• The displacement scenario remains the most prominent in the calculations of the dominant political current, and it poses the gravest danger to Jordan.
• Any formula that places broad security or administrative responsibilities on Jordan, while the core instruments of control remain in Israel’s hands, would drain the Kingdom, draw it into daily friction with the Palestinian population, and open the door to division within Jordan.
• Palestinian steadfastness holds today, yet its capacity to endure is eroding under pressures of this magnitude and persistence.
• Calls in the Israeli debate following the speech to “turn off the water tap” to Jordan revealed that this card is present in the thinking of some Israeli actors, and that it is among the first to be invoked in times of tension.
• Israeli government policies nonetheless remain the foremost challenge to Jordan’s national security, by virtue of geography, the nature of the open files, and the directness of their impact.
• Displacement may begin within the West Bank, between villages and cities, and then escalate into wider pressure if the capacity to absorb people, job opportunities, and security shrink.
• At its core, the proposal rests on demography more than geography: Jordan would bear the burden of the population and security in populated areas, while the land, the crossings, the resources, and the decision to use force would remain in Israel’s hands.
• This common ground grows in importance because Israeli discourse focuses on portraying Jordan as a divided state, socially fragile and demographically weak.
• The message reached the Gulf states clearly: American protection is subject to calculations of interest and cost, and varies with the location and nature of the attack.
• What Israel seeks in the West Bank is a strategy it pursues through long-term planning and multiple instruments, and it can be thwarted when met with organized will.
• The Israeli project in the West Bank is a political decision that can be confronted, and Arab interests likewise require a decision that turns them into reality.

Executive Summary

King Abdullah II delivered his address to the general debate of the eighty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September 2026, at a time when Israeli expansion in the West Bank intersected with risks to Jordan’s northern border and water resources, alongside disruption to regional security arrangements. The address reaffirmed established Jordanian positions. Its particular significance lay in its timing, delivery, and explicit identification of two threats with direct implications for national security: forced displacement in the West Bank and the Israeli threat to Jordan’s water security through southern Syria.

This paper assesses that the most immediate threat lies in the incremental imposition of facts on the ground, making life increasingly untenable in the West Bank and undermining the foundations of Palestinian statehood, while pressures on Jordan accumulate. This process is likely to continue regardless of the composition of Israel’s next government. Differences between Netanyahu and his opponents largely concern methods and Israel’s international image, while the broader trajectory remains one of consolidating territorial control and reducing the Palestinian presence.

The domestic consensus reflected in the response to the address provides a political foundation for a sustained national programme involving the government, the House of Representatives, the Senate, political parties, and the media. Such a programme would connect diplomacy with support for Palestinian resilience, water and border contingency planning, and stronger social cohesion. Regionally, the paper identifies the Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement as a framework in which Jordan should participate and whose development into a broader Arab security model it should encourage, as instability becomes an enduring feature of the regional order.

Over the next six to twelve months, the paper considers sustained, incremental pressure the most likely trajectory, while recognising the possibility of a wider escalation and the scope for containing some fronts through limited understandings. Jordanian policy should be judged by its ability to reduce the Kingdom’s vulnerability to pressure under each trajectory and by the tangible results it achieves in supporting Palestinian resilience, safeguarding water security, and advancing regional coordination.

I. The Political Significance of the Address and the Limits of Its Impact

The address continued a consistent Jordanian political position. The King had conveyed the same substance, with comparable candour, at the Arab summit in Cairo and in media interviews. This position also aligns with statements by Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi, Queen Rania Al Abdullah, and the Crown Prince, forming a coherent official discourse on the war and Israeli policies. Alongside the West Bank and southern Syria, the address discussed the Kingdom’s role in trade, industry, and technology, support for UNRWA, and the protection of holy sites.[1] Taken together, these themes reflect an understanding of Jordan’s national interest that combines confronting immediate threats with building economic strength.

The address resonated widely for reasons related to the circumstances of its delivery. As one of the early speeches in the general debate, it helped set the tone for the proceedings. It combined precise language with personal presence and a style of delivery that addressed a global audience on its own terms, offering a case study in political communication. It also coincided with an intensely competitive electoral period in Israel, as Netanyahu and his opponents contested the country’s image and international standing. The message of isolation therefore arrived at a particularly sensitive moment for his government. This helps explain the swift response from the Israeli Foreign Ministry and the campaign launched by Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s team.

