Al-Hol Camp: From a Geography of Isolation to an Unresolved Regional Dilemma

Executive Summary

This study examines the transformations undergone by the Al-Hol camp. It traces its establishment in 1991 to receive Iraqi refugees, up through its conversion following the fall of ISIS’s last pocket in Baghuz in 2019 into a detention and shelter center housing the families of the group’s members—alongside Syrian and Iraqi displaced persons, as well as women and children of dozens of nationalities, whose connections to the organization and legal and security statuses varied. It then examines its breakdown during 2026—following the Syrian government’s control over the northeastern region of the country—into divergent trajectories: a relatively organized Iraqi return, the transfer of Syrian families to other camps and communities, the continued presence of third-country nationals in the Al-Roj camp or their return via varying means, and the transfer of thousands of suspected ISIS members from Syrian prisons to Iraq. The study stems from a central question: Did closing the camp contribute to addressing its humanitarian and security risks, or did it merely dismantle a security hub and redistribute its burdens across countries, camps, courts, and security apparatuses with varying capabilities?[1، 9، 10، 14، 16، 17، 18، 19]

The study concludes that the closure reduced the risks of spatial concentration: overcrowding, the presence of radicalized networks within a single space, and the continuation of mass detention without clear prospects. However, it did not eliminate the legal, social, and security risks; rather, it redistributed them across entities and pathways that are difficult to track and that vary in their capacity to manage them. Consequently, the post-Al-Hol phase should not be evaluated by the number of those who left it or by its closure alone, but rather by the extent to which the fates of its former residents are documented, their referral to courts to assess their legal and security statuses, the capacity of return communities to absorb and integrate them, and the readiness of home countries to repatriate their citizens and assume their legal responsibilities toward them. [7، 9، 13، 20، 29، 49، 51، 52]

From a Jordanian perspective, available data does not indicate that the closure of Al-Hol camp posed a direct threat to its borders or triggered a mass movement from northeastern Syria toward the south. The issue most relevant to Jordan lies in the absence of updated official data specifying the numbers of Jordanians who were in the Al-Hol and Roj camps or in prisons in northeastern Syria, as well as their fate following the dispersal of residents and detainees—particularly between Syria and Iraq. This data gap gains added significance in light of the facilities Jordan has granted for the entry of Syrians, despite the ongoing requirement of having no security impediments; the effectiveness of individual screening relies on the availability and exchange of updated lists among relevant authorities. Therefore, the current Jordanian impact is linked to the difficulty of identifying individuals and tracking their legal statuses, rather than a proven geographic shift of risk. This renders data exchange with Syria, Iraq, and the International Coalition a priority for assessing the scope of the issue and addressing its various cases. [21، 22، 42، 43، 44، 45]

Central Question, Analytical Framework, and Scope of Research

This study seeks to answer the following question: Did dismantling the Al-Hol camp and transferring its residents and prison detainees lead to reducing humanitarian and security risks, or did it merely redistribute them among the Roj camp, Syrian internal camps, Iraq, home countries, and varying judicial systems? Two sub-questions arise from this: How did the fate of the camp’s residents differ from that of suspected ISIS members in prisons? And what conditions make the transfer of each category a true step toward resolving the issue, rather than merely shifting the crisis from the camp to other institutions and locations?

To answer these questions, the study distinguishes between four interconnected levels that are often conflated: the humanitarian level concerning women, children, and displaced persons; the security level pertaining to radicalized networks and suspected members of the organization; the judicial level related to jurisdiction, evidence, and fair trial guarantees; and the regional level regarding the responsibilities of home countries and the file’s implications for border security. This distinction allows for an independent assessment of each pathway: the return of an Iraqi child is not equivalent to the transfer of an adult suspect to the Iraqi judiciary, just the continued stay of a foreign woman in the Roj camp differs from the relocation of a Syrian family to the Aq burhan camp.

The study relied on a desk review of UN, official, human rights, media, and research sources, as well as a map prepared by the REACH initiative and field materials gathered from the camp administration in February 2023. It utilizes data from 2022 and 2023 to understand the camp’s structure, demographic composition, and exit mechanisms prior to the 2026 transformations. This comparison makes it possible to determine whether the closure addressed the problems associated with the camp or merely shifted them to other sites and entities. Furthermore, it distinguishes between confirmed facts and estimates, highlighting data gaps and contradictions whenever verified results cannot be reached. [1، 42، 52]

Geographical and Historical Context of Al-Hol Camp: From a Refugee Camp to a Post-ISIS Dilemma

Al-Hol camp is located in the far northeast of Syria, particularly in the Hasakah Governorate, near the Iraqi border. Over the years, the camp expanded beyond its original function of sheltering displaced people and refugees to become a vast settlement providing humanitarian aid, while simultaneously restricting the conditions of movement, entry, and exit, without resolving residents’ legal statuses or establishing clear pathways for their return. [1، 2، 3] 

 The camp map prepared by the REACH initiative in August 2022 illustrates the layout of the camp, as it comprised ten sectors, 546 blocks, and 14,300 shelters, distributed over an area approaching 2.94 million square meters. At this space at the time were 58,895 individuals, who enjoyed markets, health and educational facilities, as well as protection and aid distribution centers. Thus, these data demonstrate how it went beyond the layout and form of a “temporary” shelter camp, taking on the structure of a vast, internally organized population settlement, whose management required an integrated system of surveillance and services. [1]

