Al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon: From Ideological origins to U.S terror designation

• The study examines the trajectory of the Islamic Group in Lebanon as a process of transformation between the da‘wa, political, and military spheres within a complex Lebanese and regional context.

• The U.S. decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood—including the Islamic Group in Lebanon-constituted a strategic turning point that redefines its position within the regional order and imposes existential choices upon it.

• The Group emerged from a reformist da‘wa-oriented environment but gradually adopted a comprehensive activist organizational model influenced by Muslim Brotherhood thought.

• The Islamic Group did not evolve into a central resistance organization like Hezbollah; rather, it maintained an intermediary position—political and da‘wa-oriented, with limited military capabilities.

• The Group failed to transform into a major Sunni political party and remained a mid-level actor reliant on alliances.

• The Group now faces a moment of historic redefinition, not merely a temporary crisis.

• From the perspective of political Islam studies and analyses of sectarian systems, three major theses can be derived: Sunni political Islam in Lebanon lacks an authoritarian environment that would enable it to evolve into a dominant party as in other contexts. Resistance may confer popular legitimacy but does not generate sustainable political influence within a sectarian system. International pressures have become a structural factor reshaping Islamic movements, rather than merely an external variable.

The executive order signed by U.S. President Donald Trump designating the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon as terrorist organizations constituted a decisive turning point in Washington’s policy toward political Islam[1]. The decision was not merely an administrative measure targeting branches of the Muslim Brotherhood, nor was it confined to a purely security-driven dimension. Rather, it redefined the position of these movements within the regional and international order, distinguishing between religious outreach  and political currents on the one hand and militant currents on the other, while placing the Lebanese al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya at the center of a new international equation.

In this context, the Lebanese case acquires particular significance, given that al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya has never been a dominant actor within the Sunni landscape. Instead, it has functioned as a religious–social movement with a gradual presence, passing through multiple phases—from religious outreach -oriented activity and political engagement to a limited return to military involvement through the “Fajr Forces” during the recent war on Gaza and the support front against Israel. This complex trajectory, in which the local intersected with the regional and the missionary with the operational, rendered the movement susceptible to multifaceted American readings: politically, by closing avenues for alliances within the Lebanese arena; financially, through the constriction of institutional and social support networks; and organizationally, by exerting pressure on its leadership and its capacity for internal renewal

The U.S. decision came at a time when the movement was attempting to rebuild its position within the Lebanese arena, benefiting from the Sunni political vacuum and from efforts to open up to unconventional alliances. Yet it imposed a new reality that redrew the boundaries of its presence and confronted it with limited options: either gradual contraction into a largely symbolic entity of marginal influence; alignment with a single axis capable of bearing the costs of confrontation with Washington; or the reconstitution of its identity within a new political–social framework.

Against this crisis-laden backdrop, the article raises a fundamental question regarding the movement’s ability to balance its ideological identity with the pressures of the international political environment. On this basis, the article analytically examines the trajectory of the structural and political transformations of the al-jama’a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon—beginning with its intellectual roots and the identity tension between its religious outreach and activist dimensions, moving through its military transformations and the engagement of the “Fajr Forces” on support fronts, and culminating in the problematics of parliamentary representation and its dialectical relationship with Hezbollah.

This historical tracing seeks to understand the determinants of the movement’s current positioning, to explain the factors that have brought it into direct confrontation with the guillotine of U.S. designation, and to explore potential scenarios for its future amid narrowing horizons and mounting international pressures.

I. From religious outreach to Organization: The Formation of al-jama’a al-Islamiyya in the Lebanese Context

 The al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon is widely regarded as the Lebanese extension of the Muslim Brotherhood movement at the global level. It crystallized as an intellectual–political Islamic organization in the late 1950s and early 1960s, particularly in the city of Tripoli. This crystallization followed a period of maturation within the Islamic current in Lebanon, which was directly influenced by the thought and experience of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Syria, and Pakistan. Its formation within the Lebanese environment compelled it to engage with a political and social reality distinct from that faced by the movement in many Arab countries—especially in relation to Lebanon’s sectarian, ethnic, religious, and cultural diversity, as well as its geopolitical context. These factors necessarily shaped the movement’s evolution and its political and strategic choices over subsequent decades.