The concept of the “power of attention,” as articulated by the King, is central to understanding this resonance. The Israeli government relies on the fragmentation of international attention: the cost of violations declines as they become routine or as governments turn to another crisis. The address used this concept to refocus attention on Gaza and the West Bank, at a time of widening shifts in European and American public opinion, successive British and European sanctions, and warnings in the Israeli press about changing German attitudes towards Israel. It also challenged the narrative Israel had constructed over decades: a democracy governed by the rule of law, searching unsuccessfully for a partner for peace. In doing so, the King addressed the world through its own language and normative frameworks.

The address also maintained a clear and disciplined focus. Jordan faces multiple challenges, and its sovereignty has been violated in connection with Iranian missile activity. Yet the King concentrated on the Palestinian question as it relates to Jordanian national security, and specifically on the conduct of the Israeli government. Iran appeared in the context of the Arab Peace Initiative, among the fifty-seven Arab and Muslim countries prepared to establish normal relations with Israel in return for Palestinian statehood. This confined the confrontation to Netanyahu’s government and its policies, limiting its opportunity to broaden the circle of adversaries as a means of easing its isolation.

Assessing the address’s political impact depends on what follows. Applause and media coverage indicate how it was received; its effects will become evident in subsequent state behaviour: the extent of cooperation with settlement policies, the level of support for Palestinian institutions, and the willingness to protect Jordanian interests when they come under pressure. Jordan can engage its partners on the basis of their declared commitments. A state that supports the two-state solution should be asked to explain its position on measures that undermine the territorial and economic conditions necessary for that outcome. This inconsistency creates an opening for diplomacy organised around specific requests, each linked to a responsible counterpart and a mechanism for follow-up.

In this sense, the address marks a turning point whose significance will be determined by how Jordanian institutions act on its messages. The immediate opportunity is to make those messages the basis of a national programme managed consistently and evaluated against results.

II. The West Bank and Shifts in Israeli Politics

The address named what is taking place in the West Bank: forced displacement. In doing so, it settled a domestic Jordanian debate over the nature of developments west of the Jordan River. These developments concern the future of the West Bank and its inhabitants, directly affect Jordanian interests, and advance through several mutually reinforcing instruments: settler attacks, annexation decisions, Israeli court rulings, house demolitions, settlement expansion, and the checkpoint network. The King described this as a systematic process, identifying it as a deliberate policy.

The threat to Jordan arises from the cumulative effects of these instruments on Palestinians’ ability to remain on their land. The destruction of homes, the loss of land or income, and disrupted access to schools and hospitals combine to make life increasingly difficult in certain areas. Displacement may begin within the West Bank, between villages and towns, before generating wider pressures as the capacity of receiving communities, employment opportunities, and security diminish. Palestinian resilience remains strong, yet its capacity to withstand pressures of this scale and persistence is being eroded.

This calls for monitoring that assesses incidents cumulatively and tracks continuing territorial and demographic changes: communities emptied of their residents, land rendered inaccessible, families deprived of their livelihoods, and areas cut off from services. It is also necessary to distinguish between declared intentions, implemented measures, and actual demographic outcomes, since the strength of the evidence differs across these levels. Support for Palestinian resilience therefore requires an operational definition encompassing housing, income, services, legal assistance, and access to markets. The value of each intervention should be measured by the extent to which it enables a family, institution, or community to remain in place.

These developments coincide with changes within Israel’s political system. According to a statement by Adalah, which represents the electoral lists and candidates concerned, the Central Elections Committee voted on 23 September 2026 to disqualify the United Arab List, the Joint List, and individual candidates. Adalah announced its intention to appeal the decisions to the Supreme Court.[2] The move has clear electoral calculations behind it. With no bloc expected to secure a majority on its own, smaller parties could play a decisive role in forming the next coalition. Despite their differences, the two Arab blocs are closer to Netanyahu’s opponents, who are counting on these votes in their contest with him. The appeals process remains crucial to assessing the decision’s ultimate effect.

For Jordan, excluding Arab representation narrows the space within the Knesset for opposition to land and settlement policies. The issue also warrants attention from another perspective: whether electoral competition will push Israeli political actors towards harder positions on land, borders, and a political settlement.

Lieberman’s Proposal and the Return of the “Jordanian Option”

Avigdor Lieberman, leader of Yisrael Beiteinu, revived the idea of assigning Jordan security and administrative responsibilities in Areas A and B of the West Bank. His proposal drew objections from Netanyahu and other right-wing forces.[3] On this issue, Lieberman represents a limited current within Israeli politics, while Netanyahu’s principal opponents remain committed to a formula under which a Palestinian authority administers the population. The proposal is primarily demographic in its logic: Jordan would assume responsibility for the population and security in inhabited areas, while Israel retained control over land, crossings, resources, and decisions on the use of force.

The idea has well-established precedents. In Master of the Game, Martin Indyk recounts that when King Hussein was presented in 1974 with a proposal beginning with Jericho, he rejected it in discussions with Henry Kissinger in Aqaba, viewing it as an offer that would give Jordan the population without the land.[4] Similar formulations resurfaced during Trump’s first term in the context of the so-called “Deal of the Century,” before receding. Jordan’s position has remained consistent: rejection on principle.

Netanyahu rejected the proposal, and it was met with derision in right-wing circles. This paper interprets that response as an indication of the more far-reaching ambitions of the dominant Israeli current: retaining all the territory the right calls “Judea and Samaria” while substantially reducing the Palestinian presence over the coming years. The prospect of wider displacement remains part of the calculations of the dominant current and poses an even greater threat to Jordan than the “Jordanian option” itself.

Lieberman’s proposal nevertheless carries risks of its own. Any arrangement that places extensive security or administrative responsibilities on Jordan while leaving the principal instruments of control in Israeli hands would drain the Kingdom’s resources, draw it into daily friction with Palestinians, weaken Palestinian political representation, and create openings for division within Jordan. The Jordanian criterion is clear: supporting Palestinian institutions and their capacity to fulfil their responsibilities, while preserving the connection between a political settlement and sovereignty over territory.

The Limits of Relying on a Change of Government in Israel

Arab political debate frequently returns to the question of whether Netanyahu’s defeat would change Israeli policies towards the West Bank and Jordan. This paper assesses that the overall direction would persist. Differences between Netanyahu and opponents such as Gadi Eisenkot and Naftali Bennett largely concern Israel’s image and the management of its external relations. These figures accept settlement expansion under a more palatable legal framework and quieter displacement policies that attract less international attention—approaches that might be described as “soft settlement expansion” and “smart displacement.” The programmes of the principal political currents offer no return to the Oslo process or commitment to a sovereign Palestinian state.

A new government could also bring risks of a different kind. Netanyahu’s rhetoric and his government’s conduct have contributed to Israel’s international and regional isolation. A government more adept at diplomatic language could ease that isolation while maintaining the same trajectory on the ground, making certain policies easier to present to partners. The test must therefore remain one of conduct: the next government’s positions on settlements, the Palestinian Authority, Jerusalem, and water. This approach would allow Jordan to benefit from any substantive easing of tensions while remaining prepared for continued pressure.

Israel’s objectives in the West Bank form a strategy pursued through long-term planning and multiple instruments. That strategy can be thwarted through organised political resolve. Jordan’s central task is to develop a strategy of its own, grounded in a clear definition of its national interest in Palestinians remaining on their land.

III. The Northern Border and Water Security

The address gave explicit prominence to the northern border, linking Israeli activity in southern Syria to Jordan’s security and water resources. It thereby settled a debate premised on the assumption that existing understandings and American guarantees would prevent Israel from threatening Jordanian water security. Calls in Israeli debate following the address to “turn off the tap” to Jordan revealed that some Israeli actors regard water as an available instrument of pressure, and one of the first to be invoked during periods of tension.

Southern Syria adds a direct dimension to the risk assessment. Any sustained change in military deployments or control over areas near the border affects freedom of movement, smuggling networks, and the Syrian authorities’ capacity to administer territory adjacent to the Kingdom. Analysis must distinguish between temporary military incursions, an enduring presence, and the imposition of arrangements governing populations and resources, since each has different implications for Jordan. Discussion of a corridor connecting the Golan Heights to Suwayda should be included in national planning among the scenarios requiring monitoring, with confidence in the assessment tied to the available maps, decisions, and related developments on the ground.

Two forms of pressure must be distinguished in the water sector. The first concerns changes in control, water abstraction, or infrastructure operations in the Yarmouk basin and its tributaries. This requires hydrological and field monitoring, alongside coordination with Syria. The second concerns the possible disruption of existing supplies and arrangements with Israel. This requires an accurate assessment of dependence on those supplies and technical, legal, and diplomatic preparedness for any interruption.

The severity of these risks depends on the degree of exposure and the time needed to compensate for lost supplies. A brief disruption during peak demand could have a greater impact than a longer interruption at another time. Water security assessments therefore require operational data on stored reserves, pumping and conveyance capacity, available alternatives and the cost of activating them, and the population groups and areas likely to be most affected.

Practical priorities include testing contingency plans, reducing water losses, protecting facilities, and accelerating alternatives whose feasibility has been established. Major projects remain essential to building greater water independence over the longer term, while the intervening period requires measures that can become operational within weeks or months. Jordan’s diplomatic message carries greater weight when supported by this level of preparedness.

IV. National Cohesion and the Management of Domestic Disagreement

Before the address, Jordanian elites engaged in an extensive debate over the ranking of national challenges. Some argued that the Foreign Ministry’s rhetoric towards Israel had harmed Jordan at a moment that could ill afford escalation. Others called for “looking east,” treating the West Bank as a Palestinian matter and Jerusalem and its holy sites as a burden on Hashemite custodianship. Some proponents of this view hinted that it reflected thinking within the state. The King’s address set out the state’s position unequivocally, consistent with statements by the Queen and the Foreign Minister. Those holding other views retain their full right to express them, provided they are presented as their own assessments.

The address placed the West Bank, the northern border, water, and custodianship of the holy sites at the heart of Jordan’s national interests. Iran has played a harmful role towards Jordan: it has violated its sovereignty, and its policies display a clear degree of hostility. Jordan also has disagreements with other regional actors. The Israeli government’s policies nevertheless remain the foremost challenge to Jordanian national security because of geography, the nature of the issues at stake, and their direct effects.

Public debate allows for differing assessments of priorities, partnerships, and approaches towards Israel and Iran. It requires clear information to reduce ambiguity, sustained parliamentary scrutiny, and freedom of criticism so that decisions can be tested and improved and public trust maintained. It also requires moving beyond a pattern of short-lived mobilisation: a few days of enthusiasm, speeches, and television appearances followed by disengagement, while sustained Israeli policies continue to have direct consequences for national security.

The possibility of common ground between the state and the opposition is evident in statements by Muath al-Khawaldeh, secretary-general of the Ummah Party, following his election on 19 September 2026. He affirmed support for the Jordan Armed Forces in confronting external threats and rejected the notion of Jordan as an alternative Palestinian homeland.[5] The significance of this position derives from the party’s place within the Islamist opposition and from its articulation before the royal address, making it an indication of shared ground in defending the state. Such common ground is particularly important because Israeli rhetoric seeks to portray Jordan as divided, socially fragile, and demographically vulnerable.

In this context, the Israeli Foreign Ministry responded to the address by invoking Jordan’s disengagement from the West Bank and presenting it as a measure that deprived Palestinians of Jordanian citizenship. Returning to the relevant documents reveals the selectivity of this account. In his address of 31 July 1988, King Hussein linked the decision to support for Palestinian identity and responsiveness to the Palestine Liberation Organization’s position, within the context of the 1974 Rabat summit resolutions. He also affirmed the citizenship rights of Jordanians of Palestinian origin residing in the Kingdom.[6] The subsequent legal and administrative consequences for individuals require a separate examination of implementing documents and the cases concerned. The Israeli response reflects the damage the address inflicted on the Israeli government and its attempt to influence an international public opinion it senses it is losing.

Such precision helps protect Jordan’s domestic cohesion against the use of a complex historical issue to inflame fears. Rhetoric targeting that cohesion becomes less effective when documented information is available, equality of citizenship is upheld, and the relationship between protecting Jordan and safeguarding Palestinian rights is clearly articulated. Pressures on living standards remain part of this equation: the capacity to withstand prolonged crises depends on income, employment, services, and confidence in how burdens are distributed.

