabih Berri does not display full enthusiasm for a path of unchecked escalation, particularly given the heavy cost borne by the Shiite environment as a result of destruction in southern Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut. Yet this reservation does not evolve into an explicit political position; rather, it is translated into practical behavior centered on regulating the pace of escalation and encouraging de-escalation where possible. In this sense, Amal’s “objection” is more behavioral than rhetorical, consistent with its awareness of the political costs associated with any openly oppositional stance.
On the issue of negotiations, Amal’s position reflects a cautious approach to conflict management. Both Hezbollah and Amal have rejected direct negotiating tracks concerning a ceasefire, though this rejection does not necessarily represent principled opposition to negotiation itself. Rather, it reflects objection to the conditions and context under which such negotiations would occur-particularly amid military pressure and unfavorable power asymmetries.
Amal’s behavior can therefore be better understood through distinguishing between unity of objectives and divergence of methods vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Both actors share the strategic objective of protecting the position of the Shiite sect within Lebanon’s political system, yet they differ in the tools they employ to achieve that end. Hezbollah relies primarily on military power and regional alliances, whereas Amal tends to utilize political, institutional, and negotiating instruments. This difference does not amount to contradiction; rather, it establishes a division of labor within the “Shiite duality,” whereby military action on one side complements internal political balancing on the other.
For this reason, Amal Movement’s position can be described as a complex risk-management strategy: one that supports confrontation within defined limits, avoids open-ended escalation, preserves unified Shiite representation, and simultaneously seeks to protect domestic stability. This posture reflects not hesitation, but rather a deep awareness of the limits of power, the complexities of Lebanon’s political system, and the high cost of miscalculated choices.
The Sunni Position on Hezbollah in the Current War: Between al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya and the Future Movement
The Sunni position in Lebanon regarding the current war represents a complex and internally divided landscape that cannot be understood as a single homogeneous stance, but rather as a structural split between two principal trajectories: an “Islamist activist” path represented by al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya, and a “politically pragmatic” path represented by the Future Movement. This divergence reflects fundamentally different understandings of political role itself-between those who view resistance as an integral component of political identity, and those who see it as a threat to state stability and to the sect’s position within Lebanon’s institutional order.[3]
With regard to al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon, its position on the war can be understood through a long process of transformation that has gradually shifted it from a primarily political-religious movement into an actor balancing between politics and selective field engagement. Although historically rooted in the Muslim Brotherhood tradition, the group has not maintained a fixed political stance; rather, it has developed a functional relationship with Hezbollah that, at certain stages, has reached the level of undeclared coordination, particularly within the broader context of resistance against Israel. This evolution has not erased the ideological distinctions between the two actors, but it has produced a conditional convergence based on the notion of a “unified resistance front,” especially in light of recent wartime developments.
This convergence, however, does not amount to full political integration. Instead, it reflects a pragmatic approach within al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya that seeks to balance its Sunni Islamist identity with the realities of power on the ground, where Hezbollah overwhelmingly dominates the military sphere in southern Lebanon. Accordingly, the group appears to operate according to a logic of “limited engagement”-offering symbolic and carefully calibrated field support for resistance without entering into comprehensive strategic commitments that could place it in direct confrontation with international actors or Lebanon’s fragile domestic balances.[4]
By contrast, the Future Movement occupies a fundamentally different position within the Sunni political sphere. It is anchored more in the logic of the state than in the logic of resistance. Despite its organizational decline following the retreat of its top political leadership, the movement-historically associated with the Hariri family-continues to represent the most significant political reference point for large segments of the Sunni street, particularly in Beirut and Tripoli. Its strategic outlook is grounded in the belief that drawing Lebanon into broader regional confrontation threatens domestic stability and weakens the state itself. Accordingly, it rejects the war and insists that decisions of war and peace must remain exclusively within the authority of state institutions.