The earliest roots of  al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya  can be traced to the association “Ibad al-Rahman”, founded in Beirut in 1950 by the preacher” Muhammad ‘Umar al-Da‘uq”, which constituted the first generation of organized Islamic activism in Lebanon. Through its religious outreach activities and written publications, “Ibad al-Rahman” contributed to the consolidation of Islamic thought among those who would later establish al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya  This organizational continuity reflects a gradual trajectory in the development of the Islamic movement in Lebanon—from limited missionary activity toward the attempt to create a more comprehensive intellectual–political organization.[2]

Among the most prominent intellectual influences during this period was the magazine m al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya , which circulated in Lebanon and introduced a number of Islamic activists to Muslim Brotherhood thought. It fostered intellectual connectivity between the Brotherhood’s experience in the Arab Mashreq and the Lebanese arena, and it also contributed to the prominence of one of the movement’s historical figures,” Fathi Yakan”, widely regarded as the founder of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya   in Lebanon. This phase may thus be considered the formative nucleus that later developed into a more clearly structured organizational framework

In 1959, the separation of the Tripoli group led by “Fathi Yakan” from” ‘Ibad al-Rahman” group in Beirut was not merely a passing administrative or organizational divergence. Rather, it expressed an early “identity crisis” within the Lebanese Islamic current, placing the model of the “reformist missionary association” in confrontation with that of the “comprehensive activist organization.” While” ‘Ibad al-Rahman” under the leadership of” Muhammad ‘Umar al-Da‘uq”adopted an educational and ethical trajectory that avoided direct politicization, the Tripoli nucleus had begun to internalize a more Muslim Brotherhood thought (influenced by Qutb and al-Siba‘i), which viewed Islam as a comprehensive system that did not separate religious outreach from the instruments of power and politics.[3]

The “1958 Revolution” constituted the first field laboratory in which these latent contradictions surfaced. Whereas the Beirut center adhered to the movement’s traditional neutrality to avoid entanglement in civil conflict, the Tripoli group viewed the security conditions imposed on the city and the state of siege it experienced as necessitating that the Muslim preacher transform into a “field cadre” defending his community and principles. This defensive military engagement by Tripoli’s youth, along with their establishment of the radio station Sawt Lubnan al-Hurr (“Voice of Free Lebanon”) with its sharply political tone, was seen by the Beirut leadership as a blatant violation of the movement’s charter and an involvement in “militia-style activity” that threatened its religious outreach character.[4]

At the intellectual level, the rift deepened under intense Nasserist pressures at the time. The Beirut leadership inclined toward accommodation in order to preserve organizational cohesion, whereas “Yakan” and his associates adopted a more radical stance rejecting absorption into nationalist projects. They drew inspiration from the ordeal of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and from the 1954 visit to Lebanon by the General Guide “Hasan al-Hudaybi”, which granted them a sense of international legitimacy as an authentic branch of the global Muslim Brotherhood organization.[5]

Accordingly, the decision to separate emerged as a structural necessity enabling the Tripoli group to practice “comprehensive activism” free from the constraints of the “ethics of religious outreach” imposed by” al-Da‘uq”. This organizational rupture did not mark the end of the trajectory; rather, it represented the true moment of birth of what would later be known as al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya  “Yakan” became convinced that reform could not be achieved through preaching alone, but required the capacity for political influence and readiness for field confrontation—a seed that would later bear fruit in shaping the movement’s military and political role throughout decades of Lebanese conflict.

