Iraq at the Epicenter of the Regional Conflict Consequences and the Limits of Disengagement

It comes as little surprise that Iraq has become one of the central arenas of confrontation and a direct theater in today’s regional war. The 2003 U.S. invasion, the expansion of Iranian influence, the scale of external interventions, and the overlap of local and regional actors on its territory have collectively transformed Iraq into a contested space, both a battlefield and a platform for settling wider strategic rivalries. With each internal or regional crisis, the country is effectively put to the test on fundamental questions: the integrity of state sovereignty, the independence of its foreign policy, its ability to avoid entanglement in competing regional axes, the strength of the rule of law, and the state’s monopoly over the use of force. These recurring moments expose the depth of the political system’s structural challenges in managing sensitive issues, particularly under pressure, and highlight its limited capacity to reconcile domestic imperatives with the growing complexities of the external environment.

It can be argued that the early contours of the current regional confrontation, between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, began to surface in Iraq when U.S. President Donald Trump signaled his rejection of Nouri al-Maliki’s return to the premiership. This position placed Iraq’s political system under a complex strain, effectively pushing it into a state of constitutional paralysis since the end of January this year.

The situation has been further complicated by al-Maliki’s continued rigidity as he seeks an exit from the crisis surrounding his political future. As a result, Iraq remains, at least for now, without both a president and a prime minister. It is plausible that the ruling elite is deliberately waiting for the trajectory of the ongoing war to become clearer before resolving these leadership positions, opting instead to maintain a caretaker government with limited authority during this highly sensitive period. At the same time, there are growing indications that the option of renewing the mandate of the current prime minister, Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani, is gradually gaining traction.

Amidst the current situation, Iraqi territory has fallen within the crosshairs of an expansive targeting campaign reaching from north to south and involving all parties to the conflict. While Iran targets regions in northern Iraq for sheltering groups belonging to the Iranian Kurdish opposition, as well as the Harir military base which hosts U.S. forces in Erbil, the United States is launching airstrikes on sites belonging to armed factions and headquarters of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) across various Iraqi cities and provinces. These strikes have claimed the lives of military commanders and dozens of personnel. Concurrently, these armed factions are accused of attacking oil sites operated by foreign companies, the U.S. Embassy, the logistical support camp, and the Victoria military base in the capital, Baghdad, in addition to several vital civilian facilities, and even extending to drone strikes against neighboring countries, attacks for which some factions have officially claimed responsibility.

However, one of the most dangerous scenes into which the war has drifted, in terms of its repercussions for Iraq, is the targeting of two fuel tankers at the Port of Al-Faw and the attack on the “Majnoon” field, one of the country’s largest and most significant oil hubs. This coincides with a decline in Iraqi oil production by approximately 70%, making Iraq one of the most affected nations. Given that nearly 90% of its total oil exports pass through its maritime port on the Strait of Hormuz, this poses a high risk to state revenues, as the general budget relies fundamentally on oil due to a highly rentier economy.

Politically and securely, it can be said that the discrepancy between the Iraqi government’s stance, which calls for neutrality and the respect of “Iraqi sovereignty”, and the forces active internally that operate outside the state framework has become a natural outcome of the multiplicity of parties and powers controlling the Iraqi scene. This perpetually renews the government’s dilemma in creating a balance between the state’s external interests and the considerations of internal political and armed actors. This was evident, for example, in the government’s attempt to distance itself following the events of “October 7th” amidst the Israeli desire to expand the conflict regionally; however, armed Iraqi factions chose to intervene by shelling U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria. They did not cease until the United States targeted 85 sites after the factions attacked a U.S. base on the Syrian Jordanian border with a drone, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. soldiers in January 2024, as well as the Israeli threat during a Security Council session regarding the “right to self-defense” against factional attacks in December of the same year.

Today, the scene appears even more perilous after the armed factions, known as the “Islamic Resistance”, opted for deeper involvement by striking diplomatic targets, vital civilian infrastructure, and economic facilities both inside and outside Iraq. This is in addition to targeting military bases hosting foreign U.S. and French forces, the latest being their claim of responsibility for destroying a refueling aircraft that left six U.S. soldiers dead. This was met with a U.S. response targeting PMF headquarters across various regions, specifically strategically significant areas such as Jurf al-Sakhar and the city of Al-Qaim, with some targets located within residential neighborhoods in Baghdad. This traps Iraq in a recurring scenario defined by an inability to regulate the security rhythm or neutralize the country from the theater of war, resulting in a continuous series of strikes from all sides.

Although the Iraqi entities most involved in the war are those belonging to the “Islamic Resistance,” the strikes have begun targeting numerous brigades within the Popular Mobilization Forces, even those not involved in the conflict, despite the ambiguity surrounding the true non-involvement of some brigades. Some strikes have even targeted Iraqi Army headquarters. This is attributed to the structure of the security and military apparatus in Iraq and the dilemma of “dual identity” (PMF-Resistance). All “Islamic Resistance” factions officially belong to the PMF, which was integrated into the Iraqi Armed Forces in 2016; they all receive salaries from the state treasury, and figures from these factions hold high-ranking positions in the PMF leadership. This refers to groups like Kata’ib Hezbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya, and others. Yet, conversely, they do not consider themselves bound by the orders of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and some openly declare their ideological allegiance to the Supreme Leader in Iran.

In reality, and within the framework of war strategy, it seems that all parties’ view Iraq’s involvement as inevitable due to several considerations, including geopolitical factors and those related to the presence of proxies and networks of influence. Iran views Iraq as the final stronghold for its strategic project and as a vital artery that feeds relations with allies and proxies in the region, supporting it during times of isolation and economic siege. Simultaneously, Iraqi territory contains U.S. bases and armed Iranian Kurdish factions that Americans and Israelis have recently hinted at supporting and utilizing. This is alongside Iran’s long-term political, economic, and social investment in Iraq.

Conversely, the United States, which exerts sensitive political and economic influence, appears to recognize the importance of the border between the two countries, which exceeds 1,500 km. It understands that neutralizing Iran regionally requires dismantling its presence within Iraq, which is not limited to politics and weapons but has extended to establishing influence within state institutions and building vast, complex economic networks through which it has constructed social bases, some based on ideology and others on “clientelism.”

There are significant repercussions for Iraq, but the form and scale of these consequences will be determined by the course of the war. However, the takeaway from the current scene is that the ruling political elite has neither sought nor managed to distance itself from regional crises or restrain those who wish to plunge Iraq into “axis politics.” This stems from what the political process has accumulated over the years, producing a system where the concept of “The State” and its strategic interests are absent, failing to grasp the danger of sliding into a confrontation zone or following cross-border directives.

The current situation indicates that the scope of targeting within Iraq by all parties is continuing and expanding, driven by the continuation of the war and Iraq’s positioning within Iranian strategy and Iran’s regional role, which the United States and Israel aim to neutralize. This means that the role of armed Iraqi factions will take an escalatory path within Iraq and the region. Economically, Iraq faces an intensifying crisis given the disruption of exports through the Strait of Hormuz, which could lead to issues regarding salary payments and economic momentum, despite government attempts to find alternative routes for oil exports. Socially, there are fears that a prolonged war may lead to a state of polarization fueled by field developments and the imagery of war, which some political and armed forces may exploit for propaganda and mobilization purposes, considering Iran’s cross-border role and Israel’s regional ambitions for dominance.