Executive Summary

This paper argues that, after 2026, Jordanian foreign policy entered a phase that requires a shift from managing balances to managing Jordan’s own position within the regional conflict system. Over the past decade, Amman succeeded in preserving stability, defending its red lines on Palestine and Jerusalem, and consolidating security and economic partnerships that gave the state a high degree of resilience. Yet the environment that produced this policy has changed: the Iranian threat has reached Jordanian territory directly; the Palestinian front has become more closely intertwined with Jordan’s national security; Syria has moved from being a crisis file to an arena of political and strategic reconfiguration; and defence alliances now provide protection while simultaneously redefining Jordan’s place in the calculations of its adversaries.

The purpose of this assessment is therefore practical: to determine whether the current instruments of foreign policy still produce three outcomes for Jordan at the same time—protecting the state, preserving its decision space, and increasing the Kingdom’s strategic value to its partners. The paper proposes an evaluative framework based on five functions: the degree of security a policy generates, the level of exposure it creates, the decision space it preserves, the alternatives it expands, and the bargaining value it adds. Its central conclusion is that Jordan has a clear policy on a number of individual files, but needs an overarching principle that connects them and determines the hierarchy of risks, the limits of involvement, and the priorities for initiative.

Jordan’s priority in the coming phase should be to build “functional autonomy” within its network of alliances: full defence of its territory and airspace; a clear institutional and political separation between protecting the Kingdom and participating in broader operational objectives; consolidation of the prevention of displacement and protection of the historical and legal status of Jerusalem as supreme national interests; turning Syria and Iraq into arenas for increasing economic and security depth; and diversifying sources of power so that disagreement with any partner becomes less costly. Jordan should also identify three projects through which it can become a node rather than a corridor in the current competition over regional connectivity: a northern logistics platform linked to Syria, a regional energy and electricity interconnection hub, and an industrial-logistics function in Aqaba linking the Red Sea to neighbouring markets.

In this sense, neutrality is not the central question. The question is: on which issues should Jordan adopt a firm position, on which should it preserve distance, and where should it act before the choices of others are imposed upon it?

Why Assess Foreign Policy Now?

The most difficult question in Jordanian foreign policy is not how the state exercises its choices in an environment where the requirements of sovereignty overlap with the imperatives of alliance. The state possesses sovereignty; its institutions make its decisions; and its borders, armed forces, and diplomatic representation are all fully constituted elements of statehood. The harder question begins beyond that point: how much cost can Jordan bear when its interests diverge from those of an ally on which it depends for security and economic support?

It is precisely within this space that a decade of Jordanian foreign policy can be read—from intensive involvement in the war against the Islamic State in 2015 to the interception of Iranian missiles and drones that targeted Jordanian territory in the summer of 2026. Between those two moments, US administrations changed, the former Syrian regime fell, the Gaza war erupted, the Iran–Israel confrontation escalated and was followed by an American–Iranian confrontation, and the Jordanian economy endured a pandemic and accumulating fiscal pressures. Yet Amman’s conduct retained a striking characteristic: Jordan’s decision space expanded in some files, contracted in others, and in some cases reached highly sensitive limits.

The network of alliances Jordan has built over decades has been one of the most important sources of its resilience in a highly turbulent region. Security, economic, and political support strengthened the state’s capacity to withstand successive crises. Recent regional transformations, however, have added a more complex dimension to this equation: the deeper Jordan becomes integrated into systems of protection and alliance, the greater its need to define the distance between what directly serves Jordan’s protection and interests and what places it within confrontations that exceed its national priorities.

This is why an assessment is needed now. Its purpose goes beyond describing what Jordanian diplomacy has done over the past ten years. What must be tested is the continuing validity of the underlying “policy logic” after the environment in which it operates has changed. Decision-makers need to know where alliances produce net strength and where they also produce additional exposure; where geography has become a source of leverage and where it remains a channel through which risks travel; and which files deserve the investment of Jordan’s political capital over the next two years.

The paper therefore asks: how can Jordan preserve the value of alliance as a source of power while preventing its costs from expanding to the point that they narrow the country’s room for manoeuvre? This leads to a second question that speaks directly to the present moment: where does Jordan stand today on the map of regional conflict—as a state seeking neutrality, a defensive ally, a balancing state, or an actor with clear positions that sometimes lacks a declared framework capable of bringing them together?

