Shifts in Israel’s National Security Strategy after October 7 and Their Implications for Jordanian and Regional Security

A concise assessment on the shift in Israel’s national security strategy and its implications for Jordan and the region:

• This paper argues that, after 7 October 2023, Israel entered a new phase in which it is redefining its security concept, not as a limited military review, but as a broader change in the relationship among security, geography, and politics. The attack exposed the limits of the Israeli approach, which had long relied on deterrence, early warning, rapid decisive action, and intelligence and technological superiority. Its deeper effect was to weaken the assumption that had guided Israeli conduct over the previous two decades: that surrounding threats could be managed without fundamentally dismantling them.
  
  
• This paper draws on discussions and dialogue sessions held by the Politics and Society Institute with experts on the Israeli military and national security.
  
  
• The paper uses a situation-assessment methodology that combines a review of the historical evolution of Israeli security doctrine, an analysis of the effects of 7 October on deterrence and containment, and consideration of political scenarios associated with the nature of the next Israeli government following the elections expected in October 2026.
  
  
• The paper concludes that Israel is moving to reorder its security doctrine around a more offensive approach based on preemption, forward border defense, the imposition of security buffer zones, and greater freedom of military action beyond its immediate borders. This shift is particularly significant for Jordan because the West Bank, the Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem are the most sensitive points of contact between Israeli and Jordanian national security interests.
  
  
• The forthcoming Israeli elections carry added significance because they will be the first general election after the 7 October attack and the multi-front war that followed. The government formed after the election will therefore address national security not only as a broad political issue, but also as a formal institutional obligation under a law requiring the preparation of a national security strategy.
  
  
• Unlike in the past, the expected strategy will not remain an unwritten framework shaped by accumulated government decisions, security establishment assessments, and military documents. It will take the form of an official government-approved document defining political and security interests, threat priorities, approaches to the use of force, and the relationship between the political leadership and the military establishment.
  
  
• The greatest threat to Jordan is not a direct conventional military confrontation, but a set of interconnected demographic, border, political, and economic threats linked to the future of the West Bank, the Jordan Valley, and Jerusalem; the prospect of annexation; settlement expansion; custodianship of the holy sites; and the weakening prospects for a political settlement.
  
  
• The economic threat is expanding as functional cooperation in Jordanian-Israeli relations, most notably water cooperation, is becoming increasingly politicized. The failure to renew the agreement covering additional water supplies at reduced prices turns water from a matter of technical cooperation into an instrument of political pressure, particularly given Jordan’s limited water resources and the need to accelerate national alternatives (Jordan Times, 2026; Times of Israel, 2026).
  
  
• The paper argues that an extreme-right government would pose the highest level of risk to Jordan because it would fuse security policy with an ideological project in the West Bank and Jerusalem. However, the danger is not limited to this scenario. A traditional right-wing government or a security-oriented centrist government led by figures such as Gadi Eisenkot could continue pre-emption and forward border defense in a more institutionalized form that is more acceptable internationally.
  
  
• The paper assesses that Jordan needs a proactive approach that goes beyond reacting to events. This should include early monitoring of Israeli party platforms, close attention to the drafting of the forthcoming national security strategy, clear red lines on displacement, annexation, Jerusalem, and water, and coordinated Jordanian-Egyptian-Gulf-Palestinian positions on the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem.

The Security Shift and the Position of the Next Israeli Government

This paper adopts an analytical methodology that combines a review of the historical trajectory of Israeli security doctrine, an analysis of political changes since 7 October, and scenario building based on the character of the next Israeli government. The constant factor is the existence of a deeply rooted Israeli security doctrine, despite the long-standing absence of a comprehensive official document. The variables are the shock of 7 October, the composition of the next government, its ideological orientation, and its ability to translate prevailing security concepts into a formal written strategy.

This factor has become more significant following the passage of a law requiring every new Israeli government to prepare a national security strategy within a specified period after taking office. The next Israeli government, formed after the elections expected in October 2026, the first general election since the 7 October attack and the ensuing multi-front war, will therefore address national security not merely as a general political debate, but as a written institutional obligation. The expected strategy will no longer remain an unwritten framework formed through accumulated government decisions, security-establishment assessments, and military documents. It will become an official government-approved document defining political and security interests, threat priorities, patterns in the use of force, and the relationship between the political leadership and the military establishment. The Knesset passed the National Security Strategy Law in its final readings in 2025, and Israeli analyses indicate that the new government will be required to produce a written strategy within 150 days of its formation (Knesset, 2025; Arad, 2026).

