“Post-Gaza” Alliance Map

In an attempt to conceal the state of regional isolation into which Israel has been placed, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke of a new axis being formed by Israel in coordination and cooperation with India and a number of Arab, African, and Mediterranean countries. He concealed some names while mentioning others such as Greece and Cyprus. It is not difficult for any observer of the regional scene to anticipate which Arab and African states Netanyahu was alluding to in his remarks.

The irony is that Netanyahu’s government today, while speaking openly about a major victory against what was once called the “Axis of Resistance” led by Iran—and about its success in dismantling that regional network and undermining its influence, through the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the destruction of Hezbollah’s military capabilities and its continued political and military pursuit, as well as the case of Hamas, which the Americans and Israelis insist on fully disarming in Gaza and eliminating both politically and militarily—has not stated explicitly what he meant by the so-called “Sunni axis” that is supposedly taking shape. It is clear that this omission was deliberate.

Netanyahu had previously referred to Israel’s adversaries among what he described as radical Sunni movements—primarily alluding to the Muslim Brotherhood—in earlier meetings with Christian Zionist groups. Yet today he avoids defining what he means by the emerging Sunni axis, most likely because he now intends something different without declaring it openly: an axis he describes as nascent, comprising Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan, in addition to the new Syrian regime. In earlier interviews, Netanyahu hinted at his anger over Saudi Arabia’s choice to align with what he termed the other radical axis—referring to its relationship with Turkey.

This new shift runs completely counter to the theory Netanyahu had long adopted and promoted, domestically and regionally: that the regional arena would be cleared for Israeli hegemony after the Gaza war, and that Israel would reshape the Middle East. Even regional cooperation, the Abraham Accords, and Israel’s integration into a new Middle Eastern order were—according to that vision—supposed to stem from Israel’s military superiority and surplus power, alongside the imposition of new security conditions on neighboring states, the sidelining of the Palestinian question, and continued control and annexation in the West Bank.

What happened instead is that what Netanyahu termed the “radical Sunni axis” moved to fill the vacuum and restore a balance of power—at minimum diplomatically. What has taken shape is what may be called an “Arab-Islamic group,” comprising the aforementioned states in addition to others such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. These countries had not previously been

traditional or central players in Middle Eastern affairs; their entry into this equation aims to support the Saudi-Turkish axis confronting Israel and to broaden the coalition opposing Israeli hegemonic ambitions—an important and highly significant new development.

Netanyahu may also be pointing to the remarkable development in Saudi-Turkish relations over the recent period, the scale of their joint military and economic cooperation, Pakistan’s entry through military cooperation agreements with Saudi Arabia, growing Pakistani-Turkish convergence, and the unprecedented elevation of Jordanian-Turkish military and political cooperation. King Abdullah II awarded Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan the Order of Sharif Hussein bin Ali—one of Jordan’s highest decorations—while joint defense industries agreements and other military and defense arrangements were signed between the two countries.

Tel Aviv views such developments with deep concern for several reasons. First, they are reshaping regional alliances in ways entirely contrary to Netanyahu’s political imagination. Second, they involve states historically and politically aligned with the camp of regional moderation—states that had supported peaceful settlement (unlike the ideological discourse of the Resistance Axis), maintain strong relations with the West and the United States, and share convergent perspectives with Europe and other international actors. Third, geopolitically, they represent influential middle powers with substantial resources and capabilities. Fourth, in demographic-geopolitical terms, they represent the broader Sunni Arab and non-Arab majority of the Islamic world—where Iran, though influential, never represented that wider bloc.

Within this equation—and given Saudi Arabia’s central role in shaping this grouping—Netanyahu’s calculations are bound to change. While he may have won military battles against Iran and its allies in the previous phase, the real dilemma lies in how to politically capitalize on those gains regionally. It is evident that matters have become more complex for Israel, not better as he had promised Israelis. This likely explains his talk of a six-party axis, as if to reassure Israelis that the war has not deepened their regional or international isolation, and that Israel has new allies who share its strategic vision and interests—foremost among them India.

Ironically, Netanyahu alone has spoken of these axes. The so-called Arab-Islamic group has not described itself as a strategic axis; significant divergences remain among its members on multiple regional files, including relations with the U.S. administration and Israeli policies. Nor has the other camp—including India—spoken of a formal regional strategic axis. Attention now turns to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s expected visit to Israel on Wednesday, and whether his anticipated speech at the Knesset will confirm Netanyahu’s claims about this alliance and its members.

Netanyahu’s discourse on regional alliances is not baseless—it is strategic par excellence. It reveals a state of geopolitical fluidity and intense political-military movement, indicating that the

region is still far from consolidating the rules of a new regional order. The struggle to shape those rules remains ongoing, and the Middle Eastern geopolitical arena is expanding regionally and geographically to an unprecedented degree not witnessed in nearly two centuries.