A Theory for Assessment: Foreign Policy as the Management of Decision Space

Small and medium-sized states require a different standard of assessment from great powers. The success of Jordanian foreign policy is measured by its ability to improve the Kingdom’s position within outcomes shaped by actors larger than itself. The literature on small states, Shelter Theory, and the alliance dilemma between fears of abandonment and entrapment provide an appropriate foundation for understanding the Jordanian case. The state seeks protection, resources, and political access through allies, while at the same time attempting to prevent those relationships from turning dependence into a loss of alternatives.

Accordingly, the value of any Jordanian foreign-policy choice can be assessed through five interrelated questions: How much does it add to the Kingdom’s security? How much does it increase Jordan’s exposure to retaliation by adversaries? Does it widen or narrow the options available in the next crisis? Does it expand the number of partners, markets, and economic and political alternatives? And does it convert Jordan’s location, institutions, or relationships into value that others need? Successful policy raises the combined return of security, alternatives, and bargaining value while containing the costs of exposure and dependence.

This standard changes how “autonomy” should be understood. Here, autonomy means the practical capacity to define the national interest, rank risks, choose the degree of involvement, and bear the cost of disagreement when a supreme interest is at stake. It also means the capacity to generate initiatives that compel partners to account for Jordanian interests before designing their regional arrangements. In this sense, foreign policy becomes an instrument for protecting decision space as much as it is an instrument for protecting borders.

Proposed Assessment Matrix

From 2015 to 2026: What Does the Record Show?

2015 – Security as the Gateway to Alliance

The year 2015 offers an appropriate starting point because Jordanian security entered a different phase. Jordan had been participating since 2014 in the US-led international coalition against the Islamic State, but the capture and subsequent killing of Jordanian pilot Muath al-Kasasbeh in early 2015 transformed the war from an obligation within an external coalition into an issue of national security and dignity. Jordan subsequently intensified its air operations, while military support and coordination with Washington deepened.

From that moment, a principle took hold that would accompany Jordan thereafter: threats beyond the border can rapidly become internal threats, and confronting them requires capabilities beyond the resources of the state acting alone. The alliance with the United States consequently acquired value extending beyond diplomacy and aid to the very security infrastructure of the state. Later experience, however, showed that security dependence does not distribute its effects evenly across all areas of foreign policy.

Syria – When Geography Imposes a Policy of Its Own

Syria clearly reveals the scope for Jordanian initiative. For distant capitals, the Syrian crisis was a file within balances of power, regime politics, and alliances. For Jordan, it was all of that and more: a border of more than 300 kilometres, trade, refugees, water, smuggling, narcotics, armed factions, and transport routes connecting its economy to the north.

For this reason, the Syrian file repeatedly generated Jordanian conduct driven by direct geographic interest. With the formation of the new Syrian order, Amman moved quickly to build an institutional relationship encompassing security, energy, transport, trade, and training. The strategic significance goes beyond an improvement in bilateral relations: the more Jordan possesses a practical agenda on its own border, the more capable it becomes of moving from absorbing the effects of crisis to helping shape the surrounding environment.

In the next phase, Syria will become a test of Jordan’s ability to turn geography into strategic depth. Success will be measured by Amman’s ability to secure the border, connect the two economies through transport and energy corridors, acquire a role in reconstruction, and build channels that prevent southern Syria from once again becoming a security vacuum or an arena of armed competition. In this sense, the Syrian file is simultaneously an instrument of national security and of economic power.

Jerusalem and Palestine – The Red Lines

Jordanian policy operates differently when the issue concerns Jerusalem, displacement, or the alternative-homeland scenario. At that point, the calculation shifts from resources to the state itself: legitimacy, identity, demography, border security, and the Hashemite Custodianship over the holy sites. Jordan has therefore maintained clear red lines amid pressures surrounding various settlement proposals, most visibly in its rejection of resettlement, displacement, and any encroachment on the Custodianship.

The Gaza war broadened the meaning of these red lines. For Jordan, the danger is now a compound one: the prospect of displacement, the erosion of the two-state solution, a major eruption in the West Bank, escalating settler violence, and changes to the status of Jerusalem. Palestine has consequently become the file in which foreign policy most directly intersects with domestic national security. Any serious assessment of Jordanian policy must begin with the Kingdom’s ability to prevent unilateral transformations that would turn the Palestinian question into an internal Jordanian question.

The Economy – The Power that Sets the Price of Disagreement

The economy functions as a quiet strategic constraint. Dependence on aid and external financing does not mechanically determine political positions, but it does determine the amount of cost the state can absorb when it chooses to distance itself from a major partner. Relations with the United States, the growing partnership with the European Union, and Gulf support and investment are all genuine sources of Jordanian strength. At the same time, the structure of economic dependence is itself part of the foreign-policy calculation.