Figure (1): Spatial Structure of Al-Hol Camp as Shown in the REACH Map, August 2022. [1]

However, by mid-2026, Al-Hol was no longer an active camp in the form the world had known over the past years. The military and political shifts in northeastern Syria during January and February 2026 led to the collapse of the previous guarding system, the chaotic departure of large numbers of people, and the relocation of other families to different sites in Syria, such as camps in Aleppo, or to camps and prisons in Iraq, before the announcement of its evacuation and closure. Nevertheless, the end of the camp as a physical structure and location did not close the case; rather, it removed the central focal point that held it together, leaving behind a web of issues surrounding return, disappearances, prosecution, and reintegration. [6، 9، 10، 11، 12، 13]   

Al-Hol Across Three Phases: From a Refugee Camp to a Post-ISIS Dilemma

Al-Hol did not originate as a camp for the families of individuals who joined ISIS, nor was it originally born out of the Syrian war. Its establishment dates back to 1991, when it was created to receive Iraqis displaced by the repercussions of the Gulf War. Its population later declined, only for its use to expand once again amidst Iraqi displacement following the 2003 invasion. Thus, from its inception, the history of the location was tied to successive wars across the Syrian-Iraqi border, long before it became part of the Syrian crisis itself. [2، 3]

However, the second shift in the camp’s function emerged with new waves of Iraqi and Syrian displacement, coming to the fore with its reopening in February 2026 to accommodate a fresh influx of Iraqi refugees. Over the following months, the camp received thousands of Iraqis fleeing the city of Mosul, which was under ISIS control at the time, and the surrounding heavy fighting, just prior to the launch of the military operation to retake the city in October of that year. Consequently, this phase reveals a longstanding borderland function of the camp: absorbing the fallout of wars that extend far beyond its immediate administrative region, without being paired with stable pathways for return or long-term settlement. [4]

The third and most widely known and complex phase began between late 2018 and March 2019, amidst the assault on ISIS’s final enclave in Baghuz, in the Deir ez-Zor countryside. Within a few short months, tens of thousands arrived at Al-Hol, pushing its population beyond 73,000 by the end of March 2019, despite being originally designed to accommodate only about 20,000 people. The vast majority were women and children, many of whom arrived under severe humanitarian and health conditions following the siege, heavy fighting, and acute shortages of food and essential services. [5]

At this point, the meaning of Al-Hol fundamentally shifted. It was no longer a traditional displacement camp, but rather a human warehouse for the post “Caliphate” era: Syrians, Iraqis, and women and children from dozens of countries, as well as many other individuals whose stories of arrival and degree of connection to the group varied radically. On another note, a “foreign annex” was established inside it for third-country nationals, while adult male combatants and suspected fighters were kept in a separate network of prisons. This moment of transformation makes understanding the pre-2019 history essential: it illustrates that while the physical site predated ISIS, its regional and legal dilemma took shape only when it became a receptacle holding the group’s families, its victims, and individuals who had never undergone individualized assessments. [2، 6، 7، 8]

*Table 1. Historical Timeline of Al-Hol Camp (compiled by the author).

Analytical Distinctions: The Camp Is Not the Prison System
One of the fundamental issues in the discourse surrounding Al-Hol lies in using a single label for everyone in northeastern Syria, such as “ISIS members”, “ISIS families”, or “detainees”. However, the camp did not house a legally or socially homogeneous group; it contained displaced Syrians, Iraqis, women and children from other countries, families of individuals who joined the group, people accused of supporting it, victims of trafficking or coercion, and children who were born in the camp or arrived at an early age. [6، 7، 8]

The first level is humanitarian and civil; it relates to women, children, displaced persons, documentation, education, protection, and return. The second level is security-related: it concerns the existence of extremist networks inside the camp, homicides, threats, and smuggling. The third level is judicial: it pertains to fighters and suspects held in prisons, evidence, jurisdiction, and prosecution. The fourth level is political and international: it deals with the responsibilities of Syria, Iraq, countries of origin, and the International Coalition. Conflating these levels leads to inappropriate solutions, such as treating a child through a counterterrorism lens, or addressing an adult suspect through humanitarian aid alone.

Most male fighters and suspected fighters were held in separate facilities, not in the tents of Al-Hol. Therefore, the transfer of 5,704 individuals to Iraq in 2026 was not a relocation of camp residents, but rather a transfer from the prison system. This distinction is not merely linguistic; it dictates the applicable law, the responsible authority, the nature of evidence required, and the type of workable solution. [7، 18، 19، 26، 27]

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that nearly 90% of the residents in Al-Hol and Roj were women and children, with children accounting for approximately two-thirds. Legally, many of the camp’s inhabitants were not convicted prisoners, yet restrictions on movement and exit rendered their stay a de facto indefinite detention. This created a paradox: a location managed through humanitarian language, yet producing the effects of detention; and governed by security considerations yet lacking individual judicial screening. [7، 8، 9]

This did not mean an absence of security risks. Al-Hol witnessed homicides, threats, smuggling, and attempts by extremist networks to enforce their rules on other women and families, leading to security operations targeting networks affiliated with ISIS. However, the analytical conclusion is not that everyone was dangerous, but rather that the lack of individual screening lumped victims, suspects, extremists, and children into a single space, rendering risk management both far more difficult and significantly less just. [7، 24، 25]

