The Regional Landscape After the War: Between the Test of Stability and the Reconfiguration of Power Balances
The war between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other places the Middle East before a defining regional moment that extends beyond the outcomes of military confrontation itself to the very nature of the transformation affecting the logic of the regional order. A region that long operated according to the premise of fixed axes and enduring alignments now appears increasingly unstable and more inclined toward temporary coalitions and shifting calculations.
In this sense, the war represents an accelerant for transformations that had been accumulating for years. Since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, Tehran has redefined its regional role through a project that transcends the boundaries of the nation-state and combines political ideology, networks of allies, and expansion through fragile arenas within the Arab regional system. This trajectory was reinforced through successive milestones: the Iran–Iraq War between 1980 and 1988, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the strategic vacuum it created, Iran’s intervention in Syria since 2011, its expansion in Yemen since 2014, and the consolidation of influence in Lebanon through Hezbollah. These developments enabled Iran to construct a broad regional sphere of influence, yet they also accumulated political, security, and economic costs that became more evident after the latest confrontation.
The central paradox is that the war neither produced a decisive regional settlement nor paved the way for a stable new order; instead, it exposed the limitations of the old frameworks. The politics of regional axes no longer appears capable of generating stability, military deterrence alone is no longer sufficient to regulate regional interactions, reliance on allies and proxies has become increasingly costly, and states that once operated within relatively fixed alignments have begun searching for broader spaces of maneuver. Consequently, the conflict is no longer centered solely on who leads the region, but rather on who can endure the costs of the emerging phase while sustaining the fewest possible losses.
Iran: The Rising Cost of Influence
Iran emerged from the war confronting a different question than before: how can regional influence be preserved without turning into a permanent source of attrition? Over the past decades, Tehran succeeded in constructing a transnational network of influence stretching from Iraq to Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, benefiting from fragile state structures, the weakness of the Arab regional order, and declining confidence in international guarantees. Yet the very model that granted Iran extensive regional leverage has now become increasingly vulnerable to exhaustion.
The Iranian challenge no longer lies primarily in sanctions or military strikes, but rather in the growing cost of sustaining influence itself. Every arena requires financing, protection, and continuous political and security management. Every ally has become more exposed to both domestic and external pressure. Every regional move by Tehran now generates broader reactions than in previous periods. As a result, the network of influence that once provided Iran with significant room for maneuver is gradually transforming into a costly structure that demands resources beyond what the Iranian economy can sustainably provide. The central Iranian dilemma is no longer how to expand influence, but how to absorb its escalating costs.
Within this context, long-term attrition appears to be the most likely framework shaping the coming phase. The United States does not appear capable of easily producing a fundamental internal transformation in Iran, while experiences of prolonged pressure-such as Iraq between 1991 and 2003 or Venezuela more recently-illustrate Washington’s capacity to exhaust adversaries through sanctions and sustained political and economic pressure. At the same time, the Iranian case remains considerably more complex due to the depth of the state, the size of society, and the breadth of Tehran’s regional instruments. Iran continues to rely on its ability to absorb prolonged pressure, yet it faces a regional environment that is increasingly less willing to tolerate open-ended conflict.
Endurance alone, however, does not produce sustainable influence. Iran, which once succeeded in transforming the discourse of resistance into a form of transnational political capital, now confronts an Arab and regional environment that has become more sensitive to the costs associated with this role. The central question facing Tehran is therefore becoming less about its capacity to retaliate and more about its ability to sustain a regional project that requires continuously expanding resources in the context of a strained economy, a pressured society, and allies operating within increasingly narrow margins.
The rising cost of Iranian influence has directly affected the behavior of its allies. Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi factions, and the Houthis in Yemen no longer operate within the same open political and security space that existed in earlier phases. Any escalation undertaken by these actors now exposes both them and Tehran to broader possibilities of targeting, sanctions, and international pressure. Consequently, the network of allies has gradually shifted from a logic of broad offensive initiative toward one centered on calibrated responses and cost management.
This transformation has also altered the meaning of Iranian deterrence itself. Previously, deterrence rested on Tehran’s ability to widen pressure fronts through its allies. After the war, however, deterrence has become more closely tied to Iran’s ability to prevent the collapse or excessive exhaustion of this network. Iranian power is therefore no longer measured solely by the number of arenas in which it possesses influence, but by its capacity to keep those arenas operational and usable without allowing them to evolve into a permanent political, economic, and security burden.
