Hezbollah and the U.S.-Iran War: The Bets of Lost Time for an Equation in the Process of Collapsing”
“In this article, the assistant researcher at the Institute of Politics and Society, Meera Meshal, discusses the reasons that prompted Hezbollah to engage in the war in favor of Iran in confronting the United States and Israel. She reviews the hypotheses about this intervention, whether they are internal, related to the relationship with the current Lebanese government, or regional and related to the organic relationship between the party and the system of Wilayat al-Faqih in Iran.
Meshal argues that entering the war was not a result of a surplus of power on the part of the party; on the contrary, it is a reflection of the dilemma of choices and strategic bets, and an attempt to hold on to a very limited opportunity in the dying moments to protect an internal–regional equation that created the party’s power and capabilities in previous stages, but which is in a stage of complete erosion and collapse. Perhaps the party’s decision to enter the war will accelerate the redefinition of its role and its transformations and repositioning in the coming phase”
With the beginnings of the first threads of Monday, March 2, through rocket barrages and drones toward northern Israel, Hezbollah effectively entered the line of confrontation, in response to the assassination of the Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. However, this military event in itself is not the real question; rather, the deeper question goes beyond timing and the battlefield to touch the essence of the decision itself: what pushed the party to enter this war, despite the state of severe weakness and strategic exposure it is experiencing after its recent military and political losses? Is it a decision of direct support in favor of Iran in a battle that it considers existential with the United States and Israel? Or is it a compelled choice imposed by Lebanese internal calculations that have begun to turn against it?
Then comes the most sensitive question: to what extent does the Shiite base in Lebanon today feel a willingness to enter into an open confrontation, in light of the economic collapse, the exhaustion of the past years, and the possibilities of a dangerous internal isolation?
Did the party enter the war to support Iran in confronting the American–Israeli war in reality, while it is aware of the imbalance of the balance of power, or did it enter it to reshape the Lebanese internal equation as it did after the 2006 Lebanon War, when it turned a military adventure into a tool to re-consolidate its political superiority? And are we facing a border battle, or a pivotal moment in which the fate of the party itself will be decided, depending on what the war taking place around Iran will lead to?
These questions are not read as a military analysis of the developments of the confrontation as much as they attempt to understand the political and social backgrounds that pushed Hezbollah to engage in the war at this particular moment. The decision to enter a confrontation of this magnitude cannot be explained from a single angle; rather, the Lebanese internal factor intersects with the regional calculations related to Iran, in addition to the social mood within the Shiite environment that constitutes the party’s main base of support.
From here, the article attempts to deconstruct these factors together, in order to understand whether the party’s entry into the war reflects a well-studied strategic choice, or a compelled response to a regional and political environment that is changing rapidly, and what that might mean for its future inside Lebanon in light of the outcomes of the war taking place around Iran.
The Internal Factor — The War in the Context of an Internal Crisis
Since its establishment, Hezbollah has not dealt with wars merely as a means of external deterrence; rather, its military dimension has often intersected with calculations of internal balance. Regional confrontations were not isolated from the Lebanese context but were directly reflected in its political position within the state. In the 2006 Lebanon War, the confrontation came at a highly sensitive internal moment that followed the assassination of Rafik Hariri and the rise of the March 14 Alliance, which constituted a serious challenge to the political equation that the party had consolidated after 2005.[1]
In this context, the war was not a military event separate from the internal environment; rather, through its political outcomes it turned into a factor that reshuffled the cards and allowed the party to move from a position of political defense to the position of “victorious steadfastness,” which enabled it to consolidate its internal superiority for the years that followed.
However, projecting the previous stage onto the present moment may be an oversimplification that is misleading, for the situation today is structurally different. The party emerged from the 2024 war exhausted by economic losses that reduced its ability to buy loyalties as it did in the past, as well as by human losses, having lost a large part of its military and security leadership amid the assassinations of first- and second-tier leaders and the assassination of the party’s charismatic leader, the former Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.