 From Temporary Response to the Management of Long-Term Residency

Humanitarian aid was incapable of addressing the core of the crisis. While international and local organizations provided food, water, healthcare, educational spaces, and protection, they were not the entities capable of issuing judicial rulings, repatriating citizens, granting nationality and documentation, or deciding their destination. Thus, the humanitarian response sustained a basic standard of life, while political and legal decisions remained deferred. [5، 8، 24]

The Al-Hol experience reveals a dual failure. The first was an approach grounded in security that treated the community inside the camp as a reservoir of potential threat, lacking swift and fair judicial screening. The second was a humanitarian approach detached from political and legal solutions. As a result, “temporary” ceased to be a time-bound description and became a system of governance: delivering services day by day while continuously deferring the questions of who has the right to leave, who ought to stand trial, and which state must take responsibility for its citizens. [7، 8، 9، 49]

Before the camp’s collapse, the departure of Syrians did not follow a single path. According to information gathered from the Al-Hol administration in February 2023, there were three primary avenues: irregular departure through bribes or smugglers; tribal guarantees, whereby trusted sheikhs vouched for the return of families or individuals; and formal applications submitted to the administration and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which required undergoing a security vetting process that used to take a year.

These pathways were not equally accessible. Tribal guarantees favored individuals with social networks capable of sponsoring them, while some wives and children of ISIS fighters, along with those lacking strong tribal ties, remained in a far more vulnerable position. Furthermore, estimates regarding returnees differed between the camp administration and local leaders. These factors reveal that the absence of a unified registry was not merely a statistical issue, but a critical factor determining who could leave and who remained trapped.

Reaching the gate did not mean the return process was complete. Returnees faced housing shortages, lost documentation, difficulties registering births and marriages, limited opportunities for employment and education, and a lack of psychological support, alongside a social stigma that left families under perpetual suspicion. Therefore, success should not be measured solely by the number of deportees or departures, but by the proportion of those who secured identity documents, essential services, social acceptance, and genuine post-return stability. [2، 20]

2026: From Spatial Closure to Case Reallocation

The Al-Hol case reached a critical turning point in January 2026 as the control map in northeastern Syria shifted. Control of the camp transitioned to Syrian government forces following the withdrawal of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), while some services briefly halted before water, bread, and essential healthcare were gradually resumed. However, the rapid nature of this transition created a vacuum ahead of organized handover arrangements, fundamentally altering the core question from how to manage the camp to how to track those who left it. [10، 11، 13]

On January 19, 2026, Al-Hol housed approximately 23,407 individuals across 6,639 families, including 6,280 third-country nationals from over forty countries. Following the transfer of control, the population plummeted rapidly, with the former director reporting on February 18 that fewer than one thousand families remained. Accounts varied regarding their departure, citing spontaneous returns, escapes, departures amidst chaos, and organized transfers, while the final destinations for several third-country nationals remained without verified documentation. [6، 10، 13]

On February 20, it was reported that the camp had effectively become nearly empty, following which authorities announced its evacuation and closure. Human Rights Watch warned that the departure of the vast majority occurred largely in an unplanned manner, and that the status of thousands of individuals across Al-Hol and Roj remained unresolved. The primary implication here is that closing the physical site brought an end to the spatial detention model; however, it simultaneously weakened the ability of various actors to monitor the population in a centralized location, unless compensated by precise registries and robust follow-up mechanisms. [9، 12، 13]

Therefore, what occurred should not be framed solely as either a triumph or a collapse. While the concentration risk within Al-Hol has been reduced, a set of dispersed risks has emerged: families relocated to another camp, individuals returned to Iraq, third-country nationals departed or remained in Roj, and accused individuals were transferred to the Iraqi judiciary. The post-camp risk profile is not uniform; rather, it varies depending on the specific trajectory and the entity assuming control of the file.

4 Pathways Post-Al-Hol Closure: Where Were the Residents and Detainees Distributed?

The Iraqi Pathway: Organized Return and a Long-Term Test for Reintegration

The Iraqi pathway was the most structured. Between May 2021 and February 2026, more than 21,500 Iraqis returned from Al-Hol and Roj through 35 coordinated movements. Many families passed through reception and rehabilitation centers in tandem with issuance of identity documents and the provision of legal, psychological, and social support. This trajectory significantly reduced the population of Iraqis in both camps and shifted the case from an extra-territorial responsibility to an internal Iraqi public policy. [14، 52]

Yet the Iraqi return was not merely a matter of bus transport. Returners faced interrupted education, child registration issues, difficulties recovering lost documents, and rejection by certain communities hesitant to accept families perceived as affiliated with ISIS. To address this, the “New Beginnings” plan targeted both host communities and returnees. This underscores that the success of repatriation cannot be measured solely by the decommissioning of the camp, but rather by the state’s capacity to prevent internal isolation and social stigmatization from taking root once again.  

The Syrian Pathway: From One Camp to Another

Syrian families from the final phase were relocated to the Aq Burhan camp in the Akhtarin district of Aleppo Governorate. UNHCR updates indicated that 972 families, comprising 3,864 individuals, were registered there through March 26, 2026. These numbers reveal a clear paradox: while Al-Hol was closed, thousands of its former residents were merely relocated to another camp rather than transitioning directly into permanent housing or integrating into their return communities. [15، 16]

While this relocation mitigates the specific risks associated with the Al-Hol environment, it falls short of achieving a durable solution unless coupled with documentation, permanent housing, livelihoods, essential services, and the capacity for voluntary movement. Consequently, the redistribution of the camp does not merely equate to a redistribution of security risks; it may also represent a redistribution of humanitarian vulnerability and aid dependency.

