Israel’s Next Election and the Fall of Netanyahu’s Government: Would the Opposition Change Israeli Policy or Simply Reproduce It?

The central question is not merely whether Israel’s opposition can unseat Benjamin Netanyahu and his far-right coalition in the next election. More importantly, if such a political shift occurs, would it produce a substantive change in Israel’s policies toward the core Palestinian issues—particularly annexation, Palestinian statehood, and the E1 settlement project?

This article begins with the hypothesis that an electoral victory by the opposition—particularly the centrist and center-right parties—could lead to a change in Israel’s political approach toward these issues. Testing this hypothesis, however, requires more than analyzing campaign rhetoric. A more rigorous indicator lies in the voting behavior of opposition parties and their allies in the Knesset on resolutions concerning Palestinian statehood, the West Bank, Jerusalem, annexation, and the Ma’ale Adumim/E1 area.

The article employs a mixed-method research design. Quantitatively, it examines voting outcomes in the Knesset, including the number of votes in favor and against, the positions of the principal parties, and patterns of absenteeism or walkouts during parliamentary sessions. Qualitatively, it analyzes the political significance of these voting patterns: do they indicate a genuine shift in attitudes toward Palestinian rights, or merely a different approach to managing the conflict, its timing, and its international costs? The current composition of the opposition is also taken into account, particularly following the announcement that Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid will contest the election on a joint list under the banner Beyachad (“Together”). While this alliance strengthens the presence of the political center and center-right within the anti-Netanyahu camp, it does not predetermine their position on Palestinian statehood or annexation.

The composition of the opposition demonstrates that referring to the “Israeli opposition” as a single political bloc can be misleading. It is not an ideologically cohesive camp but rather a coalition comprising centrist, center-right, Zionist left-wing, and Arab parties. Within this spectrum, Bennett—despite positioning himself as Netanyahu’s principal challenger—remains skeptical of, or opposed to, full Palestinian statehood and instead favors limited Palestinian self-rule. Lapid adopts a more accommodating discourse toward political separation and a two-state solution under stringent security conditions, while the Democrats Party expresses clearer opposition to annexation. By contrast, the Arab parties remain the most consistent in rejecting settlement expansion and annexation while supporting the establishment of a Palestinian state. Consequently, an opposition victory would not automatically translate into the emergence of a pro-statehood government; rather, it could produce a heterogeneous coalition united in its opposition to Netanyahu but deeply divided over the substance of the Palestinian question.

Testing the hypothesis against parliamentary voting records reveals an even more complex picture. In February 2024, the Knesset approved, by a vote of 99 to 9, a resolution rejecting the unilateral recognition or international imposition of a Palestinian state. Although the resolution was framed as opposition to a non-negotiated international process, its broader significance lies in the fact that it was not merely a government initiative but received overwhelming support extending well beyond the governing coalition. The vote suggests that opposition to Palestinian statehood—or at least to its international recognition outside bilateral negotiations—has become a broadly shared position across much of the Zionist political spectrum following the events of October 7.

This trend became even more pronounced in July 2024, when the Knesset adopted another resolution rejecting the establishment of a Palestinian state west of the Jordan River by a vote of 68 to 9. Several opposition parties supported the measure, while Yair Lapid’s Yesh Atid chose to leave the chamber rather than vote against it. This parliamentary behavior is politically significant. Walking out does not constitute an explicit endorsement of Palestinian statehood; instead, it reflects an effort to avoid the domestic political costs of opposing what is widely portrayed within Israel as a national security consensus. Consequently, voting behavior weakens the hypothesis if it implies a fundamental shift toward recognition of Palestinian statehood. It lends only partial support if the expected change concerns diplomatic language and the management of relations with the international community.

The annexation issue reveals a similarly nuanced pattern. A distinction must be made between formal legal annexation and the gradual process of de facto annexation. In July 2025, the Knesset approved, by 71 votes to 13, a symbolic resolution calling for the extension of Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank and the Jordan Valley. Notably, right-wing opposition parties such as Yisrael Beiteinu supported the measure, while several centrist parties either abstained or avoided direct confrontation. This suggests that the opposition may oppose formal annexation primarily because of its diplomatic costs and its implications for relations with the United States and Europe, rather than because it fundamentally rejects consolidating Israeli control over large parts of the West Bank.