The Future Movement also approaches the current war through a broader strategic lens centered on leveraging regional transformations rather than directly participating in them. It interprets the decline of Iranian influence, the changing Syrian landscape, and Hezbollah’s current wartime pressures as potential opportunities to rebalance power within Lebanon’s political system. From this perspective, these developments are viewed as an opening to strengthen Lebanese state institutions while reducing the role of non-state actors. Thus, the movement’s position extends beyond merely rejecting escalation; it reflects a wider political calculation that the current regional moment may create conditions for reconstructing Lebanon’s internal balance around stronger state authority and weaker armed power outside institutional frameworks.
The Future Movement’s position toward Hezbollah in the present war can also be understood as a direct extension of the political structure that crystallized after the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005-a defining moment that fundamentally reshaped relations between the movement and Hezbollah. The assassination, along with the international judicial process that followed, created a profound sectarian-political rupture within Lebanon’s system and reinforced within the movement a deeply rooted conviction that the existence of arms outside state authority constitutes a structural threat to both political stability and domestic equilibrium.[5]
From this legacy, the Future Movement approaches the current war through principled opposition to any Lebanese involvement in regional conflicts managed outside state institutions, viewing such involvement as a reproduction of the “parallel state” logic that emerged in the post-assassination era. Consequently, its rejection of dragging Lebanon into confrontation is inseparable from a political memory shaped by the belief that Hezbollah’s conduct-both domestically and regionally-represents the continuation of an unconstrained model of power beyond state control, the very pattern that formed the deeper backdrop to tensions culminating in Hariri’s assassination.
Accordingly, the Sunni position on the war cannot be understood through political unity, but rather through division over the very definition of political role itself. Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya tends toward a logic of “supportive resistance,” engaging in conditional coordination within the broader axis of confrontation, while the Future Movement is positioned within a framework of “statehood and stability,” rejecting involvement in regional conflict.
At a deeper level, this divergence reflects a broader crisis of representation within Lebanon’s Sunni political sphere. There is no longer a single political center capable of monopolizing decision-making or formulating a unified Sunni position. Instead, the Sunni arena has become an open field in which two competing readings contend: one that views the war as an extension of the struggle with Israel and the logic of resistance, and another that regards it as a direct threat to the structure of the Lebanese state and its internal stability.
The Druze Position Toward Hezbollah
The Druze position in Lebanon regarding the current war is characterized by a complex and internally divided posture that reflects two distinct political approaches, represented primarily by the Progressive Socialist Party under Walid Jumblatt and the Lebanese Democratic Party under Talal Arslan. This divergence is not merely the product of temporary political disagreement; rather, it is rooted in the Druze community’s historical positioning within Lebanon’s political balance-a positioning traditionally based on managing relative neutrality and avoiding full-scale direct involvement in regional axes of conflict.
With regard to Walid Jumblatt, his position can best be described as pragmatically adaptive. His political approach is shaped by a constantly shifting reading of regional and domestic balances of power. On one hand, Jumblatt maintains a traditional Arab nationalist discourse opposed to Israel; on the other, he adopts a critical stance toward Hezbollah, particularly concerning the issue of arms and the broader role of weapons outside state structures. At the same time, Jumblatt has historically maintained a political alliance with Nabih Berri, making his approach closer to a logic of balance management within the Lebanese system. In this framework, he prioritizes domestic stability while supporting trajectories aimed at redefining and regulating the function of armed power within the authority of the state.
By contrast, Talal Arslan occupies a position more deeply integrated into the axis of confrontation. He has expressed clear support for Hezbollah in the context of the current war, emphasizing themes of internal unity and the rejection of national fragmentation, while warning against Israeli attempts to exploit domestic tensions in order to weaken the Lebanese front. Arslan’s discourse aligns more closely with the broader “Axis of Resistance” narrative, portraying Hezbollah as a central pillar in Lebanon’s protection. He also firmly rejects negotiation tracks perceived as responses to Israeli conditions, a stance that intersects significantly with Nabih Berri’s position, particularly regarding the management of negotiations and resistance to external pressure.[6]
Accordingly, the Druze position on the war can be understood as reflecting a delicate balance between two principal lines: a pragmatic-administrative line represented by Jumblatt, centered on repositioning in response to regional transformations while preserving political autonomy; and an alliance-oriented, axis-based line represented by Arslan, which aligns more directly with Hezbollah’s wartime approach.