V. The Region: Instability as a Regional Order

In the short and medium term, the region is moving towards a condition some analysts describe as “neither peace nor war.” A more precise formulation would be “regional instability,” which is gradually becoming a defining feature of the regional order itself. This is evident in the interconnectedness of the various fronts: Houthi attacks on Saudi Arabia, security in Bab al-Mandab and the Strait of Hormuz, intermittent Iranian strikes, and tensions extending to Ethiopia and Somaliland. Confrontation may subside on one front while intensifying on another. Jordan must therefore monitor each source of disruption individually, alongside the channels through which its effects reach the Kingdom’s borders and economy.

Potential US–Iranian understandings remain an influential factor. Their scope is likely to be confined to the Strait of Hormuz and the nuclear programme, while disagreements over regional influence and armed groups persist. A grand regional bargain at Arab expense, once feared by Arab capitals, appears harder to achieve today. A breakdown in negotiations, however, could trigger a renewed escalation. President Trump’s own statements, framing the choice as one between total destruction and an alternative course, reflect the scale of uncertainty. Any understanding should therefore be assessed according to its text, participants, implementation mechanisms, and exclusions. Military preparations and changes in the rules of engagement should be monitored alongside public statements.

Declining Confidence in the American Security Umbrella and Competing Models

The extent of American commitment to its partners is a decisive variable in this landscape. Washington refrained from intervening against the Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia; President Trump stepped back at the last moment from an anticipated decision concerning the Houthis, then entered negotiations with them in Oman. The message to Gulf states was clear: American protection is subject to calculations of interest and cost and varies according to the location and nature of an attack.

Competing visions of the next regional order are now emerging. The US administration’s approach centres on plans for the period “after the war with Iran” and the revival of the Abraham Accords. With few exceptions, its appeal has declined across the Gulf and the wider Arab world. The Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement between Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan has emerged as an alternative. The joint statement issued following the Istanbul meeting of 31 August 2026 records the formation of a Strategic Political and Defence Committee and an agreement to establish a secretariat in Saudi Arabia, initially headed by a Pakistani secretary-general for a three-year term.[7] These steps represent institutional progress, while effective deterrence will depend on coordination, readiness, and the speed of decision-making.

The Arab Opportunity and the Mecca Agreement

Periods of instability create opportunities for actors able to seize them. The Arab regional system now faces such an opportunity, with particular responsibility falling on states including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, and Qatar. The American message has prompted Saudi Arabia to invest heavily in the Mecca Agreement and in new relationships, including closer ties with Egypt, reflected in the Saudi Crown Prince’s visit to Cairo and meeting with President Sisi. The agreement needs to develop a joint military command and shared strategic concepts and expand to include additional Arab and Gulf states, creating an Arab model of regional security. This paper assesses that Jordan’s interests favour engagement in this process and accession alongside Egypt. Cooperation could begin in practical areas such as early warning, infrastructure protection, training, and crisis management, with commitments, decision-making procedures, and financing clarified in advance.

This approach would also change the terms of dialogue with Iran. When each Arab state reaches separate understandings with Tehran to avoid being targeted, Iran gains additional power and is fully aware of that advantage. Iran is a state with its own interests and objectives. Its influence has expanded across several Arab countries in the absence of a counterpart able to negotiate with it in the language of interests and power. Dialogue is necessary to reduce risks and constrain behaviour, and it is more effective when conducted from a position of strength: clearly defined Arab interests, established alliances, specific conditions, and understandings tied to commitments whose implementation can be monitored.

Economic Corridors and Changing Regional Maps

Security arrangements are intertwined with competition over trade and energy routes. The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor is a multilateral project whose founding memorandum of understanding in 2023 envisaged maritime and rail connections, alongside energy and communications networks, and identified Jordan along the route for the movement of goods.[8] An article by Gallia Lindenstrauss in Israel Hayom, published in July 2026, reflects Israeli concern over regional routes that could bypass Israel and discusses how it might benefit from improved connectivity through Jordan and Syria.[9] This debate indicates ongoing competition over Israel’s position in emerging networks. The corridor’s prospects should be assessed through evidence of financing, implementation agreements, and infrastructure development.

Jordan’s interest lies in developing infrastructure capable of serving multiple routes: effective connections between Aqaba, industrial centres, and border crossings; predictable transit procedures; and storage, manufacturing, and re-export services. This would enable the Kingdom to retain a larger share of economic value and reduce the impact of delays or setbacks affecting any single regional project. These transformations call for consultations among Arab states to define shared interests in energy networks and logistics corridors before those networks are shaped by actors outside the region.

VI. Possible Trajectories and Indicators to Monitor

These trajectories cover a six- to twelve-month horizon. They are conditional assessments that may overlap, and their relative likelihood will shift in response to decisions by the parties and developments on the ground. The paper considers the first trajectory the most likely, since incremental pressure can be sustained at a lower political cost than a wholesale transformation. Preparedness for the second trajectory nevertheless remains a priority because of its potentially high costs.

Continued Incremental Pressure

Settlement measures, restrictions on movement, and the erosion of Palestinian resources continue, while the various fronts are contained to differing degrees. Jordan faces intermittent political and water-related pressures, with channels of communication remaining open. This trajectory is consistent with the parties’ ability to alter conditions through separate, cumulative steps while avoiding the consequences of a full-scale confrontation.

Its likelihood increases when successive administrative and operational measures proceed without effective international action to halt them, local displacement continues, and Palestinian institutions become less able to provide services. Responding to this trajectory requires sustained financing for Palestinian resilience, monthly monitoring of demographic, territorial, and resource changes, and diplomatic action linked to each measure with a tangible impact.

A Wider Escalation across Interconnected Fronts

A security breakdown or a major political decision could trigger a larger wave of displacement or an expansion of operations in southern Syria, coinciding with disruptions to shipping and energy supplies. The costs to Jordan would multiply if pressure on its borders coincided with supply interruptions and rising prices.

Warning signs include large-scale evacuations, prolonged service interruptions, unusual military concentrations, changes to arrangements governing control of crossings or resources, and official threats followed by operational preparations. Under these circumstances, Jordan would need to activate national response plans, secure essential supplies, and coordinate swift Arab and international action, supported by public communication that limits rumours and preserves trust.

Partial Containment and Limited Understandings

International pressure, electoral calculations, or the rising costs of war could lead to de-escalation on some fronts, the easing of particular measures, or a limited US–Iranian understanding. This would create space to improve Palestinian living conditions and broaden Jordan’s room for manoeuvre, while the dispute over territory and sovereignty remained unresolved.

This trajectory becomes more likely when understandings are followed by observable measures: the restoration of services, a decline in attacks and displacement, renewed freedom of movement, and guarantees or monitoring mechanisms. Jordan’s priority would be to use the period of relative calm to secure durable gains, accelerate measures that strengthen economic and water security, and track the gap between commitments and implementation.

VII. A Programme for Jordanian Action

The value of the royal address will be determined by the state’s ability to translate it into a national programme involving the government, the House of Representatives, the Senate, political parties, and the media, with clearly assigned roles and a timetable subject to review. This programme rests on four connected pillars: strengthening Jordan’s social fabric, developing alternative plans for water security, expanding engagement with Europe, the Gulf, and the wider world, and reinforcing Jordan’s security arrangements. The paper proposes that implementation begin within one month of adoption, with a review after ninety days and assessments every six months thereafter. Coordination should be overseen by the government, supported by effective parliamentary scrutiny.

From Short-Lived Mobilisation to Sustained Action

The programme’s success requires overcoming the pattern of short-lived mobilisation that reduces responses to a passing surge of enthusiasm. A sustained approach is needed to match the continuity and long-term character of Israeli policies. This requires an interagency government mechanism to produce, within the first month, an integrated assessment of developments in the West Bank, southern Syria, and the water sector, together with their economic implications. It should also identify in advance the indicators that would trigger a shift from monitoring to active response. Specifically on water, the Ministry of Water and Irrigation should prepare, within sixty days, an operational assessment of the consequences of any supply disruption and the period for which alternative sources could compensate. This should be followed by an exercise to test alternatives and a schedule for urgent projects.

Clarifying the State’s Position and Building on National Consensus

The current phase requires a clear presentation of the state’s position in domestic debate, as articulated by the King, the Queen, and the Foreign Minister, while recognising the right of others to express their own views without attributing them to the state. The national consensus following the address, including the position of the Islamist opposition, provides a foundation for a new phase in relations between the state and political forces and for responding to Israeli rhetoric targeting Jordan’s demographic and social cohesion. This should translate into regular meetings between the government, parliamentary committees, political parties, and representatives of economic sectors; a structured process for correcting information about identity, disengagement, and custodianship on the basis of public documents; and an assessment of how crises affect the livelihoods of the most vulnerable groups.

