Negotiating Under Fire: Lebanon’s Position in the Reconfiguration of Regional Negotiation Tracks

The announcement by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of the launch of direct negotiations with Lebanon, in parallel with U.S. efforts to convene a preparatory meeting in Washington, marked a turning point in the course of the ongoing war. It shifted the Lebanese file from the framework of open military confrontation to the threshold of an unstable negotiating track. This announcement did not come within the context of a field de-escalation; rather, it coincided with the continuation of military operations, raising from the outset fundamental questions about the nature and limits of these negotiations: are they an entry point to a settlement, or a tool for managing the war through political means?

This step gains additional significance as it comes at a highly sensitive regional moment, coinciding with the launch of a parallel U.S.–Iran negotiation track in Pakistan. This places the Lebanese file within a broader negotiating landscape, where local, regional, and international calculations intersect. In this sense, Lebanese–Israeli negotiations cannot be understood in isolation from this context, but rather as part of an attempt to redistribute negotiation files across the region and separate them from one another, in a way that serves the reconfiguration of regional balances.

From “Unity of Arenas” to “Fragmentation of Tracks”

Over the past years, Iran’s strategy has been based on the principle of the “unity of arenas,” meaning the linkage of various regional fronts within a single political and negotiating framework, allowing Tehran to use each arena as leverage in another. However, current developments point to a parallel shift in U.S. strategy, based on fragmenting these arenas and transforming them into separate negotiation files, each managed according to its own balance of power.

Within this framework, Lebanon is being pushed into a negotiation track independent of the Iranian one—not only to separate the two files technically, but also to strip Iran of one of its most significant bargaining chips. Removing Lebanon from Iran’s negotiation equation effectively reduces Tehran’s room for maneuver, particularly regarding the file of “regional proxies,” which constitutes a central axis of negotiations with Washington.

Yet, this shift does not amount to a complete success in fragmenting the tracks, as the structural interconnection between arenas remains intact. Lebanon, by virtue of its position and the role of Hezbollah, cannot be entirely detached from regional balances, rendering any attempt to isolate it negotiationally vulnerable to disruption at the first military or political test.

Negotiation as a Tool of Pressure, Not a Path to Settlement

The Israeli reading of the negotiation track fundamentally differs from the conventional approach that links negotiations to the cessation of war. Israel is not seeking to end military operations as a prelude to negotiations; rather, it is using negotiations as an extension of them—an additional tool to impose political conditions grounded in military superiority.

The insistence on “negotiating under fire” reflects the core of the Israeli approach: transforming the negotiating table into a space for leveraging field pressure, rather than a balanced framework for managing conflict. In this context, negotiation becomes part of a strategy of “imposing facts,” where realities are produced on the ground and subsequently sought to be formalized politically.

Israel’s objectives in this track appear clear and direct: the disarmament of Hezbollah, the reorganization of the security situation in southern Lebanon under new arrangements, and potentially going further toward a political formula that includes some form of regulated relationship between Lebanon and Israel. However, these objectives collide with a complex Lebanese and regional reality, making their realization through negotiation highly difficult.

The Lebanese Position: Between Forced Engagement and Limited Capacity

In contrast, Lebanon is not acting from a position of full initiative, but rather from a position of damage control and containment. The official stance reflects a preliminary acceptance of the idea of negotiation, while firmly maintaining the condition of a ceasefire as a prerequisite, in an attempt to prevent negotiations from becoming an additional tool of pressure.

It appears that Beirut did not enter this track unprepared, but rather carries an initial outline of its negotiation paper, focusing on halting hostilities, Israeli withdrawal, and opening the way for subsequent arrangements within the framework of the state. However, this framework collides with rigid practical constraints, most notably the absence of internal consensus and the state’s inability to take decisive steps on the issue of arms without agreement with Hezbollah.

This contradiction between sovereign discourse and actual capacity weakens Lebanon’s negotiating position, exposing it to dual pressure: externally, through Israeli insistence on imposing its terms; and internally, through divisions over the nature and limits of negotiation.

Pakistan Talks: The Unstated Framework Governing the Lebanese Track

Despite the formal separation between the two tracks, the negotiations in Pakistan constitute the unstated framework that governs the pace of negotiations in Lebanon. The issue is not merely one of temporal coincidence, but of substantive linkage, as the file of “regional proxies” stands as a key axis in the negotiations between Washington and Tehran.

Within this context, Lebanon becomes an element within a broader negotiating equation, even if treated as an independent file. The success of Washington in imposing a separate Lebanese negotiation track would represent a breakthrough in dismantling Iranian influence, whereas Tehran’s success in linking the tracks would reaffirm its position as an indispensable regional actor.

This overlap also explains the apparent contradiction in U.S. behavior: on the one hand, supporting the launch of Lebanese–Israeli negotiations; and on the other, exerting pressure to reduce escalation, in order to prevent the collapse of the Pakistan talks. In other words, Washington is attempting to manage a delicate balance between pressure and negotiation without allowing either track to collapse.

Where Do the Negotiations Stand?

Despite the political and media momentum, negotiations remain at a very early stage, closer to “managing expectations” than producing outcomes. The anticipated meetings in Washington are preparatory in nature and at a diplomatic level, reflecting the absence of a clear agreement on the framework or agenda.

Moreover, the gap between the parties remains wide: Lebanon insists on a ceasefire, Israel refuses, and the United States attempts to manage this divergence without resolving it. Additionally, Lebanon’s unstable internal situation constitutes a further obstacle to the formation of a coherent negotiating position.

Accordingly, it can be said that the process has not yet entered the stage of actual negotiation, but remains in a phase of testing intentions and defining political lines of engagement.

Scenarios: Between Containment and Escalation

Based on current indicators, the trajectory remains open to several possibilities, none of which can be decisively favored.

The first scenario involves a relative success of the Pakistan negotiations, leading to regional de-escalation and enabling a more serious Lebanese negotiation track, potentially within security arrangements resembling or modifying UN Resolution 1701.

The second scenario entails the continuation of the separation between tracks, with Lebanon remaining a theater of military pressure, resulting in formal but ineffective negotiations alongside ongoing escalation.

The third scenario involves the failure of both tracks, due to a breakdown in U.S.–Iran understanding, potentially triggering broader regional escalation and a complete reshuffling of the landscape.

Negotiation Without Settlement

In conclusion, Lebanese–Israeli negotiations do not yet reflect a clear path toward settlement as much as they indicate a shift in the tools of conflict management. They are part of a complex regional negotiating environment, where military and political calculations intersect, and where negotiating tables are used as extensions of battlefields rather than alternatives to them.

Accordingly, the future of this track will remain suspended between two parallel paths: a war that has not yet been exhausted, and a negotiation process that has not yet matured. Between the two, Lebanon remains a testing ground for broader regional balances, the outcomes of which are ultimately determined elsewhere—most notably in Pakistan.