This dynamic became even clearer during the October 2025 vote on legislative initiatives concerning the annexation of the West Bank and Ma’ale Adumim. Although Netanyahu sought to restrain the legislative process for political and diplomatic reasons, a preliminary bill to annex Ma’ale Adumim passed its first reading with the support of both Yair Lapid and Benny Gantz. Here, voting behavior becomes especially revealing. It indicates that while centrist opposition parties may reject the sweeping annexation agenda advocated by Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, they do not necessarily oppose incorporating the major settlement blocs, particularly those surrounding Jerusalem.

The significance of the E1 development plan therefore becomes even more apparent. The area between East Jerusalem and the settlement of Ma’ale Adumim is not simply another urban development project; it constitutes a geopolitical nexus with profound implications for the territorial contiguity of the West Bank and the viability of a future Palestinian state. In August 2025, the E1 project received final approval, authorizing thousands of housing units near Ma’ale Adumim despite repeated warnings that it could sever the West Bank from East Jerusalem and effectively undermine the feasibility of the two-state solution. Given that several opposition leaders supported the annexation of Ma’ale Adumim, it is difficult to assume they would make the cancellation of E1 a defining condition of any future government. A Bennett-Lapid administration would more likely freeze or slow the project to avoid confrontation with Washington and the European Union rather than abandon it in principle.

Taken together, the evidence allows the hypothesis to be assessed on three levels. First, regarding Palestinian statehood, parliamentary voting does not support the proposition of a fundamental policy shift. With the exception of the Zionist left and the Arab parties, the Zionist opposition has shown little willingness to vote in favor of this option. Second, on annexation, an opposition government might suspend or moderate formal legal annexation, but it does not appear prepared to dismantle the underlying logic of gradual annexation or relinquish the major settlement blocs. Third, concerning E1, the most realistic change would be a return to a policy of cautious suspension under international pressure rather than the outright cancellation of the project.

Accordingly, the original hypothesis is only partially supported. The fall of Netanyahu and his far-right coalition could alter Israel’s diplomatic conduct, moderate its political rhetoric, and restore greater consideration for relations with the United States, Europe, and Arab states. Yet parliamentary voting patterns suggest that such a transition would not guarantee a structural shift in Israel’s position on Palestinian statehood, annexation, or the E1 project. The current Israeli opposition appears to oppose Netanyahu’s governing style and political alliances more than it challenges the broader settlement and security paradigm that continues to shape Israeli policy toward the Palestinians.

Ultimately, the more important question is not whether Netanyahu’s government will fall, but what kind of government will replace it, on what coalition basis, and with what explicit legislative commitments. Should a Bennett-Lapid center-right coalition come to power, Israel is likely to witness a moderation in rhetoric and a selective freezing of certain policies without a fundamental shift toward Palestinian statehood. By contrast, if such a government depends on meaningful parliamentary support from the left and the Arab parties, the prospects for halting annexation and freezing the E1 project would become considerably stronger. Parliamentary voting behavior therefore demonstrates that expectations of change should not rest on a change of leadership alone, but on a more practical test: who votes against annexation, who votes in favor of Palestinian statehood, and who explicitly commits to freezing the E1 project?

References

1. Reuters, “Netanyahu’s Biggest Rivals Join Forces for Israel’s Next Election,” April 2026؛ Israel Policy Forum, “Bennett and Lapid Unite,” April 2026.

2. Knesset, “Diktat for Establishing Palestinian State Will Endanger the State of Israel,” February 21, 2024؛ Reuters, “Israeli Parliament Backs Netanyahu’s Rejection of ‘Unilateral’ Recognition of Palestinian State,” February 21, 2024.

3. The Times of Israel, “Knesset Votes Overwhelmingly Against Palestinian Statehood Days Before PM’s US Trip,” July 18, 2024.

4. The Times of Israel, “Knesset Votes 71-13 for Non-Binding Motion Calling to Annex West Bank,” July 23, 2025؛ The Jerusalem Post, “Knesset Approves Israeli Sovereignty in West Bank,” July 2025.

5. The Times of Israel, “2 West Bank Annexation Bills Get Initial Nod,” October 22, 2025؛ Al Jazeera, “Can Israel Annex the West Bank If the US Says No?” October 24, 2025.

6. Reuters, “Israel Approves Settlement Plan to Erase Idea of Palestinian State,” August 20, 2025؛ Associated Press, “Israel Announces a Settlement Project That Critics Say Will Effectively Cut the West Bank in Two,” August 2025.