Third-Country Nationals: Between Managed Repatriation and Uncontrolled Return

Responses from countries of origin remained inconsistent. International tracking data discloses that nationals from at least 57 countries were present in Al-Hol and Roj; while some governments executed organized repatriations, others retrieved only children or maintained a stance of refusal and hesitation. Public data does not always allow for precise comparison, given that these metrics rely on open-source estimates that vary significantly in their categorization frameworks and timeline parameters [50، 51]

Australia presents a revealing example of the impact of state hesitation. In 2022, the government executed a coordinated operation that repatriated four women and 13 children, coupled with support and reintegration arrangements. However, Australian officials announced in February 2026 that the government would not carry out any further repatriation operations from Al-Hol or Roj, while simultaneously acknowledging the authorities’ commitment to issuing passports to those legally entitled to them. In May 2026, a distinct trajectory emerged when 13 individuals were preparing to return via commercial flights, without the government framing the move as an official repatriation. [47، 48، 50]

The significance lies in the distinction between “managed repatriation” and “uncontrolled return”. The former allows for identity verification, risk assessment, and arrangements for prosecution or psychosocial support prior to arrival. The latter may eventually occur by virtue of citizenship and the right to travel, but it leaves the state with less preparation time and heightens reliance on post-arrival emergency measures. Consequently, refusing to repatriate does not invariably preclude the return of citizens; rather, it may simply shift the process from a manageable mechanism into a less transparent one

Moreover, UN experts stress that safe, organized repatriation, accompanied by investigation and prosecution where evidence warrants, remains the most aligned response with international law. This does not grant impunity; instead, it shifts accountability from extraterritorial mass detention to individualized assessment within an established judicial system. Furthermore, the persistence of the Roj camp underscores that the closure of Al-Hol has not resolved the dilemma of third-country nationals, leaving behind a secondary hub dominated by foreign citizens, with children comprising a substantial portion of its population. [17، 49، 51، 53]

The Judicial Pathway: The Transfer of Prison Detainees to Iraq

In parallel with the camp’s evacuation, 5,704 individuals spanning 61 nationalities were transferred from separate prisons and detention facilities to Iraq. These individuals were not residents of Al-Hol’s tents, but they were subject to a distinct security and judicial track. While this operation mitigated the risk of prison breaches and the potential regrouping of fighters, it shifted the focal point of the crisis to the Iraqi judiciary, elevating jurisdiction, evidentiary standards, fair trial guarantees, and the death penalty into pivotal points of contention. [18، 19، 26، 27]

Transferring Detainees to Iraq: From a Security Necessity to a Legal Test

Iraqi data show that the transferred group did not constitute a homogeneous Iraqi cohort repatriated to its homeland; it comprised 467 Iraqis, 4,253 nationals of Arab states, including 3,543 Syrians, and 983 non-Arab foreign nationals. This demographic composition positions the operation as a multinational transfer to a third state, as opposed to a repatriation of citizens, thereby necessitating a clear account of the legal basis for each case. [26]

. In particular, the issue begins with the transfer itself. The operation was executed at Iraq’s request and with US assistance against the backdrop of an urgent security threat, yet public materials do not disclose a comprehensive published agreement or prior individual decisions allowing detainees to appeal and contest the transfer. While security imperatives explain the swiftness of the operation, they do not obviate the need for individualized judicial review, nor do they bypass the requirement to clarify which entity held the extradition authority and on what legal basis it acted. [27، 29، 30]

Conversely, Iraqi jurisdiction remains straightforward when the accused’s connection to crimes committed within Iraq, or targeting its national security and citizens, is established. However, it becomes significantly more complex regarding a foreign national accused of an act perpetrated exclusively within Syria. While penal code provisions provide for certain forms of extraterritorial jurisdiction, this does not equate to a broad universal jurisdiction over every act attributed to ISIS. Consequently, the prosecution must substantiate the specific statutory provision and the nexus to Iraq in every individual dossier, rather than merely relying on the organization’s transnational nature. [31، 32، 33]

Furthermore, the principle of non-refoulement regarding the risk of torture is a paramount concern. The Convention against Torture prohibits the extradition of any person to a state where there are substantial grounds for believing they would be subjected to torture. International and UN human rights bodies have documented systemic issues in certain Iraqi terrorism cases, including reliance on contested confessions, inadequate investigations into the specific roles of defendants, and the heightened risk of severe sentences or the death penalty. Hence, safeguarding the integrity of this process necessitates individualized risk assessments and independent post-transfer monitoring. [29، 34، 36، 37]

Ultimately, a fair trial serves as the decisive test determining whether transferring detainees marks a shift from a legal vacuum to actual justice, or merely a transition from indefinite detention in Syria to expedited collective proceedings in Iraq. Although the Iraqi Constitution guarantees the presumption of innocence, the right to defense, and the prohibition of torture, the Counter-Terrorism Law mandates severe penalties, often reaching the death penalty. Thus, courts must rigorously distinguish between leadership roles, active combat, financing, coercion, and mere family presence, ensuring that presumed affiliation never replaces the requirement of proving individual conduct. [31، 33، 35، 36]

