Toward a New Architecture for al-Aqsa Mosque: U.S. Legislation as an Instrument for Restructuring Israeli Control

The draft bill recently introduced in the U.S. Congress marks a pivotal moment in the trajectory of Israeli control over Jerusalem. For the first time, this trajectory shifts from the realm of on-the-ground policies and administrative measures to the level of binding U.S. legislation, effectively granting Israel an extraterritorial legal shield to consolidate its religious sovereignty over al-Aqsa Mosque. This development reflects the growing influence of Zionist lobbying networks in Washington and their efforts to redefine the legal status of the Holy Esplanade through the rhetoric of “religious freedom,” which is being employed as an entry point for restructuring both the boundaries and the meaning of the site.

In parallel with the expansionist settlement enterprise in Jerusalem and the West Bank, new external legislative steps-particularly within the United States-are emerging to provide a formal legal dimension to this trajectory. These measures aim to entrench Israeli control not only over territory, but also over sacred spaces. Within this context, the U.S. House of Representatives has introduced a draft bill that carries an implicit recognition of Israeli sovereignty over al-Aqsa Mosque-a move that constitutes a severe breach of the long-standing status quo in Jerusalem and directly undermines the Hashemite custodianship over Islamic and Christian holy sites, foremost among them al-Aqsa Mosque. This trend signals a shift among certain circles in Washington from traditional political support for Israel toward attempts to confer legal legitimacy on Israeli sovereignty measures in the city’s most sensitive sacred precinct.

According to the text published on the U.S. Congress website, the proposed legislation-submitted by Representatives Claudia Tenney and Clay Higgins and backed by the Zionist Organization of America and the Middle East Truth organization[1]-affirms the following:

• The Jewish people’s “right to full access” to al-Aqsa Mosque and their right to pray and worship there in accordance with the principles of religious freedom.
• Recognition of the “integral role of the Temple Mount” in Jewish heritage and history.
• Support for the Israeli government’s efforts to protect the rights of Muslim worshippers and the safety of Islamic structures on the site, in line with Israel’s current policies.
• Renewed affirmation of U.S. recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s “undivided capital,” repeatedly enshrined in U.S. policy and law-including recognition of Israeli sovereignty over the Holy Esplanade.

Through these provisions, the proposal moves beyond political declarations and approaches a legislative framework aimed at redefining the legal and religious status of the Holy Esplanade. This stands in direct contradiction to the established status quo and to the historic Hashemite custodianship. Here, the concept of “freedom of worship” is deployed as an instrument to alter the site’s legal character, shifting it from a space of clearly defined Islamic religious sovereignty to one framed as a “contested site” to be reinterpreted through an Israeli lens.

This development raises a fundamental question: what does it imply for Jordan’s role? The proposed U.S. legislation directly affects the Hashemite custodianship and goes beyond Jordan’s historical mandate to administer the affairs of the Holy Esplanade as an exclusively Islamic waqf. It effectively offers an alternative legal framework that transfers supervisory legitimacy toward Israel. Jordan’s custodianship today is not symbolic; it carries recognized religious–legal authority affirmed in the peace treaty. By invoking the concepts of “Jewish rights to worship” and “Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount,” the draft bill dismantles this legal foundation and relegates the custodianship to a secondary or ceremonial role-opening the door to altering the administrative structure of al-Aqsa Mosque and constraining the authority of the Jordanian Ministry of Awqaf. In this sense, the bill moves from being a mere political expression to an instrument for redistributing religious authority within the site.

The proposal emerges within a set of considerations presented by Congress. It begins with the Jewish conception of the “Temple Mount” as the holiest site in Judaism, drawing on the narrative that the First Temple-attributed to Solomon-was built nearly three millennia ago, in the tenth century BCE, followed by the reconstruction of the Second Temple in 516 BCE, known as Herod’s Temple, both of which were later destroyed. Congress asserts that this heritage is supported by “archaeological evidence and biblical texts” attesting to their historical existence. The proposal also invokes wars that shaped American political consciousness regarding Jerusalem, particularly the 1967 Six-Day War, after which both the eastern and western parts of the city fell under Israeli control-a moment presented in Israeli discourse as the “reunification of Jerusalem.” In addition, the draft cites what it characterizes as “Jordan’s 1988 relinquishment of all claims to its properties in Jerusalem,” referring to the disengagement from the West Bank. However, this interpretation overlooks that the disengagement did not include, alter, or terminate the Hashemite custodianship over Islamic and Christian holy sites, which remained intact.

The bill further rests on an Israeli narrative that frames Israel as a guarantor of “religious freedom” by allowing access to holy sites for adherents of different faiths, while claiming that the rights of Jewish and Christian visitors on the Holy Esplanade are “restricted” compared to those of Muslims. Congress underscores this by noting that Muslims may enter the compound through eleven gates, whereas non-Muslims are allowed access through only one gate and during strictly limited visiting hours; moreover, non-Muslims are barred from entering on Fridays and Saturdays, and Jewish rituals-including Shabbat observance-are prohibited. The United States, in this context, portrays itself as a historic defender of religious freedom, and asserts recognition of Israel’s “sovereign right” to protect its religious and historical sites and to ensure access for worshippers of all religions.

