The War on Iran: An Analysis of the Logic of Conflict and Potential Scenarios

This assessment proceeds from the premise that the Israeli–U.S. war on Iran has moved beyond the stage of proxy warfare into a phase of gradual attrition, cost escalation, and the reconfiguration of the region’s geopolitical and strategic environment. Drawing on a modified Delphi approach that synthesizes the assessments of a number of experts and researchers, the paper seeks to distill the most salient analytical trends across five principal axes: the nature of the conflict, the future of the Iranian regime, the objectives of both Israel and the United States, as well as the potential trajectories of the war and its “day after.”

At the level of Iran’s domestic arena, the paper suggests that the collapse of the Iranian regime through a “decapitation strategy” is neither imminent nor straightforward, given the resilience of its institutional structure and the multiplicity of power centers within it, particularly the central role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). However, this does not preclude the possibility that the war may push the regime into a phase of cumulative erosion or systemic fragility, especially if external pressures coincide with mounting internal economic, social, and political crises.

As for Israel, most interpretations indicate that its objectives extend beyond merely degrading Iran’s military capabilities. Rather, they encompass a broader effort to reshape the regional security environment and balance of power in a manner that secures Israeli superiority and dominance, curtails Iran’s influence and its network of proxies, and provides Israel with greater latitude to restore its deterrence posture following the transformations that have unfolded since October 7. In contrast, the United States appears less explicit in defining its ultimate endgame; it shows no decisive inclination toward a full-scale war or the direct overthrow of the Iranian regime, but instead favors a strategy of calibrated military pressure combined with negotiation-reflecting a degree of strategic ambiguity.

At the regional level, the paper emphasizes that the repercussions of the war extend across the broader Middle East. Iraq, Syria, the Gulf states, Turkey, and Palestine should not be viewed merely as passive arenas affected by the conflict, but as integral extensions of its underlying structure. Iraq remains the most fragile arena due to entrenched Iranian influence, the presence of armed factions, and state weakness. Syria continues to represent a sensitive theater vulnerable to the spillover of tensions. Meanwhile, the Gulf states face a delicate strategic equation: containing Iran while avoiding escalation into open war, alongside a growing effort to preserve a balance of power that prevents a shift toward unilateral Israeli predominance. This dynamic is also recognized by Turkey, prompting it to pursue a network of understandings with key regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, with the aim of fostering a more stable regional equilibrium.

With regard to the Palestinian question, the paper argues that the war has contributed to its renewed marginalization, effectively instrumentalizing it within broader regional arrangements that transcend Palestinian agency. This suggests that even when the conflict appears primarily directed at Iran, it remains closely tied to the reshaping of the regional arena in which Israel operates, including Gaza, the West Bank, and the potential expansion of normalization agreements as part of post-war configurations and pressures on certain Arab states.

The paper concludes that the most likely scenario in the foreseeable future is one of controlled attrition: the continuation of strikes, signaling, and offensive operations within controlled limits, at least in the short term, without escalating into full-scale war. This is followed by the possibility of multi-front regional escalation in the event of miscalculation or a significant breach of established rules of engagement, and subsequently by the prospect of negotiated de-escalation after a period of sustained pressure. By contrast, scenarios involving large-scale war or the rapid collapse of the Iranian regime remain less probable, although they cannot be entirely ruled out over the longer term.

Matrix of Potential Scenarios

Why Use the Delphi Method to Understand the War?

As the Israeli–U.S. war on Iran expands and its geographic and regional trajectories become increasingly intertwined, it becomes difficult to analyze it through conventional indicators of war analysis that focus primarily on measuring military balances, the costs of confrontation, and the prospects for ceasefire. This war exhibits a hybrid character in which military, political, economic, cyber, and psychological dimensions intersect, rendering it too complex to be understood through a linear framework or a single explanatory lens. Moreover, the multiplicity of actors involved-ranging from states to non-state entities-alongside the entanglement of international and regional interests, necessitates an analytical approach capable of capturing the layered interactions that shape the dynamics of escalation. Accordingly, this paper adopts an analytical framework based on a non-classical application of the Delphi Method, employing a modified approach to aggregate expert assessments, compare them, and distill their overarching trends. The analysis draws on the contributions of Ahmad Bani Hamdan, Ahmad Azem, Nathan Brown, Ammar Kahf, Firas Elias, Maen Talaa, Badr Al-Madi, Hassan Jaber, Abdullah Al-Taie, and Hussein Al-Sarayrah. These perspectives address a range of issues, including the nature and institutional resilience of the Iranian regime, the objectives of Israel and the United States in the war, as well as the potential repercussions for Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf states.Through this approach, the paper seeks to construct a more coherent forward-looking assessment of the war’s trajectories and its implications for regional balances and the broader international order.

