The Algorithm Is the Weapon
How the maturation of digitized capitalism became the infrastructure of the global far-right - and why the EU's move to ban social media for under-16s is an act of geopolitical defence as much as child protection.

The contemporary geopolitical landscape is undergoing a profound structural transformation driven by the maturation of what is best understood as digitized capitalism. In this emerging paradigm, traditional market dynamics and democratic processes are being replaced by platform-based economies, generating the rapid accumulation of unprecedented wealth and power among a new class of technological elite-Digital Lords. This class now commands vast data infrastructures, artificial intelligence capabilities, and global communication networks – and has transcended the role of corporate leadership to become independent geopolitical actors, possessing the unparalleled capacity to scale, accelerate, and manipulate political ideology on a global level.
At the nexus of this transformation lies a sophisticated form of transnational hybrid warfare. Its primary objective is the systematic erosion of public trust in historical institutions, leveraging algorithmic architectures to bypass civic dialogue entirely – accelerating audiences directly from localised grievances to the delegitimization of the state. In Europe and North America, this ideological offensive has manifested through strategic, if sometimes decentralised, alliances between American technology billionaires, data-mining corporations, and right-wing populist movements. From the foundational data-harvesting operations that drove the Brexit referendum and seeded the rise of Reform UK, to the direct algorithmic amplification of the Alternative for Germany, digital platforms have been weaponised to exploit societal fault lines and normalise extremist narratives.
Historically, right-wing factions relied on older electorates mobilised through traditional broadcasting and entrenched anxieties about migration and demographic change. Today, digital infrastructure allows these movements to bypass traditional gatekeepers entirely.
Capital has now acquired the ultimate toolset to scale and speed up political ideology – transforming private wealth into direct, unmediated socio-political influence.
To comprehend the scale of this acceleration, it is necessary to examine the structural evolution of the global economy. The transition from late-stage industrial capitalism to what scholars define as digitized capitalism – or techno-feudalism, as articulated by the economist Yanis Varoufakis – has fundamentally altered the relationship between capital, the state, and the citizen. In this techno-feudal ecosystem, technology conglomerates do not exercise coercion in the manner of historical authoritarian regimes. Instead, they engineer comprehensive, unavoidable digital ecosystems that compel participation for economic, social, and civic survival. Once inside, users are subjected to algorithmic architectures that dictate the flow of information and the parameters of public discourse. Vast repositories of behavioural and biometric data are harvested and fed into predictive models and behavioural modification algorithms – a feedback loop in which human attention is perpetually monetised, and in which the boundaries between economic consumption, social interaction, and political socialisation are almost entirely dissolved.
In this system, human agency itself becomes a commodity. The psychosocial processes traditionally managed by the family, the community, or the state are appropriated by private corporations to perpetuate prolonged engagement and ideological alignment. Because platform business models depend on maximising time on screen, their algorithms inherently privilege content that provokes high-arousal emotional responses: anger, fear, and moral outrage. Right-wing populist ideologies – which traffic in narratives of civilisational decline, demographic threat, and anti-establishment grievance – find in this environment an optimised system for rapid expansion. The marriage between new tech wealth and right-wing politics specifically in the US is not an alliance of convenience. It flows from a shared conviction that democratic governance is an obstacle, regulation is the enemy, and the market – which they own – should be the organising principle of society.
The exploitation of big data for immediate electoral gains among older voters is, however, only one dimension of this project. The long-term sustainability of the right-wing populist agenda depends on a more fundamental ambition: the ideological capture of the next generation. Through algorithmic amplification and targeted engagement across social media and gaming-adjacent platforms, children and adolescents are exposed to a continuous process of ideological grooming – one that introduces vulnerability to right-wing extremism, misogynistic worldviews, and conspiratorial frameworks such as the Great Replacement theory, specifically targeting the psychological insecurities of young boys at formative age. The combination of algorithms and largely unregulated digital spaces has given rise to a phenomenon increasingly recognised by academic researchers and national security services alike: an automated radicalisation pipeline, optimised through infinite scrolling and intermittent variable rewards, systematically steering young users toward polarising content. Boys and girls are both targeted. Neither is accidental.
This is not merely a public health crisis. It is a generational ideological operation – and the pipeline runs through the phones of children.
In response to this asymmetric threat, European governments and the EU have initiated an aggressive regulatory counter-offensive. The Digital Services Act mandates algorithmic transparency, demands platform risk assessments, and imposes fines of up to six percent of global annual turnover. But regulators have increasingly recognised its structural limitation: the DSA is a framework for ex-post enforcement and transparency obligations. It is fundamentally insufficient to counter the immediate, real-time psychological damage inflicted by algorithmic amplification at scale. Enforcement is slow. The harm is instantaneous. The gap between the two is precisely where the grooming occurs.
The accelerating movement across EU member states to ban social media for children under 16 should be understood at two levels. It is, on one level, a legitimate public health intervention – a response to documented harms to adolescent mental health from engagement-maximising design. But it is also, and this requires explicit acknowledgement, a strategic geopolitical defence mechanism: a deliberate attempt to insulate the European project from a coordinated ideological war to dismantle the EU waged by the architects of digitized capitalism. By imposing a hard age limit enforced through privacy-preserving European digital identity wallets and biometric age verification, the EU aims to “physically” interrupt the pipeline through which this US Right wing Administration and “digital lords” extract behavioural data from, and inject radicalising ideology into, the most impressionable segment of the EU’s population. It is a declaration that the psychosocial development of the next generation of European voters will not be surrendered to the mechanics of digitized capitalism. Whether it is enough remains an open question.
Which raises the question: what is Jordan doing about it? Jordan is young – the majority of its population is under 35 – highly connected and navigating pressures that make this anything but abstract: a large refugee population, significant youth unemployment, and deep regional instability. From a public health perspective: are the documented harms of algorithmic design on adolescent mental health being translated into national policy – or is the conversation still framed around screen time rather than ideological manipulation?
From a national security perspective: is Jordan equipped to treat foreign-owned platforms not merely as communication tools, but as weapons of hybrid influence actively shaping the political attitudes of its next generation of citizens?
The EU’s under-16 restrictions are imperfect and contested. But they represent a recognition that allowing this to continue unchallenged is not a neutral act. It is a choice. The question for Jordan – and for every state navigating this landscape – is whether that choice will be made deliberately, or by default.