The draft law lays the groundwork for concrete changes on the ground. It would provide Israel with an external legal shield enabling the expansion of Jewish rituals within the sanctuary, potentially including permission for audible public prayer, extended visitation hours for settlers, or the establishment of separate entry pathways. It may also be invoked to redefine police authority in ways that enable direct intervention in regulating movement within al-Aqsa and reduce the administrative role of the Jordanian Awqaf. If fully realized, such changes would effectively dismantle the long-standing status quo and move toward a model of “religious partition”-similar to what occurred at the Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron-yet now underpinned by U.S. legislative backing.

This approach is situated within an asymmetrical relationship between the United States and Israel, in which Washington provides Israel with an unprecedented level of political and legal protection, allowing it to act beyond the constraints typically imposed on states by international law. In this case, it manifests in congressional attempts to bestow legislative legitimacy on Israeli sovereignty claims over al-Aqsa Mosque. The relationship resembles that of a “favored and indulged son,” granting Israel exceptional political privilege that enables it to operate outside the boundaries that would ordinarily apply to other states.

The significance of the proposed U.S. law lies in its potential to serve as an operational tool within Israel’s domestic system, not merely as an external political statement. It is likely to be used in Israeli courts to bolster sovereignty-based arguments in cases concerning incursions or extended visitation hours, and it would provide political cover for police to implement National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir’s policies with increased assertiveness under the banner of “protecting religious freedom.” At the same time, it would offer settlers a legitimizing framework that transforms their presence in al-Aqsa from symbolic visits into an endorsed religious practice supported by external legislation-gradually creating new facts on the ground that weaken the Awqaf’s authority and reshape the contours of the status quo.

The most recent incident inside al-Aqsa Mosque illustrates a stark and dangerous breach of established arrangements. Eight settlers entered the compound through Bab al-Asbat carrying a goat, three doves, and tefillin, in an attempt to introduce and slaughter an animal offering inside the mosque[2]. This act constitutes an unprecedented escalation-not only because incursions, under the established status quo, occur exclusively through Bab al-Maghariba, but because the introduction of such a sacrificial offering carries profound religious symbolism tied to eschatological notions of “redemption” in Jewish tradition, wherein sacrificial acts-such as the slaughter of a goat or lamb-are believed to hasten the arrival of the messiah and pave the way for asserting control over the site.

This behavior cannot be understood as an isolated incident. Settlers have previously attempted to bring similar offerings into the compound, reflecting an escalating trajectory of testing the boundaries of the status quo and altering its rules incrementally. In this sense, the incident becomes another signal of attempts to impose a new reality inside the mosque-one that touches on access mechanisms, the symbolic meaning of ritual activities, and ultimately paves the way for a deeper transformation in the site’s religious and political structure.

Within this context, reports in Israeli circles indicate that Itamar Ben-Gvir intends to appoint Avshalom Peled to replace Amir Arzani[3] as commander of the Jerusalem district. Arzani is viewed as an obstacle to Ben-Gvir’s agenda in al-Aqsa Mosque, as he has resisted pressure to implement changes such as allowing public Jewish prayer and extending visitation hours, measures that would formally alter the status quo between Jordan and Israel. It is therefore likely that Ben-Gvir will appoint a figure aligned with his vision and willing to enact such changes.

At another level, Ben-Gvir is attempting to impose a policy of creating facts on the ground by transforming Jewish presence on the Temple Mount from limited, regulated visits into open religious rituals-establishing a new reality that redefines the site’s function. He is also pursuing a restructuring of the police leadership in Jerusalem by installing individuals who share his vision and support the project of temporal and spatial partition. In addition, he is leveraging his position in the government to exert sustained pressure aimed at legitimizing this shift, whether through internal decisions or by backing external legislative initiatives.

The broader landscape is thus becoming increasingly sensitive and further tilted to the right. Ben-Gvir is using his government position to advance changes aligned with his ideological worldview, particularly concerning the religious and security status of al-Aqsa Mosque. These efforts extend beyond modifying field procedures; they involve reshaping the command hierarchy of the Jerusalem police by removing or replacing officials who resist his agenda. This approach places the status quo under immediate threat and heightens the likelihood of sliding toward a more extreme policy of imposed realities-one that redraws the rules of control and presence in the city. It can be argued that this shift is not merely the product of an individual minister’s ambitions but rather represents a broader arm of the Israeli right seeking to consolidate a reality consistent with developments already unfolding on the ground.

Amid this intersection of U.S. legislation, Israeli on-the-ground pressure, and attempts to dismantle the Hashemite custodianship and re-engineer the administration of al-Aqsa Mosque, a central question emerges: Is the landscape moving toward redefining the Holy Esplanade as a fully sovereign Israeli space? Or are we approaching a moment of confrontation that will compel regional and international actors to recalibrate the rules of the game before reaching a point of no return?

[1] The Zionist Organization of America (ZOA) and the Middle East Truth (EMET) are among the most prominent right-wing, pro-Israel advocacy groups in Washington. Their discourse and political positions closely align with the Israeli right, particularly the policies of Benjamin Netanyahu, including their support for his positions on settlement expansion, Jerusalem, and national security.

[2] The status quo refers to a set of unwritten historical understandings and practical arrangements governing the administration of al-Aqsa Mosque between Jordan and Israel. These arrangements emerged gradually through accumulated practices since 1967, defining the role of each party regarding management of the site and access to it, without being formalized in an official agreement.

[3]  He is the highest-ranking officer in the Jerusalem Police and the direct commander responsible for policing al-Aqsa Mosque, including oversight of the Old City, surrounding settlements, and coordination with guard units. According to the Times of Israel, he is among the few senior officials who oppose Ben-Gvir’s attempts to alter the status quo in al-Aqsa Mosque.