Ahmad Bani Hamdan[1] starts from the premise that the war with Iran cannot be understood in isolation from its broader regional and strategic context. He argues that the confrontation reveals a fundamental paradox in Israeli power: on the one hand, Israel seeks to consolidate a deterrence equation by targeting Iranian capabilities-particularly its missile arsenal-while, on the other hand, the war exposes the limits of this power due to internal Israeli divisions, divergences within the U.S. political environment, and the growing opposition to prolonged wars within currents such as “America First.”

Bani Hamdan further notes that, despite its focus on Iran, the war is not confined to the attrition of its immediate adversary. Rather, its effects extend to other regional actors, including U.S. allies, who are compelled to bear the costs of a dual strategy that combines reliance on American power with the challenges of navigating a volatile regional environment.

He also assesses that the continuation of the war may create indirect strategic opportunities for other actors-most notably Turkey and China-which could capitalize on the preoccupation of the primary parties in a protracted conflict to expand their economic and diplomatic influence in the region. This, in turn, situates the confrontation within a more complex framework than that of a mere bilateral conflict between Israel and Iran.

From another perspective, Bani Hamdan emphasizes that the war with Iran is also closely linked to the broader Palestinian and regional dimension. The confrontation may contribute to the reordering of regional and international priorities in ways that further marginalize the Palestinian issue or instrumentalize it within broader regional arrangements that transcend Palestinian agency. This underscores the extent to which the military confrontation is intertwined with wider political and strategic dynamics across the region.

This line of analysis is reinforced by Ahmad Azem,[2] who links the war to domestic political calculations within Israel, particularly the need of Benjamin Netanyahu to reshuffle the internal political landscape, expand the space available to consolidate his political standing, and divert attention from internal crises, including corruption cases and deep societal divisions. From this perspective, the war functions simultaneously as a tool for managing external threats and for navigating Israel’s internal political predicament.

At the same time, Ahmad Azem links the war on Iran to domestic political calculations within Israel. According to his analysis, regional escalation cannot be separated from the internal political context confronting Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Under mounting political and judicial pressures, the war may serve as a means of reshuffling the domestic political landscape, consolidating the position of the right-wing government, and diverting attention from Israel’s internal crises. From this perspective, the war becomes not only a tool for managing external threats but also an instrument for managing internal political balances within Israel.

In addressing U.S. objectives in this war, Azem argues that the American position cannot be detached from domestic political considerations within the United States. U.S. administrations often view external crises through the lens of their domestic political implications, particularly in the context of approaching electoral cycles. In this regard, the administration may seek to achieve tangible outcomes that can be presented to the domestic public-either by demonstrating the effective use of military force or by advancing a political settlement framed as a diplomatic achievement.

Similarly, the nature of this war cannot be understood independently of the position of the Palestinian issue within it. Several experts, most notably Ahmad Azem and Ahmad Bani Hamdan, suggest that the war with Iran may directly or indirectly contribute to the reordering of regional and international priorities in ways that further marginalize the Palestinian issue or instrumentalize it within broader regional arrangements that transcend Palestinian agency. This implies that even when the war appears primarily directed at Iran, it remains closely tied to the reshaping of the regional arena in which Israel operates, including Gaza, the West Bank, the expansion of normalization agreements, and pressures on certain Arab states.

From another angle, Azem notes that Turkey is closely monitoring the conflict, given its geostrategic position, its investments in the region, and the potential impact of the war on its relations with both Iran and Israel. This may prompt Ankara to reassess its regional posture and strategic alignments. As for the Palestinian issue, the war exerts a dual effect: while it may experience further marginalization within regional priorities, it may also be instrumentalized as part of broader regional balancing arrangements-adding yet another layer of complexity to the overall strategic landscape.