The requirement therefore goes beyond “diversifying donors.” The priority is to diversify sources of capacity: higher exports, more secure energy, regional transport networks, production-linked investment, and commercial relations that make Jordan a node needed by its surroundings. Every increment of growth built upon an independent regional function expands political decision space more than short-term financing does.

2026 and Entry into the Operational Theatre of War

The most consequential shift occurred when Jordanian territory itself became an explicitly declared target of missiles and drones coming from Iran. During June and July 2026, the Jordan Armed Forces announced on several occasions that they had intercepted missiles and drones targeting the Kingdom, including eight missiles on 9 July, four missiles and six drones over a twenty-four-hour period on 23 July, and five missiles on 30 July. These incidents move the debate beyond projectiles merely crossing Jordanian airspace to the direct targeting of Jordanian territory.

At this point, the function of alliance changes. Defence systems, training, and intelligence coordination with partners strengthen Jordan’s ability to protect its population and airspace. At the same time, the more deeply the Kingdom is integrated into a wider regional defence architecture, the greater the likelihood that an adversary will read Jordan as part of that alliance’s operational domain. The new equation is therefore that the instrument reducing Jordan’s vulnerability to attack may simultaneously increase its salience in adversaries’ targeting calculations.

This is the “shelter paradox.” Security shelter remains essential, but its value must now be measured by its ability to provide defence while containing entrapment. What is required is a clear political doctrine: any threat to Jordanian territory is treated as a national threat, while any use of Jordan’s location, airspace, or infrastructure for operations extending beyond the defence of the Kingdom is subject to an independent calculation of Jordanian interest. This separation is the core of protecting decision space.

Where Does Jordan Stand Now? Between Neutrality, Alignment, and Balancing

Describing Jordanian policy as “neutrality” compresses a more complex reality. Jordan is a close security ally of the United States, is bound by a peace treaty with Israel, is an active member of the Arab system, and is an advanced partner of the European Union, while also maintaining relations and interests with regional powers operating outside these networks. This structure makes Jordanian policy closer to “selective balancing”: clear alignment in defence of the state, greater autonomy on existential issues, and calculated distance from conflicts that do not serve a direct Jordanian interest.

The problem requiring policymakers’ attention arises when this rule remains implicit. Ambiguity can provide tactical flexibility in some crises, but it becomes costly when confrontation accelerates and allies and adversaries alike need to interpret Jordan’s position. Defensive measures may then be read as offensive alignment, while balanced diplomacy may be read as hesitation. What is needed is not the proclamation of a rigid doctrine, but the formulation of operational principles that make the limits of Jordan’s role intelligible.

The proposed principle is: “Jordan is a state of protection and stability, not a platform for conflict.” It is committed to defending its territory, airspace, and borders; it participates in arrangements that reduce direct threats; it resists any change affecting its existential interests in Palestine and Jerusalem; and it builds regional relations around preventing wars from spilling into its national space. Such a formulation gives allies clarity about what Jordan can provide, gives adversaries clarity about the limits of Jordan’s role, and gives Jordanian institutions a unified standard for assessing external requests.

The Current Threat Map: What Actually Threatens Jordan?

The problem in ranking risks begins when all regional crises are placed on the same level. For Jordan, threats differ according to their proximity to the structure of the state, the speed with which they can spill over, and the Kingdom’s ability to influence them. The most useful classification for decision-makers therefore ranks them by their effect on the state rather than by the identity of the actor from which they originate.

Level One: Existential and Sovereignty Threats

Palestinian displacement toward Jordan; alteration of the historical and legal status of Jerusalem and the holy sites; missile and drone attacks on Jordanian territory; and border penetration on a scale that threatens control and sovereignty. These are issues requiring firm positions because they directly affect the structure of the state, the security of its population, and its legitimacy.

Level Two: High Strategic Threats

A large-scale eruption in the West Bank; fragmentation or instability in southern Syria; expansion of an Iran–Israel or Iran–US confrontation through Jordanian airspace; transnational narcotics, arms, and militia networks; and disruption of trade and energy routes. The effects of these risks may begin outside Jordan, but they can spill into the Kingdom rapidly and drain its resources.

Level Three: Accumulating Structural Threats

Economic dependence, unemployment and weak growth, water and energy security, refugee pressures, declining capacity to finance defence and services, and the erosion of the two-state solution. These risks move more slowly, but they determine the state’s capacity to absorb crises and to say “no” when necessary.

