This paper was prepared based on a dialogue session convened by the Politics and Society Institute with journalist and U.S. affairs expert Imad Al-Rawashdeh, with the participation of a group of researchers, politicians, and journalists, to discuss the U.S. elections and their regional implications.

Introduction

The ongoing transformations in American politics reveal a landscape far more complex than the traditional competition between the Democratic and Republican parties. Beneath the familiar partisan polarization, another divide is widening within each party over the economy, the role of the state, the limits of American power abroad, relations with Israel, and the future of military intervention in the Middle East. This divide takes on added significance as the November 2026 congressional midterm elections approach, coming at a moment when domestic economic pressures intersect with the political repercussions of regional wars, the rise of new generations of voters, and growing tensions between grassroots constituencies and the traditional establishments of both parties.

The rise of figures from the Democratic progressive wing, such as Abdul El-Sayed and Zohran Mamdani, has revived an old question in a new form: Is the United States genuinely moving toward a different political direction, or does what we are witnessing remain an influential protest movement operating within a system that retains a considerable capacity to absorb and slow political change?

This question carries particular significance for the Middle East because a growing part of the American domestic debate now directly touches on issues that were once treated as established assumptions: the scale of U.S. military engagement abroad, the nature of the relationship with Israel, the cost of wars, the priority that Asia should receive relative to the Middle East, the limits of financing allies, and the relationship between foreign policy and the economic welfare of American citizens.

Yet interpreting these transformations solely through the rise of the Democratic left would lead to incomplete conclusions. The more significant phenomenon is the emergence of simultaneous fractures on both sides of the political spectrum. Within the Democratic Party, tensions are intensifying between the progressive wing and the traditional centrist leadership, while the Republican Party faces a divide between the conservative national-security establishment and the populist current associated with the slogan “America First.” Despite their considerable ideological differences, parts of the populist right and progressive left converge in their opposition to prolonged wars, foreign spending, and the influence of major economic institutions.

From this perspective, the 2026 elections appear less as a gateway to an immediate transformation of American politics than as a test of the scale of the change taking place beneath the surface of the political system and of the ability of traditional institutions to contain it.

This paper seeks to assess the direction of change in American politics through the 2026 midterm elections by examining the rise of progressive currents, divisions within both parties, and the institutional constraints that limit the translation of these shifts into policymaking. It also explores possible electoral scenarios and their implications for U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, particularly Iran, the Palestinian issue, Israel, and Jordan.

From Sanders to a New Generation

The rise of democratic socialism in the United States cannot be understood as an electoral phenomenon that began with Mamdani or El-Sayed. Its roots lie in a series of shocks that accumulated over the past two decades and transformed the relationship of segments of American society with the political and economic elite.[1]

Bernie Sanders emerged during the 2016 elections as a clear expression of left-wing opposition to the Democratic Party establishment. Sanders’ significance did not derive from winning the presidential nomination, but from his ability to transform ideas that had remained on the margins of American political discourse for decades into central political issues: universal healthcare, education, student debt, economic inequality, the influence of large corporations, and campaign finance.

The disputes surrounding the 2016 Democratic primaries demonstrated the extent of the tension between this emerging movement and the party establishment. The process continued with the election of a group of progressive lawmakers to Congress known as “The Squad,” transforming the movement from an electoral campaign associated with Sanders into a broader and more organized political current.

Mamdani and El-Sayed emerged at a later stage of this trajectory, but their significance lies in the different demographic and political environment in which they operate. The new progressive movement relies more heavily on young people, urban areas, racially and culturally diverse communities, and voters who connect domestic social justice with positions on war and foreign policy.

A new political equation has consequently emerged: a voter who rejects the dominance of large corporations over the economy may also be more willing to question foreign military assistance; a voter demanding expanded healthcare may ask about the domestic cost of another war; and a generation that approaches politics through concepts of justice and human rights may apply the same standards to U.S. policy toward Palestine.

The Gaza War and the Shift in the American Political Mood

The Gaza war gave significant momentum to a transformation that was already underway within certain segments of American society. The Palestinian issue has become increasingly prominent on university campuses, within youth movements, and in debates inside the Democratic Party, reaching levels that would have been difficult to imagine only a few years ago.

