New Study: “Rival Strategies, Shared Threat: Israel–Türkiye Competition and Syria’s Future”

- The study analyzes the political order that emerged in Syria after the fall of the Assad regime and argues that the country has not moved toward state consolidation or unified governance. Instead, it has entered a relatively stable strategic equilibrium characterized by fragmentation, overlapping authorities, and sustained external competition. The central claim is that Syria’s current condition is not a temporary transition failure, but the product of strategic interaction among regional actors-particularly Israel and Türkiye-whose competing visions shape the country’s trajectory.
- According to the study, Israel prefers a fragmented and weak Syria because a unified central state could constrain Israeli military freedom, restore strategic threats, and potentially enable renewed Iranian influence or hostile regional alignments. As a result, Israel’s strategy focuses on preventing consolidation by targeting military infrastructure, limiting state-building efforts, and maintaining conditions that allow for deterrence and operational flexibility. In contrast, Türkiye pursues a form of conditional unification aimed at stabilizing its southern border, preventing Kurdish autonomy, and embedding its political and economic influence within emerging Syrian institutions.
- The divergence between these strategies is rooted not only in competing geopolitical ambitions but also in different threat hierarchies. Israel views the re-emergence of a strong Syrian state as the primary long-term risk, while Türkiye perceives fragmentation, instability, and Kurdish empowerment as the most immediate dangers. This misalignment makes sustained cooperation unlikely and transforms Syria into a continuous arena of regional rivalry rather than a shared stabilization project.
- The study also emphasizes the agency of domestic Syrian actors-including militias, tribal networks, and semi-autonomous administrations-arguing that they are not passive proxies but strategic actors who exploit regional competition to preserve autonomy and extract resources. Their reluctance to fully integrate into a centralized authority reinforces fragmentation and complicates efforts at state consolidation.
- The research draws on multiple theoretical frameworks, including Regional Security Complex Theory, balance of threat theory, proxy intervention literature, spoiler dynamics, and game theory. By integrating these approaches, the study conceptualizes the interaction between Israel and Türkiye as a repeated strategic game lacking the conditions for trust or credible commitment. Each actor therefore adopts unilateral strategies that undermine the other’s objectives, producing a persistent stalemate.
- The main conclusion is that Syria’s fragmentation is not simply a transitional phase but a rational and self-reinforcing equilibrium produced by strategic competition. No actor possesses the capacity to impose a unified political order, yet each retains the ability to block unfavorable outcomes. This results in a condition of partial integration, incomplete governance, and ongoing instability that persists because it represents the least costly option for key stakeholders. Rather than being a failure of policy or reconstruction, fragmentation emerges as the most stable outcome under multipolar regional rivalry.
- Finally, the study suggests that the Syrian case reflects a broader pattern in post-conflict environments where overlapping external interventions, proxy dynamics, and divergent threat perceptions prevent consolidation. In such contexts, fragmentation may become the default political order, not because it is optimal, but because alternatives are riskier and lack enforceable guarantees. This framework offers a transferable lens for understanding why stabilization often stalls in multipolar regional systems and why seemingly suboptimal outcomes endure over time.
Note: Published articles and papers do not necessarily reflect the views of the Politics and Society Institute.
To read the full study , download it:
