Who Decides the Future of the West Bank? The Question Missing from the Lieberman–Netanyahu Dispute

The proposal by Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the Yisrael Beiteinu party, to assign security and administrative responsibility for parts of the West Bank to Jordan sparked a dispute with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. In an interview with Besheva, Lieberman argued that the Palestinian Authority was no longer capable of administering these areas and that Israel needed to find another party to assume responsibility for them. During the interview, he referred to Areas B and C, before later clarifying that he had meant Areas A and B.[1]

Netanyahu attacked the proposal, describing Lieberman as a leftist and demanding that he withdraw a proposal that could allow the Jordanian army to control what Netanyahu called “Israel’s lands.” Lieberman responded by clarifying his vision: full Israeli control and territorial contiguity between the different parts of Area C, alongside assigning the administration of Areas A and B to Jordan in place of the Palestinian Authority. He described his proposed arrangement as an “Israeli–Jordanian confederation.”[2]

Netanyahu’s description of Lieberman as a “leftist” carries additional significance in the context of Israeli electoral competition. Netanyahu did not discuss the proposal solely as an arrangement for administering the West Bank; he presented it as a concession of security control that right-wing voters should not accept. Lieberman responded by invoking the Bar-Ilan speech, in which Netanyahu had previously spoken of the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state, before himself reaffirming the need for Area C to remain under full Israeli control. The dispute thus acquired an electoral dimension, as both sides competed to present their positions as the most firmly committed to Israeli control over the West Bank, while the Palestinians’ right to determine its future remained outside the discussion.

If the discussion stops at Netanyahu’s response, the disagreement appears to concern the entry of Jordanian forces into the West Bank. Lieberman’s clarification, however, shifts the question to another level: how might responsibility for administering the population and control over the land be allocated in the coming phase? His proposal assigns Jordan responsibility for areas where most Palestinians live, while leaving Israel in control of the area that constitutes the largest share of the West Bank’s territory. Here, Jordan is no longer merely a proposed alternative to the Palestinian Authority; it becomes part of an arrangement that separates those who administer the Palestinians from those who hold decision-making power over the geography of their land. In the dispute over which two parties would assume these roles, the Palestinians are absent as the holders of the right to determine the West Bank’s future.

Area C at the Heart of the Proposal

The division of the West Bank into Areas A, B, and C originated in the interim Oslo arrangements, which were intended to lead to a permanent settlement[3].Yet the persistence of this division has made the fate of these areas, particularly Area C, directly consequential for the future of any Palestinian state. Area C accounts for approximately 60 percent of the West Bank and includes settlements and expanses of land that separate and surround Palestinian communities.[4] Control over it therefore cannot be viewed as a matter separate from the administration of Areas A and B.

The importance of this point is evident in Lieberman’s own response. While defending the transfer of responsibility for Areas A and B to Jordan, he stressed the need to establish territorial contiguity between the different parts of Area C and keep it under full Israeli control.[5] If the areas under Israeli control are connected in a way that entrenches this reality, the question is no longer limited to who provides services or handles security in Palestinian cities. It also concerns those cities’ ability to connect with one another and the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state on contiguous territory.

In this sense, Lieberman’s proposal separates the population from the land. It seeks a party to assume responsibility for administering Palestinians’ daily lives, while insisting that Israel retain control over a large expanse of their land. Transferring administration may appear to change the party responsible for the population’s affairs, but it does not answer the more important political question: what is the fate of the land on which Palestinians are supposed to exercise their right to self-determination? Indeed, focusing on who administers them may obscure the continued control over the geography that determines their future.

Developments concerning the land do not stop at the boundaries of Area C. Peace Now has documented Israeli measures extending into Areas A and B, including infringements on the Palestinian Authority’s powers and pressure on its financial resources, alongside settlement activity in areas under its administration[6]. This does not mean that the Israeli government has adopted Lieberman’s proposal, or that the publicly expressed disagreement between him and Netanyahu is merely superficial. It does, however, clarify the context in which the proposal is being put forward: the Authority’s powers are being eroded, Israeli measures affecting the land are expanding, and a proposal then emerges calling for the administration of Palestinian areas to be assigned to another party. This is where the idea of “who administers the population and who controls the land” acquires practical significance.