The student protests of 2024 demonstrated that the issue had moved beyond political groups and Arab and Muslim communities and entered the broader political discourse of a younger generation that views the war through ethical and human-rights frameworks. This transformation also extended to segments of the millennial generation and some liberal constituencies within American society, including Jewish Americans who increasingly distinguish between supporting Israel and endorsing the policies of successive Israeli governments.

The political weight of the Palestinian issue, however, needs to be understood within the broader American context. Voters’ views on Gaza intersect with their concerns about the economy, inflation, energy prices, public spending, and foreign wars. The political impact of the war therefore becomes greater when its costs or consequences are felt domestically.

This became particularly evident as regional tensions began affecting energy markets and supply chains. Escalation with Iran, disruptions to maritime navigation, and concerns surrounding the Strait of Hormuz directly connect foreign policy to fuel prices, agriculture, and industry. At that point, the debate over the Middle East shifts from a distant geopolitical question into a domestic electoral issue.

This dynamic helps explain part of the transformation taking place on both the left and the right. The left opposes wars from the standpoint of social justice and opposition to interventionism, while parts of the populist right believe that American resources should be directed toward domestic priorities and that “endless wars” contradict the principles of “America First.”

Generational change within American society reinforces this shift. Generation Z and millennials display greater skepticism toward foreign intervention and unconditional military assistance, alongside stronger concern for economic and social justice. While significant divisions remain within younger generations themselves, the more consequential effect of this transformation is the erosion of the traditional consensus surrounding the U.S. role abroad rather than the emergence of an alternative progressive consensus.

Electoral Geography: The Ceiling Facing Progressives

The experience of the progressive movement reveals a fundamental distinction between winning in a city or congressional district and succeeding at the statewide or national level.

In major urban centers, a progressive candidate can build an electoral coalition based on young people, minorities, educated constituencies, and liberal voters. Senate elections, by contrast, require candidates to appeal to an entire state encompassing cities, suburbs, rural areas, and more socially conservative constituencies.

Moving from a local victory to a statewide one therefore represents an entirely different political test.

Abdul El-Sayed’s case illustrates this dilemma. Success in a primary election can reflect the strength of the progressive base, while a general election confronts the candidate with a more diverse demographic and political landscape, in addition to substantial financial and media competition from forces that perceive the rise of this movement as a threat to existing political balances.

The issue becomes even more significant in Senate elections because senators represent entire states, whereas members of the House of Representatives represent smaller and generally more homogeneous districts. The progressive wing can therefore achieve faster breakthroughs in the House and in municipal elections than in the Senate.

This reality helps explain the continued resilience of the centrist Democratic establishment. It recognizes that winning national power requires success in swing states, suburban communities, and among independent voters whose positions do not necessarily align with democratic socialist platforms.

The struggle within the Democratic Party is therefore likely to continue, but more as a process of permanent negotiation between two wings than as a decisive victory for either side.

An Identity Crisis Within the Democratic Party

The disagreement within the Democratic Party is no longer confined to social spending or taxation. It has expanded into a broader debate over the party’s identity and the role of the United States in the world.

The traditional establishment maintains a vision grounded in international alliances, the liberal economy, U.S. leadership of the international system, and the strategic relationship with Israel. The progressive wing, by contrast, calls for a stronger connection between foreign policy and human rights, reduced military intervention, conditions on certain forms of foreign assistance, and the redirection of resources toward domestic priorities.

This confrontation is reflected in the relationship between the party’s grassroots base and its leadership. The establishment argues that some progressive positions could weaken the party’s ability to compete in swing states, while progressives contend that the establishment has become excessively tied to large corporations, major donors, and the interests of the economic elite.

This confrontation is likely to continue beyond the 2026 elections. The progressive movement has a growing base and an increasing ability to place new issues on the political agenda, but it still lacks the geographic distribution required to take control of the party, its leadership, and its candidates at the national level.

The Republican Divide: “America First” Versus the Requirements of Global Power

Parallel to the Democratic identity crisis is another divide within the Republican Party and the MAGA movement.[3]

A central component of Donald Trump’s popularity was built on promises to end foreign wars, restore manufacturing to the United States, secure the borders, and reduce the costs Washington bears in defending its allies. Once in power, however, these commitments came into conflict with a different set of imperatives associated with the United States’ position as a global power.

Escalation in the Middle East and the close relationship with Benjamin Netanyahu’s government have generated tensions within the Republican populist sphere. Figures such as Tucker Carlson and Representative Thomas Massie have criticized foreign interventions and questioned their compatibility with “America First.”