Features of the Security Shift after 7 October

Historically, Israeli security doctrine rested on a triad of deterrence, early warning, and rapid, decisive victory, with defense added later as missile threats evolved and the home front became more exposed. In practice, however, particularly in Gaza and Lebanon, this doctrine developed into a strategy of conflict management through limited rounds of escalation, intended to restore deterrence without changing the basic structure of the threat. This policy reflected the Israeli view that Hamas and Hezbollah could be contained through recurring rules of engagement, and that intelligence and technological superiority gave Israel sufficient capacity to detect and prevent escalation before it became a strategic threat (Bar, 2024).

The 7 October attack shook this belief at its foundation. In the emerging Israeli interpretation, the problem was no longer limited to an intelligence failure; rather, it pointed to the failure of containment itself. The central question therefore shifted from how to deter an adversary to a more fundamental one: how can the adversary be prevented from building the capacity to threaten Israel in the future? In this sense, preemption is replacing traditional deterrence. Instead of waiting for a threat to mature, it seeks to dismantle its sources at an early stage through preventive strikes, buffer zones, tighter security control, and disarmament in areas near the border. This interpretation is consistent with the growing Israeli debate on the need for a new security concept after the failures of 7 October, and with the shift from defending the border line to pushing the threat farther from it (INSS, 2025).

Jordan at the Center of the Equation: The Jordan Valley, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Water as Interlocking Threat Arenas

The shift in Israeli security doctrine poses a direct threat to Jordan because of the place of the West Bank and the Jordan Valley in Israel’s security thinking. Since 1967, Israel has viewed the Jordan Valley as strategic depth and an eastern security frontier, a buffer that provides greater control over the surrounding geography and limits unwanted access from the east. The post-7 October period adds another function to this concept: territorial control is no longer only defensive, but also a means of creating a permanent political reality by reshaping space and entrenching facts on the ground over the long term. Recent analyses also treat the Jordan Valley and the eastern highlands of the West Bank as part of Israel’s strategic protection against potential threats from the east, rather than solely as a Palestinian issue open to negotiation. The movement of the area from a border zone to a fixed element of Israeli security thinking therefore heightens Jordanian concern, because any change in the Jordan Valley’s function directly affects Jordan’s national security and its wider strategic environment (Institute for Palestine Studies, 2025).

The demographic threat is one of the most serious dimensions of this equation. Deeper Israeli control in the West Bank, settlement expansion, intensified settler violence, restrictions on movement, and the weakening of the Palestinian economy may push Palestinians toward coerced or involuntary choices. These policies do not produce their effects at once; rather, they accumulate gradually by making daily life less sustainable, reducing employment opportunities, fragmenting territorial links between towns and villages, and tightening control over resources and movement. This does not necessarily imply an immediate, direct mass-displacement scenario. It does, however, create conditions for slow displacement or growing demographic pressure, confronting Jordan with highly sensitive risks to national security, political identity, and social balance. Any Israeli policy that empties areas of the West Bank or pushes residents to seek routes out therefore represents a direct threat to Jordanian interests, even if it is not officially described as “displacement”. The danger increases when economic and social pressure is accompanied by political rhetoric that accepts the idea of demographic “decisiveness,” thereby turning population movement into part of the conflict rather than merely a side effect.

The political threat lies in the erosion of the two-state solution and the consolidation of a reality that leaves Jordan facing a closed Palestinian equation west of the river. The more Israel entrenches security control in the Jordan Valley and the West Bank, the less feasible a viable Palestinian entity becomes, whether in terms of territorial continuity, control over borders and resources, or the capacity to build sovereign institutions. Jordan would then face a prolonged Palestinian political vacuum marked by the fragility of the Palestinian Authority, the growing power of settlers, and the rise of religious nationalism within Israel. In such circumstances, the risk would extend beyond the fate of the West Bank to Jordan’s regional role, its position in the settlement process, and its ability to defend a political vision based on an independent Palestinian state. Weakening this vision also places renewed pressure on Jordan as a central Arab actor bearing the consequences of a lack of political horizon, both in its relations with international powers and in its domestic political and social environment, where the Palestinian question becomes increasingly present in everyday Jordanian calculations.