The Gulf: From Security Reassurance to Risk Management
The Gulf states are approaching the current phase as a direct test of their economic security rather than merely their military security. The Gulf no longer views Iran solely through the lens of direct military threat, but increasingly through the unpredictability of its regional behavior and the potential consequences that any major confrontation could generate for maritime routes, energy markets, critical infrastructure, and supply chains. Consequently, Gulf capitals are reconsidering the meaning of security itself: Is reliance on the American security umbrella still sufficient? Do traditional alliances continue to provide genuine reassurance? And how can the costs of exposure be reduced in the face of a conflict whose outbreak and termination are not solely within Gulf control?
The coming phase appears increasingly characterized by a Gulf transition from the logic of traditional alignment toward more cautious and calculated policies. This does not imply a rupture with the United States, unconditional openness toward Iran, or full integration into Israeli-regional arrangements. Rather, the Gulf states are likely to expand their room for maneuver across all of these trajectories simultaneously through diversifying security and economic partnerships, strengthening defensive capabilities, and accelerating regional cooperation in the fields of energy, ports, trade corridors, and investment. This dynamic became evident whenever threats emerged against maritime navigation in the Red Sea or the Gulf, where the effects of escalation were immediately reflected in shipping costs, insurance rates, and energy prices.
The Abraham Accords of 2020 reflected part of this transformation by demonstrating the willingness of certain Gulf states to think beyond traditional frameworks in managing security and partnerships. Yet the latest war places this trajectory before a far more sensitive test. Relations with Israel may provide certain technological and security advantages, but they also carry substantial political and societal costs, particularly in light of the profound shifts that the Gaza war has generated within Arab and international public opinion.
At the same time, the Gulf regional system has, over recent years, moved beyond many of the internal disputes and tensions that once threatened its cohesion. Nevertheless, the post-war phase may impose a new challenge: will political cohesion alone be sufficient, or does the moment require the construction of a deeper concept of collective Gulf security? The current period appears particularly conducive to redefining Gulf alliances beyond symbolic displays of consensus and toward more practical arrangements capable of crisis management, securing strategic corridors, protecting critical infrastructure, and reducing vulnerability to major regional shocks.
This transformation has reshaped Gulf calculations toward the United States, Israel, and Iran simultaneously. Gulf capitals have become more inclined to preserve their security relationship with Washington while reducing the degree of complete dependence upon it. At the same time, they have grown increasingly cautious toward any regional trajectory that could place them in direct confrontation with Iran or turn their vital infrastructure and maritime routes into part of the target matrix in any future escalation.
The Arab Mashreq: Pragmatism as a Strategy of Survival
The war demonstrated that several states in the Arab Mashreq have begun approaching regional transformations through a framework that is less ideological and more closely connected to calculations of survival and opportunity. Within this context, Jordan and Syria emerged as two important cases in managing regional balances without directly sliding into the conflict itself. Both states adopted cautious policies based on avoiding confrontational alignments, preserving channels of communication, and attempting to transform geographic position into a political and economic opportunity.
Jordan possesses a particular advantage within this framework. It occupies the center of the connecting spaces linking the Gulf, Palestine, Syria, Iraq, and the Mediterranean. The crisis highlighted Amman’s capacity to absorb shifting dynamics, present itself as an actor capable of communicating with multiple parties, and diplomatically and politically fill certain regional gaps. Yet the central Jordanian challenge does not lie in the recognition of its role or the willingness of regional actors to engage with it, but rather in transforming that acceptance into tangible domestic outcomes: investment flows, logistical opportunities, trade expansion, participation in reconstruction efforts, and improvements in developmental conditions.
From another perspective, Syria appears to stand before an opportunity shaped by changing balances after years of attrition. To a certain extent, Damascus has moved beyond the logic of unproductive alignments and has begun operating with a form of political pragmatism that could influence its future alliances. If emerging economic transformations acquire greater clarity, Syria may find itself able to recover part of its geopolitical function as a corridor linking the Mashreq, the Gulf, Turkey, and the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, this trajectory will remain contingent upon the Syrian state’s ability to rebuild its institutions, regulate its external relations, and provide a minimum degree of political and economic stability.
Together, Jordan and Syria present a broader model of transformation within the Mashreq: the transition from geography as a security burden to geography as a strategic resource. States capable of converting their geographic position into an economic and logistical function are likely to possess greater room for maneuver in the coming phase. By contrast, states that remain trapped within rigid alignments or persistent internal instability will continue to bear the costs of geography without benefiting from its advantages.
The importance of Jordan and Syria lies in the fact that both are attempting to transform political caution into a regional function. Jordan recognizes that geographic location alone is insufficient. After decades of performing primarily political and security roles, the Jordanian state is now seeking to translate that role into economic value, particularly amid increasing discussions surrounding transport corridors, energy projects, and reconstruction efforts in the Mashreq. Jordan is therefore not merely avoiding involvement in the war; it is seeking to consolidate its position as a connecting node linking the Gulf, the Levant, Palestine, and Iraq. Syria, after years of exhaustion, is similarly searching for a path toward gradual reintegration into the regional system through economic interests, reconstruction, and commercial connectivity. The underlying wager in both cases is that geography can be transformed from a security liability into an economic opportunity.