The Palestinian Authority and Elections: Who Chooses the Administering Authority?

Lieberman begins by rejecting the Palestinian Authority’s continued administration of Areas A and B, then proposes reaching an agreement with Jordan for it to replace the Authority in assuming security and administrative responsibility. This goes beyond criticizing the Authority’s performance or questioning its capacity to govern; it moves a decision concerning the future of a Palestinian institution into an Israeli political debate, without taking Palestinian will as its starting point. The Authority can be criticized, reformed, or replaced, but the question of who represents Palestinians and administers their affairs cannot be settled by designating an alternative from outside their own ranks.

Lieberman’s proposal came days before the opening of nominations for the Palestinian legislative elections on September 26, 2026, according to the timetable announced by the Central Elections Commission, with voting scheduled for November 28[7]. The proximity of these dates does not establish that Lieberman intended to respond to the elections or influence them. Nevertheless, the coincidence reveals a political paradox: at a time when a Palestinian electoral process is being put forward to reshape institutions and representation, the Israeli dispute presents a vision that bypasses the existing Palestinian institution and seeks a party to administer Palestinian areas.

Elections, in themselves, do not resolve the problems of the Palestinian political system or the obstacles to holding them under occupation. They do, however, reaffirm the principle absent from Lieberman’s proposal: the future of Palestinian institutions is a matter for Palestinians to decide. Replacing the Authority with an arrangement formulated outside this process is not merely an administrative adjustment; it affects who exercises authority over Palestinians and the Palestinians’ own place in decisions concerning their future. This issue becomes more sensitive when the transfer of administration is coupled with the retention of Israeli control over Area C.

Jordan Between Responsibility for the Population and the Palestinians’ Right to the Land

Lieberman’s proposal assumes that Jordan is prepared to take on the responsibility he proposes transferring to it. In the interview, he said that Jordan “has no choice” and spoke of the possibility of Jordanian forces entering or of forming forces under Jordanian command[8]. His statement, however, presents no publicly announced understanding with Amman, nor can he determine Jordan’s role west of the river on its behalf. For Jordan, moreover, the issue extends beyond whether to accept a security or administrative mission; it concerns the future of the Palestinian state, the nature of the relationship between the two banks, and the limits of Jordan’s role in a cause fundamentally grounded in the Palestinians’ right to their land.

One of the proposal’s problems lies in transferring responsibility for administering Palestinians to Jordan while leaving Israel in control of Area C. If the party administering the population has no decision-making power over the largest portion of the West Bank, then the proposal does not address the West Bank’s future as the territory of a Palestinian state; instead, it redistributes the burdens associated with its population. The question facing Jordan then becomes connected to the definition of the Palestinian cause itself: does it remain the cause of a people demanding sovereignty and self-determination, or does it become a matter of administering a population for whom other parties share responsibility?

The timing of the dispute carries additional significance in this context. On September 22, 2026, King Abdullah II warned before the United Nations General Assembly against land seizures, settlement expansion, and the expulsion of Palestinians, describing developments in the West Bank as “de facto annexation” aimed at making the establishment of a viable Palestinian state impossible[9]. The following day, Lieberman’s proposal emerged, calling for the administration of Areas A and B to be assigned to Jordan while retaining Israeli control over Area C. The proximity in timing does not indicate a direct connection between the speech and the proposal, but it highlights their different starting points: the future of the land and the state, and the Palestinians’ right to self-determination, in the Jordanian position, versus the allocation of administrative responsibilities and control in Lieberman’s proposal.