In 1964,  al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya  emerged in an official capacity and inaugurated its center in Beirut. “Fathi Yakan “assumed the position of its first Secretary-General, alongside a number of founding figures, including “Fayez Iyyali, Muhammad Karima, Muhammad Dri‘i, and Ibrahim al-Masri”. During this phase, the movement issued a series of religious outreach and organizational publications, most notably al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya: Principles and Objectives, through which it affirmed that reforming the condition of Muslims could not be achieved through preaching or individual efforts alone, but required organized Islamic action capable of leading society and confronting contemporary intellectual, political, and social challenges. This articulation reflected the movement’s transition from a general missionary discourse to a more comprehensive conception of its role within the public sphere[6]

By the mid-1960s, al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya  in Lebanon had moved beyond its founding phase into one of broader organizational consolidation, as its leadership framework and institutional structure began to take shape at the national level. This development contributed to unifying its activities across different Lebanese regions. The transformation was not merely an internal organizational evolution; it represented a crucial step in consolidating the movement’s presence as an organized Islamic actor, paving the way for its subsequent entry into public life and shaping both its political role and the nature of its relationships with party forces in Lebanon

2-From Religious outreach to Arms: Structural Transformations of the Movement in Wartime

The transition ofal-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya    in Lebanon toward military action and resistance was not the outcome of a decisive ideological choice made at a single moment. Rather, it resulted from an accumulative trajectory shaped by the structural transformations Lebanon experienced from the mid-1970s onward. The movement had initially emerged as areligious outreach–intellectual organization with gradual reformist aspirations, inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood experience and operating through organizational discipline and collective action, with a clear inclination to avoid direct confrontation with the state or other social components. However, the outbreak of the civil war in 1975 thrust the movement into a new security and sectarian reality in which state authority collapsed and arms became the principal instrument for managing conflict, compelling it to reconsider its position and function within this environment.[7]

Within this context, the establishment of the “al-Mujahidun” organization in northern Lebanon appeared more as a defensive response than as a fully developed military project. The movement viewed armed activity at that stage as a means of protecting Muslim-majority areas and safeguarding social existence amid what it perceived as direct threats arising from sectarian violence. This transformation was marked by a high degree of pragmatism: recruitment expanded to include pious individuals beyond the movement’s formal organizational framework, and semi-public military training courses were adopted, indicating that field necessity took precedence over strict organizational considerations. Nevertheless, this trajectory remained geographically and temporally limited, effectively ending with the Syrian intervention in 1976, which constrained the movement’s military activity and imposed new balances that forced it to dismantle its armed structure in the north.

A deeper transformation in the movement’s military trajectory emerged with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, a pivotal moment that redefined its conception of armed action. In the wake of the collapse of trained and armed Palestinian factions and the exposure of the Sunni arena in the south, a resistance vacuum emerged that promptedal-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya—particularly in the city of Sidon—to reactivate military engagement within a newly formed armed wing, the “Fajr Forces.” At this stage, arms shifted from being a tool of local defense to becoming part of a broader religious–political conception of confrontation with Israeli occupation, grounded in a combination of ideological motivations, field imperatives, and a social base that perceived resistance as an expression of dignity and territorial defense.[8]

The trajectory surrounding the establishment of the “Fajr Forces” reveals a structural tension within the movement between a central leadership characterized by caution and risk aversion, and field leaderships that allowed military realities on the ground to dictate outcomes. In several instances, military operations preceded formal organizational decisions, reflecting the movement’s shift toward armed engagement as an interactive process imposed by necessity rather than a pre-formulated strategy. Nevertheless, the leadership soon found itself compelled to absorb this reality, subsequently endorsing military activity within defined constraints that preserved operational secrecy and linked the armed wing to the political leadership in order to secure material and organizational cover—without, however, adopting a comprehensive military project akin to that pursued by other resistance organizations.[9]