Jerusalem and the Hashemite Custodianship constitute another level of threat. The rise of religious-nationalist currents within Israel and growing calls to alter the status quo at Al-Haram Al-Sharif place Jordan before an acutely sensitive political and religious test. The Hashemite Custodianship is not merely symbolic; it is a pillar of Jordan’s diplomatic legitimacy on the Palestinian issue and a central expression of Jordanian presence in Jerusalem and in Arab and Muslim consciousness. Any infringement of the status quo in Jerusalem, the imposition of new facts inside the holy compound, or the use of the religious issue in Israel’s domestic political contest would therefore place pressure on Jordan at home and abroad and make the relationship with Israel more difficult to manage within the framework of the peace treaty.

Even limited changes to procedures or symbols in Jerusalem can acquire far-reaching political significance because the city’s religious status can turn any alteration into a wider regional crisis. This reality requires Jordanian decision-makers to balance the protection of national constants with the need to avoid open confrontation.

The border dimension concerns the Jordan Valley and the crossings between Jordan and the West Bank. If Israeli control of the Valley becomes a permanent element of national security strategy, the Jordanian-Palestinian border will be subject to more rigid Israeli security arrangements. This could affect the movement of people and goods, the Karameh/Allenby crossing, and Jordan’s ability to manage its daily relations with the West Bank. The risk here lies not in a legal amendment to the peace treaty, but in a gradual change in the security and economic environment along the border, leaving Jordan more exposed to unilateral Israeli decisions during periods of escalation. Tighter crossing restrictions could also affect local economies in border areas, social and family ties between the two banks, and Jordan’s capacity to sustain a practical role in supporting Palestinians through civilian and humanitarian channels. In this context, the border is not merely a geographical line; it is a political, security, and economic arena in which multiple interests intersect, and any disruption increases pressure on Jordan directly.

Water is a direct component of Jordan’s national security equation. Jordan is one of the most water-scarce countries in the region, and any change in Israeli control over the Jordan Valley or in the management of shared resources directly affects the state’s ability to meet the needs of its population, agriculture, and public services. Control over the eastern areas of the West Bank and the Jordan Valley extends beyond military and security considerations to include water basins, groundwater recharge areas, agricultural land, and watercourses near the Jordanian border.

As Israeli security policy becomes increasingly linked to control over natural resources, water becomes part of the regional balance of power rather than a purely technical or service issue. Any expansion of Israeli control could therefore intensify pressure on Jordan, either by limiting access to shared resources or by linking them to more complex political and security arrangements. Climate change and rising domestic demand make this factor more serious, affecting Jordan’s social and economic resilience over the medium and long term.

The water file adds an economic and sovereign dimension to this threat, particularly following Israel’s announcement that it would not renew the agreement supplying Jordan with additional water at reduced prices. This development shows that functional cooperation between the two sides is no longer insulated from political tension. Although the peace treaty provides for basic water allocations to Jordan, the additional agreement was especially important in light of the country’s acute water scarcity. Its non-renewal therefore creates a quantitative water challenge and demonstrates the potential for water, energy, and economic dependency to become instruments of pressure in bilateral relations (Jordan Times, 2026; Times of Israel, 2026).

From the perspective of Jordanian decision-makers, water now extends beyond its technical and development value. It suggests that any political escalation with Israel over the West Bank, Jerusalem, or Gaza could spread to economic and essential sectors that affect Jordan’s internal security. Reducing dependence on arrangements that can be politicized is therefore a security necessity, not merely a development option. In this context, projects such as the National Water Carrier, energy diversification, more efficient water management, and broader regional and international partnerships not linked to Israel should be treated as national security priorities.

The Israeli Political Landscape: Which Government Will Shape the Next Strategy?An Extreme-Right Government: Security as an Instrument of an Ideological Project

The level of threat will vary depending on the nature of the next Israeli government. If an extreme-right government is formed, the risk to Jordan will increase sharply because security considerations would merge with an ideological project based on annexation, settlement expansion, weakening the Palestinian Authority, and redefining the West Bank as an area of Jewish sovereignty. In this scenario, buffer zones would not be only a military measure; they would become part of a broader political project. Post-war developments have already included wider incursions across the West Bank, increasing settler violence, and stricter restrictions on movement and economic activity, reinforcing Jordanian concerns that security pressure could create conditions that push Palestinians out (Mada al-Carmel, 2024).