Crucially linked to this process is the chain of custody for evidence. Controlling entities over the detention facilities have changed, and records were transferred amid rapid military conditions. Therefore, the defense counsel must be able to establish precisely when and where a person was detained, who interrogated them, what physical evidence was seized, how it was preserved, and whether coercion took place. In fact, flaws in the chain of custody not only jeopardize the rights of the accused, but they also undermine ISIS victims, as unreliable trials risk squandering the opportunity to formally prove horrific acts of murder, enslavement, torture, and genocide. [30، 36]

Additionally, two categories require further safeguards: minors and third-country nationals. The Iraqi authorities identified 157 individuals under the age of eighteen, triggering the necessary application of juvenile justice standards, verification of child recruitment and coercion, and prioritizing rehabilitation. Furthermore, foreign nationals retain the right to consular access, translation services, and legal counsel, while their respective home states bear the responsibility of monitoring their cases, ensuring their citizens are not left exposed to torture or the death penalty without consular protection. [28، 38، 39]

As of August 1, 2026, the judicial landscape was still taking shape. Although the completion of investigation and accountability procedures was announced for 4,872 individual files, alongside expectations of imminent court referrals, no comprehensive official announcement regarding final judgments within this transferred cohort has been issued. For this reason, the study does not label the current trials as unfair before they unfold; instead, it establishes key benchmarks to measure their fairness: proving jurisdiction, providing access to lawyers and translators, investigating claims of torture, excluding coerced evidence, applying specialized standards for minors, and refraining from imposing the death penalty for mere group membership. [40]

Foreign States, the Syrian State, and the International Coalition: Distributed, Uncanceled Responsibilities

The transition of control altered the entity administering the site, but it did not absolve other parties of their responsibilities. As the de facto authority over Al-Hol following January 2026, the Syrian state bears the responsibility to protect the population, register departing and transferred individuals, preserve records, documentation, and evidence, prevent human trafficking and enforced disappearances, and ensure that the decommissioning of the camp does not degenerate into forced displacement or a new form of arbitrary detention lacking legal grounds. [6، 9، 11، 55]

The Syrian government promotes its “No Camps 2026” policy as a transition from protracted camp-based displacement to permanent housing, essential services, and viable livelihoods within return and host communities. This policy could represent a significant paradigm shift if coupled with durable solutions; however, it risks turning into a purely administrative closure if families are simply transferred to a new camp or left without civil documentation and adequate housing. Consequently, the benchmark of success is not the disappearance of the Al-Hol name but achieving a genuine systemic reduction in camp dependency. [15، 16، 55]

As for home countries, they possess powers that neither Syria nor humanitarian organizations enjoy: issuing civil documentation, repatriating citizens, investigating crimes, and providing protection and reintegration programs. These states cannot indefinitely offload their legal obligations onto a conflict zone. Furthermore, the Australian experience demonstrates that citizens may return even in the absence of state-sponsored mechanisms, meaning that refusing organized repatriation ultimately weakens a state’s ability to manage returns rather than preventing them altogether. [47، 48، 49، 50، 51]

While the International Coalition lacks the general legal authority to compel a sovereign state to repatriate its citizens, it holds substantial political, security, and financial leverage. Historically, the Coalition has previously secured detention facilities and camps, facilitated repatriations, and funded services at the Al-Amal Center in Iraq, before executing the transfer of 5,704 detainees and capturing their biometric data. Concurrently, the United States has continued supporting service administration and reintegration efforts while actively urging states to repatriate their remaining nationals from the Roj camp. [27، 52، 53]

Following the shift in control, the Coalition’s role transitions from direct security management to a political and technical responsibility: handing over records and biometric data, preserving evidence and its chain of custody, enabling cross-border tracking, funding reintegration programs, and exerting diplomatic pressure for coordinated repatriation. This mandate does not imply that the Coalition supplants the Syrian state or home countries. Rather, it underscores that the Coalition cannot treat a change of custody as the conclusion of its role, following years of establishing and supporting the detention infrastructure.

Jordan After the Closure of Al-Hol: The Challenge of Individual Identification and Tracking Individuals’ Whereabouts and Legal Status

The shifts of 2026 altered the nature of the link between the Al-Hol case and Jordan. The camp’s closure, the return of large numbers of Iraqis, the relocation of Syrian families to other sites, and the remaining presence of some third-country nationals in the Roj camp coincided with the transfer of thousands of detainees from prisons in northeastern Syria to Iraq. Available data does not indicate a mass movement of these groups toward southern Syria, and consequently toward the Jordanian border. Therefore, the decommissioning of Al-Hol cannot, in and of itself, be treated as a direct threat to Jordan. [14، 15، 16]

However, the dispersal of residents and detainees across these distinct pathways raises a more specific query regarding the status outcomes of Jordanians who may be among them. The study found no recent data in official, open sources specifying the number of Jordanians who were present in the Al-Hol and Roj camps or in prisons in northeastern Syria, nor their breakdown by age, gender, or legal status. Additionally, no public information is available to clarify whether any of them were among the 5,704 detainees belonging to 61 nationalities who were transferred to Iraq, or if they departed for other destinations following the shift in control and the evacuation of the camp.