Nathan Brown[3] centers his analysis on the institutional nature of the Iranian regime as a key variable in understanding the future trajectory of the war. He begins from the premise that the system is not built around the authority of a single individual, but rather rests on a complex and interlocking institutional architecture composed of religious, political, security, and economic bodies established since the 1979 Islamic Revolution to entrench the principle of Velayat-e Faqih and ensure regime continuity.

According to Brown, this institutional structure endows the Iranian regime with a high capacity to absorb and adapt to external shocks. The assassination of senior figures or the targeting of strategic infrastructure does not necessarily translate into systemic collapse. In his assessment, the belief that the Iranian regime can be rapidly overthrown through military strikes constitutes a political illusion that overlooks the depth of the Islamic Republic’s institutional experience, as well as the networks and mechanisms designed to guarantee continuity of governance even under conditions of intense pressure or leadership transition.

Brown further links this analysis to a more grounded understanding of the current war by noting that U.S. policy toward Iran appears to lack a clearly defined strategic framework. This is largely because Washington’s decisions on this issue are significantly shaped by the personal positions of the U.S. president, resulting in inconsistent and sometimes contradictory statements regarding the nature and objectives of the conflict. At times, U.S. discourse appears to lean toward regime change, while at other moments it suggests a more limited aim of modifying Iran’s regional behavior or compelling it to return to the negotiating table.

From this perspective, Brown argues that such American strategic ambiguity reflects the absence of a coherent vision regarding the desired end state of the war or the feasibility of regime change as a realistic objective. This ambiguity, in turn, is reflected in Delphi-based assessments of the regime’s future trajectory.

In light of this, Brown’s analysis underscores the depth of the Iranian regime’s institutional architecture as a central factor in explaining its resilience. It also highlights the importance of incorporating this institutional dimension into any strategic analysis of the war, particularly when the objective is to assess the future of the Iranian regime under current military, economic, and political pressures.

Badr Al-Madi[4] highlights in his analysis that the war with Iran cannot be understood in isolation from broader shifts in the regional balance of power, nor from the efforts of certain Arab states-most notably Saudi Arabia-to redefine their strategic positioning in response to Iranian influence. According to Al-Madi, any military or strategic escalation in the region is closely tied to attempts to manage the Iranian threat in a manner that preserves relative stability while avoiding a prolonged direct confrontation. In this sense, Iran itself becomes a central axis in the management of delicate regional balances, rather than merely a military adversary of Israel.

Al-Madi further emphasizes that Israeli calculations in the war extend beyond confronting Iran alone; they also involve reshaping the regional environment in ways that strengthen Israel’s position within the emerging Arab regional order. Israel’s efforts to expand normalization with certain Arab states, and to push others toward new security arrangements, form part of a broader strategy aimed at redistributing influence across the region. This, in turn, adds an additional layer of complexity to the strategic calculations of both Iran and neighboring Arab states.

From Al-Madi’s perspective, the Arab Gulf constitutes a central strategic axis in the calculations of the regional conflict. It is viewed not merely as a theater affected by military dynamics, but as a key arena for managing energy flows, maritime routes, and the balance of influence among regional and international powers. Moreover, the indirect repercussions of the conflict-whether through Iraq and Syria or via Iranian networks of influence-render the war an instrument for the broader reordering of strategic priorities, including the balancing of Iranian influence and the redefinition of the limits of Arab and international engagement in the region.

In this way, Al-Madi’s analysis complements those of other experts by underscoring that the current war is not a short-term or limited confrontation. Rather, it is a multi-layered war of attrition in which the regional map of influence is being redrawn, and through which the capacity of various actors to manage both internal and external pressures is being tested while preserving their strategic positions. From this vantage point, the war becomes a mechanism for restructuring regional balances, rather than merely a direct military confrontation between Israel and Iran.

In his assessment, Ammar Kahf[5] highlights that this confrontation reveals a fundamental paradox in Israeli power. On the one hand, Israel seeks to re-establish a deterrence equation by targeting Iranian capabilities-particularly its missile arsenal. On the other hand, the war itself exposes the limits of this power, whether due to internal Israeli divisions, divergences within the U.S. political environment, or the growing opposition to protracted wars among currents such as the “America First” movement. This observation carries methodological significance, as it underscores that war does not merely generate attrition for the adversary; it simultaneously reveals vulnerabilities within the initiating actors themselves.

