From the Strait of Hormuz Crisis to Resource Integration: The Fourth Gulf War as a Historic Opportunity to Reconfigure Energy and Water Security in the Middle East

• The escalation between the United States, Iran, and Israel represents a structural shock to the global energy system rather than merely a temporary military crisis.
• Energy security has become an integral component of geopolitical deterrence calculations, not solely an economic matter.
• The Strait of Hormuz constitutes the most critical chokepoint in the global economy due to the concentration of oil and gas flows passing through it.
• Energy markets often price geopolitical risks psychologically before they materialize, thereby amplifying the impact of any perceived threat.
• The suspension of Israeli gas supplies has exposed the fragility of the “interdependence narrative” in the Eastern Mediterranean.
• Diversifying the energy mix enhances resilience, yet it raises costs during emergency situations.
• The crisis is pushing both Europe and Asia to accelerate diversification strategies and expand their strategic reserves.
• For Jordan, strategic hedging is no longer optional but an existential necessity.
• Strategic reserves provide decision-makers with critical time and maneuvering space during crises.
• The conflict highlights the limitations of managing energy and water resources within narrow national frameworks.
• A historic opportunity exists to initiate functional regional integration beginning with energy and water.
• Energy and water are structurally interconnected, and the security of one is inherently linked to the other.
• Regional integration need not begin with comprehensive political union but can evolve gradually through functional cooperation.
• The region now faces a fundamental choice: continue managing vital resources through the logic of conflict, or transform the shock into an opportunity for integration and shared survival.

The escalating military confrontation among the United States, Iran, and Israel represents a pivotal moment in the global politicization of energy. The conflict is no longer confined to the traditional equations of military deterrence; rather, it has expanded to penetrate the deeper structures of energy infrastructure, supply chains, maritime chokepoints, and the mechanisms governing global market pricing. What we are witnessing today is not a temporary energy disruption triggered by a limited military incident. Instead, it constitutes what can be more accurately described as a structural shock that redefines the relationship between geopolitics, energy security, and the global macroeconomic order, while simultaneously exposing the vulnerability of the international energy system to high-intensity geopolitical conflicts.

From the earliest moments of escalation, the Strait of Hormuz has once again returned to the forefront of strategic analysis as the most dangerous chokepoint in the contemporary global economic system. This narrow waterway-measuring only about 33 kilometers at its narrowest point-carries approximately one quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade, in addition to nearly one fifth of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments. Such an unprecedented concentration of energy flows through a single maritime corridor means that any threat, even if symbolic or limited in scope, possesses the capacity to generate shockwaves across global markets that may at times exceed the magnitude of actual physical damage. Energy markets, by their very nature, are highly sensitive to psychological expectations and geopolitical risk, and they frequently price in danger long before it materializes.

The strategic importance of the Strait does not stem solely from the volume of energy flows that traverse it, but also from the geographic concentration of demand associated with those flows. The overwhelming share of oil and gas exports passing through the Strait is destined for Asia-particularly China, India, Japan, and South Korea. This concentration means that any disruption to navigation would not constitute merely a regional crisis confined to the Gulf states. Rather, it would represent a global shock striking at the very core of Asian industrial growth, while simultaneously generating renewed waves of imported inflation across both advanced and developing economies. Moreover, approximately 11 percent of global non-oil trade also passes through this maritime corridor, directly linking energy security to the security of supply chains, food flows, and maritime transportation.

Within this context, threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz cannot be separated from Iran’s broader strategy of asymmetric deterrence. Recognizing the imbalance in conventional military capabilities vis-à-vis the United States and its allies, Iran has over the decades developed a strategic doctrine centered on targeting critical nodes within the global system-most notably energy infrastructure and maritime chokepoints. Historical experience-from the “Tanker War” of the 1980s to the attacks on oil tankers and energy facilities in recent years-demonstrates that even a marginal increase in perceived security risk immediately reverberates through maritime insurance premiums, shipping costs, and global oil and gas prices, even in the absence of an actual closure of the Strait.

Parallel to this maritime dimension, the current crisis also exposes the fragility of regional gas networks in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel’s decision to suspend operations at parts of its offshore infrastructure-most prominently the Leviathan gas field-has resulted in a complete halt of gas supplies destined for Jordan and Egypt. This development strikes at the heart of the “interdependence” narrative that had been promoted over the past decade as a foundation for regional stability. Energy, which was expected to function as an instrument of integration and peace-building, has once again reemerged as a tool of pressure and a source of structural vulnerability-particularly for importing states that have anchored significant portions of their energy security to a single supplier or a single supply route.