Furthermore, the nature of the ISIS threat itself has evolved. A UN monitoring team report in February 2026 estimated that between 1,500 and 3,000 fighters remained active in Syria and Iraq, while a recent European report indicated that Deir ez-Zor remained the primary operational theater for the organization, alongside an active presence in Raqqa, Idlib, Aleppo, and Palmyra, with indicators of a limited resurgence in the south. This indicates that the danger has not vanished and has eventually shifted from broad territorial control to scattered cells employing improvised explosive devices (IEDs), ambushes, and targeted assassinations. [42، 43]

This data gap becomes more significant post-2026. Previously, the centralized presence of residents and detainees within designated camps and detention facilities enabled, in principle, their systematic registration and identity verification. Conversely, their subsequent dispersal across Syria, Iraq, and various home countries has fragmented records and data custody among multiple authorities. While this information vacuum does not inherently prove an active security threat, it hinders any accurate assessment of the Jordanian caseload. Crucially, it prevents authorities from determining whether the cohort includes women and children in need of identity verification and civil documentation, or individuals suspected of criminal offenses whose cases demand distinct legal and security frameworks.

By contrast, actual border risks exist, though they are broader than the Al-Hol case itself. Throughout 2026, Jordanian forces continued to thwart infiltration and smuggling attempts along the northern border, including apprehending infiltrators and intercepting drones carrying narcotics. These incidents confirm the ongoing activity of cross-border networks, but they do not establish a link to former Al-Hol residents. The distinction is critical: the policy objective is to prevent the trajectories of unregistered departures from intersecting with existing smuggling infrastructure, rather than assuming that current networks originated from the camp. [44، 45، 46]

Nevertheless, there are indicators of enhanced institutional control capabilities. Regional security coordination has persisted, with the Chiefs of Staff of Jordan and Syria meeting in April 2026 to discuss military cooperation, counterterrorism, and drug trafficking. This coordination mitigates the assumption of an unmonitored border, shifting the core focus from the absence of a Syrian counterpart to testing the quality of information sharing and joint response capabilities. [21، 22،
 44]

Facilities for the entry of Syrians must likewise be read with precision. Official decisions allowing specific categories, such as students, professors, commercial registry and property owners, and retirees, to enter or travel back and forth without prior approval still maintained the prerequisite of having no security impediments and explicitly excluded cases that still require prior authorization. Consequently, these measures do not represent a general opening of the border or an abandonment of security vetting, nor can they be cited on their own as evidence of an increased risk of cross-border transfers from the Al-Hol population. [47]

Fundamentally, the most realistic challenge for Jordan remains an intelligence one. It centers on matching names, fingerprints, and documentation; ascertaining whether any individuals among the camp residents or detainees hold Jordanian citizenship or possess familial or operational links to the Kingdom; and tracking the final destinations of those who departed without registration. The absence of an officially disclosed number of Jordanians precludes a rigorous quantitative assessment. As a result, exchanging lists with Syria, Iraq, and the Global Coalition becomes a higher priority than amplifying a generalized threat narrative.

Accordingly, the threat to Jordan becomes real if four indicators emerge collectively or sequentially: proving the presence of Jordanians or individuals linked to the Kingdom among those missing from official registries; monitoring their movement toward the south; establishing connections between them and ISIS cells or smuggling networks; and the occurrence of operational or logistical activity near the border. Without these indicators, it is most accurate to describe the impact as an administrative burden of operational tracking and information exchange, rather than an imminent threat or a new wave of refugees.

This cautious analysis does not diminish the importance of preparedness. The organization remains capable of operating through scattered cells, and southern Syria is defined by a multiplicity of local actors and its own unique complexities. Nonetheless, the appropriate response requires precise intelligence cooperation, risk-based screening, and monitoring shifts in ISIS operational patterns, instead of reverting to a generalized assumption that any instability in northeastern Syria will automatically migrate towards Jordan. [42، 43، 44، 45]

Thus, Jordan’s immediate challenge lies in identifying individuals and tracking their legal status outcomes, rather than being tied to an assumed geographical shift of threat from northeastern Syria to the Jordanian border. This requires exchanging lists and biometric data with Syria, Iraq, and the International Coalition, verifying citizenship cases and legal ties to the Kingdom, and distinguishing between returning civilians and children versus suspected criminal offenders. While the continuation of Jordanian–Syrian security coordination strengthens border control capabilities, it does not replace the need for precise knowledge of who was present in the camps and prisons and where their paths eventually led following the developments of 2026.

Practical Indicators for Assessing the Impact on Jordan

What the study adds: Moving beyond population redistribution toward a redistribution of responsibility

The study yields three core insights that transcend mere numerical aggregation. First, while the dismantling of the Al-Hol camp has mitigated concentration risks, it has generated dispersed sub-files requiring distinct policy instruments: humanitarian relief for families, reintegration for returnees, prosecution for accused individuals, repatriation for foreign nationals, and tracking for unregistered departures.

The second insight posits that differentiating between the camp and detention facilities reconfigures institutional responsibility. Camp residents cannot be collectively categorized under the counter-terrorism umbrella, nor can prison detainees be referred to the judiciary in the absence of evidence, legal jurisdiction, and due process guarantees. Thus, the study pivots from asking “where have we placed them?” to “what is the appropriate legal and social trajectory for each individual?”