With the expansion of the Sidon experience and the accumulation of military expertiseal-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya , gradually evolved from a pattern of limited guerrilla warfare toward more structured military activity, drawing on the experience of defecting officers and modest logistical support that developed over time. Yet this evolution did not transform the movement into a dominant military force; rather, it remained circumscribed by complex political and regional considerations, particularly after the “Ta’if Agreement”, which led to the disarmament of most militias while granting Hezbollah near-exclusive authority over resistance activities against Israeli occupation. Within this framework, the movement’s military role receded, maintaining only a symbolic and limited presence through the” Fajr Forces”—reflecting a renewed shift toward the position of a cautious observer rather than that of a central resistance actor.[10]

Accordingly, the movement’s turn to armed activity cannot be understood as a linear, escalating trajectory, but rather as a series of phased transformations oscillating between engagement and withdrawal, shaped by local and regional balances of power and by the organization’s internal capacity to bear the consequences of the military option. This trajectory became one of the principal determinants of the movement’s subsequent political identity and contributed to shaping its complex relationship with other actors in the resistance arena—most notably Hezbollah—where objectives converged in confronting occupation without resulting in integration or a long-term strategic alliance.

Parliamentary Representation of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon

The parliamentary representation of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon has never constituted a natural extension of its organizational size or of its missionary and social role. Rather, it has remained shaped by political, sectarian, and regional considerations that limited its capacity to translate into stable parliamentary influence. Since its entry into electoral politics in the early 1970s, the movement has approached parliamentary participation as a political margin capable of expansion or contraction according to balances of power and domestic and regional environments. This has produced an irregular legislative presence, subject to fluctuation alongside shifting political contexts.

The first electoral experience in 1972 demonstrates that the movement’s entry into parliamentary life occurred in a context in which the Sunni political environment was not prepared to embrace political Islam as a representative option, given the dominance of traditional leaderships and the movement’s lack of an organized electoral infrastructure capable of competition.

The period following the” Ta’if Agreement”—particularly the 1992 elections—represents the peak of the movement’s parliamentary representation. Yet this advancement did not stem from direct popular expansion so much as from a temporary Sunni political vacuum. This vacuum resulted from the weakening of traditional leaderships, the restructuring of power and parliamentary seats on the basis of parity between Muslims and Christians in a 128-seat legislature, the adoption of confessional balance in senior state positions, and the decline of the historical political influence of established elites. These dynamics provided emerging movements, including Islamic groups , with an unprecedented opportunity to access parliament.[11]

It soon became evident, however, that this parliamentary presence did not evolve into an upward trajectory. The 1996 elections and those that followed revealed the fragility of the movement’s electoral resilience under stringent Syrian management of the political arena, and later under the rise of the Future Movement after 2005 as the near-exclusive representative of the Sunni constituency. In this context, the movement chose the position of a “cautious partner” rather than that of a competitor, supporting and aligning with the Future Movement. This ensured a limited parliamentary presence (as exemplified by the case of Imad al-Hout), but at the same time constrained its capacity to build an independent bloc or articulate a distinctive political discourse.

The electoral success of” Imad al-Hout”in Beirut since 2009 [12]constitutes a particular model of the movement’s parliamentary representation: individualized and limited urban representation grounded more in the movement’s institutional infrastructure than in a solid electoral base, reliant on political networks, conciliatory rhetoric, and the ability to position itself among competing alignments. Nevertheless, this model remained limited in impact, proving difficult to replicate in other constituencies—as evidenced by the movement’s setbacks in the 2018 elections and its modest results in 2022—reflecting its continuing inability to expand parliamentary influence beyond the capital.

Accordingly, the movement’s parliamentary representation prior to the most recent war on Gaza did not amount to a comprehensive political project; rather, it expressed an ongoing effort to preserve a foothold within Lebanon’s political system without confronting major forces or fully dissolving into them. Its individualized, symbolic model of representation exemplified how limited presence could be maintained through political networks and consensus-oriented discourse, without the capacity to broaden influence elsewhere, as electoral outcomes in 2018 and 2022 demonstrated.