From another angle, the Lebanese environment is no longer accepting of the equation of a “state within a state,” under which falls a plan for disarmament and the immediate ban on Hezbollah’s activities through handing over weapons to the Lebanese state, limiting its work to the political sphere within constitutional and legal frameworks, and considering any security or military activities carried out by the party as outside the law and not recognized by the state. These decisions were announced by the President of the Republic when Hezbollah entered the war as a party to it.[2]
On the other hand, interpreting the party’s decision to enter the war as merely an attempt to escape its internal crisis or to rally popular support—assuming that the party still possesses the same margin of maneuver it had in 2006, and that it can utilize the war internally in the same way—is an assumption that is difficult to defend in light of the political, economic, and military exhaustion it faces today.
The party today operates within a more exhausted Lebanese environment, within a more complex regional balance of power, and within a Shiite reality less capable of enduring prolonged adventures. Therefore, it is difficult to say that the decision to enter the war was driven primarily by a desire to reproduce the internal equation; it is more likely that the internal factor was present as one element within a broader equation, but it was not the main driving force.
The war may produce internal effects through the re-polarization, but that does not mean this was its original purpose. Risking an unequal war in a fragile economic and social context does not seem to be a guaranteed tool for fixing internal superiority; rather, it may carry a counterproductive cost. Here lies the fundamental difference between 2006 and today: previously, the war was conducted from a position of confidence in the party’s ability to turn the confrontation into internal political capital. Today, however, engaging in a confrontation amid such exhaustion and exposure makes it difficult to consider it merely a calculated internal maneuver.
The external actor – the existential connection with Iran and Syria previously
Hezbollah remains an organic part of the Iranian regional strategy, as Tehran views its network extending from southern Lebanon to Yemen and the resistance factions in Iraq as advanced lines of defense for its regime, making the party one of the multi-front deterrence tools.
But the central question here is: did the party enter the war in execution of an Iranian function, or driven by the motive of preserving the Iranian regional umbrella, the loss of which constitutes a significant political and strategic cost for the party both domestically and externally?
Since its founding, the party has benefited from the Syrian depth as a secure strategic flank, providing it with freedom of military and logistical movement outside Lebanon, and facilitating the arrival of supplies. Nevertheless, this equation changed radically with the political transformations in Damascus. The new Syrian government under Ahmad al-Shar’ has a poor history and legacy with Hezbollah, especially during the stage of its military entry into Syria to assist President Bashar al-Assad against the resistance, at which time the party’s role was a significant variable in protecting the Syrian regime.
This shift forced Hezbollah to reassess its strategy. The relationship was no longer an organic alliance based on ideological integration but became pragmatic and conditioned on specific interests, including avoiding any direct confrontation with the new state. At the same time, the party lost the Syrian supply route that had allowed it freedom of logistical movement and military positioning, in addition to the continuous military and missile supplies that Hezbollah had relied on to refill its arms depots and maintain connections with the axis of resistance extending from Tehran through the influential and powerful factions in Iraq, passing through Syria, and reaching Lebanon, at a time when the party also possessed significant political, security, and military power.[1]
As for Iranian support, despite Tehran’s continued provision of limited political and military backing, Iran’s ability to compensate the party as it did in the past has declined noticeably, especially after the heavy attrition in previous years, whether in Syria or the recent war with Israel, along with the accompanying human losses and leadership assassinations. This has reduced the party’s political and military maneuvering margin and directly affected its relationship with the Shiite base in Lebanon.”[2]
In this context, it appears that the party’s decision to enter the war was not merely an internal mobilization choice or automatic Iranian support, but an expression of limited awareness that the battle was no longer optional, as the fall of Iran or a change in its role would lead to the collapse of its regional instruments, foremost among them Hezbollah. If Iran does not emerge from this war victorious, or at least if the current regime cannot persist, the repercussions for Hezbollah will be direct and severe, because it entered the battle from a position of necessity rather than from one of absolute strength.
Domestically, this will affect the party’s credibility before its Shiite environment, especially if the community begins to feel that its participation in the war is being imposed from beyond Lebanon’s borders without clear protection. Additionally, the party’s ability to turn regional tension into increased internal influence will decline, and any open confrontation with Israel will become more dangerous, since Iranian logistical and strategic support may no longer be guaranteed as before.
The Shiite Base – Between Solidarity and Existential Concern
The most important question at this stage does not concern only what Hezbollah wants, but also what its social base desires. Today, the Shiite base is not in the same position it was during the 2006 war, as it faces severe economic and social burdens, along with cumulative human losses and genuine fears of internal isolation or even civil strife.
