JPS Interview with Omar Razzaz
The future of the entire region today is contingent upon the repercussions of the war between United States, Israel, and Iran. Nevertheless, it is difficult at this stage to predict the form or image that things will take after the war, as everything is linked to its trajectories and its military and political outcomes. What is clear, however, is that the Middle East stands at a critical crossroads, particularly the Arab states in this region, which still represent, until now, the weakest party in the equation.
While Israel has historically been preoccupied with the concept of security and preserving the territories it occupies in Palestine, today it is different and possesses a major ambition based on regional domination. This agenda has been reinforced with the arrival of the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump. One can easily observe Israeli unilateralism in the West Bank, Gaza, Lebanon, and southern Syria, while there exists no force internationally or regionally, Arab or Western, that is willing or capable of deterring these Israeli tendencies in imposing a new equation in the Middle East region.
Such major transformations impose fundamental questions upon the states of the Arab Mashreq. It is important for them to determine their position regarding the future relationship with Iran, a state that has historically existed in the region, while Israel remains an externally imposed entity. Do we wish to build a different future vision in the relationship with Iran based on cooperation, regional security, and parity, or do we surrender to the concept of an endless existential conflict with the Iranians?! Such a question is more important to answer today than at any previous time, because the current war has demonstrated the resilience of the Iranian regime and the strength of the state there. It has withstood the United States of United States, the world’s superpower. Instead of the collapse of the regime there and its surrender, or a popular uprising against it, as Netanyahu had imagined and convinced Trump of, we found that the regime has instead become more resilient and stronger internally. The Trump administration, and even Netanyahu’s government, reached the conclusion that focusing on the objective of overthrowing the regime there is futile. This means that we will continue dealing with the Iranian regime during the coming phase, which raises an important question for Arab states, particularly the Gulf countries, regarding the kind of what kind of relationship we want with Iran.
In this context, it is still not clear whether our brothers in the Gulf possess a unified answer to the previous strategic question, or whether there are multiple Gulf conclusions and answers. What is clear, however, is that we are facing a phase that calls for an Arab and Gulf reassessment. If there is a recommendation to be presented to these states, it is the necessity of seeking a framework for a positive regional relationship with the Iranians, and defining the rules of the game with them internally and regionally in a manner that serves the interests of both sides. We must move beyond framing the relationship within the sectarian and identity trap, for it is the interests of states that drive policies. Our interests today lie in a strategic partnership based on clear rules with Iran, instead of waiting for the deals that others conclude with it.
The Turkish position here appears to represent an important model of political maturity, realism, and rationality in the management of foreign policy, particularly at the regional level. Turkey did not drift into sectarian or historical rhetoric in its position toward the current Iranian war; rather, it linked its position to its economic and strategic interests, and viewed the war from the perspective of the threat to its national security on the one hand, and its political interests on the other. The fall of the Iranian regime could mean three dangerous outcomes for the Turks: first, the possibility of identity wars erupting and extending across the region, creating a state of instability; second, a refugee crisis toward Turkey and its impact on internal stability; and third, the strengthening of Israeli regional power and the undermining of the principle of deterrence and the balance of power in the region. Therefore, Turkey realized that its interest lies in stopping the war and avoiding being drawn into the United Statesn-Israeli agenda and the calamities it could bring upon the region.
These transformations are not limited to the regional level, but are also international in nature. The entire world is changing, and there are international transformations that we can observe even in the relationship between United States and its closest European allies. Did French President Emmanuel Macron not call on Europeans to awaken in the face of these global developments?! Did Trump himself not visit China in order to find a solution to the “Iranian problem”? Does the Strait of Hormuz not affect the entire global economy and, to a large extent, the Arab-Gulf economy?!
Thus, we too-Arabically-are required to awaken and think about the major transformations underway, our place in the world, and our strategic interests. This calls on us to work on redrawing the relationship with United States, China, Europe, Turkey, and other states. This is one of the major questions arising from the war and its current repercussions?!
