Iraq and the War on Iran: Transformations of the State and the Regional Sphere
The war on Iran does not merely represent a military confrontation linked to the nuclear program or to the traditional conflict between Iran, the United States, and Israel. Rather, it reflects a profound moment of regional restructuring in the Middle East, extending beyond the boundaries of direct conflict toward the redefinition of spheres of influence, the functions of states, and the nature of the security environment across the Arab Mashreq. At the center of these transformations stands Iraq as one of the arenas most deeply affected by the war – not only because of geography, but also because of the political and security structure that emerged within the country after 2003, transforming it into a principal intersection point for American and Iranian interests in the region.
The war reveals a qualitative transformation in Iraq’s position within the regional equation, as the country has moved beyond its traditional role as an arena for the intersection of American and Iranian influence to become a space through which regional balances themselves are being reconfigured. In this context, the conflict is no longer defined solely by the scale of influence exercised by regional and international powers inside Iraq, but rather by the function Iraq is expected to perform within the emerging structure of the Middle East. The central question is whether Iraq will continue to operate as an extension of Iran’s strategic depth, or whether it will move toward integration within the Arab, Gulf, and broader international sphere as a state capable of reordering its own security and economic domains. From this perspective, the war represents a pivotal moment in Iraq’s transition from a field for managing external influence into a geopolitical and security nexus through which the balances of the Arab Mashreq are being reorganized.
Over the past two decades, Iraq gradually shifted from being a central state within the Arab regional order into an open geopolitical sphere for regional and international competition. A political-security model emerged inside the country based on balancing American influence and Iranian influence, making Iraq’s stability directly dependent upon the nature of relations between the two sides. Yet the current war has pushed this equation into a far more complex phase, because the conflict is no longer merely about managing influence or containing escalation; rather, it has become an attempt to redesign the regional environment itself. This development places Iraq before a decisive strategic moment concerning the future of the state and its regional function.
Within this context, Iraq is no longer viewed merely as an Iranian “sphere of influence,” but increasingly as a central arena for reshaping regional balances in the post-war order. The United States views the reconstruction of the security order in the Arab Mashreq as inseparable from reconfiguring the Iraqi sphere and reducing Iran’s capacity to use it as a platform for regional influence. Conversely, Iran regards Iraq as the most important defensive line for its strategic depth, and losing influence there would signify a substantial decline in its ability to shape regional balances.
Accordingly, Iraq’s crisis in the post-war period will not simply be a crisis of political order or domestic balances of power, but rather a crisis concerning the very nature of the state itself: can Iraq evolve into a sovereign state capable of making independent decisions and managing its regional relations according to the logic of national interest, or will it remain an open arena for overlapping external influence and regional conflict? This is what makes the war on Iran a moment of comprehensive redefinition for Iraq’s position within the emerging regional order, rather than merely a passing security development.
First: Iraq – From a Sphere of Influence to an Arena of Regional Reengineering
The war on Iran has redefined Iraq’s position within regional balances in an unprecedented manner. Iraq is no longer merely an Iranian sphere of influence or a traditional arena of American-Iranian confrontation; rather, it has evolved into one of the principal arenas for the reengineering of the regional order in the post-war phase. This transformation is linked not only to the rise or decline of Iranian influence, but also to the nature of the role Iraq is expected to perform within the emerging regional environment.
Over the past two decades, the Iraqi equation was built upon a form of “undeclared balance” between United States and Iran. The United States ensured the survival of the Iraqi state and its formal institutions, while Iran succeeded in constructing an extensive network of influence within Iraq’s political, security, and social structures. However, the current war has pushed this equation toward gradual disintegration, as Washington increasingly views Iraq’s continued incorporation within the Iranian sphere of influence as a direct threat to its broader project of reshaping regional balances across the Mashreq and the Gulf.
Conversely, Iran recognizes that losing Iraq – or even witnessing a decline in its ability to shape developments there – would signify not merely a reduction in regional influence, but the collapse of one of the most important pillars of its “forward defense” strategy. Consequently, Iraq has become, for both sides, a decisive arena for redefining influence rather than merely managing it.
The danger of the current phase lies in the fact that Iraq today stands between two contradictory projects: one seeks to reintegrate Iraq into the broader Arab, Gulf, and international environment as a stable and functional state; the other seeks to preserve Iraq within Iran’s strategic sphere as an advanced defensive line safeguarding Tehran’s regional influence. This contradiction makes Iraq one of the most sensitive and unstable arenas of the post-war regional order.