A Jordanian Strategy for Developments West of the River

Jordan needs a dedicated strategy for addressing developments west of the Jordan River. It should begin with an operational definition of “support for Palestinian resilience” and a programme that can be financed and evaluated. Within ninety days, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Planning, in coordination with the relevant Palestinian bodies and Arab and international partners, should identify interventions covering continuity of health and education services, livelihood support, legal assistance for threatened communities, and improved market access. Impact should be measured by the ability of families and institutions to remain in place and by the regularity of funding and its delivery to intended beneficiaries.

This strategy should rest on a realistic assessment of Israeli politics, avoid relying on a change of government in Israel, and remain alert to the language of “soft settlement expansion” and “smart displacement” that Netanyahu’s opponents may adopt. It should include an unequivocal rejection of the “Jordanian option” in any form, given the trap it poses for both Jordanians and Palestinians and its potential to fuel domestic strife. Within one month, the Foreign Ministry should define a set of specific requests for engagement with the United States, Europe, and the Gulf states. Each should address a clearly identified issue, such as protecting particular Palestinian communities, sustaining institutional funding, or preventing harm to water security. Responses should be reviewed every three months.

Regional Engagement and the Development of an Arab Model

Regionally, the paper recommends engagement in the Mecca Agreement and efforts to develop it into a framework with a joint military command, shared strategic concepts, and a broader Arab membership, in coordination with Egypt and the Gulf states. Within three months, the relevant authorities should complete an assessment of possible avenues for accession and cooperation, identifying the benefits, commitments, and costs associated with each option and submitting recommendations for phased implementation. In parallel, Jordan should encourage consultations among Arab states to define their shared interests in the coming period, including energy networks and logistics corridors. The Ministries of Transport, Industry and Trade, and Planning should review priority connectivity projects, giving particular weight to their capacity to serve multiple trade routes.

Concluding Assessment

The King’s address to the United Nations conveyed established Jordanian positions at the right moment and in the right language. It challenged Israel’s narrative before a global audience and settled two questions domestically: forced displacement in the West Bank and the Israeli threat to Jordanian water security through southern Syria. The next task begins with an accurate assessment of changes on the ground, followed by a closer connection between foreign policy instruments and the capacity to protect water resources, borders, and the economy. Supporting Palestinians’ ability to remain on their land brings Jordan’s national interest into alignment with the defence of their right to self-determination.

The next chapter will be written in Amman, through the ability of the state and society to transform a moment of consensus into a strategy, and in Arab capitals, through their ability to turn the Mecca Agreement from an emerging institutional framework into an effective regional model. Over the coming months, the test will be how far Jordan’s vulnerability to pressure declines, how much the conditions for Palestinian resilience improve, and what degree of Arab coordination is achieved to preserve the Kingdom’s freedom of choice. Israel’s project in the West Bank is a political undertaking that can be challenged. Arab interests likewise require a political decision capable of translating them into reality.

Sources and References

[1] Royal Hashemite Court, address by King Abdullah II to the general debate of the eighty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly, 22 September 2026. Official English text.

[2] Adalah, statement on the Central Elections Committee’s decisions to disqualify Arab electoral lists and candidates, 23 September 2026. Adalah represents the lists and candidates in the appeals proceedings.

[3] Anadolu Agency, “Jordanian Administration in the West Bank: Lieberman’s Proposal Angers the Israeli Right,” 23 September 2026. In Arabic.

[4] Martin Indyk, Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy (New York: Knopf, 2021).

[5] Al-Bosala News Agency, “Al-Khawaldeh: The Ummah Party Stands behind the Jordan Armed Forces and Extends Its Hand to All National Political Forces,” 19 September 2026. In Arabic.

[6] King Hussein bin Talal, disengagement address, 31 July 1988, reproduced in the Interactive Encyclopedia of the Palestine Question, from Shu’un Filastiniyya, no. 185 (August 1988), pp. 139–142.

[7] Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Joint Statement Issued by the Strategic Political and Defence Committee of the Mecca Mutual Defence Agreement,” concerning the Istanbul meeting of 31 August 2026.

[8] “Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor,” 2023. Text preserved in the White House archives.

[9] Gallia Lindenstrauss, “Israel Must Turn Regional Trade Bypass into Opportunity,” Israel Hayom, 2 July 2026. Opinion article.