The Jordanian Truck Crisis: Why Do Amman and Damascus Need Operational Governance?

On 6 February 2026, Syria’s General Authority for Land and Sea Ports issued a decision restricting the entry of foreign (non-Syrian) trucks into Syrian territory, with a limited exception for transit shipments under customs escort to ensure that cargo is not unloaded inside Syria. In practice, the decision institutionalizes the “Back-to-Back” mechanism, which requires incoming trucks to unload their cargo at customs yards at border crossings, after which the goods are transferred onto Syrian trucks to continue their journey inside Syria. This mechanism had been applied in previous periods and entails additional costs and longer handling times.

A Response to Demands or a Cost Shift ?

The Syrian decision can be understood on multiple levels. It came in the wake of a strike– not the first of its kind-by Syrian truck drivers, whose demands focused on regulating the labor market through activating turn-taking offices, limiting monopolistic practices, and enforcing reciprocity with foreign drivers. From this perspective, the speed with which the decision was announced and implemented can be seen primarily as a tool to absorb drivers’ anger, and secondarily as an attempt to redistribute job opportunities in favor of the Syrian fleet.

Both The Damascus Chamber of Commerce and The Damascus Countryside Chamber of Commerce called for suspending the decision and postponing its implementation, given its anticipated economic and logistical repercussions on the Syrian domestic market. The sector is estimated at around 30,000 trucks, about 70% of which (approximately 21,000 trucks) are active, according to the latest available figures. This highlights the sector’s economic and social weight, the sensitivity of its demands, and the need to enhance traffic regulation and address accumulated problems in Syrian transport. The sector today is experiencing a complex internal crisis, including frequent amendments to domestic freight tariffs, repeated complaints about rising operating costs due to fuel price fluctuations, and the deterioration and aging of a large portion of the Syrian land transport fleet.

This is compounded by:

1-regional access constraints for the Syrian fleet, as parts of it face difficulties accessing neighboring markets for technical and operational reasons, including fleet age, insurance requirements, and transit conditions. As a result, the state may seek to compensate by empowering the Syrian fleet domestically rather than relying on transit traffic.

2-Security and oversight considerations also play a role. Increasing inspection points within customs yards may be framed as a measure to enhance oversight and reduce smuggling risks, despite the significant decline in smuggling rates to and from Syria.

However, the legitimacy of the objective does not negate the cost of the tool when applied without the necessary operational conditions for success, such as sufficient port capacity, handling equipment, designated lanes for sensitive goods, and coordination with border partners. Consequently, the decision quickly became one with externalized costs, as its operational burdens extended to neighboring borders, particularly Jordan.

Where Is the Cost?

The Back-to-Back mechanism increases handling steps, resulting in longer waiting times, higher costs, and increased risks for sensitive and perishable goods. At the level of Jordanian–Syrian relations, the decision raises a number of concerns. Although it is a unilateral decision issued by the Syrian side, it affects shared interests and bilateral agreements governing trade exchange and cross-border freight movement.

Syria represents a strategically important market for Jordan due to geography, its role in supporting Jordanian industries, and the export opportunities it provides, in addition to serving as Jordan’s gateway to other regional markets. This is reflected in Jordan’s exports to Syria, which reached 278 million Jordanian dinars during the first ten months of 2025. An average of 400 trucks cross daily carrying various goods, including foodstuffs and construction materials. Any sudden operational disruption at the border therefore has a direct impact on exporting sectors, delivery timelines, costs, and contractual commitments. The impact extends beyond time and cost to affect operational trust between the two sides and the stability of supply chains through the Jaber–Nasib crossing.

From the Jordanian Perspective

The sudden decision disrupted the Jordanian fleet inside Syria and at the border. Slow transshipment operations and the abrupt implementation led to severe congestion at the Nasib–Jaber crossing, where hundreds of trucks accumulated. Jordan sought to contain the fallout by emphasizing that the measure applies to all foreign drivers, not Jordanians alone, in an attempt to depoliticize the decision and preserve space for technical negotiations. At the same time, Jordan announced meetings with the Syrian side to discuss the decision, especially amid reports of assaults on Jordanian drivers and damage to dozens of trucks, according to statements by the head of the Jordanian Truck Owners’ Syndicate.