At a deeper level, this divergence reflects the structural role of the Druze community as a “balancing force” within Lebanon’s political system rather than as a fully committed actor within any single regional or domestic axis. Historically, Druze politics has often been shaped less by ideological absolutism than by strategic calibration-an effort to preserve communal relevance, political maneuverability, and survival within a highly fragmented sectarian order. In this sense, the Druze stance toward Hezbollah and the current war is not solely about support or opposition, but about preserving the sect’s strategic flexibility amid rapidly shifting internal and regional dynamics.
Christians in Lebanon Between War and Sovereignty: Internal Division and Multiple Approaches
The Christian position in Lebanon regarding the confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel reflects a complex political structure rooted in internal plurality, one that ultimately converges around a broad rejection of war, even if the motives behind this rejection and the methods of expressing it differ significantly. The Christian political scene cannot be reduced to a single unified position; rather, it is distributed across three principal currents: a sovereignist right-wing current opposed to Hezbollah, an allied current supportive of it, and a centrist pragmatic current seeking to manage political balance.
The Christian Right: The Lebanese Forces and the Kataeb Party
The Christian right in Lebanon adopts a hardline and openly oppositional stance toward Hezbollah in the current war, portraying it as “playing with fire” through political and media discourse that firmly rejects dragging Lebanon into regional conflict. Yet this position is not merely a situational reaction to the war itself; rather, it is rooted in a deeper vision concerning the nature of the Lebanese state and the limits of sovereignty within it. For this current, the core issue is not simply the support war or the confrontation with Israel as such, but the fact that the decision over war and peace has effectively been appropriated by Hezbollah. In this sense, any military confrontation with Israel becomes, from their perspective, a manifestation of a structural defect in Lebanon’s political system rather than a strategic choice open to legitimate national debate.
Accordingly, the Christian right rejects participation in the war on the grounds that it does not serve Lebanese national interests, but instead thrusts the country into a confrontation beyond its capacity to endure. Hezbollah is held directly responsible for the economic and social consequences resulting from this path. This accusation extends beyond ordinary political disagreement and is embedded within a broader narrative that sees Hezbollah as instrumentalizing Lebanon within a wider Iranian-led regional agenda, thereby transforming the state into a proxy battleground rather than an independent sovereign entity.
This discourse is further reinforced by the growing rhetoric of “protecting the regions,” as voices have increasingly emerged calling for forms of localized or communal self-protection in predominantly Christian areas, based on the perception that the state is incapable of fully imposing its sovereignty and that Hezbollah’s arms represent a threat to domestic equilibrium. This trend reflects a high level of distrust in the current structure of the Lebanese state and increasingly leans toward a form of communal security logic, one that perceives the proliferation of weapons outside legitimate state authority as an existential threat rather than merely a political disagreement.
At the same time, this current remains firmly committed to the principle that all arms must be monopolized by the Lebanese state and the Lebanese Armed Forces-not merely as a sovereignist slogan, but as a foundational condition for rebuilding the state and restoring national unity. In its view, the existence of a parallel military force does not simply undermine sovereignty; it deepens internal fragmentation and obstructs the development of effective national institutions.