The third insight demonstrates that regional threat is not a static quantity transferred from one locus to another. It may diminish through structured return, triage, and documentation; conversely, it can escalate when returns occur unrecorded, host communities resist reintegration, or judicial proceedings unfold in a manner that erodes trust. Hence, demographic redistribution functions either as a solution or a catalyst for crisis, depending directly on the institutional capacity of the receiving entities.

Scenarios and Recommendations: How to Close the Case, Not Merely the Location

The most plausible scenario entails the dismantling of the camp while leaving the underlying crisis in a state of strategic dispersion. Although Al-Hol has been officially closed, the Roj facility remains operational; some families have been relocated to alternative sites; the legal status of certain foreign nationals remains ambiguous; and Iraq has initiated judicial processing for thousands of pending files. While this scenario mitigates the heightened risks associated with maintaining a massive, centralized footprint in Al-Hol, it does not automatically generate a sustainable long-term resolution. [9، 13، 16، 17، 26]

The optimal scenario rests upon a unified registry linking data across Al-Hol, Roj, detention facilities, and reception centers, alongside individualized evaluations that distinguish civilians and children from suspected perpetrators. It further entails fair trials where evidence permits, the systematic repatriation of third-country nationals, formal documentation of births and kinship, and support targeted at receiving communities rather than returnees in isolation. Crucially, the process must encompass post-return monitoring to gauge educational attainment, housing stability, employment integration, and social acceptance, moving beyond the mere counting of departures. [7، 14، 20، 29، 49، 52]

Regarding Syria, the priority lies in preserving records, preventing enforced disappearances, and translating the “no-camps” policy into durable housing and basic services solutions. For Iraq, the imperative is to decouple civilian returns from criminal prosecutions while safeguarding due process rights for defendants. For countries of origin, the focus must shift toward structured repatriation rather than awaiting unmanaged returns. Meanwhile, the International Coalition must facilitate the transfer of data and evidence, support tracking and reintegration efforts, and leverage its influence to compel member states to fulfill their legal and strategic responsibilities. [27، 49، 52، 53، 55]

Regarding Jordan, the study recommends establishing a dedicated data-exchange mechanism with Syria, Iraq, and the Global Coalition concerning Jordanian nationals and individuals with links to the Kingdom. It further advises cross-referencing biometric registries with border control systems and developing an early-warning matrix to monitor southward movements, operational ties to smuggling networks, and shifts in ISIS operational dynamics. Crucially, entry protocols must remain predicated on individualized risk assessments, avoiding the collective stigmatization of Syrian nationals or treating economic and educational accommodations as inherent security vulnerabilities. [21، 22، 27، 44، 47]

The most hazardous scenario entails the escalation of administrative chaos into unrecorded disappearances outside regulatory frameworks, leaving children devoid of civil documentation and education. It involves the issuance of blanket or summary judgments that undermine justice, while receiving communities reject returnees, driving them toward vulnerable margins susceptible to exploitation. Indiscriminate mass detention does not yield security, yet chaotic release or transfer is equally incapable of doing so. Sustainable security originates from empirical precision, individualized accountability, and institutional capacity for long-term monitoring.

Conclusion

The closure of the Al-Hol camp has neither resolved the crisis nor left it in its original state. While it successfully mitigated the risk of concentrating tens of thousands within a single space, it simultaneously fragmented responsibility across multiple tracks: Iraq repatriated its citizens and inherited the challenge of reintegration; Syria closed the facility while relocating certain families to alternative sites; foreign nations oscillated between structured repatriation, outright refusal, and unmanaged returns; Iraq received prison detainees for broad judicial processing; and Roj camp persists as living proof that the file remains far from closed.

The post-Al-Hol dilemma is not that the threat has “transferred” entirely from Hasakah to the broader region, but rather that its ultimate trajectory has become contingent upon the institutional capacity of the entities receiving its fragmented elements. If comprehensive registration, individualized risk assessments, fair judicial proceedings, and social reintegration are successfully implemented, the dismantling of the camp could mark the inception of a durable resolution. Conversely, if identities, evidence, and rights are lost, the facility’s closure will merely represent a transition from a visible geography to a less transparent, and far more elusive, crisis

Central Data Gap: Within the official open-source materials reviewed up to August 1, 2026, the study identified no updated, reliable Jordanian data categorizing Jordanian nationals previously held in Al-Hol, Roj, or detention facilities by gender, age, or legal status. Consequently, the study refrains from offering unverified numerical estimates and instead treats the establishment of a shared database as a core recommendation rather than an available dataset.

Post-Al-Hol Case Framework Matrix

References

References:

[1] REACH Initiative: Al- Hol Camp Map and Overview as of August 2022;produced 28 September 2022. Map attached to the research material.

[2] Tahrir Institute for Middle East:Policy Challenges in repatriation From Al-Hol Camp In Syria, August 6,2024.

[3] Peer-reviewed study: Health and Humanitarian Challenges in Al-Hol Camp, Northeast Syria, 2020.

[4]  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees( UNHCR): Thousands of Iraqis seek refuge from Mosul fighting in war-torn Syria, 2016.

[5]  UNICEF: Syria Crisis Humanitarian Response Situation Report, March 2019.
https://www.unicef.org/media/77251/file/Syria-Crisis-SitRep-March-2019.pdf

[6]  Associated Press: Mass Departure from Al-Hol ahead of its closure and the legal status of its residents,2026.

