The Historical Roots of the Kurdish Question in Northeastern Syria

The Kurdish question remains one of the most pressing and consequential issues shaping the political order of the Middle East. Across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, Kurdish aspirations for self-determination have repeatedly collided with the territorial integrity of existing nation-states. Despite numerous historical attempts to establish an independent Kurdish state, these efforts have largely failed, giving rise instead to fragmented political movements and varying forms of autonomy.

In Turkey, the Kurdish movement became closely associated with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which emerged within a Marxist ideological framework and engaged in a prolonged armed struggle against the Turkish state. In Iraq, relations between Kurdish political factions and the Ba‘ath regime were marked by shifting alliances, recurrent military confrontations, and mutual accusations, until the regime’s collapse in 2003. In Syria, the roots of the Kurdish question can be traced back to the 1962 census in al-Hasakah Governorate, which stripped tens of thousands of Kurds of their citizenship-a policy that persisted until the recent issuance of Decree No. 13 by President al-Shar‘. Following the events of 2011, northeastern Syria witnessed a period of political hesitation rather than immediate engagement in the uprising, while the establishment of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in 2015, with U.S. support, ushered in a new and ambiguous phase whose long-term implications remain uncertain.

Yet beyond its geopolitical and military dimensions, Kurdish nationalism constitutes an integral part of Syria’s social and urban fabric. Kurds represent a fundamental component of major Syrian cities and regions, and any serious effort toward political stabilization, national reconciliation, or post-war reconstruction will remain incomplete unless this issue is addressed as a structural and foundational challenge rather than as a marginal or temporary concern.

At the outset, it is essential to acknowledge that the Kurdish question is a historically rooted, transnational problem spanning the geography of four states in the Arab world and the Middle East-beginning in Iran, extending through northern Iraq, southern Turkey, and reaching northeastern Syria. At the same time, it is important to recall that Arab societies were not the primary source of this historical injustice; rather, responsibility lies with the political and geographical division of the region imposed through international agreements, starting with the Sykes–Picot Agreement of 1917 and culminating in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

With the emergence of the nation-state project in Iran (under the Shah), Turkey (under Kemalism), and Ba‘athist rule in both Iraq and Syria, Kurdish nationalism was revitalized in these states as a natural reaction to the absence of an inclusive national state capable of accommodating diverse religious, ethnic, and communal backgrounds in a manner that would foster genuine citizenship within a unified national framework. The Kurds launched their first separatist attempt in northwestern Iran with the establishment of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad, which survived only for a few months before being dismantled. While the state itself was short-lived, the Kurdish aspiration for an independent Kurdistan was not extinguished.

In Turkey, the Kurdish youth movement emerged as the most active among the aforementioned cases in its pursuit of Kurdish independence. Abdullah Öcalan came to dominate the Kurdish political scene from the early 1980s through the founding of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which was grounded in Marxist ideology. The party entered into fierce armed confrontations with the Turkish state, resulting in heavy casualties on both the Turkish and Kurdish sides. Following his arrest in a dramatic, widely publicized operation, Öcalan was imprisoned after having been granted a prolonged period to operate against Turkey from Syrian territory under the rule of Hafez al-Assad. In 2025, Öcalan called on his supporters to cease hostilities with Turkey, ordered the dissolution of the PKK, and urged integration into the Turkish state-building process. This decision was rejected by many Kurdish leaders, who subsequently chose to continue their activities across the four aforementioned states under different organizational names.

In Iraq, relations between Kurdish political forces and the Ba‘ath regime were characterized by profound complexity, repeated military clashes, and mutual accusations, until the end of Ba‘athist rule in 2003. At that point, the Kurds found themselves facing a historic moment to establish the nucleus of a Kurdistan state in northern Iraq.

In the Syrian case, the roots of the problem date back to 1962 and the so-called al-Hasakah census (a governorate with a significant Kurdish population), which stripped many Kurds of Syrian citizenship through a political decision that remained in effect until the recent issuance of Decree No. 13 by President al-Shar‘.

It is important to note, with regard to Syria, that there is no dense Kurdish demographic presence across the Syrian Jazira as a whole; rather, Kurdish settlement has historically been concentrated in al-Hasakah Governorate-particularly in its northeastern and northwestern areas-where Kurds have lived alongside Arab communities within the same social and geographic space.

What Happened in Northeastern Syria After 2011?

In the early stages of the Syrian uprising, there was no genuine Kurdish mobilization in support of the broader popular movement. Instead, Kurdish political actors largely adopted a posture of strategic anticipation, closely observing developments that might yield political gains for the Kurds similar to those achieved in Iraq after 2003.

The entry of the extremist organization ISIS into the Syrian arena, and its seizure of Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor, opened a new political horizon for Kurdish elites. In 2015, a new military-political structure was formed under the name Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with the declared objective of combating ISIS and with direct support from the United States and Western powers. The SDF sought to present itself in a manner compatible with prevailing Western political discourse at the time, while simultaneously cultivating ties with Arab tribal communities under the banner of fighting terrorism and contributing to Syria’s future. Although Arabs constituted a numerical majority within the SDF, they remained largely absent from its actual decision-making and leadership structures.

Over time, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) consolidated effective control over the SDF, transforming it into a vehicle for pursuing ambitions that the party had failed to achieve within Turkey itself. The SDF rejected all initiatives proposed by the Syrian government aimed at ending the state of territorial fragmentation, while maintaining control over Syria’s most vital water, energy, and agricultural resources. Moreover, the SDF went beyond this by actively assisting the Syrian regime in suppressing the uprising, particularly in the city of Aleppo.

What Has Happened in Recent Weeks?

In recent weeks, the Syrian government has repositioned itself vis-à-vis the United States through renewed Arab political support from key regional states with significant strategic weight. This shift resulted in the withdrawal of political and security cover from the SDF. At the same time, the Syrian government successfully competed with the SDF on the very issue through which the latter had legitimized itself in Western eyes-namely, the fight against terrorism-thereby stripping the SDF of its primary source of external legitimacy.

Concurrently, the SDF lost its local social base when the Arab majority in northeastern Syria turned against it, in response to its coercive policies toward local populations and the increasing ethnicization of relations between the two sides. This dynamic facilitated the Syrian army’s efforts to reassert control over large parts of the Jazira region. It also became increasingly evident that the PKK exercised full control over the SDF, as all attempts at political compromise or negotiated solutions between the SDF and the government were systematically obstructed. The SDF escalated further by releasing large numbers of ISIS detainees in an attempt to accuse the Syrian government of enabling the re-emergence of the extremist organization.

What Is Likely to Happen Next?

The U.S. administration is expected to attempt to restrain the Syrian government-particularly in al-Hasakah-in order to provide Kurdish leadership with an opportunity to reorganize. This scenario, however, carries serious risks for Syria’s future, as it may lead to a prolonged war of attrition aimed at undermining national security and stability. Such a strategy could also seek to reinforce separatist tendencies among other Syrian groups through acts of terrorism, thereby prolonging the Syrian crisis.

Note

The Kurdish component remains an integral part of Syria’s major urban centers and constitutes an essential pillar of the country’s ongoing reconstruction and state-building processes.