Within this framework, the discourse of the Christian right centers on several core pillars: restricting decisions of war and peace exclusively to the Lebanese state; disarming Hezbollah or integrating its military capabilities into official state institutions; and rejecting the transformation of Lebanon into an arena for regional conflict. Ultimately, this position reflects a political philosophy that frames sovereignty not only as territorial integrity, but as the restoration of institutional authority over all strategic decisions-particularly those that determine whether the nation enters war.[7]
Marada Movement: Positioned Within Hezbollah’s Axis
The Marada Movement, led by Sleiman Frangieh, has adopted a closely allied and explicitly supportive position toward Hezbollah in the current war. Yet this support extends beyond conventional political alignment; it reflects a deeper integration into a broader regional vision of conflict. According to Frangieh’s discourse, the movement views itself as part of an interconnected regional axis, meaning that the war is not understood primarily as an internal Lebanese choice, but rather as the inevitable outcome of a wider struggle with Israel-one in which Hezbollah would have been targeted sooner or later regardless of Lebanon’s immediate behavior. In this framework, responsibility for the outbreak of confrontation is redefined: it is no longer linked principally to Hezbollah’s decision-making, but instead to the structural nature of the regional conflict itself.[8]
Frangieh’s praise for Hezbollah’s military capabilities also serves a function that goes far beyond symbolic or moral support. It performs a clear political role centered on reinforcing the legitimacy of Hezbollah’s arms by emphasizing their effectiveness and their ability to restore operational strength after the 2024 war in ways that, as he suggests, “surprised both friends and enemies.” This rhetoric strengthens a narrative in which Hezbollah’s military arsenal is framed not as a burden on the Lebanese state, but as a strategic element of balance and deterrence. In doing so, it directly contradicts the sovereignist argument advanced by Hezbollah’s Christian and political opponents.
Moreover, Frangieh’s embrace of the equation, “If the resistance wins, we win with it; if it loses, we lose with it,” reflects a highly advanced level of political and strategic identification. This formulation goes beyond alliance politics and approaches something closer to unity of fate, positioning the movement not merely as a supporter of Hezbollah, but as an actor whose own political future is bound to the outcome of the war itself.
Despite this deep engagement, however, Frangieh also seeks to draw clear internal boundaries. He repeatedly warns against slipping into sectarian strife or civil war and firmly rejects any attempt to disarm Hezbollah by force. This position is rooted in a reading that sees any major disruption of Lebanon’s internal balance as potentially reproducing earlier conflict scenarios. Within this logic, civil peace becomes a strategic priority equal in importance to confrontation with Israel-not an alternative to it, but a parallel condition necessary for national survival.
In this sense, the Marada Movement’s position reveals a broader political philosophy in which political and security legitimacy are not measured solely by the state’s monopoly over arms, but by its actual capacity to protect the country. From this perspective, Hezbollah’s continued military role remains justified so long as the Lebanese state lacks the practical capability to impose credible deterrence on its own.
This approach places Marada in structural contradiction with other Christian forces-particularly sovereignist currents such as the Lebanese Forces and Kataeb-which argue that Hezbollah’s independent military power is itself the core source of dysfunction in the Lebanese state and a primary reason Lebanon remains vulnerable to recurring war on its own territory. Ultimately, Marada’s posture reflects a Christian political current that prioritizes strategic alliance, deterrence, and regional realism over the classical sovereignist model centered exclusively on state monopoly over force.
The Free Patriotic Movement: The Pragmatism of Differentiation and Balance Management
The Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) occupies a centrist position between Lebanon’s competing Christian political currents, making its stance one of the most complex within the Christian political arena. After having served as a principal ally of Hezbollah through the Mar Mikhael Memorandum of Understanding signed on February 6, 2006-which played a major role in ending Hezbollah’s political isolation and providing Christian political cover for its weapons-the movement has gradually shifted toward a more differentiated position. This transformation reflects a dual reality of political distancing combined with tactical continuity, particularly in light of deepening political and presidential disagreements that accumulated over time. As a result, the relationship has increasingly resembled selective cooperation rather than a rigid structural alliance.
This shift is especially visible in the FPM’s position on the current war. The movement rejects the logic of “unity of fronts” and opposes linking Lebanon’s fate to a broader war involving Iran, arguing that Hezbollah has moved beyond the framework of defending Lebanon and has exceeded the original terms of understanding by becoming engaged in a regional conflict that does not serve Lebanese national interests.
