Lebanon in 2026: State Governance under the Pressure of Concurrent Deadlines

As Lebanon closes out 2025, it has emerged from a state of complete institutional vacuum, yet it has not entered a phase of sustainable stability. The state has formally reoccupied its institutional position, but this position remains constrained by internal and external limitations that render every move susceptible to escalating into a new crisis. What distinguishes the current phase is not merely the magnitude of the challenges themselves, but rather their simultaneity, interdependence, and the narrow margin of maneuver available to state institutions.

The first year of the presidential and governmental term, under President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, did not fail by the standards of administrative performance. However, it confronted early on a structural reality: addressing the files that paralyzed the state over the past decade remains a necessary condition, yet one that is insufficient in itself. This is due to a deeper structural dilemma embedded in the Lebanese political system, whose roots extend to the post–Taif Agreement period and relate to the nature of power balances, governance mechanisms, and the management of authority. Foremost among these are the issues of arms, borders, relations with Syria, and Lebanon’s position within the matrix of regional conflicts. These files, however, are not managed through a purely domestic will; rather, they are continuously drawn into external arenas of negotiation and pressure.

This reality renders 2026 a highly sensitive transitional year, in which the state’s capacity is tested not in imposing solutions, but in preventing slippage, regulating political and institutional tempo, and preserving a minimum level of institutional cohesion amid the entanglement of its major dossiers.

The Issue of Arms Monopoly: The State’s Dilemma between Commitment and Capacity

As the end of 2025 approaches, the issue of confining arms exclusively to the state has become an open file that can no longer be politically or media-wise contained. The state, along with the presidential and executive institutions, has formally committed itself to this path;[1] the Lebanese Armed Forces have entered into a gradual implementation plan;[2] and tangible progress has been achieved in specific areas south of the Litani River. Yet this trajectory has not evolved into a generalizable model. Instead, it has turned into a continuous testing ground for the limits of state authority.

The core dilemma lies in the fact that the armed actor concerned does not approach this issue as a purely domestic Lebanese matter, but rather as part of a broader regional system. The declared position rests on rejecting any discussion of weapons outside a package of conditions that includes the Palestinian arena, the eastern borders, and full Israeli withdrawal. In practical terms, this means that the decision on arms is deferred to an undefined regional settlement, both in scope and timing.

For the Lebanese state, this positioning generates a dual dilemma. On the one hand, it cannot retreat from its declared commitment without incurring high political and international costs. On the other hand, it lacks both the instruments and the political consensus required to enforce implementation through coercion or sustained internal pressure. Any miscalculated advance risks opening the door to internal tensions that would be difficult to contain, while prolonged freezing of the file could be used as a pretext for imposing external pressures or faits accomplis.

Accordingly, 2026 is likely to be a year of managing this impasse rather than resolving it. The current government will seek to consolidate the gains achieved, prevent regression, and attempt to widen the scope of implementation without sliding into a comprehensive confrontation with Hezbollah and its constituency. This is, by nature, a fragile course, prone to disruption by any security or political development-particularly if external trajectories were to evolve toward a new Israeli strike against Tehran.

Southern Lebanon and Monitoring Mechanisms: From a Technical Framework to a Pressurized Negotiating Track

In parallel with the arms file, southern Lebanon was transformed during the second half of 2025 into a multi-layered pressure arena. The monitoring and follow-up mechanisms established to oversee the ceasefire are no longer used exclusively for that purpose. Their role has gradually expanded to become a platform for managing conditional stability and, potentially, an entry point for long-term arrangements.

The changes introduced at the level of representation within these mechanisms are not merely procedural details. The inclusion of civilian elements and the elevation of representation-through the appointment of former ambassador Simon Karam as head of the committee on the Lebanese side[3]-signal a shift toward a policy-oriented track. This reflects a transformation from technical monitoring into an undeclared negotiating process over the future of the south, its security function, and the terms of movement and deployment within it, particularly in light of U.S. proposals to establish an economic zone in the border area of southern Lebanon.

