Israel’s New Dilemma
Despite Benjamin Netanyahu’s rhetoric about pressing ahead with a project of Israeli regional dominance, alongside political discourse centered on reshaping the Middle East and transforming Israel’s security doctrine from defense to regional influence, it is becoming increasingly clear that important reassessments are now taking place within Israel regarding the lessons drawn from the wars it has fought since October 7, 2023.
What is striking is that these reassessments are not coming from Netanyahu’s political rivals or from Israel’s liberal and left-wing circles. Rather, they are emerging from voices close to Netanyahu’s government and from within Israel’s own right-wing camp. One of the most important examples is the study written by Raz Zimmt, titled “In the Wake of Operation Roaring Lion: Preliminary Insights and Regional Implications,” published by one of Tel Aviv’s leading strategic think tanks, the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
The article, published earlier this month, argues that despite the extensive Israeli and American military strikes against Iran and the destruction of numerous military targets, Iran ultimately managed to endure the assault. Several key objectives, including the collapse of the Iranian regime and the dismantling of Iran’s regional influence, were not achieved.
On the contrary, Zimmt argues that Iran succeeded, through what he describes as “asymmetrical deterrence,” in securing important strategic gains and redefining its regional power. Through the Strait of Hormuz and its ability to influence energy prices, international shipping routes, and the global economy, Iran has reinforced its position as a regional actor capable of shaping regional equations despite the severe blows it has sustained over the past period.
The study reaches a highly significant conclusion: rather than thinking in terms of completely eliminating Iran, Israel must instead deal with Tehran within the framework of long-term regional deterrence. This requires redefining the regional environment, as well as the strategies and instruments of conflict itself. Air power, missiles, and conventional military superiority are no longer sufficient to decisively settle modern conflicts. Economic and geographic dimensions have become equally central to these new equations.
This means that Israel will have to confront the “Iranian threat” over the long term, beyond the illusion of “decisive strikes,” and through broader strategic and regional alliances, particularly with the Gulf states, which have themselves suffered heavily from the current war and Iranian retaliatory attacks.
Zimmt also acknowledges the deep divergence between Gulf perceptions of the coming phase and Israel’s own strategic outlook. While Israel remains primarily focused on security threats, particularly from Iran, Gulf states are prioritizing ending the war, preserving stability, and protecting regional economic development. This divergence creates major political and strategic obstacles to building Israeli-Gulf partnerships.
At the same time, the article largely overlooks the central Saudi condition for normalization with Israel: a political settlement leading to a Palestinian state — conditions that Netanyahu’s government, and perhaps any future Israeli government, appear unwilling to accept.
A second article reflecting a similar shift among some Israeli circles was written by Ariel Kahana in Israel Hayom, under the title “A Diplomatic Move Is Better Than a Futile War in Lebanon.” In it, Kahana admits — with visible bitterness — that the idea of achieving total military victory over Hezbollah is unrealistic and unattainable, even if Israel were to occupy all of Lebanon. Such a scenario, he argues, would only strengthen Hezbollah’s narrative while further weakening the current Lebanese government.
More importantly, Kahana acknowledges that despite the devastating war in Gaza, Israel has failed to eliminate Hamas. Consequently, he argues, Israel must begin considering diplomatic initiatives and political solutions. He even proposes an Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a shift toward serious negotiations with the Lebanese government in a way that could strengthen state institutions and enhance Beirut’s leverage against Hezbollah.
Ultimately, Israel may still possess overwhelming military superiority, but the recent wars have simultaneously exposed the limits of hard power and the illusion of “final victory.” What is unfolding today within some Israeli strategic and intellectual circles reflects a growing realization that the “new Middle East” envisioned by Netanyahu is far more fragile, complicated, and resistant to absolute dominance than the Israeli right imagined in the aftermath of October 7.