Level Four: Threats to Status and Function

Jordan being bypassed in corridor, transport, and energy projects; the movement of mediation and trade centres toward other regional nodes; and the Kingdom’s transformation into a low-value transit space. These developments do not directly threaten the border, but they reduce Jordan’s bargaining value and increase its dependence on external resources.

The Wider Equation: Four Sensitive Files That Must Be Read Together

The first analytical error is to separate Palestine from Iran, Syria from the economy, or air defence from alliances. The current environment connects these files within a single equation. Escalation in Palestine increases domestic and diplomatic pressure on Jordan; escalation with Iran increases demand for protection and military coordination; the greater security dependence becomes, the more important economic and political alternatives become; and Syria and Iraq offer Jordan space in which to build depth and regional functions that can reduce some of that dependence.

The first file is Palestine, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, which forms the political core of Jordanian national security. The second is airspace and the missile threat, which forms the military core of national security. The third is Syria and Iraq, which constitute Jordan’s sphere of border and economic depth. The fourth is the network of alliances, financing, and corridors, which determines both the amount of power available and the freedom to use it. Advanced foreign policy manages these files as one system, using gains in one file to increase capacity in another.

What Has Worked in Jordanian Policy, and What Needs Recalibration?

Jordan has succeeded, first, in preserving the continuity of the state amid regional shocks that destabilised countries larger than itself. Second, it has built a network of alliances that gives it access to military, financial, and diplomatic capabilities exceeding its own resources. Third, it has maintained stable red lines on Jerusalem, displacement, and the alternative-homeland scenario. It has also shown an ability to recover initiative in Syria and to use multilateral diplomacy on Gaza and the Palestinian issue.

The area requiring further development is the conversion of these separate successes into a single theory of action. Jordanian policy sometimes appears highly clear on each individual file while the connection between the files remains less explicit. This helps explain why “wisdom” and “balance” appear so frequently in descriptions of Jordanian conduct, while it can be harder to identify the outcome Jordan wants to achieve five years from now.

Wisdom in foreign policy has value when it protects a defined objective. When it becomes an end in itself, it can produce a policy that preserves the status quo while the status quo itself is changing. The current phase therefore requires moving from the question “How do we avoid the worst?” to an additional question: “What position does Jordan want to occupy in the regional order now taking shape?”

Priority Policy Directions for Jordan: The 2026–2028 Agenda

The ordering of priorities here is deliberate. Jordan possesses limited diplomatic and security capital, and distributing it evenly across every file reduces its impact. The following priorities combine the scale of the threat, the possibility of influence, and the strategic return:

1. Establish a “Defence of Jordan” Doctrine

Develop operational understandings with allies that clearly distinguish the defence of Jordanian territory and airspace from participation in regional offensive operations. This includes rules governing the use of airspace, information-sharing, protection of bases and installations, and political communication during moments of escalation. The aim is to ensure that every additional defensive capability increases the Kingdom’s security without automatically expanding the definition of its role in war.

2. Move the Palestine File from Crisis Management to a Policy of Preventing Transformation

The priority is to prevent four transformations: displacement; collapse of the Palestinian Authority or a large-scale eruption in the West Bank; alteration of the status of Jerusalem; and consolidation of a reality that eliminates the possibility of a Palestinian state. Jordan needs a permanent political coalition with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Gulf states, the European Union, and other influential actors—one that operates before crises rather than after them and turns these red lines into diplomatic and economic costs for any actor seeking to cross them.

3. Build “Northern Depth” through Syria

Move from border reopening and security coordination to a Jordanian programme for Syria encompassing security in the south, counter-smuggling, transport, electricity, water, institutional training, and reconstruction. Every project that links stability in southern Syria to a Jordanian economic interest reduces the cost of the border and increases the Kingdom’s value to Damascus and international partners.

4. Reinsert Iraq into Jordan’s Strategic Calculation

Iraq should be understood as a market, a source of depth for energy and transport, and a partner in border security—not as a separate bilateral file. Electricity interconnection, trade, the overland route, and trilateral projects with Egypt can become instruments for expanding Jordan’s alternatives and reducing the economy’s sensitivity to a single shock.

5. Diversify Power, Not Relationships Alone

The objective is to convert relations with the United States, the European Union, the Gulf, and Asia into productive assets inside Jordan: energy, supporting defence industries, technology, logistics, water, and digital corridors. Genuine diversification is measured by what the Jordanian economy can produce and export and by the number of partners that acquire a material interest in the Kingdom’s stability.