Kahf further argues that the future of the Iranian regime is inseparable from the extent of its influence across surrounding regional arenas. Iranian networks of influence in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon constitute, for Tehran, an integral component of a broader regional deterrence architecture that enables it to absorb direct pressure. Consequently, any substantial transformation in the structure of the Iranian regime would be directly reflected in these arenas. This helps explain the concern expressed by certain regional actors regarding the potential spillover of Iranian instability into its wider geopolitical environment-particularly at a time when the region is undergoing a transitional phase marked by the erosion of old balances without the emergence of stable new ones. In this context, the declining capacity of the United States to impose a clearly defined regional order, coupled with the rise of multiple regional powers, has rendered the Middle East increasingly akin to a multipolar regional system characterized by high fluidity and uncertainty.

The dynamics of attrition do not remain confined to Iran, Israel, and the United States; rather, they extend into the surrounding regional arenas, thereby imparting a broader structural dimension to the conflict. Syria, in particular, represents a sensitive theater for the potential diffusion of the conflict-whether through Iran-aligned militias or through heightened tensions in southern Syria-making it part of the geopolitical landscape likely to absorb the reverberations of the confrontation.

Kahf also notes that the logic of attrition assumes an additional dimension in the Arabian Gulf, where the conflict intersects with energy calculations, maritime routes, and global economic security. Targeting-or threatening to target-the Gulf should not be understood solely as military escalation, but as a mechanism for raising the costs of war, expanding the scope of pressure, and conveying strategic messages to the United States and its allies through markets, energy flows, and maritime corridors. At the same time, Kahf argues that Turkey recognizes that unchecked Israeli predominance in the region could generate a significant imbalance in the regional order. This perception drives Ankara to seek a network of understandings with key regional states-such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan-with the aim of constructing a more stable regional equilibrium.

The U.S. strategy in the current conflict appears to align more closely with a model of military pressure conditioned by negotiation. According to this interpretation, Washington is not necessarily seeking the outright overthrow of the Iranian regime; rather, it aims to undermine Iran’s deterrent capabilities and compel it to return to the negotiating table regarding its nuclear program and regional conduct. However, this approach simultaneously generates a clear divergence between the United States and Israel. While Washington tends to employ military force as an instrument of political leverage, certain circles in Israel appear more inclined toward fundamentally weakening Iran-even at the risk of triggering a prolonged regional escalation.

The implications of this strategic ambiguity extend to U.S. allies in the Middle East. Regional states, particularly in the Gulf, find themselves navigating a complex equation: on the one hand, reliance on the American security umbrella; on the other, the need to contend with an increasingly fluid regional environment marked by the variability of U.S. positions and the lack of strategic clarity. This reality has prompted several Arab states to reassess their regional policies and to explore more balanced approaches to managing tensions with Iran.

In his assessment, Firas Ilyas[6] argues that the current war may render Iraq one of the most vulnerable regional arenas to the conflict’s spillover effects. The intricate relationship between Baghdad and Tehran, coupled with the extensive influence of armed factions affiliated with the so-called “Axis of Resistance,” makes it difficult for the Iraqi government to insulate the country from regional developments. Iraq already suffers from institutional fragility, which allows these factions to impose their political and security narratives at the expense of the state’s authority, thereby increasing the likelihood of Iraq’s gradual entanglement in the conflict.

Ilyas further contends that Syria represents another sensitive arena for potential conflict diffusion, whether through Iran-aligned militias or through rising tensions in southern Syria. As such, Syria constitutes part of the geopolitical landscape likely to absorb the reverberations of the confrontation. He adds that the nature of the Syrian regime and the complexity of regional entanglements make it difficult to predict the trajectory of the conflict there. Nevertheless, he emphasizes that any escalation in Syria could have direct repercussions on regional balances of power and on the strategic calculations of multiple actors, including Israel, Russia, and Turkey.

