The Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads: The New U.S. Shift and Its Regional and Jordanian Implications

On November 24, 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump issued an executive order directing the Departments of State and Treasury to initiate a process for assessing the designation of “certain branches of the Muslim Brotherhood” as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and “Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).”
The order states that these branches “fuel terrorism, commit, facilitate, or support violence and destabilization campaigns that undermine the interests of the United States and its allies in the Middle East, and pose a threat to U.S. citizens and to U.S. national security.”

Although the order does not itself announce the designation, it constitutes the first formal step requiring the relevant U.S. agencies to examine the classification and take concrete action within a specified period not exceeding 75 days.

This decision marks a significant turning point in the U.S. relationship with Sunni political Islam, and with the Muslim Brotherhood in particular, at a moment of profound regional turbulence. It raises pressing questions about the future trajectory of the movement and its current crisis, as the Brotherhood stands at a critical crossroads that will shape its future relevance and redefine its roles and modes of engagement.

While the executive order does not specify which branches may be directly affected, early indications from within U.S. institutions suggest that the scope of targeting is likely to include organizational structures-among them those already banned in Jordan-as well as leading figures whom Washington believes may be linked to channels of political or financial support for resistance movements. This especially pertains to actors associated in recent years with activities the United States views as part of broader environments supportive of “resistance movements.”

These considerations come in light of recent developments in Jordan, including the dissolution of the Brotherhood’s legal framework last April, which could make the Jordanian case a focal point of monitoring and assessment in any emerging U.S. approach.

To begin with, it is important to note that the executive order does not designate the Muslim Brotherhood in its entirety as a terrorist organization. Rather, it instructs U.S. institutions to initiate a designation process targeting specific branches and sub-entities, particularly those operating in Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. The prospective designation is grounded in these branches’ alleged support for, or involvement in, the events of October 7. According to U.S. assessments, the Brotherhood’s branches in Jordan and Egypt provided financial support to Hamas, while Lebanese factions-including the al-Fajr Forces affiliated with the Islamic Group-participated in rocket fire and military engagements against Israel.

These movements have long characterized the United States as the “head of global terrorism,” citing Washington’s interventionist record in the region-from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to its positions and support during recurring Gaza wars, and its broader role in regional conflicts. The singling out of these specific countries appears to reflect a U.S. approach focused on the social and political environments that Washington views as support hubs or channels of influence for resistance factions. This falls within a broader American strategy aimed at weakening the financial and political networks linked to the Brotherhood or to factions aligned with it in certain arenas.

The executive order relies on two distinct legal pathways:

1. The First Pathway: The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA): This pathway allows for designating an entity as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). It is the most severe classification available under U.S. law, enabling the government to prosecute any party that provides material support to a designated entity. It authorizes targeting of any individual or institution-inside or outside the United States-offering material or logistical support. Effectively, this pathway treats the organization as a comprehensive, unified entity with an international legal status.

2. The Second Pathway: The International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA): This mechanism is used to designate individuals and entities as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) under Executive Order 13224. It targets actors specifically linked to “terrorism,” and encompasses the financial and political networks surrounding the Brotherhood. This includes:

• Senior figures or financial sponsors;
• Associations, charities, and organizations that are structurally or functionally connected to the Brotherhood;
• Companies, educational centers, or media platforms considered part of its support network;
• Bank accounts and financial intermediaries providing resources to Brotherhood branches.

This pathway is distinguished by its legal flexibility: it can be applied to specific branches or affiliated entities without requiring a blanket designation of the Brotherhood as a whole. As a result, it enables the imposition of effective financial, economic, and political restrictions on the broader ecosystem in which the movement operates.

Taken together, the decision proceeds along two parallel tracks that create a dual-layered sanctions framework. This expands Washington’s coercive tools and allows for the targeting of organizational branches, individuals, and financial networks linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. It also provides the U.S. administration with considerable political flexibility, sparing it the legal and diplomatic costs associated with attempting to classify the entire international organization-a process the Trump administration sought during its 2016–2020 term with respect to Egypt’s Brotherhood, but one that ultimately encountered legal obstacles and opposition from U.S. bureaucracy and European partners due to the movement’s networked, non-centralized structure.