Egypt: Managing Balance Rather Than Exercising Singular Leadership
Egypt is navigating the current phase with a considerable degree of caution and relative ambiguity. It continues to possess the demographic, geographic, and historical weight that makes it an indispensable actor within the broader equation of Arab security. Yet Cairo increasingly faces questions regarding its ability to translate this weight into effective regional influence. The structure of the Arab regional order has changed substantially, new centers of power have emerged in the Gulf, and Egypt’s ability to act as the sole or natural center of regional leadership has gradually diminished.
An increasingly common perception within certain Gulf capitals is that Egypt is no longer the actor automatically called upon in every regional equation. This is not merely a symbolic shift, but rather an indication of a broader transformation in the distribution of Arab power. Financial, investment, and political influence has increasingly moved toward the Gulf, while Egypt faces significant domestic economic pressures that make its external posture more closely tied to considerations of financing and internal stability.
Nevertheless, Egypt remains central to several strategic files that are difficult to bypass, particularly Gaza, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Yet Cairo today operates through the logic of balance management more than through the traditional logic of regional leadership. The significance of the Egyptian role in this phase derives from the arenas in which Cairo continues to maintain direct leverage: Gaza, the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, and the Eastern Mediterranean. These files ensure Egypt’s continued relevance by virtue of geography, security, and vital national interests, even if it no longer possesses the capacity to lead the region according to older regional frameworks.
Accordingly, the Egyptian challenge no longer revolves around restoring a previous position in its traditional form, but rather around formulating a more realistic regional role centered on mediation, the protection of strategic corridors, and the management of balance among the Gulf states, Washington, Israel, and the Palestinian question.
Iraq: State Fragility and the Question of Function
Iraq remains one of the most fragile actors within the regional landscape. The state has not fully emerged from the consequences of 2003 and continues to operate under the pressure of overlapping external influence, internal fragmentation, and multiple competing centers of power. The persistence of Iranian influence within Iraqi institutions, the possibility of new sanctions targeting individuals or entities, and the presence of armed factions with regional affiliations all make Iraq particularly vulnerable to the repercussions of the war.
At its core, the Iraqi crisis is a crisis of state function. Iraq possesses vast oil resources, a strategic geographic position, and substantial demographic depth, yet it continues to struggle to transform these assets into effective sovereignty and an independent political posture. With every regional escalation, the same question re-emerges: can Iraq become a state capable of managing its position and balancing its interests, or will it remain an open arena for the intersection of American and Iranian influence as well as domestic conflicts?
Any new sanctions or economic disturbances could open the door to renewed waves of protest, particularly amid the accumulation of crises related to public services, unemployment, corruption, and declining confidence in state institutions. Here, the Iraqi paradox becomes especially clear: the state possesses numerous elements of strength, yet it lacks a unified decision-making center capable of transforming these elements into a coherent national project.
This fragility becomes evident during almost every American-Iranian confrontation. Baghdad attempts to declare neutrality while political and armed actors within Iraq continue to move according to the dynamics of the relationship between Washington and Tehran. As a result, Iraq often finds itself unable to separate its national interests from the calculations of external powers, particularly when armed factions, sanctions, or the energy sector become instruments of reciprocal pressure.
Iraq does not suffer from a shortage of power, but rather from its fragmentation between the state and actors operating beyond its institutional framework. For this reason, the function of the Iraqi state itself lies at the heart of the crisis. Iraq’s challenge is not a lack of resources or geopolitical significance, but the weakness of its ability to transform both into an independent and coherent national policy.
Israel: Military Superiority and the Crisis of Legitimacy
On the other side of the regional equation, Israel emerges from the war with clear military superiority, yet simultaneously confronts a challenge of a fundamentally different nature. Military power can alter battlefield balances, degrade the capabilities of adversaries, and impose temporary realities, but it cannot by itself guarantee political legitimacy or long-term regional stability.
Since the Gaza war between 2023 and 2025, Israel’s image has deteriorated significantly across broad sectors of Western public opinion, particularly in Europe and the United States. Criticism related to the humanitarian costs of military operations and the nature of Israeli policies toward the Palestinians has intensified considerably. This shift may not immediately produce a dramatic reversal in the policies of Western governments, but it is reshaping the political and moral environment within which Israel operates.
The Israeli dilemma lies in the fact that every expansion in the use of force increases the difficulty of presenting Israel as a stabilizing actor within the region. Israel may succeed in imposing security arrangements or weakening specific adversaries, yet it will face growing challenges in translating these military achievements into stable regional and international acceptance. In this context, power remains capable of producing deterrence, but incapable on its own of producing legitimacy.