Within this context, the FPM adopts an approach built around two parallel principles: first, emphasizing the necessity of restricting weapons to the state and restoring security and military decision-making to official institutions; and second, rejecting any internal confrontational path or attempt to impose such a transformation by force. According to this perspective, the issue of Hezbollah’s arms cannot be resolved except through an internal consensual process accompanied by the construction of a capable state and international guarantees that protect Lebanon from external aggression. This reflects a recognition of the limits of coercive change in a deeply divided political environment.
The movement’s post-ceasefire statements further illustrate this orientation. The FPM explicitly links sovereignty to state-building as the sole national reference point, calling for Hezbollah’s arms to be transferred to the Lebanese Army within an integrated national framework, while also advocating a negotiation process that secures Lebanese rights without succumbing either to surrender or to external dictates. Yet despite its sovereignist tone, this proposal remains constrained by a pragmatic ceiling: it simultaneously insists on Hezbollah’s integration into the state project rather than its confrontation, exclusion, or forced dismantlement.[9]
Accordingly, the FPM’s positioning can best be described as a strategy of “balance management.” It seeks to distinguish itself from the Christian right by rejecting direct confrontation with Hezbollah, while also differentiating itself from Hezbollah’s unconditional allies by refusing full, unqualified alignment with the resistance project. However, this middle-ground positioning places the movement in a chronic strategic dilemma. It often appears unable to definitively resolve its choice between the logic of the state and the logic of alliance, leaving it more engaged in managing crisis than in resolving it. This ambiguity is shaped by calculations aimed at preserving political relevance while avoiding the costs of sharp polarization in Lebanon’s fragmented environment.
Despite these differences, a core common denominator can still be identified across most Christian political forces: broad opposition to Lebanon’s involvement in an open-ended war, and the belief that the country is being drawn into a conflict that exceeds both its capabilities and its national interest. Yet this rejection does not emerge from a unified political vision. The Christian right links it to sovereignty and disarmament; the Free Patriotic Movement links it to balance management and avoidance of internal confrontation; while Hezbollah’s Christian allies situate it within a wider regional framework that can justify participation in confrontation under specific strategic conditions.
At its core, therefore, the Christian position reflects a deeper and more fundamental question about the nature of the Lebanese state itself: Is Lebanon a sovereign state capable of monopolizing decisions of war and peace, or is it an arena in which internal and external forces intersect and compete?
It is this unresolved question-more than the war alone-that ultimately defines the place of Christians within Lebanon’s current political equation.[10]
Conclusion
At first glance, Lebanon’s political landscape-defined by shifting maps of alliance, conflict, and recurring crises-may not appear fundamentally new. In many respects, it resembles a repeated version of long-standing political structures: a traditional alliance framework linking Hezbollah with certain Sunni and Christian forces on the basis of resistance and hostility toward Israel; a persistently tense relationship over the past two decades between Hezbollah and the dominant current within the Sunni sphere, particularly the Future Movement; a historically adversarial relationship with the Lebanese Forces; enduring alliances with other Christian actors; fluctuating positions among segments of the Christian political scene; and a pragmatic Druze posture, especially within Walid Jumblatt’s camp.
Yet despite these familiar structural patterns, major internal and external transformations have significantly altered the balance of power in ways increasingly unfavorable to Hezbollah.
The first major variable is the substantial weakening of the so-called Axis of Resistance, which long served as Hezbollah’s principal regional strategic support structure. Most notably, the collapse of the Assad regime not only deprived Hezbollah of one of its most important geopolitical pillars, but also transformed its relationship with what had historically been its strategic depth in Syria into one marked by tension and hostility with the current Syrian order. This development represents far more than a tactical setback; it signals a structural erosion in Hezbollah’s regional operating environment.
The second critical variable is the American position-particularly under Trump-era policies-which has become more overtly aligned with Israel and more directly complicit in pressuring Hezbollah within Lebanon itself. This is reflected in the increasingly hardline posture of U.S. officials dealing with Lebanon, including the American envoy Tom Barrack, whose rhetoric has strongly emphasized the necessity of Hezbollah’s disarmament. Such positions indicate that Washington is no longer merely managing Lebanon’s internal equilibrium, but is increasingly invested in reshaping it in ways that directly constrain Hezbollah’s military and political autonomy.
The third variable lies in broader regional transformations, particularly the rise of economic integration projects, normalization initiatives with Israel, and new regional connectivity frameworks supported directly by the United States. These developments create mounting pressure on Lebanon’s government and presidency from both external actors-especially the U.S. and Israel-and internal anti-Hezbollah forces to engage in such projects under the banner of “Lebanon’s interests first.” In practical terms, this introduces a new strategic equation in which Hezbollah is not only challenged militarily or politically, but increasingly confronted by an alternative regional order that seeks to redefine Lebanon’s priorities through economic and geopolitical integration.
Taken together, these transformations suggest that Lebanon’s next internal phase may represent a decisive crossroads for Hezbollah’s future. The challenge facing the party is no longer limited to military confrontation with Israel, nor solely to domestic sectarian polarization. Rather, Hezbollah now confronts a broader strategic dilemma involving the erosion of its regional support system, intensified international pressure, and a changing Middle Eastern order that may gradually reduce the political viability of its traditional resistance-centered model.
Accordingly, the coming period is likely to test whether Hezbollah can successfully adapt from being primarily a regional military actor supported by an ideological axis into a more flexible domestic political actor capable of navigating a transformed Lebanese and regional environment-or whether it will instead face increasing strategic isolation. In this sense, Lebanon’s internal equation is no longer simply about managing old divisions; it is becoming a central arena in determining whether Hezbollah can preserve its role under radically changing conditions, or whether the country is entering a new political era in which the foundations of that role are fundamentally renegotiated.
[1] Abdullah, Ahmed, 2026. “Is the alliance between Hezbollah and the Amal Movement in Lebanon cracking?” https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/cz9jny7nekzo .
[2] Nabih Berri: Who is the ‘engineer of political compromises’ in Lebanon?” https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/czj91vl88jmo . BBC News.
[3] Lebanon’s Politics: The Sunni Community and Hariri’s Future Current.” https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/96-lebanon-s-politics-the-sunni-community-and-hariri-s-future-current-arabic.pdf.
[4] Shaboura, Asrar, 2026. “Sunni and Shiite: Lebanon Between Two Weapons.” https://alhurra.com/12875 . Alhurra.
Previous reference.
[5] Previous reference.
[6] Dhiban, Kamal, 2026. “How Jumblatt and Arslan Read the Negotiations.” https://www.lebanon24.com/news/lebanon/1512990/%D9%87%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D9%8A%D9%82%D8%B1%D8%A3-%D8%AC%D9%86%D8%A8%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%B7-%D9%88%D8%A3%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%84%D8%A7%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AA%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%88%D8%B6.
[7] 2026. “The Kataeb Party’s position on the ban of Hezbollah’s military activities.” [https://nabd.com/s/168912088-526c58/%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B8%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9](https://nabd.com/s/168912088-526c58/%D9%85%D9%88%D9%82%D9%81-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%83%D8%AA%D8%A7%D8%A6%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86-%D8%AD%D8%B8%D8%B1-%D8%A3%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%B7%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9).
[8] > “President of the Marada Movement – Suleiman Frangieh.” [https://youtu.be/s__tIIjIgDA?si=FhtR8VH_RNZN8kiv](https://youtu.be/s__tIIjIgDA?si=FhtR8VH_RNZN8kiv).
[9] > 2026. “Frangieh confirmed that Hezbollah surprised both enemies and friends.” [https://www.elnashra.com/news/show/1773403/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A5%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%AD](https://www.elnashra.com/news/show/1773403/%D9%81%D8%B1%D9%86%D8%AC%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%A3%D9%83%D8%AF-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D9%81%D8%A7%D8%AC%D8%A3-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B9%D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D8%B5%D8%AF%D9%82%D8%A7%D8%A1-%D8%A5%D8%B0%D8%A7-%D8%B1%D8%A8%D8%AD ). Elnashra.
[10] According to a phone interview with the international relations researcher Dr. Mohammad Fawaz, 2026.