Likud and the Traditional Right: Continuing Security Control through More Disciplined Instruments

A traditional right-wing government led by Likud would be less strident in its rhetoric, but it would likely continue a policy of permanent security control. The lessons Israel has drawn from 7 October point toward establishing security belts in Gaza, southern Lebanon, and Syria, while assigning particular importance to the Jordan Valley in its defensive concept. A poll published by Israel Hayom showed broad Israeli support for buffer zones and a permanent security presence in areas perceived as threatening around Israel, as well as limited confidence in international forces as an alternative to Israeli security control (Israel Hayom, 2026).

Yashar and Eisenkot: Institutionalizing the Security Shift in Centrist Language

From another perspective, the Yashar party, led by Gadi Eisenkot, represents a distinct current within Israeli politics. It is neither a left-wing party nor an advocate of the religious right’s discourse. Rather, it reflects an institutional security current that seeks to restore confidence in the state and the military after 7 October and to rebuild security decision-making on professional foundations. Its importance lies in its potential to present Israel’s security shift in a form that is more acceptable domestically and internationally. A government that includes figures such as Eisenkot might moderate the language of annexation and expansion, while making pre-emption and forward border defense more organized and legitimate, particularly in the eyes of the United States and Europe.From Jordan’s perspective, this scenario is no less significant than the right-wing scenario, because the risk shifts from ideological momentum to the institutional entrenchment of the new security strategy. Recent reports indicate that Eisenkot is positioning himself within a centrist camp focused on rebuilding the state after the war, restoring trust in institutions, and investigating the failures of 7 October (Reuters, 2026a).

The Centrist Opposition: Less Open Annexation Does Not Mean Retreat from the New Doctrine

A broader opposition government that brings together centrist forces such as Lapid and Bennett could reduce the likelihood of overt annexation, but it would not return Israel to the pre-7 October period. The post-attack Israeli consensus is shifting toward rejection of the former containment policy, especially regarding Gaza and Lebanon. Israeli commentary has argued that, had the 7 October attack been prevented, Israel would likely have continued its policy of containing Hamas because the prevailing assumption was that the movement had been deterred and that its governing and economic interests would prevent a major offensive. The collapse of this assumption means that any future government, including a centrist one, will have to present its public with firmer security responses (Michael & Wertman, 2025).

The Left and Centre-Left: Greater Political Space within Firm Security Constraints

A left-wing or centre-left government remains the least politically threatening scenario, but it would not reverse the security shift. Such a government might restore greater emphasis on coordination with Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority, reduce the likelihood of formal annexation, and create a window for political or regional arrangements. However, Israel’s post-7 October social and political environment would still bind any government to the requirement of prior security and to the need to show its ability to prevent threats from accumulating. The difference would therefore lie in the instruments, the language, and the extent of external coordination, not in the underlying movement toward more forward defense and stricter prevention.

Regional Repercussions: From the Egyptian Border to the Arabian Gulf

The regional repercussions extend to Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and the Arabian Gulf. For Egypt, the main risks concern Gaza, the Philadelphia Corridor, and scenarios of displacement toward Sinai. Any prolonged Israeli security presence in Gaza would revive tensions surrounding the peace treaty and border coordination. In Lebanon, the south is likely to become a testing ground for a new version of the security-belt concept, particularly as Israel seeks to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding capabilities near the border. In Syria, Israeli strikes against Iranian entrenchment and weapons transfers are likely to continue, with the possibility of expanded security surveillance in southern Syria. Recent international reporting indicates that Israel is moving toward a long-term strategy based on buffer zones in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon, reflecting a shift from responding to attacks toward pushing sources of threat away from its borders (Reuters, 2026b).

The Arabian Gulf faces a different threat related to maritime routes, Iran, the Houthis, and energy security. The further Israel expands its policy of pre-emptive strikes, the greater the risk that Gulf states will be drawn into consequences they cannot control, particularly in the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, and the Strait of Hormuz. The danger would increase if confrontation with Iran or its allies became open-ended, leaving Gulf States to balance regional deterrence, the protection of trade and energy flows, and the need to avoid involvement in a confrontation whose course they cannot control.