The novelty of the current executive order lies in its precise legal engineering. The Brotherhood does not operate as a centralized organization in a manner that meets U.S. statutory criteria for blanket designation; it functions instead as a deeply entrenched transnational network. Consequently, the administration opted to focus on specific branches and associated networks rather than the organization as a whole-a strategy that maximizes impact while avoiding legal vulnerabilities, making the likelihood of implementation substantially high.

Why Now?

U.S. policy toward political Islam has never been uniform or consistent; rather, it has fluctuated with changing administrations, political moments, and the dispositions of decision-makers. Over the past decades, Washington’s approach has oscillated between exclusionary policies and strategies of engagement and incorporation that viewed Islamic movements-foremost among them the Muslim Brotherhood-as comparatively “more moderate” than armed jihadist groups such as al-Qaeda. At various points, these movements were even perceived as potential buffers against the rise of violent extremism, particularly as they adopted the rhetoric of “moderate Islam,” integrated into the institutions of the modern nation-state, and participated in electoral politics.

Yet the tension between these two currents has remained constant. The right-leaning camp in Washington-closely intertwined with pro-Israel lobbying networks-has long argued that the Brotherhood does not fundamentally differ from armed groups in its ultimate aims, and that the various strands of political Islam share a common long-term objective: “establishing an Islamic state and implementing sharia.” From this perspective, the movement is viewed as a strategic threat, not as a political actor that could be relied upon to help contain extremism or address crises in the Arab and Islamic worlds. This view gained significant traction after the September 11 attacks and intensified following the Arab uprisings, during which the Brotherhood rose to power in several countries-reopening the political-Islam file inside U.S. institutions in a substantial way.

Conversely, the Obama administration witnessed a notable openness toward political Islam, reflected in closed-door meetings and conferences organized by the White House and major think tanks, as well as in academic and media discourse. Yet even this openness never matured into a stable policy. As Robert Satloff notes in his seminal study, “U.S. Policy Toward Islamism: A Theoretical and Operational Framework,” the decisive factor in Washington’s approach has consistently been U.S. national interest rather than ideological alignment. This principle explains why the American position shifts with changing circumstances-and why Washington reverts to a more hardline stance whenever it perceives a direct threat to its core interests.

At the heart of U.S. interests in the current decision lies one overriding priority: strengthening Israel’s security. Since October 7, Washington has adopted a policy aimed at diminishing any organizational, financial, or political infrastructures believed to provide direct or indirect support to Palestinian resistance movements. In this context, statements by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior security officials have explicitly called for “draining the regional environment that provides political cover or societal support to the resistance.”

This trajectory aligns with the approach of several Arab governments that leverage the Brotherhood as a political tool to justify tightening security measures and consolidating control over the public sphere-producing broader convergence between U.S. and regional narratives on the Brotherhood. The timing also reflects an international moment in which the “terrorism” narrative is resurging, partly driven by Israel’s attempt to reestablish itself globally as a “victim” of terrorism following the severe international backlash against its conduct-including what many organizations and experts have labeled a genocide-in the Gaza Strip.

Today, in the aftermath of the events of October 7, 2023, and with the perceived “involvement” of certain Brotherhood branches in activities considered a red line by Washington and its allies, the U.S. administration finds itself compelled to adopt a markedly different approach.

It is also important to consider the decision by the Governor of Texas designating the Muslim Brotherhood and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) as transnational terrorist organizations. Although a state-level measure, the decision reflects a broader trend within conservative U.S. states adopting more hardline rhetoric toward political Islam and civil society organizations connected to Arab and Muslim communities. The danger of this trajectory lies in its provision of domestic political cover for more assertive federal actions. It may also pave the way for similar decisions in other states, creating a political environment that legitimizes expanding the security-driven approach toward the Brotherhood at the national level. Accordingly, the Texas decision is not an isolated development but rather an indicator of a gradual shift within segments of the U.S. political system-one that may eventually shape Washington’s foreign policy and provide greater legitimacy for targeting Brotherhood branches across the region.