This disagreement extends beyond individual personalities. Part of the working-class and rural constituency that supported Trump wants American resources directed toward industry, the economy, and border security. When energy prices rise or trade is disrupted by an external crisis, defending overseas military engagement becomes increasingly difficult before this constituency.

The electoral effect of this divide in the midterms could manifest more through abstention than through vote switching. A Republican voter dissatisfied with foreign policy may be unlikely to vote Democratic, but may choose not to vote at all—a possibility capable of altering outcomes in closely contested districts.

Vice President J.D. Vance occupies a particularly sensitive position within this equation. He seeks to reconcile the rhetoric of “America First” with traditional national-security requirements, and the populist base with the Republican establishment. His positions on foreign wars therefore form part of a broader struggle over the future of the Republican Party after Trump.

What Could the Midterm Elections Change?

Historically, midterm elections tend to produce losses in the House of Representatives for the party controlling the White House. Under the current political conditions, the possibility of Democrats securing a narrow House majority remains significant, while flipping the Senate appears considerably more difficult.[4]

If this scenario materializes, Washington would enter a period of divided government, in contrast to the current situation in which the president and the Republican Party enjoy greater room for maneuver because the executive and legislative branches are controlled by the same party.

A Democratic majority in the House would provide the party with extensive oversight mechanisms: congressional investigations, hearings, subpoenas for officials and documents, disputes over the budget, and potentially impeachment proceedings or other forms of political accountability. Even if such measures do not lead to the president’s removal, they could drain the administration politically, slow its domestic agenda, and keep the White House in a permanent defensive posture. Their impact on foreign policy, however, would be more limited.

The U.S. presidency enjoys broad latitude in foreign relations and national security. Over several decades, the executive branch has expanded its ability to employ executive orders, emergency declarations, administrative decisions, and broad legal interpretations to overcome legislative gridlock. Trump could therefore become weaker legislatively after 2026 while retaining significant room for maneuver in managing Iran, Israel, trade, and alliances.

It is therefore necessary to distinguish between two different outcomes: a Democratic victory in the House could alter the political balance of power in Washington, but it would not automatically produce a reversal in U.S. foreign policy.

Ninth: Trump Between Domestic Constraints and Expanding Executive Power

Iran and the “No War, No Peace” Equation

Trump possesses substantial room to conduct foreign policy through executive instruments and flexible interpretations of presidential authority. Yet this room remains constrained by electoral calculations, divisions within the Republican Party, relations between the administration and Congress, and the economic and material costs of any external escalation. This dilemma is most clearly visible in the Iranian file, where the need to demonstrate strength intersects with the risks of sliding into a costly, large-scale war.

Relations with Iran provide one of the clearest tests of the contradictions within the Trump administration. Two competing perspectives operate within the president’s political environment. The first is represented by a pragmatic populist current that views another regional war as something that would drain resources, raise energy prices, and contradict campaign promises to end wars. This perspective is associated with figures close to J.D. Vance’s political orientation.

The second is represented by more hawkish forces within the security and political establishment, which advocate maximum pressure and strict military deterrence and overlap in several respects with the worldview of the Israeli government and pro-Israel lobbying groups.

The interaction between these two currents produces a pattern of limited escalation, followed by negotiations, and then renewed pressure, rather than an immediate transition toward either a comprehensive war or a comprehensive agreement.

An additional consideration is directly economic. Any major disruption in the Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz would raise the costs of energy, transportation, fertilizers, and raw materials, with consequences reaching American voters before the elections.

Military constraints are equally important. Recent regional confrontations have consumed part of the U.S. stockpile of interceptors, air-defense systems, and advanced missiles, while defense industries require time to replenish those inventories. Opening another major front in the Middle East could therefore affect U.S. readiness in other theaters, particularly the Indo-Pacific.

The state of “no war, no peace” consequently appears to be more than personal procrastination on Trump’s part. It is a logical outcome of several competing pressures: the need to demonstrate deterrence, fear of a comprehensive war, electoral calculations, energy prices, divisions within the administration, and military readiness.

Israel and Palestine: The Resilience of the Alliance and the Limits of Change

The U.S.–Israeli relationship rests on a deep strategic alliance supported by well-established security, legislative, and financial institutions. At the same time, room remains for disagreements between the two governments over timing and the limits of escalation when Israeli calculations conflict with broader U.S. interests, particularly those related to energy prices, regional stability, and the domestic costs of a wider confrontation.