6. Adopt a Declared Policy toward Iran Based on Deterrence and Communication

Following the direct targeting of Jordanian territory, the Iran file requires a political channel operating alongside military deterrence. Jordan’s message should be consistent: sovereignty is a red line; Jordanian territory is not part of other actors’ wars; and Jordan retains channels of communication that reduce miscalculation and clarify rules of conduct. Deterrence without communication increases the risk of misunderstanding, while communication without deterrence weakens credibility.

7. Convert Geography into a Regional Function

The next phase of competition will centre on corridors and nodes: transport, energy, data, reconstruction, and supply chains. Jordan should identify only three projects through which it can become a node rather than a corridor: a northern logistics platform linked to Syria, a regional energy and electricity interconnection hub, and an industrial-logistics function in Aqaba linking the Red Sea to neighbouring markets.

Three Tests for Decision-Makers before Any New Alignment

The preceding framework can be converted into a practical tool applied before sensitive decisions:

• The first is the “direct-interest test”: Which specific Jordanian threat does this involvement address?
• The second is the “blowback test”: How might the adversary redefine Jordan after this decision, and what capabilities would be required to absorb the response?
• The third is the “day-after test”: Does the decision expand Jordan’s options once the crisis ends, or bind it to an arrangement that is difficult to exit?

These tests prevent tactical decisions from becoming unintended strategic commitments. They also provide Jordanian institutions with a common language for evaluating requests from allies during periods of pressure and make foreign policy less dependent on the skill of managing each crisis separately.

Conversely, Jordan’s experience reveals three circles of national decision-making—more precisely formulated as follows:

• In the first circle, direct sovereign security, the priority is decisiveness: protection of territory, borders, and airspace, and prevention of displacement and penetration.
• In the second circle, alliances and regional conflicts, the priority is conditional engagement: cooperation that increases Jordanian security while establishing clear limits to the role.
• In the third circle, economic and regional relations, the priority is initiative: building networks and projects that give Jordan independent value.

This formulation is more useful than dividing files into “for” and “against.” It links the degree of commitment to the degree to which an issue touches the national interest. The closer a threat moves toward the state, the firmer the position should become; the closer a request is to another actor’s objectives, the greater the need for conditions and limits; and the more a file concerns the construction of future power, the greater the need for initiative.

Shelter and Target: The Conclusion for Decision-Makers

The strategic challenge facing Jordan after 2026 concerns the quality of its alliances and how they are used. The Kingdom needs the United States, Europe, China, and its Arab partners, just as those actors need a stable Jordan capable of protecting its borders, securing its routes, and performing political and security functions that cannot easily be replaced. This mutual need is the starting point for constructing a more balanced relationship.

The strength of an alliance should also be measured by the amount of decision space Jordan retains when interests diverge. “Engineering dependence” therefore becomes a central task: preserving the umbrella that increases capability, expanding the alternatives that reduce the cost of disagreement, and building regional functions that make Jordanian stability an interest of others rather than solely a Jordanian need.

After eleven years of transformation, Jordan has reached a different stage in its foreign policy. It needs firm positions on existential issues, deep defence alliances, precise limits on involvement in other actors’ conflicts, and economic and regional initiatives that expand the number of available alternatives. This is not a policy of neutrality; it is a policy of positioning.

The success of Jordanian foreign policy over the next decade will be measured by its ability to achieve four outcomes: to remain an ally its partners need; to keep its territory and airspace outside the function of regional offensive operations; to retain the capacity to reject what threatens its existential interests; and to increase the number of files in which it shapes facts rather than merely managing their consequences. The same geography that has made Jordan an ally that is difficult to dispense with also places it close to every new war. The real challenge is to convert this paradox into policy: raise the value of location, reduce the cost of exposure, and transform alliances from a shelter for survival alone into instruments for building an independent Jordanian capacity to choose. At that point, the question “Where does Jordan stand?” becomes answerable with clarity: Jordan stands at the centre of the defence of its own interests, within its alliances, and within boundaries that it defines for itself.

Sources

• Jordan Armed Forces – Arab Army, statements issued on 9, 22, 23, 29 and 30 July 2026 concerning the interception of missiles and drones coming from Iran and the targeting of Jordanian territory.
• Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, 2026 statements concerning Gaza, the West Bank and Jerusalem, the position on Israeli attacks on Syria, and developments related to Iran.
• Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, “The Palestinian Cause and the Peace Process,” identifying the establishment of an independent Palestinian state as a supreme Jordanian national interest.
• Memorandum of Understanding on the Strategic Partnership between Jordan and the United States (2022), and the resulting support commitments for 2023–2029.
• Literature on small states, Shelter Theory, and the alliance dilemma (abandonment/entrapment) as the conceptual basis for the “decision space” framework used in this paper.