Second: Transformations in Iraq’s Security Sphere and the Crisis of Sovereignty
The war on Iran has exposed the fragility of Iraqi sovereignty in an unprecedented manner, as the Iraqi state no longer faces conventional threats related solely to territorial borders. Instead, it has become part of an interconnected regional security sphere in which military, intelligence, economic, and cyber dimensions overlap and interact simultaneously.
Today, Iraq does not exercise full control over its own security domain due to the multiplicity of armed actors, the overlap of political loyalties, and the connection of certain internal forces to competing regional agendas. As a result, the Iraqi state has frequently proven incapable of monopolizing security decision-making or preventing its territory from being used as an arena for the exchange of regional messages and confrontations.
The current war has also demonstrated that the concept of sovereignty is no longer defined solely by the prevention of external intervention, but rather by the state’s ability to control its own strategic decision-making process internally. Iraq may possess formal institutions, an army, and a government, yet it continues to face a fundamental challenge concerning the capacity of these institutions to impose their authority across the entirety of the domestic security sphere.
Within this context, Iraq has moved from a phase of “managing threats” to one of “managing attrition” – that is, coping with prolonged security, political, and economic pressures that gradually erode the state without necessarily producing outright collapse. This pattern of threat constitutes one of the most dangerous transformations generated by the war, because it places Iraq in a permanent condition of structural instability.
Third: Armed Factions Between the Iranian Function and the Post-War Dilemma
Armed factions constitute one of the most sensitive and complex issues in the post-war phase following the war on Iran, because they are no longer merely military forces. Rather, they have evolved into an intertwined political, economic, and security structure exercising broad influence within the Iraqi state. Over the past years, these factions represented one of the principal instruments of Iranian influence, providing Iran with the ability to shape Iraqi decision-making without requiring an extensive direct presence.
However, the current war has pushed these factions into a complicated strategic dilemma. On the one hand, they cannot fully detach themselves from the Iranian project due to the depth of their ideological, political, and security ties. On the other hand, maintaining the same role and function after the war may place them under increasing American, regional, and international pressure.
At the same time, the new regional transformations no longer permit the same margin of maneuver that these factions enjoyed during the phase of the “war on terrorism” or the era of “indirect deterrence.” The regional environment is increasingly moving toward the reconstruction of the centralized state and the reduction of the role of non-state armed actors. Consequently, the future of these factions has become closely tied to their ability to adapt to a different political and security environment.
The war has also revived the question of the “state monopoly over arms” as an issue connected not merely to Iraq’s internal stability, but to its future regional position as well. Iraq’s reintegration into the broader Arab and international environment is becoming increasingly dependent upon the state’s capacity to regulate the security sphere and reduce the multiplicity of armed centers of power.
Fourth: The United States and the Reconstruction of Iraq’s Functional Role
The United States no longer views Iraq solely through the lens of counterterrorism. Rather, it increasingly treats Iraq as a central component in the broader project of reshaping the security architecture of the Arab Mashreq following the war on Iran. Yet the current American approach differs significantly from the post-2003 phase, as it is no longer based on direct occupation or state-building through military force. Instead, it seeks to reproduce a “functional Iraq” capable of integrating into the emerging regional order without becoming a source of instability or a threat to the balances Washington aims to consolidate across the region.
Accordingly, the United States now relies on more sophisticated instruments that include financial and economic pressure, the restructuring of security cooperation, support for formal state institutions, and the gradual integration of Iraq into the Gulf and broader Arab framework, alongside efforts to reduce the capacity of armed factions to shape security and political decision-making. This approach aims to produce an Iraq that is less dependent on Iran and more capable of playing a balancing role within the new regional environment, while avoiding the costs of a comprehensive American military confrontation on Iraqi territory.
However, this strategy faces complex structural challenges because Iranian influence in Iraq is no longer confined to military or security dimensions alone. It has become deeply embedded within economic networks, political structures, and social and religious spheres, making the process of reshaping the Iraqi arena far more complicated than merely containing or weakening armed factions. Consequently, the American-Iranian struggle inside Iraq has gradually evolved from a conventional contest over influence into a struggle concerning the very nature of the Iraqi state itself and the form of its positioning within the coming regional order.