In this reality, part of the Shiite community may rally around the party in a moment of direct threat to Iran or to southern Lebanon, but another part has begun to raise a different and more sensitive question: is the survival of the community organically linked to the survival of the party, or has the separation between the community as a Lebanese component and the party as an ideological military organization become a necessity to protect Shiite existence in Lebanon?
To understand this shift in social mood, it is necessary to return to the historical background of the Shiites’ position in the Lebanese state. Shiites constitute approximately one-third of the population in Lebanon, that is between 27% and 32%, and have historically suffered from political and economic marginalization since the founding of the state. The majority of Shiite communities were concentrated in the peripheries, particularly in the south, the Bekaa, and marginal neighborhoods in Beirut, where development levels were low and political representation was also limited.[3]
However, this reality began to change gradually with the rise of organized Shiite political activity, first with the Amal Movement, which emerged in 1975, and then more profoundly with the emergence of Hezbollah in the 1980s, which presented itself not only as a resistance organization but also as a social and political lever that moved the Shiites from the margins of the state to the heart of the Lebanese equation.
Over time, a feeling became entrenched within the Shiite consciousness that the party had granted the community political and security power that was not previously available. Alongside its military role, the party built a wide network of social, health, and educational institutions, creating a structure resembling a ‘state within a state,’ providing a sense of protection and political representation, and linking the economic interests of a large portion of the Shiite base to the party and its institutions, as well as to its ability to provide jobs and services to members of the community.
This feeling was reinforced after the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000, and then after the 2006 war, when the image of the party as a force capable of standing up to Israel was solidified. At that stage, the party was not seen only as a political organization but as a symbol of collective dignity and the ability to assert a regional position for the community.
It is natural and logical that this equation began to change gradually with regional transformations, particularly after the party’s intervention in the Syrian war in 2011. The Syrian regime under Bashar al-Assad constituted the party’s logistical and strategic depth, and the military intervention in Syria was justified as a necessity to protect the supply line and prevent the fall of a central regional ally. However, this intervention carried a high human cost, as a large number of fighters were killed over the years of war, shifting the mood within the Shiite community from a stage of national resistance to a more complex phase in which the idea of resistance intertwined with the burden of engagement in long regional conflicts. These transformations accumulated alongside the economic collapse Lebanon has experienced since 2019, which placed the Shiite community, like other Lebanese communities, under unprecedented economic and social pressure.
With the outbreak of the Israeli war on Gaza, the question resurfaced about the likelihood of Hezbollah’s involvement in a wider confrontation with Israel. However, the initial indicators at the time showed that the party’s solid base was not in an impulsive mood toward a full-scale war. The war was no longer perceived only through the logic of deterrence and dignity, but also through the logic of the social and economic costs that the local community might bear.
As the confrontation later expanded, these costs multiplied. A series of Israeli strikes, including targeting field commanders and assassinating prominent figures within the party, caused a deep shock within the Shiite community. These losses were not merely military but also carried symbolic weight, particularly after the loss of leaders who represented moral and political pillars within the Shiite society. This factor contributed to reinforcing a state of silent anxiety within the supportive community, as the idea of war began to be received with greater caution and concern compared to previous stages.
In this context, one can observe a growing sense of resentment within some Shiite circles, not necessarily toward the idea of resistance itself, but toward the cost of continuous engagement in regional conflicts that go beyond Lebanese borders. After years of economic attrition and human losses, an increasing awareness has emerged that the Shiite community bears a large share of the burdens of these confrontations, whether demographically, economically, or in terms of infrastructure and services. This is especially the case since the compensation that previously occurred through the Iranian system for the party, financially covering a large part of the people’s compensation and the rebuilding of infrastructure, no longer exists, and Tehran will not be able to provide such compensation in the future. In addition, the Lebanese state is incapable of covering these significant costs for the residents of the south and the southern suburbs of Beirut.