Saudi Arabia, for example, has strengthened its relations with Pakistan and Turkey, and it is clear that there is a major gap between it and the United Statesn administration’s perceptions of the coming phase, as well as a crisis of trust. The arrival of warplanes and thousands of Pakistani soldiers to Saudi Arabia has been announced. Likewise, relations between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Qatar, and Turkey have been strengthened in order to confront these historic developments and challenges. This requires pushing toward a policy of “diversifying Arab strategic options,” not limiting oneself to the idea of unilateralism in the relationship with the United Statesns, and breaking free from the theory of United Statesn protection for the Arab Gulf.
In addition to the above, Israeli hostile behavior today is not only directed against the Palestinians, but also against Lebanon and Syria, alongside provocative statements against Jordan and Saudi Arabia, the attempted assassination of Hamas leaders in Qatar, and the exceeding of humanitarian standards in dealing with the Palestinian situation. Perhaps the latest example is what happened to the activists of the Freedom Flotilla and the assault against them.
All of this has created unprecedented reactions in global and United Statesn public opinion, a noticeable change in the positions of European states, and a crisis with countries such as Spain and the governments of Ireland and Norway, as well as with the European Union, the United Nations, and South Africa. It has also produced a shift in United Statesn public opinion and a state of unprecedented division within United Statesn circles toward Israel. All of this calls for the development of an Arab agenda of action to invest in these new international climates in the confrontation with Israel, which, after the war on Gaza, has demonstrated intentions of hegemony and a sense of overwhelming power in the region.
As for Jordan, there are important outcomes and conclusions, foremost among them the necessity of maintaining a significant degree of neutrality in the United Statesn-Iranian war and avoiding being drawn into a regional conflict that does not serve Jordanian interests under any circumstances. If we have had a historical problem with Iranian policies and ideas in the region, today we have a major problem with the policies of Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel, and with what Israeli politicians harbor for the future of the West Bank. Therefore, it is important to maintain a position of not being drawn into any battle or war with Iran, but rather to present a moderate and balanced model similar to the Omani model, and to remain keen on preserving this strategic advantage for us, as it will serve Jordan with all parties in the future.
At the level of the greatest challenge externally, it lies with Israel, and with Netanyahu’s government in particular, and with the agenda of this government toward both the West Bank and Jordan alike. For Netanyahu, Jordan is nothing more than a functional state or a reservoir for Palestinian refugees. It is clear that the peace project ended in Israel with the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, and what has taken place afterward has no relation to a peaceful settlement or belief in peace. I still remember the meeting that brought me together with Benjamin Netanyahu in the summer of 1996, when he became Prime Minister of Israel. There was a conviction on the part of King Hussein, may he rest in peace, that he represented a threat to peace, and he wanted to send him clear messages regarding the Jordanian position on peace and its parameters. He asked me to receive him at the airport and meet with him. He rode with me in the car and was extremely arrogant. It was clear to me from that very moment that he was a person who did not want peace, who believed only in power and arrogance, and who saw no one before him. The atmosphere between us was tense even while I was driving him from the airport during that visit. From that first meeting onward, my firm conviction, which only grew firmer, was that peace with such a person could not be possible.
In the same context, it is necessary for there to be a “Jordanian program” in the West Bank to confront Israeli policies, and that we do not suffice with meeting and speaking with the Palestinian Authority alone, but rather that there be channels, policies, and various forms of engagement with the different Palestinian forces, because confronting the Israeli project of annexing and devouring the West Bank and displacing the Palestinians is a vital Jordanian national, security, and strategic interest.
This also requires that we develop our relations with neighboring states, with the Gulf, Iraq, and Syria, and that these policies take on an institutional character-not merely a personal one-in a way that serves the interests of the states of the region in general. With Syria, it is true that our interest lies in the unity of Syrian territory and the strength of the state there, but at the same time it is mistaken to imagine that major economic benefits will come from Syria. Rather, Syria may become a major economic competitor to Jordan during the coming phase, especially with regard to the transportation of Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. As for Iraq, it is clear that there remains a gap between us and the Iraqi street, and we must work on building major bridges of communication, official and popular diplomacy, and developing good reciprocal relations, especially with Shiite forces whose relationship with the Arab states and Jordan is supposed to be positive.
In conclusion, our fate today, as Arabs, is in our own hands, and we must choose whether we want, as states and as a nation in this region, to have a voice in shaping the scenarios of the coming phase. Do we want to sit at the table with the other players and have our own voice? Or do we remain outside history and action, remaining passive observers of decisions made by others?!
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