American society, meanwhile, is experiencing a gradual shift in attitudes toward the Palestinian issue, particularly among young people, progressives, and some liberal Jewish constituencies. Debate over conditioning assistance, human rights, and settlements is expanding. Yet translating this change into official policy remains slow because of the strength of institutional frameworks supporting Israel, including the commitment to Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge, long-term assistance arrangements, and broad support within Congress.

The most likely change, therefore, lies in political discourse and pressure rather than in the fundamental structure of the alliance. A distinction also remains between Biden’s more traditional approach, based on containment and the two-state solution, and Trump’s more transactional approach, grounded more heavily in the balance of power on the ground.

American Jews, Evangelicals, and AIPAC: Multiple Centers of Pro-Israel Influence

The pro-Israel political environment in the United States is no longer a homogeneous bloc. Growing divisions are visible within the American Jewish community itself, between Orthodox and conservative constituencies that are more closely aligned with right-wing Israeli governments and liberal and centrist groups that adopt more critical approaches toward settlements and escalation and give greater space to the language of compromise and the two-state solution. This development has contributed to the growing visibility of organizations such as J Street.[5]

At the same time, the instruments of influence differ among pro-Israel forces. AIPAC operates primarily through electoral financing and institutional relationships with Congress, while evangelical influence draws on a broad popular base within the Republican Party and direct influence over primary elections and the party’s ideological identity.

As Republican populism grows, this structure itself is coming under greater pressure over the cost of external commitments and the limits of relations with Israel. The future debate within the American right is therefore likely to become increasingly tied to the definition of “America First” and to what that concept requires—or permits—in terms of support for traditional allies.

Possible Scenarios

Scenario One: Divided Government and Continuity in Foreign Policy — The Most Likely Scenario

Democrats win a narrow majority in the House of Representatives, while Republicans retain control of the Senate. Congressional investigations and oversight of the Trump administration expand, its ability to pass major domestic legislation declines, and political polarization intensifies ahead of the 2028 elections.

At the same time, the president retains broad latitude in foreign policy. Pressure on Iran continues while a comprehensive war is avoided; relations with Israel remain strong despite recurring disagreements over the limits of escalation; and pressure increases on allies to assume a larger share of the burden.

Progressives continue to make gains within the Democratic Party, but remain an influential minority rather than becoming the party’s new leadership.

Regional implication: Change in U.S. political discourse would be greater than change in the underlying strategic structure.

Implication for Jordan: The strategic relationship would continue, alongside a growing need to expand relations within Congress and engage the emerging generation of political leaders.

Scenario Two: Gradual Progressive Gains and the Reshaping of the Democratic Party — A Medium-Term Possibility

A larger number of progressive candidates win congressional and local elections, and generational pressure increasingly translates into influence within party institutions.

Calls to condition certain forms of military assistance become stronger, human-rights discourse becomes more central, and unconditional support for foreign interventions weakens.

The transformation nevertheless remains gradual because of the Senate, electoral geography, national-security institutions, and the party’s centrist leadership.

Implication for Jordan: Building relations with emerging wings of the party becomes increasingly important as part of a multi-level engagement strategy.

Scenario Three: A Cross-Partisan Populist Realignment — The Most Important Long-Term Scenario

The overlap between the populist right and progressive left expands around opposition to wars, reducing foreign commitments, challenging large corporations, and prioritizing domestic concerns.

Deep disagreements continue between the two camps on social and cultural issues, immigration, and economic policy, yet they place pressure from opposite directions on the foreign-policy model that prevailed after the Cold War.

This scenario would not produce a political alliance between the right and the left. It would, however, weaken the consensus that allowed the United States to engage in extensive foreign intervention at relatively limited domestic political cost.

Strategic outcome: A gradual transition from a policy of broad primacy toward a more selective approach that relies on deterrence, partners, and regional alliances rather than prolonged direct wars.

Scenario Four: Regional Escalation Restores the Traditional Establishment — A Possible Scenario Whose Likelihood Rises in the Event of a Major Crisis

A broad confrontation with Iran erupts, or the regional war expands in ways that directly threaten U.S. interests. Domestic demand for security rises, the institutional wings of both parties regain part of the initiative, and anti-interventionist currents temporarily lose some of their ability to shape the political agenda.