With the outbreak of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, the movement’s symbolic role within the resistance sphere re-emerged through the reactivation of its military wing, the “Fajr Forces,” in certain operations against Israeli occupation. This reflected its moral and political association with the idea of resistance without full engagement in a comprehensive front or a long-term strategic alliance. Such limited involvement enabled the movement to preserve both symbolic and field presence in Lebanon, balancing the benefits of popular and political momentum surrounding resistance with the avoidance of direct confrontation that might threaten its organizational structure.

As the upcoming elections scheduled for May approach, the movement stands at a crossroads: either to continue with the model of individualized symbolic representation, or to seek a redefinition of its parliamentary role through a clearer discourse capable of addressing a crisis-ridden Sunni constituency searching for alternatives rather than a reproduction of existing political balances

3-After “Al-Aqsa Flood”: al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya  Between Engagement and Support

The return  of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya   military wing, the “Fajr Forces,” to the Lebanese military scene in the context of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation cannot be understood merely as the resumption of suspended military activity. Rather, it should be seen as the product of a complex interaction between internal Lebanese variables, an explosive regional context, and the movement’s calculated repositioning within the equation of conflict with Israeli occupation. This return did not emerge from a vacuum, nor did it signify a fundamental transformation in the movement’s doctrine; instead, it represented a measured situational response to the strategic shock generated by the war on Gaza.[13]

At the regional level, the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation constituted a revealing moment that restored the option of armed resistance to prominence in Arab and Islamic popular consciousness, breaking the stagnation that had prevailed after years of political and military containment of resistance movements. As” Muhammad Takkoush”, the current Secretary-General of  al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya , noted:

“The Al-Aqsa Flood battle has put an end to the illusion that had prevailed—that this entity cannot disappear. Today, the conviction of its disappearance has become firmly rooted among all Arab and Islamic peoples in light of its defeat in this battle, and this battle will shape the contours of the region in the coming phase.”[14]

Within this context, the movement found an opportunity to reactivate its symbolic capital as an Islamic component of resistance, particularly in light of the direct targeting of Hamas, with which it maintains intellectual and organizational affinities—albeit unofficial—stemming from their shared grounding in the Muslim Brotherhood tradition. Accordingly, the involvement of the “Fajr Forces” in certain operations against Israeli occupation served to affirm this moral and political linkage without reaching the level of comprehensive engagement in the conflict.

At the domestic Lebanese level, the return of the’ Fajr Force”s reflects an attempt byal-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya   to break the condition of political and popular marginalization experienced by the Sunni arena following the decline of the Future Movement and the absence of an overarching leadership representing this constituency within major national equations. In this context, the banner of resistance has functioned as an effective lever for reproducing presence—not only through discourse but also through calculated field action that repositions the movement within the conflict with Israel and grants it a broader margin of maneuver within internal balances.

Yet this engagement remained governed by a set of strict constraints, foremost among them the security and political realities in southern Lebanon, which are effectively dominated by Hezbollah as the only actor capable of managing the lines of contact with Israeli occupation. Accordingly, the return of the “Fajr Forces” would not have been possible without field coordination and implicit facilitation by the party—an acknowledgment made by the movement’s own leaders. Such coordination, however, does not signify the existence of a strategic alliance or unity of decision-making; rather, it reflects a situational convergence of interests shaped by the necessities of the moment and calculations of mutual deterrence vis-à-vis Israel.

Within this framework,  al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya role in the context of “Al-Aqsa Flood” may be understood as symbolic and political more than militarily decisive. The limited scale of its capabilities and the nature of its operations suggest that the objective was not to open a comprehensive front, but to convey multidirectional messages: a message of solidarity with Gaza; a domestic Lebanese message asserting that resistance is not the exclusive domain of a single actor; and a regional message indicating that the Lebanese arena is plural in its actors rather than monopolized by a single representative force.[15]

Conversely, through this limited role, the movement has sought to maintain a delicate balance between engagement and entanglement. It aims to benefit from the popular and political momentum generated by resistance while avoiding the costs of escalation into open warfare that could expose its organizational structure and social base to substantial risks. At the same time, through its political discourse, it has been careful to deny alignment with any regional axis, preserving a margin of maneuver that allows for repositioning in response to shifting balances of power.