Furthermore, U.S. security institutions increasingly view political-Islam movements-as transnational actors that transcend the borders of the modern nation-state-as deserving of central consideration in strategic assessments. This applies both to their ideological frameworks and to their cross-border support networks. Coupled with the political and security developments since 2023 and the roles played by various Brotherhood branches, this outlook has rendered the moment ripe-politically and legally-for advancing the process of designating specific Brotherhood branches.

The Core Dilemma: Implications of the Decision for Jordan

Jordan represents the most sensitive arena for any shift in U.S. policy toward political Islamist movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood in Jordan possesses a unique historical and organizational character that sets it apart from other branches, both in terms of its long-standing relationship with the Jordanian state and the legal recognition it once enjoyed. This recognition enabled the group to operate freely and become one of the most influential actors in the Jordanian public sphere-an influence reflected in its deeply rooted social and political legacy across state institutions and society.

The Jordanian branch now under scrutiny is the same entity that was formally banned domestically in April of this year. It was already grappling with a series of escalating internal crises, which amplifies the sensitivity of the moment and places the group before a dual challenge: a domestic ban and potential U.S. pressure. This dual front increases the political and security stakes within the Kingdom. It is plausible that Jordan moved quickly to impose the domestic ban as a preemptive measure-seeking to manage the file internally before it evolved into a source of external pressure that would further complicate the political and security landscape.

The gravity of this shift becomes even more significant within a highly complex and interwoven regional context. Any change in U.S. policy toward the Brotherhood now transcends theoretical debate and carries direct operational implications for internal security calculations and state stability. It also affects Jordan’s international standing and its regional role as a primary ally of Washington, turning the country into a testing ground for balancing domestic stability with external pressure.

Ultimately, the Brotherhood in Jordan enters a delicate phase in which its ability to adapt will be tested, alongside the state’s ability to manage an exceptionally sensitive file amid a rapidly transforming regional environment and intensifying international pressures. At another level, the U.S. decision is likely to trigger a reconfiguration within Jordan’s Islamist opposition ecosystem. Actors closest to the Brotherhood may opt for strategic repositioning-either by adopting a more pragmatic discourse to avoid international scrutiny or by retreating into social and religious fronts less vulnerable to political accountability. Conversely, other Islamic-oriented currents-particularly the socially conservative mainstream-may capitalize on the Brotherhood’s diminished presence to fill the political and social spaces that historically constituted its traditional arenas of influence.

Conclusion

The U.S. decision marks a watershed moment in the evolution of the international stance toward political Islam. For the first time in two decades, Washington’s approach is shifting from rhetorical pressure and indirect measures to binding actionable steps that reshape the regional environment and redefine the political operating space of Islamist actors. The partial designation of Brotherhood branches effectively-though implicitly-places moderate, civically engaged currents in the same category as armed and radical factions. This provides political and legal cover for Arab states that have pursued confrontational strategies against political Islam since 2013, while simultaneously reinforcing efforts to construct a regional security architecture in which Washington and Tel Aviv are more explicitly and deeply intertwined.

At the center of this transformation lies a pivotal question: Will the decision compel the Brotherhood to undertake a serious, perhaps even forced, intellectual revisiting of its ideological and political project-particularly with the movement’s centennial approaching-or will it continue its long-standing pattern of “crisis management,” seeking adaptive margins that merely ensure survival? For over a decade, the movement has experienced internal erosion and declining organizational legitimacy, repeatedly missing structural reform opportunities that could have redefined its role and recalibrated its internal balances-choosing instead short-term, reactive adjustments rather than strategic revision.

The question extends beyond internal organizational dynamics to a more politically sensitive issue: Will the U.S. designation diminish the Brotherhood’s popular appeal, or increase it? This remains uncertain, particularly in an Arab public atmosphere emotionally charged with solidarity for resistance movements and mounting anger toward the United States over its role in the Gaza war. The decision may be perceived not as a targeting of organizations per se, but of “political positions,” potentially giving the Brotherhood a symbolic boost on the street. Yet this effect could be mitigated if local governments move proactively to fill any resulting political vacuum and present new alternatives-thereby limiting the Brotherhood’s ability to capitalize on a narrative of “external targeting.”