Within this context, the current American approach toward the government of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi appears to form part of a broader strategy aimed at recalibrating Iraq’s political and security sphere in the post-war period. Washington has provided conditional support to the al-Zaidi government, tied to a number of requirements, foremost among them controlling the weapons of armed factions, reorganizing relations with Iran, and strengthening the centralization of security decision-making under state authority. The American administration recognizes that no project aimed at reintegrating Iraq into the Arab and Gulf environment can succeed without reducing the multiplicity of competing centers of power inside the Iraqi state.
Conversely, failure by the al-Zaidi government to address these conditions may push the administration of President Donald Trump to treat Iraq as part of a broader American vision for reshaping the position of Iran and its regional allies in the aftermath of the war. Such a scenario could open the door to a more intense phase of political, economic, and security pressure on Baghdad, particularly if armed factions continue to exercise a role that extends beyond the boundaries of the state and its formal institutions.
Fifth: Iraq and the New Regional Corridors
The war on Iran has revealed that conflict in the Middle East is no longer managed solely through military power or traditional deterrence balances. Instead, it has become increasingly tied to control over trade corridors, energy routes, supply chains, and strategic infrastructure. Regional and international competition in the current phase no longer revolves merely around political influence, but around which actors possess the capacity to control the movement of trade, energy, and geopolitical connectivity between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Within this context, Iraq emerges as one of the most important geopolitical nodes capable of linking the Gulf region with the Mashreq, Turkey, and Europe.
Accordingly, the importance of activating alternative oil transportation routes outside the Strait of Hormuz has increased significantly, whether through Syria, Jordan, or Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the “Development Road Project” has gained strategic prominence, representing not merely an economic or logistical initiative, but an attempt to redefine Iraq’s geopolitical function within the emerging regional environment. Through this project, Baghdad seeks to transition from the model of a “rentier state” dependent primarily on oil revenues to that of a “nodal state” occupying a central position within regional transportation, energy, and trade networks. Such a transformation offers Iraq an opportunity to rebuild its strategic position not only as an energy producer, but as a vital regional corridor linking the Gulf to Europe through Turkey.
At the same time, however, the war on Iran has once again highlighted the fragility of Iraq’s economic position, since any instability in the Gulf or the Strait of Hormuz directly affects Iraqi oil exports, trade flows, investment activity, transportation costs, and insurance expenses. Moreover, the growing significance of overland corridors and geopolitical alternatives to traditional maritime routes may encourage regional and international powers to treat Iraq as an arena of competition over economic influence, not merely security influence.
Within this framework, the struggle over Iraq no longer concerns only who possesses political or security influence inside the country, but also who determines Iraq’s position within the new regional maps of trade and energy. Economic corridors have become an integral component of the reshaping of geopolitical balances in the Middle East, making Iraq’s future increasingly dependent upon its ability to transform itself from a “passageway for crises” into a “regional connectivity hub” capable of performing a functional role within the regional and international economy.
Nevertheless, the success of this transformation remains conditional upon Iraq’s ability to achieve political and security stability. Any persistently unstable environment will make it difficult to attract investment or develop infrastructure capable of regional competitiveness. Consequently, Iraq’s post-war economic future will depend not only on oil prices or the scale of its natural resources, but also on its ability to manage its geographic position as a source of strategic power rather than as an open arena for regional conflict and competition.
Sixth: The Gulf and Iraq – From Security Containment to Conditional Partnership
The war on Iran may lead to a deeper redefinition of the relationship between Iraq and the Gulf states than at any previous stage. This is particularly true following the numerous attacks launched by Iran-aligned armed factions against Gulf countries, especially Kuwait, and the resulting statements of condemnation issued by the Gulf Cooperation Council, which held Iraq responsible for these attacks. Gulf states no longer view Iraq solely through the lens of security threats or Iranian influence; rather, they have increasingly come to recognize that Iraq’s stability constitutes an integral component of the stability of the Gulf environment itself.
Accordingly, the Gulf approach toward Iraq may gradually shift from a policy of “defensive containment” to one of “conditional partnership” – namely, political and economic engagement with Baghdad in exchange for strengthening state institutions, reducing the influence of armed factions, and consolidating state control over the domestic security sphere.
At the same time, Iraq understands that its reintegration into the Gulf environment could provide an opportunity to reduce the degree of its economic and political dependence on Iran while opening the door to major regional investments and strategic development projects. However, the success of this transformation will remain closely tied to Baghdad’s ability to build a stable state capable of protecting sovereign decision-making and providing a secure environment for economic and investment cooperation.