The ability of such a scenario to restore the old consensus, however, would depend on the duration and cost of the conflict. If the confrontation becomes prolonged, energy prices increase, and losses mount, the opposite effect could emerge and domestic opposition could expand.

Indicators to Watch Until the 2026 Elections

Several indicators could determine which of these scenarios becomes more likely.

The first is the performance of progressive candidates in states where electoral coalitions must extend beyond major cities. Success in such environments would be more significant than victories in municipal contests or safe Democratic districts.

The second is the size of any majority Democrats manage to secure in the House of Representatives, since an extremely narrow majority would constrain the party’s ability to manage a divided government.

The third is the trajectory of divisions within MAGA, particularly the position of the conservative base toward Iran and the relationship with Netanyahu.

The fourth is the direction of energy prices, inflation, and the broader U.S. economy, as these factors will determine the extent to which voters can separate foreign policy from their living conditions.

The fifth is the evolution of attitudes within the American Jewish community and among evangelicals, because changes in either constituency would affect partisan calculations regarding Israel.

The sixth is the degree of depletion of U.S. military capabilities and munitions, as well as progress in rebuilding defense inventories, since material capabilities will shape the scope for military action as much as political will.

The seventh is developments in the West Bank and Israeli policy. A major escalation could transform the relationship with Israel from an area of consensus into an increasingly divisive electoral issue.

Conclusion

The indicators discussed above suggest that the United States is entering a period of domestic political reordering that goes beyond the rise of a handful of progressive figures, although the process is moving too slowly to produce a fundamental transformation in the near term.

The consensus that shaped a substantial part of U.S. foreign policy after the end of the Cold War is facing simultaneous pressures from the progressive left, the populist right, generational change, the increasing costs of war, economic pressures, and strategic competition with China.

The central question in the coming years, therefore, will extend beyond which party controls Congress or the White House. The more consequential issue is which conception of the American national interest ultimately prevails: continued broad external engagement, or a more selective approach to the use of force and the allocation of resources and commitments.

The outcome of this domestic contest will gradually determine the boundaries of the U.S. role in the international system, particularly the extent of Washington’s engagement in the Middle East and the nature of its relationships with allies and adversaries across the region.

For Jordan, the relationship with the United States remains firmly anchored in the Kingdom’s geographic and security importance, its role in intelligence cooperation and counterterrorism, defense coordination, and the institutional foundation provided by long-term agreements and assistance. Yet transformations within American politics require Amman to broaden the tools through which it manages this relationship.

Jordan’s engagement should therefore extend beyond security and geopolitical narratives to include development, refugees, healthcare, economic stability, and human rights. Such an approach would allow Amman to engage simultaneously with the traditional establishment and emerging progressive currents. The most appropriate strategy is consequently to diversify Jordan’s channels of engagement in Washington and maintain a long-term balance that avoids dependence on any single party or political current.

Notes

[1] The 2003 Iraq War represented one of the formative moments in this transformation. The war weakened confidence in U.S. foreign policy, particularly among generations that witnessed the growing human and financial costs of military interventions without outcomes commensurate with those costs. The 2008 financial crisis then added a deeper social and economic dimension: the middle class came under severe pressure, income and wealth inequalities widened, and a perception became increasingly entrenched among broad segments of the public that the financial system was capable of protecting major institutions more quickly than it could protect families and the working class.

[2] Bernie Sanders is a prominent American politician and an independent member of the U.S. Senate representing Vermont. He is known for his left-wing and democratic socialist views and twice sought the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination, in 2016 and 2020.

[3] MAGA stands for “Make America Great Again,” a political slogan prominently associated with Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign. The slogan dates back to earlier periods in American politics and was notably used in Ronald Reagan’s 1980 presidential campaign. It was also used by former President Bill Clinton, although he later criticized its political meaning during the 2016 election.

[4] Shifting the balance of power in the Senate is generally more difficult than in the House because of the nature of electoral representation. Senators represent entire states and therefore require broad electoral coalitions encompassing cities, suburbs, and rural areas, which generally pushes candidates toward more centrist positions. Political and social transformations consequently tend to reach the House more rapidly, while the Senate functions as one of the institutional mechanisms of continuity within the American political system.

[5] J Street is a liberal nonprofit organization that advocates U.S. leadership in pursuing a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian and broader Arab-Israeli conflict.