Lebanon Between a Stalled Negotiation Track and Mounting Israeli Military Pressure
The results of the seventh round of Lebanese-Israeli negotiations show that the track has entered a phase far more complex than a simple dispute over a ceasefire or withdrawal from specific points. The core of the problem is now bound up with the shape of the security arrangements Israel wants to impose in south Lebanon, and with the limits of the role required of the state and the army in dismantling Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. The talks do not appear to have collapsed, but in their current form they are no longer capable of producing an imminent settlement, and have increasingly become a framework for managing the conflict while each side works to improve its position on the ground.
The central dilemma lies in the two sides’ disagreement over the sequencing of implementation. Lebanon wants a comprehensive halt to military operations and additional Israeli withdrawals that would allow the army to expand its deployment, in parallel with completing measures to confine weapons to the state and prevent the rebuilding of military positions. Israel, by contrast, wants to establish nearly the opposite formula: removing Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and verifying that it does not return, first, and only then discussing withdrawal. This disagreement is not technical — it effectively determines which side bears the first political and security risk.
For the Lebanese state, carrying out sweeping measures against Hezbollah without a matching Israeli withdrawal places the army under a heavy domestic cost, even as Israel continues to occupy positions and carry out raids and incursions. Israel, for its part, holds that withdrawing before verifying the removal of the party’s capabilities could allow it to return to the areas it vacates. A closed loop has thus formed: Israel ties withdrawal to prior Lebanese steps, while the state’s ability to carry out those steps grows harder the longer the occupation and Israeli military pressure continue.
More significantly, the latest round showed a rise in the ceiling of Israeli demands. The discussion is no longer confined to military positions and weapons, but has extended to searching residential areas and vetting the identities of those returning to areas where the army is deploying, on the pretext of a possible return of Hezbollah members among the population.
This shifts the negotiation from addressing a specific military deployment to an attempt to set long-term security rules for the south. The Lebanese army has rejected including comprehensive searches among the negotiated commitments, on the grounds that deciding which locations require searching, and how, must remain a Lebanese decision — not a standard set by Israel.
The sensitivity of the issue deepens with the proposal to vet the identities of returnees, since applying it requires information determining whom Israel considers a member of the party. Accepting this formula could in practice lead to some form of coordination or exchange of security information, whether directly or through a third party — something Lebanon rejects. The dispute has thus come to exceed the question of army deployment, reaching a more fundamental question: is the state’s recovery of control over the south a sovereign Lebanese process, or part of a security system whose standards and verification mechanisms Israel determines?
Within this context, the “pilot areas” take on an importance beyond their geographic size. Lebanon insists on Khiam and Bint Jbeil because moving to a second area is meant to demonstrate a corresponding Israeli step matching the measures carried out by the army. If the state’s authority expands and military positions are removed without a parallel Israeli withdrawal, the model loses its domestic political value. Israel, in turn, insists that the first area is not yet secure — which in practice gives it the ability to block movement to any subsequent phase by claiming the conditions for verification have not been met.
Here, too, the limits of Lebanon’s reliance on the United States become apparent. Lebanon entered the latest round expecting greater American pressure to secure a halt to military operations and further withdrawals, but the American delegation showed clear flexibility toward Israeli intransigence. This does not mean Washington has abandoned the track; rather, it indicates that Washington is prioritizing the continuation of negotiations and the prevention of an explosion over any current readiness to force Israel into fundamental concessions.
This situation places Beirut before a dilemma. Continuing negotiations that yield no Israeli steps weakens the state’s position at home, yet withdrawing from them would deprive Lebanon of the main international channel available for containing Israel. The hint at non-participation in the next round can therefore be read as an attempt to restore balance to the process and pressure Washington, rather than a final decision to end it.
On the ground, the Ali al-Taher heights represent the most sensitive test of this equation. Available information indicates that Israel is working to tighten the siege around the site and cut its supply routes, in parallel with targeting, reconnaissance, and military pressure. Israel’s objective at this stage does not appear to be a large ground operation as such, but rather the creation of conditions that push the state and the army to handle the site themselves — achieving the Israeli objective without bearing the cost of storming it.
The importance of the Ali al-Taher area extends beyond the facility located there. The site overlooks Kfar Rumman and Nabatieh and is linked to Hezbollah’s defensive depth, so its transfer to army control under pressure could establish a new model: identifying a military position belonging to the party, isolating it in the field, increasing pressure on it, and then demanding that the army move in. Should this model succeed, Israel may attempt to repeat it at other sites toward Iqlim al-Tuffah and Jabal al-Rihan — which explains the sensitivity of the party’s position.
Hezbollah, in turn, faces a difficult dilemma. Accepting the evacuation of Ali al-Taher under pressure might allow it to avoid a military confrontation, but could open the door to a series of similar demands. Defending the site against an Israeli operation, on the other hand, could turn a limited military point into the spark for a wider confrontation. The party’s decision on the site is thus tied to its own assessment of the line between an acceptable tactical retreat and the beginning of the dismantling of its defensive system in depth.
The Lebanese army sits at the heart of this equation. It is capable of deploying into positions vacated by understanding, but it cannot easily turn the process of confining weapons into a military confrontation with Hezbollah, particularly in the absence of a parallel Israeli withdrawal. The state’s ability to advance will therefore remain tied to a clear reciprocal formula: a Lebanese step in exchange for a measurable Israeli step.
On this basis, all-out war does not appear to be the most likely scenario in the near term. The more probable course is a continuation of negotiations under military pressure, with the American channel kept open, alongside limited Israeli operations aimed at adjusting facts on the ground and pushing the army to expand the scope of its control. This approach is less costly for Israel than war, and allows it to pursue gradual security objectives without bearing the consequences of a broad military operation.
This path, however, carries the risk of slippage. Should Israeli pressure move from positions near the confrontation line to the party’s deeper defensive infrastructure, or should Israel attempt to impose arrangements unaccompanied by corresponding withdrawals, Hezbollah’s capacity to keep absorbing strikes will decline, and the likelihood of a response will rise.
Accordingly, the decisive factor in the coming phase is not the convening of an eighth round in itself, but whether it proves possible to build a formula linking three elements simultaneously: Israeli withdrawal, the expansion of the army’s authority, and the reduction of Hezbollah’s military presence. Success on that front could restore the negotiations’ function and give the state room to gradually expand its control. A continued Lebanese push for unilateral security steps, matched by Israel’s retention of freedom of military action and its positions, will instead push the track toward further deadlock.
From here, the battle over the Ali al-Taher facility looks like the first real test. Settling it through the army in exchange for a clear Israeli step could open a gradual, repeatable path. An Israeli storming of the site, or a shift of pressure toward Hezbollah’s deeper lines, would instead suggest that Israel has moved from a policy of containing the party’s presence in the south to an attempt to dismantle its defensive system in depth — at which point the risk of a wider confrontation becomes considerably more serious. Lebanon is thus entering a phase in which negotiations still exist, but the field is increasingly dictating the terms of negotiation more than the negotiations are dictating the movement of the field.