4-Between Politics and the Field: The Leadership Dilemma within al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya.

The movement seeks to preserve a delicate balance that is clearly reflected in its current leadership map, which has come to embody competing internal currents mirroring the identity struggle between the field and politics.” Muhammad Takkoush” (the current Secretary-General) stands at the forefront of a current pushing toward full engagement within the axis of resistance, and is viewed as an architect of the decision to resume military activity and to pursue open coordination with Hezbollah and Hamas. In contrast to this momentum, Member of Parliament” Imad al-Hout “emerges as an influential voice representing the institutional and sovereignty-oriented wing—one that fears the dilution of the movement’s Sunni identity within the Iranian project and seeks to maintain the necessary distance that shields the movement from domestic and international political isolation.

Between these two currents, historical figures such as Azzam al-Ayoubi (former Secretary-General) and Ibrahim al-Masri (one of the founders) play the role of organizational safety valves[16]. This generation attempts to preserve internal cohesion and prevent strategic disagreements from escalating into structural fragmentation, particularly amid security challenges and assassinations targeting field cadres. This internal division is not merely a difference in viewpoints; rather, it reflects the movement’s deeper dilemma in defining itself either as a transnational resistance movement or as a Lebanese political party committed to the constraints of the state—an unresolved tension that has intensified under mounting external pressures

The Relationship Between al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya   and Hezbollah: The Dialectics of Sect and Resistance in the Lebanese Context

The relationship between a-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya   and Hezbollah is characterized by dynamism and complexity, shaped by a range of domestic and regional factors. It has been constructed upon a dual dialectic combining sectarian and resistance dimensions. In the early stages of Hezbollah’s emergence, the party reportedly made use of training camps affiliated with  al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in several areas, particularly in Sidon, the western Beqaa, and parts of the border strip.

This phase indicates that relations between the two actors originated on a practical and military basis, removed from any sustained political or electoral alliance. It reflects both parties’ interest in preserving their organizational and political independence and in avoiding the transformation of such cooperation into a comprehensive political partnership that might be affected by sensitivities related to sectarian affiliation and divergent ideological references.

At the political level, the trajectory of relations between  al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and Hezbollah has not witnessed the formation of direct electoral alliances, aside from limited forms of coordination that have appeared in student and professional union frameworks and in certain municipal contests—particularly in Beirut, the Beqaa, and Sidon. This uneven level of political cooperation can largely be attributed to sectarian affiliation: Hezbollah’s representative base is predominantly” Shi‘I”, whereas  al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya draws on a Sunni constituency rooted in Muslim Brotherhood reference points. This dynamic has constrained the prospects for building a sustainable political alliance despite convergences in certain agendas and strategic choices.

The relationship experienced overlapping phases of convergence and tension during the period of Syrian presence in Lebanon, as the two actors engaged intermittently in political and security consultations under their shared opposition to U.S.–Israeli policies. However, the events of 7 May 2008, alongside the political transformations following 2005—particularly the so-called “Cedar Revolution,” which led to the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon and was followed by the assassination of Prime Minister” Rafik Hariri”—revealed deep divergences in each side’s approach to Lebanon’s political reality[17]

Differences in positions regarding the Syrian crisis further deepened these divergences. al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya    adopted a stance supportive of the Syrian uprising, whereas Hezbollah became involved alongside the Syrian regime, leading to an accumulation of political and security tensions that were reflected in escalating friction in certain localities. [18]This dynamic illustrates clearly how regional disagreements imbued with sectarian dimensions can obstruct potential paths toward rapprochement. Nevertheless, channels of communication between the two actors were never completely severed; rather, they continued within a gradual and provisional framework governed by considerations of tension management and the preservation of a minimum level of internal stability.[19]