What is being discussed in this context has not yet reached the level of a formal agreement, but it goes far beyond the concept of a ceasefire. The discourse revolves around security lines, zones with special conditions, and long-term arrangements that constrain the on-the-ground reality and impose gradual faits accomplis that would be difficult to reverse at a later stage.

The Lebanese state rejects these proposals in principle,[4] yet at the same time finds itself compelled to engage with them through a logic of damage limitation rather than decisive resolution. The capacity for outright rejection is unavailable due to the realities produced by the latest war at the end of 2024, developments in Syria, and the structural weakening that has affected Iran. Conversely, full acceptance carries significant sovereign and political costs. As a result, this file is being managed in 2026 on the basis of preventing escalation, postponing major milestones, and tying any progress to broader understandings that have yet to mature.

The Lebanese Armed Forces between the Pressure for Decisiveness and the Logic of Containment

The Lebanese Armed Forces are currently experiencing unprecedented pressure, having become central to a shifting international approach to stability in Lebanon-one that goes beyond traditional support and increasingly assigns the military additional political and security burdens. The cancellation of Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal’s visit to Washington was not a mere protocol matter;[5] rather, it reflected divergences in timing and approach amid growing Israeli pressure aimed at directly linking the army’s performance to the resolution of the arms issue, particularly north of the Litani River. This expectation exceeds the army’s operational capacity and the limits of the domestic political cover available to it.

By contrast, Haykal’s visit to Paris constituted a moment of recalibration in international engagement with the military institution.[6] The notably warm French reception conveyed a clear political message affirming continued confidence in the army as a central pillar of stability, while promoting a more gradual approach grounded in containment rather than confrontation, and in supporting the army’s mandate rather than instrumentalizing it as a tool of pressure.

This French differentiation, while not a substitute for U.S. decision-making, has nonetheless provided an additional margin of maneuver-particularly in light of ongoing Israeli attacks and repeated attempts to place responsibility for any setbacks in implementing ceasefire arrangements on the state and the army alike.

Within this context, preparations for an international conference to support the Lebanese Armed Forces fall under a dual-track effort: to provide practical assistance that mitigates field-level attrition, while simultaneously entrenching the military’s role within an equation of conditional stability. This path, however, remains contingent on the availability of U.S. political cover and on the army’s ability to maintain a delicate balance between carrying out its assigned tasks and avoiding a slide into roles that exceed its capacity or place it in a position of internal confrontation.

Relations with the New Syria: Mutual Security Anxiety and Non-Deferrable Files

Alongside other sovereign dossiers, the Lebanese–Syrian relationship stands out as one of the most structurally complex challenges as 2026 approaches, given the shared geography and the deep historical, political, and security intertwinement between the two countries. This relationship has never functioned as a conventional foreign-policy file; rather, it has consistently constituted a direct determinant of Lebanese stability. Shifts in Syria have routinely reverberated inside Lebanon,[7] which has, at various junctures, become a space of impact and interaction with Syrian developments.

This reality renders any change in the structure of power or in the security approach in Damascus a pressure factor on Lebanon, elevating the file beyond the diplomatic sphere and positioning it as a key variable of stability-or tension-in the coming phase.

The dossiers at stake between the two countries are weighty and do not allow for protracted handling. Foremost among them is the issue of Syrian detainees in Lebanese prisons, which Damascus views as an obligatory entry point for any evolution in bilateral relations, while Lebanon finds itself constrained by internal legal and political considerations that prevent isolated treatment of the matter. At the same time, the presence of former-regime officers and officials on Lebanese territory constitutes a persistent source of concern for the Syrian authorities, who perceive it as a potential threat to Syria’s internal stability.

Syrian anxieties are not confined to individuals; they extend to broader scenarios involving the possible reactivation of the coastal region, the northeast, or Suwayda, within projects aimed at weakening central authority in Damascus.[8] This concern drives Syria to elevate levels of security coordination and political pressure, placing Lebanon before difficult choices in managing this file without becoming a direct party to Syria’s internal conflict.[9]

Accordingly, 2026 will be decisive in determining whether the relationship moves toward a framework of mutual risk management or toward an accumulation of tensions that could translate into security repercussions within Lebanon-particularly if they intersect with pressures emanating from the southern front and the unresolved arms dossier.