With regard to the Arabian Gulf, Ilyas underscores that the conflict is not confined to its military dimension; it extends to encompass energy calculations, maritime routes, and global economic security. He notes that targeting-or threatening to target-the Gulf serves as a mechanism to raise the costs of war, broaden the scope of pressure, and transmit political and military signals to the United States and its allies through energy markets and strategic waterways. This dimension, he argues, reflects attempts by certain regional actors-foremost among them Saudi Arabia-to manage the Iranian threat without sliding into direct confrontation, while simultaneously seeking to prevent the conflict from becoming a sustained instrument for reproducing Iranian influence or marginalizing the Arab role in the region.

Ilyas further argues that the nature of the war is intrinsically linked to the Palestinian issue. Even if the conflict appears to be directed primarily at Iran, it may-directly or indirectly-contribute to a reordering of regional and international priorities in ways that further marginalize the Palestinian cause or instrumentalize it within broader regional arrangements. In this sense, Gaza and the West Bank become integral components of the strategic theater of the conflict, shaped by Israel’s regional calculations and the emerging balance of power in the region.

On this basis, Ilyas contends that the current confrontation should not be understood as a short war with clearly defined beginnings and endpoints, but rather as a prolonged process of attrition that extends beyond the limits of direct military engagement. At the same time, it functions as a mechanism for reshaping the relationships between power, deterrence, and influence across the region. The war thus unfolds across multiple, interconnected levels: exerting pressure on Iran; managing U.S.–international competition; reconfiguring Israel’s security environment; and restructuring the surrounding Arab arenas-from Iraq and Syria to the Gulf and Palestine. Understanding the nature of this war, therefore, becomes a necessary entry point for interpreting broader regional dynamics.

Ma‘an Tallaa[7] similarly argues that the ongoing confrontation with Iran must be analyzed through a broader lens that goes beyond immediate military responses. In his view, the October 7 attacks constitute a pivotal turning point in Israeli strategic thinking, as they exposed deep vulnerabilities in Israel’s traditional security doctrine-one that, since 1948, has relied on the principles of rapid deterrence and transferring the battlefield onto the adversary’s territory. According to Tallaa, the shock of these attacks has driven the Israeli security establishment to undertake a comprehensive reassessment of this doctrine and to pursue the construction of a regional environment that reduces potential sources of threat before they evolve into direct strategic risks.

Tallaa further suggests that Israel’s current strategy is evolving through incremental phases. It begins with efforts to weaken non-state actors associated with the Iranian axis-such as Hamas and Hezbollah-and then progresses toward employing a broader set of tools, including precision strikes, cyber warfare, and the targeting of military leadership and strategic infrastructure. Within this framework, the approach aims to gradually erode the military capabilities of Iran and its regional networks of influence, while avoiding a large-scale conventional war that would impose significant costs on all parties involved.

Tallaa grounds his analysis in the premise that this strategic project is not merely a conventional response to an immediate Iranian threat, but rather part of a broader vision aimed at re-engineering the regional security environment, which has been fundamentally altered in the aftermath of the October 7 events. In this sense, Israeli military operations are not to be understood as isolated actions, but as interconnected components of a long-term project seeking to redraw the contours of regional deterrence in line with the vulnerabilities exposed in the traditional security doctrine.

Tallaa further notes that this strategic orientation cannot be separated from Israel’s domestic political context. War has become not only a means of confronting external threats, but also an instrument for reinforcing internal stability and managing the domestic political landscape. While Israel seeks to restore its deterrent capacity and expand its strategic maneuverability, the war simultaneously offers an opportunity to recalibrate internal political balances within Israeli society in response to the shock generated by the October 7 attack-both at the security and political levels.

Accordingly, Tallaa argues that the confrontation with Iran extends beyond immediate military dimensions; it constitutes part of a comprehensive Israeli strategy to reshape the regional security order. This is pursued through the accumulation of calibrated pressure instruments and the gradual reduction of sources of threat over the medium and long term, while embedding this strategy within a domestic political framework that enhances Israel’s capacity to sustain itself in an unstable regional environment.

For his part, Hassan Jaber[8] approaches the nature of the war from the standpoint that it cannot be understood in isolation from broader transformations in the international system. The confrontation, in his view, represents a test of the United States’ ability to manage a high-cost regional conflict without diverting its strategic focus from competition with China. From this perspective, the war ceases to be merely a Middle Eastern crisis and instead becomes part of a wider challenge concerning the limits of American hegemony, the costs of sustaining it, and Washington’s capacity to simultaneously manage regional crises while competing with rising powers.