The limits of Israeli power are increasingly visible in the widening gap between the ability to impose realities on the ground and the ability to politically justify and sustain them. The Gaza war between 2023 and 2025 exposed Israel to mounting criticism within universities, media institutions, and human rights organizations across Europe and the United States, while simultaneously widening the distance between official Western support and emerging public opinion trends that increasingly perceive Israeli power as having moved beyond the boundaries of self-defense toward the production of a continuing moral and political crisis. Israeli military superiority therefore appears more capable of managing crises than resolving them.
This transformation became particularly evident in the expansion of protests across American universities and the escalation of European criticism associated with the Gaza war. The resulting gap is likely to shape Israel’s regional position in the post-war environment. States that may cooperate with Israel economically or in the security sphere are expected to do so according to highly calculated interests, while remaining cautious regarding the political costs of full strategic alignment. Consequently, Israel may retain substantial deterrent and coercive capabilities, yet it will encounter greater difficulty in transforming itself into an accepted center of regional stability, particularly so long as the Palestinian issue remains unresolved in its current form.
From an Ideological Middle East to the Pragmatic Middle East
The most profound transformation emerging from the post-war phase lies in the gradual transition from a Middle East governed by ideological alignments and rigid regional axes toward a more pragmatic and fluid regional order. States are no longer operating solely according to the traditional slogans of resistance, normalization, confrontation, and bloc politics, but increasingly according to more direct calculations centered on security, economics, energy, strategic corridors, investment, domestic stability, and the capacity to absorb the costs of crisis.
This does not signify the end of ideology or the disappearance of longstanding conflicts. The region remains shaped by a dense historical memory of confrontation and by unresolved issues such as Palestine, Gulf security, the future of Iran, and the crisis of the state in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. What is new, however, is that states have become increasingly inclined to manage these issues through a logic of maneuverability, diversified partnerships, and the avoidance of complete integration into closed regional blocs.
The central problem in today’s Middle East is not the absence of alliances, but the speed with which they shift under the pressure of crises. The region is increasingly defined by changing spaces, overlapping networks of interest, and security and economic arrangements that continuously emerge and are subsequently reconfigured in response to evolving pressures. States capable of understanding this fluidity at an early stage and transforming it into a strategic framework are likely to hold a comparative advantage in the coming period.
The new pragmatism is evident in the fact that rivalry and partnership no longer operate along rigid or linear lines. A state may oppose another actor in a security file, cooperate with the same actor economically, and simultaneously maintain indirect diplomatic channels on a separate issue. This pattern is visible in Gulf relations with Iran, Israel, and the United States; in Jordan and Syria through attempts to transform geography into strategic utility; and in Egypt through the management of multiple regional roles without claiming comprehensive leadership over the Arab system.
These developments do not indicate the disappearance of ideological conflict, but rather demonstrate that states have become more sensitive to cost calculations. Power, alliances, geographic position, and even political discourse are increasingly evaluated according to their ability to protect economic interests, preserve domestic stability, and expand room for maneuver. For this reason, the coming phase is unlikely to resemble the era of rigid regional axes that characterized earlier decades. Instead, it is likely to be defined by fluid and overlapping relationships in which rivals and partners intersect simultaneously across multiple arenas.
The most significant transformation in the region therefore does not concern only changes in the balance of power, but also changes in the logic of political thinking itself. States that spent decades managing the region through rigid alignments have gradually begun to recognize that the costs of prolonged attrition now exceed the ability of all parties to sustain them indefinitely. The current phase is consequently less driven by ambitions of decisive victory and more oriented toward managing losses and expanding strategic flexibility.
Conclusion
The Middle East stands before a prolonged transitional phase in the aftermath of the war. Iran will continue defending its position and regional influence, though at a significantly higher cost. The Gulf states will seek forms of security less dependent on external reassurance and more centered on risk management. The Arab Mashreq will attempt to transform geography into political and economic opportunity. Egypt will seek to redefine its role within a multi-centered Arab regional order. Iraq will remain confronted by the unresolved question of statehood and political function. Israel, meanwhile, will face the dilemma of translating military superiority into legitimacy and durable stability.
The Middle East after this war is no longer a region governed by rigid and fixed axes as in previous eras. Alliances have become more flexible, rivalries less clearly defined, and states increasingly operate according to calculations tied to security, economics, and domestic stability rather than grand ideological narratives. As regional actors attempt to protect their positions and interests, the region appears to be entering a prolonged period of shifting balances in which the ability to manage costs becomes more important than the ability to impose decisive outcomes.
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