What Jordanian Decision-Makers Should Monitor in the Coming Months

For Jordanian decision-makers, it is insufficient to treat the Israeli shift as a broad trend or as a temporary change tied to a specific political context. They should instead monitor a set of precise and interconnected indicators through which the direction of the forthcoming strategy can be assessed, and its implications for Jordan can be measured, both for border security and for broader political and regional arrangements:

• Monitor Israeli party platforms ahead of the October 2026 election, particularly their positions on the West Bank, the Jordan Valley, Jerusalem, Gaza, buffer zones, and the written national security strategy. Particular attention should be given to the electoral rhetoric of right-wing and religious parties regarding annexation, sovereignty over the West Bank, Al-Haram Al-Sharif, and the status of the Palestinian Authority. These terms are not merely campaign slogans; they also indicate political orientations that may later become government policy.
  
  
• Monitor leaks or early drafts related to Israel’s forthcoming national security strategy, especially provisions concerning the eastern border, buffer zones, pre-emption, and freedom of military action. Legal and security language should be examined for signs that these concepts are moving from military assessment to formally adopted state guidance.
  
  
• Track Israeli decisions on settlements, land confiscation, bypass roads, and the arming of settlers in the West Bank. These measures are practical tools for reshaping the political geography on the ground, and they directly affect the prospects for any future settlement as well as the territorial continuity between Palestinian towns and villages.
  
  
• Monitor the level of settler violence in the Jordan Valley, the northern West Bank, and the Jerusalem area, and assess whether it is becoming an organized policy of pressure on the Palestinian presence. An increase in the frequency or regularity of such violence may indicate a shift from scattered individual acts to a more systematic instrument of conflict management.
  
  
• Track the financial and security condition of the Palestinian Authority. Its collapse or severe weakening would leave Jordan most exposed to the political and security vacuum west of the river, increase the burden of security and humanitarian coordination, and raise the possibility that field-level crises could reach the Jordanian border directly or indirectly.
  
  
• Monitor any change in arrangements at the Karameh/Allenby crossing, whether concerning the movement of people, goods, or aid. Such changes may provide an early indicator of a shift in the Jordanian-Palestinian security environment and of the possible use of the crossing as an instrument of political or security pressure during periods of tension.
  
  
• Monitor Israeli positions on the Hashemite Custodianship and the status quo at Al-Haram Al-Sharif, particularly during religious seasons and periods of domestic Israeli escalation. Any change in this file would extend beyond the symbolic or religious sphere and could affect Jordan’s regional relations and political standing in Jerusalem.
  
  
• Follow the water file with Israel, while distinguishing between the core obligation under the peace treaty and any additional arrangements that may be renewed, suspended, or politicized. The analysis should examine how this issue relates to regional tensions and to the political messages exchanged between the two sides.
  
  
• Accelerate the assessment of how the non-renewal of the additional water agreement affects Jordan’s water security, the cost of alternatives, and the timetable for the National Water Carrier Project. Delays in this assessment could limit the state’s capacity to prepare realistic alternatives in a timely manner and increase the cost of future responses.
  
  
• Monitor US and European discourse on annexation, displacement, and Jerusalem. The clarity or ambiguity of Western positions will affect Israel’s room for maneuver and may determine how boldly the next Israeli government implements its policies on the ground.
  
  
• Monitor any shift in Gulf positions toward security or economic cooperation with Israel. Arab divisions weaken Jordan’s ability to establish collective red lines and to concentrate political pressure on those states that continue to take a more cautious position.

Final Assessment: The Threat Extends beyond the Composition of the Next Israeli Government to the Structure and Outlook of Israeli Security Doctrine

This assessment concludes that 7 October did not create a new Israeli doctrine from nothing. Rather, it brought the most offensive elements of the existing doctrine, including decisive action, prevention, security belts, forward defense, and long-range strikes, to the forefront. The change therefore appears less a temporary response to a major security event than an internal reordering of security priorities in which control and anticipatory prevention have become more prominent in Israeli strategic thinking. For Jordan, the central challenge is to prevent the West Bank and the Jordan Valley from becoming fixed elements of an official, written Israeli national security strategy. Such a development could close the Palestinian political horizon and place direct pressure on Jordanian national security, whether across the border or through the broader political environment surrounding the Palestinian issue.

The danger of the expected document lies in its potential to move preemption, buffer zones, and security control from ad hoc practice to established principles of state policy. This shift could give field practices broader theoretical and official cover, making them more enduring and less vulnerable to rapid changes in government. The different scenarios also show that the threat is not confined to the rise of the extreme right, despite the high risk it poses. It extends to a security centrist government or an opposition-led government because the post-7 October shift has become part of a wider Israeli security consensus and national outlook. Jordan’s concern therefore lies not only in the identity of the governing party, but in the direction of an intellectual and security structure that may outlast changes in government.