This shift is not limited to popular sentiment alone, but may also reflect on the nature of the relationship between the Shiite political forces themselves, particularly between Hezbollah and the Amal Movement. The duality formed by the two sides for decades served as a safety valve within the community, providing a political framework that prevented internal division. However, Amal’s position, being more integrated into the state institutions, may lead it, in moments of major crises, to adopt a more pragmatic approach that balances the strategic alliance with the party and the protection of internal stability for both the community and the Lebanese state. That is, a widening of the political distance between the two organizations, even if unannounced, may reflect a deeper shift within the Shiite street itself, because political unity has historically been one of the main elements of community cohesion.[4]
Overall, it can be said that the Shiite environment is not experiencing a revolt against Hezbollah, but is going through a calm phase of re-evaluating its priorities. After decades of political ascent and a sense of power, this environment now finds itself facing deep economic and social challenges, alongside a more volatile regional environment and a less solid Iranian guarantee.
The Decisive Factor – What Will Happen in the Iranian War?
Hezbollah’s future is no longer determined solely in southern Lebanon or Beirut, but has become largely linked to the outcomes of the ongoing war surrounding Iran. The party constitutes one of the main components of the regional network that Tehran has built over past decades, and consequently its strategic fate is intertwined with the fate of this system. Since its founding in the 1980s, the party has been organically connected to Iranian support politically, militarily, and financially, and has long benefited from the Syrian depth, which constituted a vital logistical corridor for its weapons and capabilities. However, the fall of the former Syrian regime, in addition to the wide-ranging war Iran is facing today, has placed the party in an unprecedented equation: the loss of the Syrian lifeline on one hand, and the potential exposure of the Iranian umbrella itself to existential pressure on the other.[5]
In this context, the party’s entry into the war becomes part of calculations that go beyond the Lebanese arena. The party understands that any major strike against Iran would not only mean a decline in its regional influence, but could also shake the foundation on which its military and political project is built. Therefore, the war appears to it more as a battle to defend the network of alliances that grants it the ability to endure, rather than merely a conventional confrontation with Israel.
This close connection simultaneously carries significant strategic risks. If Iran emerges from this war exhausted but still intact, the party may attempt to gradually reinvent itself within Lebanon, benefiting from the continued minimum political and military support. However, if Iran experiences a fundamental transformation in its political structure or regional role, the party could face a dual crisis concerning identity, funding, and legitimacy. In the most extreme scenario—if the Iranian regime undergoes a major shake-up or political collapse—the party may face a complete redefinition of its role, which could gradually push it toward becoming a Lebanese political party rather than a regional military organization.
In light of this equation, the party’s decision to enter the war was not an expression of surplus power as much as it was a reflection of the narrowness of strategic options. For it, the loss of Iran after the loss of the Syrian depth could mean the loss of the fundamental pillars it has relied on for decades. This makes the war, for the party, closer to an attempt to prevent the collapse of the system that grants it the ability to endure, even if the cost of this confrontation is high for the party, its base, and Lebanon as a whole.
[1] Statement of the March 14 Forces . https://www.lcrs-politica.com/research/byan-ko-14-aathar-almoetmr-althalth
[2] Akoum, Caroline 2026. The Lebanese government bans the military and security activities of ‘Hezbollah’… and obliges it to ‘hand over the weapons.’ Al-Sharq Al-Awsat . https://aawsat.com/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D8%B4%D8%B1%D9%82-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A/5246644-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%83%D9%88%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D8%A8%D9%86%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AD%D8%B8%D8%B1-%D9%86%D8%B4%D8%A7%D8%B7%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%AD%D8%B2%D8%A8-%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%84%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B3%D9%83%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9%E2%80%A6
[3] Previous reference
[4] https://share.google/MUO9Ud6MQa7l8yo68 “ Why does Hezbollah link Lebanon’s fate to regional events, and specifically to Iran?”
[5] Abdullah, Ahmed, 2025. ‘Is the alliance between Hezbollah and the Amal Movement in Lebanon cracking?’ BBC.” . https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/cz9jny7nekzo
[6] Previous reference
[7] Rentawi, Arib, 2026. ‘Hezbollah as it enters Iran’s support war alone… A tour of the ‘Strategic Mind’ of the Party.’ Jerusalem Center for Political Studies.”.
[8] Rentawi, Arib, 2026. ‘Iran, if it endures… the end of wars, not the mother of battles.’””
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