[7] Amnesty International: Injustice, Torture, and Death in Detention in Northeast Syria, April 2024.

[8] International Committee of the Red Cross: Questions and Answers about the committee’s work in Syria and the Situation in Al-Hol and Roj.

[9]  Human Rights Watch: Northeast Syria: Camp Closure Leave Thousands in Limbo, February 23, 2026.

[10]  Reuters: Sharp decline in the number of residents of Al- Hol, February 18, 2026.

[11]  Associated Press: Basic Services resume after the transfer of control, February 5, 2026.

[12]  Associated Press: Al-Hol camp becomes nearly empty, February 20, 2026.

[13] Reuters: European Security concerns over the large-scale departure from Al-Hol February 24, 2026.

[14]  United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees-Iraq: Civil documentation for returnees from northeastern Syria, July 6, 2026.

[15] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Regional Flash Update No.66 on the relocation of families to Al-Aqrab, February 27,2026.

[16] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Update on Al-Aqrab and the registration of 972 families as of March 26, 2026.

[17] Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights: Visit  of the international commission of inquiry and the situation in Roj Camp, July 8, 2026.

[18]Associated Press: More than 5,700 suspected ISIS members transferred from Syrian prisons to Iraq, February 13, 2026.

[19] Iraq News Agency: Iraq receives 5,704 detainees transferred from Syrian prisons, February 13, 2026

[20]  United Nations in Iraq: New Beginnings plan for the return, rehabilitation and reintegration of Iraqis. https://iraq.un.org/en/288489-un-and-iraq-launch-one-un-plan-support-return-rehabilitation-and-reintegration-iraqis-al-hol

[21] Reuters: Jordan and Syria agree on border security, combating smuggling and preventing an ISIS resurgence, January 7,2025.

[22]  Reuters: Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Turkey coordinate efforts to confront ISIS, February 5, 2025.

[23] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Operational Data Portal- Jordan as of June 30,2026

[24] UNICEF: Whole of Syria Humanitarian Situation Report 2022.

[25] U.S. Central Command: Statement regarding the Syrian Democratic forces security operation in Al-Hol  Camp, September 18, 2022.

[26] Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council: Receipt of 5,704 detainees from 61 countries and distribution by nationality, February 13, 2026.

[27] U.S Central Command: 2026 Posture Statement on the transfer of 5,704 Detainees and the call for the repatriation of Nationals from Roj, July 14, 2026.

[28] Iraqi News Agency: Screening of 157 persons under the Age of 18 Among Those Transferred, February 16, 2026

[29] Human Rights Watch: Risks of Abuse and Unfair Trials following Transfer to Iraq, February 17, 2026
https://www.hrw.org/news/2026/02/17/iraq-alleged-isis-detainees-transferred-from-syria-at-risk-of-abuse

[30] Syrian Network for Human Rights: The Fate of Transferred Detainees and the Chain of Custody of Evidence, June, 18,2026

[31] Constitution of the Republic of Iraq of 2005.

[32] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Iraqi Penal Code No.111 of 1969.

[33]  United Nations office on Drugs and Crime: Iraqi Anti-Terrorism law No.13 of 2005.

[34] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Convention against Torture, Article 3.

[35]Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: International Covenant on civil and political rights.

[36]  United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights: Human rights in the administration of justice and terrorism trials, January 2020.

[37] United Nations commission against torture: concluding observations on Iraq, June 15, 2022.

[38] UNICEF: Convention on the Rights of the Child, in particular Articles 37 and 40.

[39] United Nations: Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Article 36.

[40] Rudaw: Completion of investigation into 4,872 files out of 5,704, July 15, 2026.

[42] Security Council: Thirty-seventh report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team concerning ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida, S/2026/44, February 4, 2026.

[43] European Union Agency for Asylum: Syria Security Situation Report, July 2026; ISIS Activity Patterns and Geography.

[44] Jordan News Agency (Petra): Jordan and Syria discuss military cooperation, counter-terrorism, and drug trafficking, April 7, 2026.

[45] Jordan News Agency (Petra): Three arrested in border infiltration attempts, July 27, 2026.

[46] Jordan News Agency (Petra): Drone smuggling and infiltration attempts from Syria thwarted on the northern front, April 2, 2026.

[47] Jordan News Agency (Petra): Entry and departure decisions for Syrians maintaining the condition of no security impediments, April 29, 2025.

[48] Australian Department of Home Affairs: Announcement of non-implementation of new government repatriations from Al-Hol and Roj, February 17, 2026.

[49] Australian Department of Home Affairs: Discussion on the return of a group of 13 people on commercial flights, May 6, 2026.

[50] Australian Department of Home Affairs: Annual Report 2022-2023 and documentation of the repatriation of four women and 13 children in 2022.

[51] Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): Detention and repatriation from northeast Syria and the legal position on repatriating nationals.

[52] Rights & Security International: Global Repatriations Tracker from northeast Syria; estimated data and measurement methodology.

[53] Reuters: Syria announces plan to close Al-Hol and Roj camps and separate civilian camps from prisons, January 30, 2026.

[54] Inspectors General of Operation Inherent Resolve: Congressional report for the period January–March 2026; support for the Hope Center, return of Iraqis, and services.

[55] United Nations in Syria: Joint Country Analysis 2026, the “No Camps 2026” policy, and durable solutions.