This implies that the logic of attrition does not apply to Iran alone, but may also extend to the United States itself, as a party bearing the costs of direct or indirect engagement in the conflict. Jaber argues that this paradox reflects a recurring dilemma in U.S. foreign policy. The United States faced a similar predicament during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where military operations evolved into protracted arenas of strategic attrition that drained American military and political resources and undermined its ability to manage competition with rising powers. From this standpoint, the continuation of the conflict with Iran may create an indirect strategic opportunity for China, which could capitalize on Washington’s preoccupation with a prolonged regional conflict to expand its economic and diplomatic influence across various regions of the world.

Abdullah Al-Taai[9] focuses in his analysis on Iraq as a central arena within the dynamics of the war with Iran, describing it as the vital artery of the Iranian regional project, given its geographic position and its political and military linkages with Tehran. From this perspective, any shift in the balance of power between Iran and its adversaries is likely to be directly reflected in Iraq.

Al-Taai notes that the presence of zones of influence controlled by Iran-aligned armed factions within Iraqi territory increases the likelihood of Iraq becoming a theater for indirect confrontation between the United States and Iran. This dynamic renders the Iraqi state-whose political and security apparatus suffers from structural and institutional weaknesses-particularly vulnerable to both direct and indirect forms of regional interference.

Moreover, Al-Taai argues that this entanglement does not remain confined to Iraq alone, but extends its effects to other regional arenas. The fragility of Iraqi state institutions, coupled with the ability of armed factions to impose their political and security narratives, casts a shadow of instability over the broader dynamics of conflict across the Middle East.

In addressing the future of the Iranian regime, Al-Taai suggests that targeting its military leadership and strategic infrastructure could place Iran under an unprecedented test-particularly if such pressures are accompanied by mounting economic and social strains. This could push the regime toward heightened political and security fragility, with the potential for escalating internal protests or ethnic tensions in sensitive regions.

Within this context, Al-Taai introduces a more severe scenario involving the potential fragmentation of Iran’s territorial cohesion should internal and external pressures accumulate simultaneously. Although he considers this scenario unlikely in the near term, he emphasizes that it remains present in strategic discourse, especially given existing ethnic tensions in areas such as Kurdish, Baloch, and Arab (Ahvaz) regions. He further underscores that the realization of such a scenario would carry significant regional costs, as it could trigger widespread instability across the region.

Turning to the Turkish arena, Al-Taai observes that Ankara is closely and cautiously monitoring regional developments, particularly regarding the possibility that certain regional actors might exploit the Kurdish issue in Iraq, Syria, or even within Iran. He adds that the emergence of a new Kurdish entity in the region constitutes one of Turkey’s most significant strategic concerns, potentially prompting it to intensify security coordination with both Iraq and Syria to prevent such an outcome.

In this sense, Al-Taai concludes that Iraq is not merely a peripheral arena in the conflict, but rather one of the critical pathways through which the war could evolve from indirect pressure into open security entanglement-given the depth of Iranian influence within it, the presence of armed factions, and the limited capacity of the Iraqi state to impose its sovereign authority across the full spectrum of the security domain.

Hussein Al-Sarayrah[10] characterizes this conflict as a “war of time”-that is, a war not measured primarily by immediate military victory, but by the capacity of the parties to endure, absorb pressure, and sustain the costs of attrition over an extended period. In this type of warfare, the central question is not: who will win first? but rather: who can endure longer without succumbing to internal collapse or debilitating exhaustion that undermines their ability to continue the struggle. In this sense, time itself becomes a strategic resource, and the war shifts from a confrontation on the battlefield to a competition over resilience, the management of erosion, and the denial of any clear political or military resolution to the adversary.

This understanding aligns with Al-Sarayrah’s broader argument that the current war does not constitute a single, unified military front, but rather a network of interconnected conflicts. While it includes direct military strikes, it also extends into economic sanctions, cyber warfare, psychological and media pressures, and symbolic messaging related to deterrence and the projection of resilience. This framework is particularly significant, as it explains why the war-despite the intensity of certain phases-remains resistant to rapid closure, and why its subsidiary objectives tend to multiply over time, making it increasingly difficult to identify a clear endpoint or to establish a stable definition of “victory.”