In 2016, meetings between    al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and Hezbollah resumed gradually as part of efforts to manage domestic realities and reduce existing tensions. Following the election of Ismail Haniyeh as head of Hamas’s Political Bureau, reconciliation meetings were facilitated between the two sides, bringing together the then Secretary-General of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya  , “Azzam al-Ayoubi”, and the late Secretary-General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah. These encounters contributed to political and media de-escalation, without producing comprehensive political understandings or establishing a sustainable alliance framework.[20]

When” Muhammad Takkoush “assumed the movement’s leadership in 2022, the relationship witnessed a shift toward greater coordination and alignment in political, media, and security spheres. This included participation in what was described as the “support war” in solidarity with Gaza and the formation of joint committees for electoral coordination in certain constituencies—notably in the northern and central Beqaa, Mount Lebanon, and the Third Southern District.

This relationship may be understood through the dialectic of sectarian and resistance factors:

                    •The sectarian factor constituted a basis for divergence and caution, as differences in Shi‘i and Sunni affiliation impeded the formation of a durable long-term political alliance, a dynamic evident in contrasting positions toward the Syrian uprising.

                    •The resistance factor, embodied in confronting Israeli occupation and defending the Palestinian    cause, provided common ground for gradual rapprochement, enabling military and media coordination on certain strategic issues and demonstrating the capacity of strategic interests to partially transcend sectarian divides.

Accordingly, the relationship between   al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya and Hezbollah may be understood as a dynamic and evolving interactive model governed by a continuous balancing between sectarian affiliation and resistance considerations. The patterns of this relationship shift between limited cooperation, acute tension, and varying forms of political and strategic coordination, depending on changes in local and regional contexts.

This trajectory demonstrates that, although the sectarian factor influences the political and social choices of both actors, it does not constitute a final determinant of alliance formation. By contrast, the resistance factor serves as a practical framework that allows relations to be recalibrated and positions brought closer whenever shared interests so require.

Within this broader perspective, the experience of al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya    in Lebanon reveals the structural complexities confronting Sunni political Islam within a highly sensitive confessional system. It becomes evident that reliance solely on doctrinal legitimacy or on the symbolism of “resistance” is insufficient to establish a sustainable political presence. Between its missionary and social roles on the one hand, and its attempts at political engagement and alliance-building within a shifting domestic and regional environment on the other, the movement faces the challenge of redefining its position and function within—rather than outside—the Lebanese system. This compels it to maintain a careful balance between identity and interest, and between ideological constants and the demands of political reality.

5-.  al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon and Its Inclusion on Trump’s Blacklist

The decision by the U.S. administration to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as “terrorist organizations” should be understood within a broader regional–political context, one that cannot be separated from the repercussions of the war on Gaza or from the structural relationship between the Trump administration and pro-Zionist lobbying forces in the United States. This decision does not constitute an independent legal or security-based assessment of the activities of these groups within their respective countries; rather, it reflects a political approach that takes into account Israeli interests and targets Palestinian resistance movements, foremost among them Hamas, framing political Islam—whether peaceful or activist—as part of a wider threat landscape.[21]

The gravity of this measure lies not only in its political characterization but also in the narrow timeframe (45 days) granted by the executive order to the Departments of State and Treasury to implement punitive measures, placing the organization under imminent financial and legal pressure. Despite attempts by the group’s leadership—including” Dr. Bassam Hammoud”, Deputy Head of the Political Bureau of Islamic groups in Lebanon—to downplay the impact of these measures by emphasizing the organization’s institutional independence and self-financing, a closer reading suggests that such designation would narrow the movement’s political maneuvering space domestically. It would further complicate the relationship between its institutionalist current (led by Imad al-Hout) and both the Lebanese state and the international community.

