Jordanian Diplomacy and Sailing Through Dense Fog
In a recent televised interview with the BBC, King Abdullah II conveyed Jordan’s strategic approach toward Israel’s far-right government under Benjamin Netanyahu. The King stated unequivocally that he does not trust a word Netanyahu says, signaling a firm and decisive stance in framing the relationship between Jordan and Israel, three decades after the signing of the Peace Treaty. These remarks follow similar statements by both the King and Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, reflecting an official Jordanian discourse that portrays the Israeli government as rogue and extremist.
Early on, deep political disagreements emerged between Jordan’s decision-making circles in Amman and Benjamin Netanyahu’s political positions; however, these disagreements have reached an unprecedented level, prompting Jordan to take a leading diplomatic role both regionally and internationally, particularly since “The Al-Aqsa Flood” and Israel’s military campaign on the Palestinian people in Gaza. This development is rooted in three key factors. First is Jordan’s long experience dealing with Netanyahu, a relationship historically marked by tension and clear hostility. Second is Israel’s rightward political shift and the rising influence of extremist religious movements that openly reject peace with the Palestinians, oppose the creation of a Palestinian state, and advance only the doctrine of population transfer. Third is the renewed discussion in religious and political Zionist circles of the so-called “Jordanian option,” which entails forced displacement and annexation of the West Bank. All of this unfolds against a backdrop in which there is virtually no influential current within Israeli society, either today or in the foreseeable future, that recognizes the imperative of a peace built on negotiated settlement and the fulfillment of Palestinian rights.
The return of Donald Trump, accompanied by a far-right team, deepens the challenge of navigating the new regional and strategic environment. Within the incoming administration, there is clear competition over who can serve Israel’s interests the most. And although visible differences have emerged between the current U.S Secretary of State, Mike Rubio, who strongly embraces Zionist rhetoric, and U.S Vice President J.D. Vance, who leans more toward the “America First” camp, these are marginal disagreements that do not in any way weaken U.S. support for Israel. Netanyahu capitalizes on this dynamic to the fullest extent.
What is even more concerning for decision-making circles in Amman is the forceful re-entry of Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, into the political scene. Kushner is known for his hostility toward Jordan and, according to official Jordanian accounts, played a role in what was described nearly six years ago as the “sedition case.” Today, he returns as one of the most influential figures shaping Trump’s approach to Gaza, and potentially the entire regional agenda.
Jordan therefore approaches developments in Gaza with caution. The twenty-point framework announced by President Donald Trump consists largely of general principles rather than concrete commitments, meaning the “battle over details” will be critical, difficult, and highly consequential. Jordan, along with a group of Arab and Muslim states, was unable to significantly alter the draft presented by Trump, a document engineered by Steve Witkoff (his Middle East envoy), Jared Kushner, and Netanyahu, and aligned almost entirely with the Israeli vision.
Yet accepting it became the only strategic option to halt the war on Gaza. What follows is the real political struggle: a contest between international and regional approaches, and a clash of strategic agendas. This next phase is marked by profound uncertainty, a foggy environment in which even short-term outcomes are hard to discern, let alone formulating long-term policies and strategies capable of responding to the new realities.
The coming phase will be filled with challenges for Jordan and for the Palestinians, particularly with regard to questions surrounding Gaza’s future. There are fundamental disagreements between Jordan and the Arab-Islamic group on one side, and Israel and the U.S. administration on the other, over most issues related to the second stage. These include: the structure of the technocratic administrative committee (with Israel rejecting Palestinian and Arab proposals); the role of the Global Peace Council (as the Palestinians reject U.S. guardianship and seek to restrict the council’s mandate to reconstruction and development); the role of international forces (with Jordan insisting they operate strictly as peacekeepers separating Israelis and Palestinians, and not as an internal security force, a role that should be carried out by Palestinian police trained in Egypt and Jordan); the relationship between the technocratic committee and the Palestinian Authority; Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza; and the definition and disposition of Hamas’ weapons (with Jordan recognizing that Israel is primarily focused on dismantling the tunnel network entirely). In short, the range of unresolved and contentious issues is wide, and each represents a political battle of its own.
Jordan’s approach to Gaza avoids competing with Egypt, Qatar, or Türkiye. Jordan’s priorities there are clear: ending the war, addressing humanitarian and relief needs, and preventing any separation between the West Bank and Gaza, while political mediation and influence are largely left to those other states.
However, the situation in the West Bank is entirely different. It is inseparable from Jordan’s national security calculus and is a source of deep concern for policymakers in Amman. Jordan played a significant role in persuading President Trump to publicly oppose the annexation of the West Bank. Yet there are persistent Jordanian anxieties that this rejection is fragile and not guaranteed to endure, nor does it necessarily oppose the annexation of parts of the West Bank. Israel could pursue annexation gradually, piece by piece. In fact, the annexation project is already advancing on the ground, threatening to eliminate any prospect of a viable Palestinian political entity.
Jordanian diplomatic discourse stresses that a silent war is unfolding in the West Bank parallel to the ongoing war in Gaza. It argues that the West Bank project pursued by extremist Zionist actors in the West Bank and Jerusalem poses a greater threat to regional security and has a higher potential to ignite the region. The core danger lies in the possible collapse of the Palestinian Authority, the ensuing security vacuum, and Israel’s plans to fragment the West Bank into isolated “cantons” under suffocating economic conditions – effectively producing a de facto “voluntary transfer” driven by political, economic, and security pressures.
Jordan’s problems with its destabilizing neighbor, the government of Benjamin Netanyahu, are not limited to the western front; his policies pose even greater risks along the northern border, particularly concerning Suwayda and southern regions of Syria. There is clear evidence of an active Israeli agenda to fragment Syria, redraw spheres of influence, and place the new Syrian regime under the control of Netanyahu’s government. This strategy involves seizing key strategic sites in the south, linking Suwayda to the Golan Heights, and establishing an Israeli military and security presence in southern Syria, leveraging figures of questionable reliability, such as Hikmat al-Hajri. Should Israel attempt to create a new geopolitical balance in southern Syria, Jordan will face a significant and genuine challenge, one that may compel it to reconsider its military and security approach to its northern borders.
In this context, another challenge emerges in dealing with U.S. policies and a personality such as President Donald Trump. It is clear that this administration – as a former official noted in a closed session at the Politics and Society Institute two years ago – downplays Jordan’s strategic value. Trump tends to focus on the major regional powers and those with substantial resources, which makes Jordan cautious and vigilant in its dealings with Washington. Although Jordan generally avoids direct confrontation with the U.S., if a moment arises that requires a clear “no,” Jordanian policy will adopt that stance. Similar instances occurred during Trump’s first term, as well as in several comparable historical turning points.
Jordan’s current strategic bets focus on the formation of a new regional-strategic axis, referred to as the “Arab-Islamic Group,” which takes positions aligned with Jordan’s own. Jordan’s relations with both Saudi Arabia and Qatar are steadily improving, with clear coordination on regional strategic issues. Similar patterns are evident in its traditional relations with the UAE and Egypt. Jordan provides full backing for the new Syrian regime, reflecting the conviction in Amman that any alternative would lead to chaos and internal conflict. At the same time, Jordanian-Turkish relations are visibly improving.
On the international front, Jordanian diplomacy has been unusually active in recent years, with relations with Europe improving significantly. Jordan also maintains good relations with Russia. Next week, the King will undertake a political tour of friendly Asian countries. These steps aim to strengthen Jordan’s international and regional ties and to build a network of strategic alliances with these states, enabling Amman to navigate the profound uncertainty surrounding Jordan-U.S. relations and the deepening crisis arising from the new Israeli reality.