Regarding the future of the Iranian regime, Al-Sarayrah assesses that it possesses a high capacity to absorb external shocks and to regenerate internal cohesion under pressure. The historical experience of the Islamic Republic suggests that external threats often function as catalysts for internal mobilization, reinforcing narratives of “existential targeting” and strengthening social and political solidarity around the regime. In such contexts, external conflict is frequently instrumentalized to reorder domestic priorities within Iranian society and to defer internal tensions, thereby providing the regime with additional room for endurance-even in the face of significant military and economic pressures.

Future Scenarios of the War

The nature of the data employed in this study does not permit the generation of strictly quantitative weights in a statistical sense, as the paper is not based on a closed-ended survey or on standardized Delphi rounds that are amenable to direct quantitative measurement. Nevertheless, an analysis of the relative frequency of ideas within the analytical corpus allows for a distinction between more prominent and less pronounced trends. In this context, the logic of prolonged attrition and the hypothesis of institutional resilience within the Iranian regime emerge as the most dominant trends in expert assessments. By contrast, scenarios of rapid collapse or decisive, large-scale warfare appear less prevalent and are more closely tied to conditional escalation assumptions. Meanwhile, the prospect of a return to negotiations is not presented as the antithesis of escalation, but rather as a potential outcome following a phase of calibrated military pressure.

On this basis, it is possible to construct a scenario matrix that is more consistent with the analytical trends revealed by the modified Delphi reading. In this framework, scenarios should not be understood as entirely discrete alternatives, but rather as potential trajectories that may overlap or unfold sequentially, depending on the evolution of both the military and political landscapes.

An Interpretive Reading of the Scenario Matrix

The scenario matrix indicates that the most likely outcome in the foreseeable term is neither full-scale war nor a stable settlement, but rather the continuation of a pattern of calibrated attrition, in which the parties exchange strikes within relatively controlled limits while keeping the door open to either recalibrating or expanding the conflict in response to shifts on the battlefield and in the political arena. This scenario derives its plausibility from its alignment with the most prominent trend in the analytical corpus-namely, the logic of a prolonged, multi-instrument war that seeks not rapid resolution, but the gradual exhaustion of the adversary and the reshaping of the conditions of equilibrium.

By contrast, the scenario of multi-front regional escalation remains a credible possibility, though not the most immediately likely one. It is typically associated with a breakdown in the existing rules of engagement, miscalculation, or the uncontrolled involvement of armed actors across surrounding arenas. The significance of this scenario stems from the fragility of certain regional environments-particularly Iraq and Syria-as well as the sensitivity of the Gulf and key maritime corridors to any uncalculated expansion of the conflict.

The scenario of negotiated de-escalation following pressure should not be interpreted as a purely peaceful trajectory, but rather as a potential outcome of a preceding phase of escalation, in which military operations are employed to renegotiate the terms of engagement rather than to resolve the conflict at its roots. In this context, war functions as a mechanism for reconstructing the rules of negotiation, particularly with regard to Iran’s nuclear program, its regional behavior, and its networks of indirect influence.

The matrix also suggests that debates over the future of the Iranian regime should move beyond the binary of immediate collapse versus survival. More critical is whether the war will produce a gradual erosion in the regime’s structural capacity to govern and to reproduce its legitimacy, even in the absence of sudden collapse. While this scenario may not be the most prominent in the short term, it remains highly relevant in the medium term-especially if economic, military, and social pressures accumulate alongside a decline in both internal and external deterrence credibility.

Finally, the scenario of a decisive, large-scale confrontation remains the least probable-not because of its lack of danger, but because of the high costs it would impose on all parties, making it more likely to emerge from the failure of containment mechanisms than as a preferred strategic option. A comprehensive war would likely entail deeper U.S. involvement, significant disruption in global energy markets, and an unprecedented expansion of regional instability. These factors collectively incentivize actors to treat such a scenario as a contingency of necessity rather than a deliberate strategic choice.

Accordingly, the five scenarios should not be understood as closed alternatives, but as interconnected trajectories between which the conflict may shift, depending on changes in deterrence conditions, the positions of major powers, the roles of regional actors, and the nature of internal transformations within Iran, Israel, and the United States.