Consequently,  al-Jama‘a al-Islamiyya in Lebanon faces a strategic dilemma: either to persist in the path of “military support,” with the popular legitimacy it may generate but at high political cost; or to move closer to actors capable of absorbing the consequences of confrontation with the United States—foremost among them Hezbollah—without necessarily entering into a full strategic alliance or adopting a unified political–security project; or alternatively, to bend before international pressure in order to preserve its organizational and social gains.[22]

This pressure emerges at a moment when the movement was attempting to break out of the contraction it had experienced in recent years by repositioning itself within the Lebanese political field, benefiting from the vacuum created by the retreat of traditional Sunni political forces. Yet the constraining international environment has rapidly reduced its room for maneuver—not only legally and financially, but also in terms of domestic political acceptance, as Lebanese party actors have become increasingly cautious about any engagement with it, fearing direct external repercussions.

Thus, U.S. measures cannot be viewed as isolated or temporary actions; rather, they function as a factor reshaping the boundaries of the organization’s strategic options and future trajectories

[1] Abu Rumman, Muhammad. (2025). Trump and the Muslim Brotherhood: “Booby‑Trapping the Future”. Al‑Araby Al‑Jadeed.

Available at: https://www.alaraby.co.uk/opinion/ترامب-والإخوان-المسلمون-وتفخيخ-المستقبل?amp

[2] Aitanī, Amal, ʿAlī, ʿAbd al‑Qādir, & Maʿīn, Yaḥyā. (2013). The Islamic Group in Lebanon from Its Origin until 1975. Beirut: Al‑Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations.

[3] Yakn, Fatḥī. (n.d.). Goal of Housing and Demonstrating Bounties in the Biography of al‑D… Rābiṭat ʿUlamāʾ al‑Sūrīyīn [The Association of Syrian Scholars]. Retrieved from https://www.islamsyria.com/ar

[4] BBC Arabic. (2024). “1958 War: Marine Corps Forces in the Streets of Beirut.” BBC.

Available at: https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/c511p0vgnpwo  

[5] Previous reference

[6] Al‑Jama‘ah al‑Islamiyyah (The Islamic Group) – The Islamic Group in Lebanon.

Official website: https://www.al‑jamaa.org

[8] Islamic groups in Lebanon

[9] previous reference

[10] Precious reference

[11] Lebanese Army. (n.d.). Taif Agreement: Headings of National Unity and Modernization. Official website of the Lebanese Army.

Retrieved from https://www.lebarmy.gov.lb/ar/content/إتفاق‑الطائف‑عناوين‑الوحدة‑والتحديث

[12] Lebanese Parliamentary Elections 2009. (n.d.). Official website of the Lebanese Elections Commission.

Retrieved from https://elections.gov.lb/

[13] BBC Arabic. (2024). “1958 War: Marine Corps Forces in the Streets of Beirut.” BBC. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/arabic/articles/c511p0vgnpwo.

[14] Safa – Palestinian Press Agency. (2024, July 5). Haniyeh and Taqoush Discuss Field and Political Developments of “Al‑Aqsa Storm.” Safa.ps. Retrieved from https://safa.ps/post/371381/هنية‑وطقوش‑يبحثان‑تطورات‑طوفان‑الأقصى‑الميدانية‑والسياسية.

[15] Previous reference

[16] Previous reference

[17] Mohna, Sawsan. (2024). “May 7, 2008: How It Affected the Political Scene and Future of Lebanon.” Independent Arabia.

Retrieved from https://www.independentarabia.com/node/575696/يوم‑7‑مايو‑2008‑كيف‑أثر‑على‑المشهد‑السياسي‑ومستقبل‑لبنان؟  

[18] Khaled, Nidal. (2025). The Islamic Group in Lebanon in Times of Regional Transformations. Independent Arabia.

Retrieved from https://www.independentarabia.com/node/… (article originally published in Arabic)

[19] Al‑Asrī, Khalid. (2013). Hezbollah and the Syrian Crisis: Framing the Position. Hespress.

Retrieved from https://www.hespress.com/

[20] Qasir, Qasim. (2022). The Islamic Group and Hezbollah: Where They Meet and Where They Diverge?. ALAMAN.

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[21]Previous reference

[22] Jawhar, Suhaib. (2026). Between the Deadlock of Options and Shifting Alliances: The Future of the Muslim Brotherhood in Lebanon. Institute of Politics and Society