Beyond increased costs, the Jordanian transport sector views the decision as affecting the very structure of trade exchange. The mechanism effectively limits the role of Jordanian trucks to delivery at the customs yard, with Syrian trucks completing the journey inside Syria. This creates a classic land transport problem: imbalance between outbound and return trips.

When return loads are unavailable, empty returns increase, raising total transport costs and pushing carriers either to raise outbound freight rates or withdraw from the route entirely. The impact extends beyond economics to local social effects, harming small businesses and service providers dependent on cross-border movement.

Moreover-and most importantly- the generalization of this mechanism raises two key issues. Legally, the decision constitutes a violation of the bilateral agreements between the two countries. These joint agreements stipulate that Jordanian trucks are permitted to enter Syria while loaded and may return if cargo is available, and the same provisions apply to Syrian trucks. Furthermore, in terms of legal hierarchy, the decision ranks below the bilateral agreements, which means that any substantive change to transit rules imposed through a unilateral decision-without a bilateral process ofe for interpretation or amendment-creates a conflict with the governing legal framework regulating truck movement. This, in turn, calls for managing the dispute through technical and legal channels rather than entrenching it as a fait accompli. In addition, Jordan allows Syrian drivers to enter its territory to transport goods, which makes the logic of “reciprocity” less applicable in the Jordanian case.

Operationally, Back-to-Back cannot serve as a universal model. Some goods are perishable or handling-sensitive, while others require equipment and time incompatible with daily traffic volumes. When generalized without exemptions or fast-track lanes, the mechanism leads to congestion and higher logistics costs.

In both cases, the cost is ultimately borne by importers and consumers through higher costs and disrupted regularity of supply. This is further compounded when taking into account another critical operational factor: the readiness of the Nasib–Jaber border crossing itself to implement “back-to-back” mechanisms. Such a mechanism cannot be implemented through an administrative decision alone; it requires sufficient capacity in handling yards, separate entry and exit lanes, loading and unloading equipment, the ability for temporary storage and queue management, as well as adequate inspection staff and an information system capable of reducing congestion, overcrowding, and slow cargo transfer. These requirements are currently not in place, despite the existence of development and expansion projects at the crossing.

Although joint committees are working to enhance economic cooperation- particularly in trade- the decision tests their effectiveness and their ability to provide early warning and prior coordination on measures affecting both sides, rather than relying on reactive communication after disruptions occur.
Accordingly, a set of recommendations emerges to promote operational governance and mitigate the impact of sudden unilateral decisions:

1. A bilateral protocol for border changes: Any substantial modification to transit or handling rules should be preceded by official notification and a defined transition period, except in cases of declared and justified security necessity.
2. A joint operations room at the Jaber–Nassib crossing: Establish a daily coordination mechanism (customs, transport, border management) with a 24/7 hotline to resolve issues immediately and align decisions with on-the-ground realities.
3. Fast-track procedures for perishable goods: Adopt a clear list of perishable and essential items, implement time-bound fast-track lanes, and allow operational exceptions when handling equipment is unavailable.
4. Transparency and grievance mechanisms: Standardize receipt requirements with clear processing times and fees, and introduce a rapid grievance mechanism to prevent bottlenecks or profiteering.
5. Road safety as a bilateral responsibility: Treat the protection of drivers and trucks as an integral part of managing bilateral relations, enforcing security along routes leading to the crossing.
6. Separating sectoral disputes from transit regulations: Address the Syrian transport sector’s internal demands through gradual domestic reforms rather than shifting the burden onto border operations.
7.Empowering the joint technical committee: Grant it operational authority to issue standard operating procedures and performance indicators, institutionalizing coordination and minimizing surprises.

Conclusion

Ultimately, this crisis is less a test of trade volume than a test of operational governance at the cross-border level between Amman and Damascus in the transport sector. Where operational governance is absent, technical decisions easily become sources of political friction. Conversely, clear coordination rules allow disputes to remain within a technical framework, protecting bilateral relations from volatility and laying a more stable foundation for sustained economic openness.

Reference:
[1] Citing a high-ranking Jordanian source, February 13, 2026.
[2] It is worth noting that the Ramtha–Daraa border crossing remains closed. Jordanian authorities attribute this to the Syrian side’s lack of operational readiness, despite recurring parliamentary and public demands for its reopening to ease pressure on the Jaber–Nassib crossing.