What Should Jordan and Other States Facing These Threats Do?

Jordan should act proactively along parallel tracks. Waiting for events to unfold is no longer sufficient in a rapidly changing regional environment, particularly amid signs that Israeli policy is shifting from situational reactions toward a more fixed, long-term approach:

• Establish a specialized strategic monitoring unit to track Israeli party and military texts in Hebrew and English and to analyze indicators related to annexation, displacement, buffer zones, and the reorganization of the security space along the borders.
• Establish clear red lines with Washington and Brussels against displacement, annexation, and changes to the status quo in Jerusalem. These red lines should be translated from broad positions into repeated, specific political messages that explain the consequences of any change for Jordanian and regional stability.
• Build a common Jordanian-Egyptian-Gulf-Palestinian position on Gaza, the West Bank, and Jerusalem so that no party faces Israeli policy alone and these issues are treated as interconnected rather than separate matters.
• Strengthen border and humanitarian preparedness without accepting any displacement scenario, through improved security and logistical planning, stronger rapid-response capacity, and sustained political emphasis on rejecting any attempt to turn Jordan into a geographical or demographic substitute.
• Reduce economic, water, and energy dependence on arrangements that can be politicized. Continued asymmetrical dependence leaves instruments of cooperation vulnerable to pressure during periods of tension and narrows the space for national decision-making.
• Accelerate water-security alternatives, particularly the National Water Carrier Project, and treat water not simply as a resource-management issue but as a matter of national security. Water security is no longer purely technical; it is directly linked to domestic stability and long-term resilience.
• Intensify Jordan’s legal and diplomatic engagement to affirm that Jordanian security is not a secondary file attached to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but a fundamental condition for regional stability, and that any threat to it will have consequences beyond the country’s immediate borders.
• Establish a regular coordination channel with the Palestinian Authority, Egypt, and Gulf states to monitor indicators of annexation, displacement, and escalation in Jerusalem, ensuring continuous political, security, and diplomatic follow-up rather than contact only during crises.
• Prepare periodic assessments for Jordanian decision-makers on the development of Israel’s written strategy and link them to direct implications for internal security, borders, water, and the economy, so that Jordanian decisions are based on early analysis rather than delayed reaction.
• Other Arab states facing these threats need a joint preventive approach based on coordinated early warning, rejection of permanent security belts and annexation, protection of maritime routes, and clear conditions on any security or political cooperation with Israel to prevent the new security doctrine from becoming a project to reshape the region by force. This approach also requires broader Arab consensus on defining the threats and stating explicitly what can be accepted and what must be rejected. Without such consensus, each state remains in a weaker position when facing bilateral pressure.

Conclusion

The ongoing changes in Israeli security thinking after 7 October indicate that the region is not facing merely a passing phase of military escalation. Israel may be moving toward a written national security strategy that elevates practices previously managed through ad hoc decisions into formal principles of state policy. This shift assigns greater weight to pre-emption, buffer zones, forward border defense, and security control in future Israeli decision-making, and it requires these indicators to be read as part of a new political and security architecture rather than as temporary reactions.

For Jordan, the danger of this phase lies in the convergence of geography, security, and politics. The West Bank, the Jordan Valley, Jerusalem, and water are no longer separate issues; they have become interconnected elements of a single security equation. Any Israeli change in the West Bank has political and demographic consequences for Jordan and affects calculations related to domestic stability and the border. Any challenge to Jerusalem places pressure on the Hashemite Custodianship and confronts Jordan with questions of role, standing, and historical legitimacy. Any use of water, crossings, or economic relations as leverage turns instruments of cooperation into instruments of pressure and makes Jordanian decision-making more sensitive in both day-to-day and strategic matters.

Jordan’s response therefore cannot be limited to crisis management after events occur. It requires a clear shift toward proactive policy that monitors Israel’s evolving approach before it becomes an official document, establishes early red lines, broadens Arab coordination, and reduces dependence on arrangements that can be politicized. The response must combine political, legal, economic, and security instruments because the threat is no longer one-dimensional; it now operates across several arenas at once. In the coming period, Jordanian security will be affected not only by what Israel does militarily, but also by what it formally writes into its next strategy, how that strategy is implemented in the West Bank, Jerusalem, the Jordan Valley, water, and the borders, and whether Jordan and other Arab states can build a position capable of preventing these texts from becoming a permanent reality.

References

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