For Jordan, the suspension of Israeli gas supplies should not be interpreted merely as a technical disruption within the energy supply system; rather, it constitutes a genuine strategic test of the state’s capacity to manage external shocks. The crisis has revealed the speed with which the national electricity system shifted to emergency contingency plans, relying on liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports through the floating storage and regasification vessel (FSRU) Energos Force stationed in Aqaba, alongside the temporary reintroduction of heavy fuel oil and diesel into the generation mix. While this operational flexibility reflects earlier investments in energy infrastructure, it simultaneously underscores the higher costs associated with emergency alternatives compared with natural gas-both in financial terms and in their environmental impact.

The data related to Jordan’s electricity generation mix adds an important analytical dimension. The sharp decline in the share of natural gas in electricity generation during 2024, alongside the growing contribution of oil shale and renewable energy, cannot be separated from the broader context of regional uncertainty. While diversification of the energy mix provides a greater margin of security, reliance on more expensive fuels during periods of crisis translates directly into pressures on production costs, electricity tariffs, the trade deficit, and foreign currency reserves. In an economy that remains a net importer of energy, such pressures are rapidly transmitted into higher inflation, increased transportation costs, and rising food prices.

At the Gulf level, threats to oil and gas infrastructure open the door to far more dangerous scenarios. The memory of the 2019 attack on the Abqaiq processing facilities-which temporarily removed roughly five percent of global oil supply from the market-remains vivid in the minds of both markets and policymakers. A comparable or larger-scale attack today, amid heightened geopolitical tensions and tighter global inventories, could produce a shock exceeding even the oil crises of the 1970s. Although Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates possess partial pipeline alternatives designed to bypass the Strait of Hormuz, the carrying capacity of these routes cannot fully compensate for the total volume of daily energy flows. This implies that a portion of global supply would inevitably be removed from the market, creating a sharp price gap.

Globally, these developments intersect with an already delicate phase for the international economy. Energy markets are experiencing significant volatility, liquefied natural gas markets remain relatively tight, and central banks are still attempting to balance inflation control with the preservation of economic growth. Any prolonged energy shock would likely reproduce the conditions of stagflation, particularly in energy-importing economies, prompting further monetary tightening, economic slowdown, and potentially recession in some regions.

Conversely, the current crisis is accelerating a broader process of strategic repositioning in global energy policies. Europe, which had already begun reducing its dependence on single-source energy supplies following the Ukraine crisis, now finds itself compelled to deepen diversification efforts and expand investments in renewable energy, hydrogen, and cross-border infrastructure. Asia, for its part, is strengthening its strategic reserves while pursuing long-term supply contracts aimed at reducing exposure to volatility in spot markets. At the global level, a critical reality is becoming increasingly evident: energy security has become as much a military issue as it is an economic one, and the protection of maritime chokepoints and critical infrastructure has become an integral component of deterrence strategies.

Within this context, several plausible future scenarios emerge. The most likely scenario involves controlled escalation that sustains a high level of geopolitical tension without descending into full-scale war-thereby keeping prices elevated and volatile without triggering a systemic collapse of the energy system. Nevertheless, the possibility of a broader regional confrontation remains real, particularly one that could involve the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and attacks on Gulf energy production and export infrastructure. In such a scenario, the consequences would extend far beyond economic disruptions, potentially affecting the very structure of the international system. By contrast, a rapid diplomatic de-escalation-while capable of temporarily calming markets-would not erase the underlying reality that strategic trust has been eroded and that energy will remain a political instrument in the region’s conflicts.

For Jordan, these dynamics point to a clear conclusion: strategic hedging is no longer optional-it has become an existential necessity. Diversifying energy sources, accelerating investment in solar and wind power, building sufficient strategic reserves of petroleum products, and employing financial hedging instruments whenever feasible all constitute elements of a protective buffer within a highly volatile regional environment. Each additional percentage point of domestically generated renewable energy translates into reduced exposure to external shocks, while every additional day of strategic reserves provides policymakers with greater room to manage crises without resorting to costly or hasty decisions.

The confrontation among the United States, Iran, and Israel should therefore not be viewed as a transient military episode, but rather as a systemic shock that is reshaping the global architecture of energy security. Control over energy flows, the safeguarding of maritime corridors, and the protection of critical infrastructure have become central elements in the balance of international power. The manner in which this crisis is ultimately managed will determine not only the trajectory of oil and gas prices in the near term, but also the contours of the global energy and geopolitical order in the twenty-first century.