In condemning Israeli annexation measures, the Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had affirmed that Israel has no sovereignty over the occupied West Bank and linked the resolution of the Palestinian question to the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination and to establishing their independent state on their land[10]. A distinction must therefore be drawn between Jordan’s support for Palestinians and their state, and the assumption that it would replace their institutions in administering parts of the West Bank under an arrangement that preserves Israeli control over a large expanse of its territory. The former is a publicly stated Jordanian position; the latter is an Israeli political proposal, and there is no evidence that Jordan has accepted it.

Who Decides the Future of the West Bank?

The Netanyahu–Lieberman dispute reveals a disagreement over the role that might be assigned to Jordan in the West Bank. It also reveals the limits of the Israeli discussion when it revolves around administering and controlling the areas without beginning with the Palestinians’ right to self-determination. In Lieberman’s vision, responsibility for Palestinians in Areas A and B is transferred to Jordan, while Area C remains under full Israeli control. Netanyahu’s objection, meanwhile, targeted the possibility of a Jordanian military presence west of the river and did not restore Palestinians to the position of decision-makers regarding the future of their land.

The proposal’s impact should therefore be assessed not by whether it could be implemented tomorrow or whether Jordan would accept it, but by what it reveals about the way the West Bank’s future is conceived: a search for someone to administer the population, while control over the land continues to be treated as a settled matter or as something that can be expanded. Here lies the question missing from the dispute: will the West Bank continue to be discussed as the land of a people entitled to sovereignty and statehood, or will it gradually be reduced to areas whose administrative responsibilities are allocated among other parties, while the future of its geography is decided without the Palestinians?

[1] Ynet, “Liberman Called for Jordan to Govern Palestinians in the West Bank: ‘They Have No Choice,’” September 23, 2026. “Avigdor Lieberman: Jordan Should Control Areas A and B in Judea and Samaria.”

[2] Arutz Sheva, “Liberman Proposed an Agreement with Jordan to Administer Areas A and B; Netanyahu Attacked,” September 23, 2026. “Lieberman Proposed Reaching an Agreement with Jordan on Administering Areas A and B—Netanyahu Attacked.”

[3] United Nations, Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (Oslo II), September 28, 1995. “Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (a.k.a. ‘Oslo II’)—Question of Palestine.”

[4] Peace Now, “The Quiet Annexation of Areas A and B and Steps to Bring Down the Palestinian Authority,” August 13, 2026. “The Quiet Annexation of Areas A and B and Steps to Bring Down the Palestinian Authority.”

[5] Arutz Sheva, “Liberman Proposed an Agreement with Jordan to Administer Areas A and B; Netanyahu Attacked,” September 23, 2026. “Lieberman Proposed Reaching an Agreement with Jordan on Administering Areas A and B—Netanyahu Attacked.”

[6] Peace Now, “The Quiet Annexation of Areas A and B and Steps to Bring Down the Palestinian Authority,” August 13, 2026. “The Quiet Annexation of Areas A and B and Steps to Bring Down the Palestinian Authority.”

[7] Central Elections Commission–Palestine, “CEC Announces Legal Timetable for the 2026 Legislative Elections,” July 23, 2026. “The Elections Commission Announces the Legal Timeframes for the 2026 Legislative Elections.”

[8] Ynet, “Liberman Called for Jordan to Govern Palestinians in the West Bank: ‘They Have No Choice,’” September 23, 2026. “Avigdor Lieberman: Jordan Should Control Areas A and B in Judea and Samaria.”

[9] King Abdullah II Official Website, “King Abdullah II’s Address at the Opening Session of the 81st United Nations General Assembly,” September 22, 2026. “His Majesty King Abdullah II’s Address at the Opening Session of the 81st United Nations General Assembly—September 2026.”

[10] Jordanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, “Jordan Condemns Israeli Measures Aimed at Annexing Occupied Palestinian Territories,” February 15, 2026. “Jordan Condemns in the Strongest Terms the Israeli Government’s Measures Aimed at Annexing Occupied Palestinian Territories.”