Seventh: The Future of the Iraqi State in the Emerging Regional Order
The war on Iran reveals that Iraq today stands before a decisive historical moment concerning the redefinition of the state itself, rather than merely the reconfiguration of internal political balances. The central question in the post-war phase no longer revolves around who governs Iraq today or the shape of future governing coalitions, but rather the nature of the Iraqi state that will emerge within the new regional environment: will Iraq become a state capable of monopolizing security and political decision-making and managing its external relations according to the logic of national interest, or will it remain an open arena for overlapping regional and international influence and the multiplication of internal centers of power?
Within this context, the real challenge facing Iraq lies not merely in avoiding the repercussions of the war or containing its security and economic consequences, but in utilizing this moment of regional transformation to rebuild the state and strengthen the concept of sovereignty as the capacity to control strategic decision-making rather than as a mere political slogan. The more Baghdad succeeds in bringing weapons under state authority, strengthening formal institutions, diversifying its regional and international relationships, and reducing its dependence on external conflicts, the greater its ability to move from the position of a “conflict arena” to that of a “regional actor” capable of influencing surrounding balances of power.
Conversely, the continuation of the overlap between the state and armed factions, and between national decision-making and external pressures, may push Iraq toward a more fragile and unstable phase, particularly if the post-war environment evolves into an open arena for the redistribution of influence across the Arab Mashreq and the Gulf region. Iraq today faces a crisis that extends beyond traditional political divisions to the level of a “crisis of the state model” itself – that is, a crisis concerning the ability of the political system established after 2003 to survive within a regional environment increasingly moving toward the redefinition of the concepts of security, sovereignty, and the function of the state.
Accordingly, Iraq’s future within the emerging regional order will depend on its capacity to transition from the logic of “managing fragile balances” to that of “building a capable state” – a state that possesses sovereign decision-making authority, manages its foreign relations according to an independent strategic vision, and repositions its geographic location and economic resources within a national project capable of reducing its vulnerability to regional transformations. Otherwise, Iraq may remain one of the Middle East’s most exposed arenas for long-term geopolitical exhaustion and competition.
Conclusion
The war on Iran reveals that Iraq stands today before one of its most sensitive and consequential moments since 2003, because the transformations currently unfolding are not limited merely to the redistribution of influence across the region, but extend to the redefinition of the regional order itself and the function of states within it. Within this context, Iraq is no longer simply a country affected by the conflict; rather, it has become one of the principal arenas through which the shape of the new balances in the Arab Mashreq and the Gulf will ultimately be determined.
The current war has demonstrated that the model of “Iraq as an open arena” is no longer sustainable in the same form that emerged over the past two decades, particularly within a regional environment increasingly moving toward the reconstruction of security and economic spheres on new foundations centered around reducing the role of non-state actors, enhancing the strategic importance of economic and energy corridors, and redefining the relationship between the state, sovereignty, and security.
At the same time, Iraq now stands before a decisive strategic crossroads: either it succeeds in utilizing this moment of regional transformation to rebuild the state, reinforce the centrality of sovereign decision-making, and open itself toward its Arab and regional environment as a balancing state and a strategic connectivity hub; or it remains an open arena for American-Iranian competition and regional conflict, with all the accompanying risks of long-term exhaustion and structural instability.
Accordingly, Iraq’s future after the war will not be determined solely by the outcome of military confrontation, diplomatic settlements, or the scale of American and Iranian influence inside the country. Rather, it will depend fundamentally upon the capacity of the Iraqi state itself to redefine its position and function within a regional order moving toward a phase of greater complexity, fluidity, and competition than ever before.
Ultimately, Iraq’s post-war future will not be determined solely by the balance of American and Iranian influence, but by its ability to transform from a space through which the conflicts of others are managed into a state capable of redefining its position and function according to the logic of national interest. If Baghdad succeeds in controlling armed actors, consolidating sovereign decision-making, and leveraging its geographical position within emerging networks of energy, trade, and regional corridors, Iraq may shift from being a fragile arena of contestation to becoming an active regional nexus. However, if the dual-state dynamic persists, Iraq will remain one of the Middle East’s most vulnerable arenas for prolonged exhaustion and external competition-not because it lacks resources, but because it remains unable to convert its strategic location into effective sovereignty.
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