Conclusion

This paper concludes that the war with Iran is best understood, at its core, as a struggle over the reconfiguration of regional balances rather than a conflict aimed at achieving rapid and decisive military victory. The most prominent trend in expert assessments points toward a logic of prolonged, multi-domain attrition, in which force is employed to impose new strategic conditions rather than to secure an immediate and definitive outcome.

The analysis further suggests that the Iranian regime does not appear prone to rapid collapse; however, it may face a trajectory of gradual structural erosion should the war persist and pressures accumulate. Conversely, Israel appears to be operating within a broader project aimed at re-engineering the regional security environment, while the United States continues to manage the conflict through calibrated military pressure and strategic ambiguity, enabling it to maneuver without full-scale entanglement.

At the regional level, the war reveals that Iraq, Syria, the Gulf, Turkey, and Palestine are not peripheral arenas, but integral components of the conflict’s underlying structure. It also points to a growing tendency toward regional realignment-particularly at the Saudi–Gulf level-in an effort to balance between containing Iran and preventing unchecked Israeli predominance.

A close analytical reading of expert perspectives demonstrates that the war with Iran has evolved beyond a conventional military confrontation between defined actors. It has become a process of re-testing the entire architecture of regional deterrence, where the limits of power, the resilience of political systems, and the endurance of regional networks under pressure are all being assessed. The issue is no longer confined to the balance of military capabilities, but extends to each actor’s ability to manage escalation without sliding into comprehensive war, and to translate military pressure into political or strategic gains.

Accordingly, analyzing the present reality requires tracking three interrelated levels: the dynamics of the immediate military battlefield; the responses of domestic structures within the states concerned; and the behavior of regional arenas that function as transmission spaces for deterrence and pressure. This, in turn, necessitates moving beyond viewing the war as an isolated event, toward understanding it as part of a broader transitional phase in the regional order, in which the rules of engagement and the acceptable limits of power among actors are being redefined.

From this perspective, forecasting future trajectories becomes contingent upon monitoring a set of critical indicators, including Iran’s capacity to maintain internal cohesion, the limits of Israeli escalation, the nature of U.S. engagement between deterrence and containment, and the positioning of major regional powers. If the conflict continues within its current pattern of calibrated escalation, it is likely to lead to a gradual redrawing of deterrence structures and alliance patterns in the Middle East-even in the absence of a full-scale war. However, if any of these indicators exceed their thresholds, the confrontation may shift from a multi-arena war of attrition to a more profound moment of systemic reconfiguration within the regional security order.

In the foreseeable future, controlled attrition remains the most likely scenario, followed by the possibility of conditional regional escalation, and then negotiated de-escalation after a phase of pressure. By contrast, full-scale war or the rapid collapse of the Iranian regime remain less probable, though they cannot be entirely ruled out.

Ultimately, the principal contribution of this paper lies not merely in compiling diverse interpretations of the war, but in transforming them into a structured analytical framework suitable for comparison and forecasting. This approach enhances the methodological rigor and explanatory depth of Arab discourse on the confrontation with Iran, while opening the way for a more nuanced understanding of the conflict’s potential trajectories within a regional and international context marked by high levels of fluidity and uncertainty.

[1] Security and strategic expert.

[2] Academic advisor at the Politics and Society Institute; Professor of Political Science and International Relations at Birzeit University and Qatar University.

[3] Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University; U.S.-based scholar of law and Middle East politics. He is also a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he writes on religion, governance, and politics in the Arab world.

[4] Academic advisor at the Politics and Society Institute; Professor of Political Sociology at the German Jordanian University.

[5] Executive Director of the Omran Center for Strategic Studies; expert and lecturer on Syrian and regional affairs.

[6] Professor of International Relations at the College of Political Science, University of Mosul, Iraq; specialist in defense policy and strategic and security affairs.

[7] Director of Research at the Omran Center for Strategic Studies; Syrian academic and researcher specializing in security and military affairs.

[8] Nonresident researcher at the Politics and Society Institute, specializing in international relations and Middle East politics.

[9] Nonresident researcher at the Politics and Society Institute, specializing in Iraqi affairs, Islamic groups, and Middle East issues.

[10] Programs Director and resident researcher at the Politics and Society Institute.