The Electoral Milestone: Where Politics Intersects with the Balance of Power

In light of the foregoing, the parliamentary electoral milestone occupies a later position in the timeline, yet a far more advanced one in terms of significance. The 2026 elections do not constitute an isolated file; rather, they are a direct outcome of how the country’s principal dossiers have been managed in the preceding phase.

What remains constant in political calculations is that Hezbollah has shown no reservation toward holding elections on their constitutional deadline. On the contrary, the party[10] views elections conducted under the existing balance of power as serving its political standing, consolidating its representative capacity within the Shiite community and beyond-particularly in the absence of any settlement regarding the arms issue. From its perspective, elections at this juncture do not pose a threat, but rather function as an instrument for entrenching the prevailing reality.

By contrast, key political forces are betting on the option of postponement, not out of principled opposition to elections, but based on a reading that any vote held prior to addressing the arms dossier would merely reproduce the same structural imbalance within the political system. These forces argue that proceeding to the ballot box without an alteration in the balance of power would effectively entrench existing influence, weaken prospects for rebalancing within state institutions, and fail to keep pace with regional transformations-particularly those witnessed in Syria and Palestine.

This divergence renders the 2026 elections an acutely sensitive file. Holding them on schedule could yield a parliament that mirrors the current balance of power, thereby complicating the subsequent management of sovereignty-related dossiers. Postponement, on the other hand, would open the door to a new constitutional and political crisis, exposing the state to accusations of obstructing democratic entitlements.

In this sense, elections are transformed from a democratic instrument into an arena of struggle over the timing of change rather than its principle. It is an arena that cannot be disentangled from negotiations over arms, from stability in the south, or from the trajectory of relations with Syria.

A Year of Consolidating Realities, Not Producing Transformations

Lebanon enters 2026 in a phase characterized more by the consolidation of existing realities than by the production of transformative change. The capacity to impose clear trajectories remains limited, while the decisions taken in 2025 have placed the country before practical tests whose political and executive components have yet to be fully completed.

The core files-the arms dossier, the southern front, relations with Syria, and the electoral milestone-can no longer be managed in isolation. Any disruption in one will immediately reverberate across the others, narrowing the margin for maneuver and reducing the effectiveness of postponement strategies. In this context, the most likely course in 2026 appears to be one of long-term containment, premised on preventing explosion without the ability to reach a comprehensive settlement.

The electoral milestone reflects this reality more than it shapes it. Holding elections on schedule may entrench the existing balance of power, while postponement would open the door to an additional constitutional crisis. In both scenarios, the elections remain closely tied to the trajectory of the arms issue and sovereign stability, rather than constituting an autonomous choice.

In sum, 2026 is set to be a year of risk management rather than solutions. The success of the state will not be measured by its capacity for decisiveness, but by its ability to prevent the convergence of crises at a single moment and to preserve a minimum level of institutional cohesion within an exceptionally fragile domestic and regional environment.

[1] Anadolu Agency – Lebanon: Cabinet tasks the army with a plan to confine weapons to the state before the end of 2025.

[2] Asharq – Lebanon: Government approves the army’s plan to restrict arms to state control.

[3] Al Jazeera Net – What does Lebanon’s appointment of a civilian figure to the “Mechanism” committee signify?

[4] Associated Press – Lebanese president says Hezbollah disarmament will come through dialogue, not “force”.

[5] Reuters – U.S. cancels Washington meetings with Lebanese army chief over remarks on Israel, sources say.

[6] Al-Modon – Haykal’s visit to Paris: French warmth and “containment” as the slogan of the current phase.

[7] Syria TV – Growing concern over remnants of the ousted regime in Lebanon: Will coordination between Damascus and Beirut intensify?

[8] Arabi Post – SDF knocks on Lebanon’s door: Suspicious political moves raise concern in Beirut and fears of reactions from Syria and Turkey.

[9] The New York Times – Ousted and in exile, generals secretly plot an insurgency in Syria.

[10] Lebanese Broadcasting Corporation – Hezbollah supports holding elections on schedule.