It is also important to connect what might metaphorically be termed the “Fourth Gulf War” with a historic opportunity to rethink the architecture of regional cooperation in the Middle East-not from the perspective of military security, but from that of existential security linked to energy and water. Major crises, as historical experience demonstrates, do not merely expose structural vulnerabilities; in rare moments they also open windows for political and economic re-foundation on more rational and sustainable bases.

The experience of the 1973 oil supply crisis illustrates how transnational energy shocks can reshape the regional political imagination. That crisis marked a decisive turning point in the trajectory of European integration, when European states realized that their economic security could no longer be safeguarded through isolated national policies. Although the roots of European integration predate that moment-most notably with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community-the shock of 1973 accelerated the transition from limited sectoral cooperation toward a broader integration process that ultimately culminated in the formation of the European Union. The core lesson here is that energy served as a political catalyst for redefining sovereignty as a collective capability rather than an exclusively national one.

Within this framework, the ongoing conflict in the Gulf-together with the threats it poses to the Strait of Hormuz and to oil and gas infrastructure-can be interpreted as a difficult yet potentially transformative opportunity to revisit the question of regional integration in the Middle East on new foundations. The region is marked by a structural paradox: it is among the richest regions in the world in terms of energy resources, yet among the most water-scarce, while simultaneously remaining one of the most institutionally fragmented regions globally. This contradiction renders the continued management of energy and water within narrow national frameworks a persistent recipe for fragility and conflict, rather than a basis for integration and stability. At the same time, it is essential to recognize the political sensitivities surrounding regional integration, which is often stigmatized as normalization, as well as the risk that such frameworks could be instrumentalized by Israel to exert political leverage over regional states rather than to preserve regional stability.

Linking energy and water is therefore no longer a matter of intellectual reflection but a strategic necessity. Conventional energy production consumes substantial quantities of water, while water desalination and transport require stable and affordable energy supplies. This structural interdependence means that any disruption in one sector inevitably reverberates through the other. Consequently, envisioning a functional form of regional integration-beginning with the interconnection of energy grids and water infrastructure-could provide a practical nucleus for moving beyond the zero-sum logic that has dominated the region for decades.

What makes this moment particularly conducive to such a proposal is that the current conflict has exposed the limits of the logic of singular dependence-whether on a single resource, a single supply route, or a single strategic partner. Energy-exporting states have come to realize that financial surpluses do not insulate them from geopolitical shocks, while energy-importing states have learned that their economic security remains contingent upon external stability that lies largely beyond their control. This equation, at least in theory, creates a shared interest in constructing a regional framework for risk management-one grounded in the sharing of both benefits and burdens, rather than the externalization of crises.

A gradual pathway toward a flexible form of regional integration can be envisioned-one that does not rely on comprehensive political union, which remains unrealistic under current circumstances, but instead on functional integration beginning with energy and water. Regional electricity interconnections, integrated gas networks, joint investments in renewable energy, and cross-border projects for water desalination and transport could together form an “infrastructure of trust” that precedes politics rather than waiting for it. Just as the European Coal and Steel Community served as an instrument for defusing conflict between France and Germany by binding their vital interests together, energy and water projects in the Middle East could gradually reduce the incentives for conflict while increasing the costs of political rupture.

For countries such as Jordan-situated at the intersection of both energy and water scarcity-this direction represents not an idealistic option but a direct strategic interest. Jordan does not possess the luxury of managing its crises in isolation from its regional environment. Any regional framework for cooperation in energy and water would help mitigate the country’s structural vulnerabilities and enable it to assume a functional role as a hub for interconnection and coordination rather than remaining merely a recipient of external shocks. Moreover, such forms of integration would open new horizons for development and investment, transforming geography from a structural burden into a strategic asset.

Ultimately, if the so-called Fourth Gulf War reveals the harshest face of the politicization of energy, it simultaneously places the region at a historic crossroads. The Middle East can either continue managing its vital resources through the narrow logic of insulated sovereignty and conflict-thereby perpetuating recurring crises-or seize this moment of shock to launch a new integrative trajectory beginning where existential interests converge: energy and water. Just as the crisis of 1973 united Europe around the recognition that security cannot be built in isolation, this war may paradoxically provide the opportunity the Middle East needs to reimagine its unity-not as an ideological slogan, but as a rational project of collective survival.