Rethinking Relations with Iran
The funeral of Iran’s former Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, served as an important opportunity for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the conservative establishment to convey a series of carefully calibrated symbolic and political messages. Each participating delegation carried its own significance, while the ceremony also projected messages to both domestic and international audiences. Notably, the event witnessed broad Arab and Islamic participation-particularly from the Gulf states-coinciding with reports of expanding backchannel political, economic, and diplomatic contacts between Iran and several regional countries following the memorandum of understanding reached between the two sides.
No Jordanian delegation participated in the funeral ceremonies, underscoring the persistent estrangement and prolonged tensions between Amman and Tehran. Relations have deteriorated further in the aftermath of the recent war involving the United States and Israel, during which Iran launched multiple missiles toward Jordanian military bases, claiming they hosted American forces. This has been accompanied by a sustained Iranian political and media campaign portraying Jordan in a negative light and consistently criticizing its policies since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.
From Jordan’s perspective, the doctrine of Wilayat al-Faqih has been viewed with deep suspicion since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The relationship has long been characterized by profound mistrust. Throughout both official and unofficial negotiations, Jordanian officials have consistently confronted their Iranian counterparts with evidence of activities deemed detrimental to Jordan’s national security, including documented lists of Jordanian targets. Despite repeated efforts to improve bilateral relations-from the era of King Hussein to that of King Abdullah II-meaningful progress has remained elusive. One of the latest rounds of dialogue took place in Baghdad, where Jordanian and Iranian officials held several parallel meetings alongside the Saudi-Iranian negotiations that ultimately produced a significant rapprochement between Riyadh and Tehran. Yet Jordanian-Iranian relations continued to be defined by uncertainty, tension, and recurring crises.
This longstanding history, however, does not necessarily justify accepting the continuation of this negative trajectory. Relations between states are ultimately governed by strategic interests rather than emotions, resentment, or political grievances. The experience of the Gulf states offers a compelling illustration. Following the signing of the memorandum of understanding with Iran, Gulf governments moved swiftly to reassess the future of their relations with Tehran, dispatched official delegations to offer condolences, and media reports pointed to negotiations over major economic and financial agreements between the two sides.
Indeed, the Gulf states have suffered far greater economic, political, security, and military costs from Iranian policies and regional conduct than Jordan has. Nevertheless, their strategic interests have prompted them to move beyond these disputes and embark on a new phase of engagement with the Iranian state. The recent war demonstrated that the Iranian political system is neither fragile nor easily destabilized; rather, it has proven resilient and institutionally cohesive. Even the Trump administration ultimately adjusted its objectives after recognizing the limits of its ability to weaken the Iranian regime, replacing more ambitious goals with narrower and more attainable ones. A similar reassessment is also evident in Israel, where much of the current military analysis reflects a renewed appreciation of Iran’s capabilities and calls for revising future approaches toward Tehran.
In discussions with Jordanian officials and political figures, references to Iran frequently evoke memories of previous rounds of dialogue that yielded few tangible results, leading many to question the value of renewed engagement or the existence of meaningful shared interests-particularly when compared with the Gulf states, whose geopolitical realities compel them to maintain channels of communication with Tehran. Such reasoning, however, oversimplifies both the interconnected nature of the regional strategic environment and the broader benefits that could emerge from sustained dialogue. Developing channels of communication and fostering common understandings on political, economic, and security interests may generate strategic dividends extending well beyond the bilateral relationship itself. Even if such engagement were to produce no more than improved coordination with Iraq through these diplomatic channels, the resulting gains would still represent a significant strategic advantage for Jordan.
A more effective approach would be to pursue a regional dialogue led by the Middle Powers of the region-namely Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt. These states have emerged as influential regional actors and collectively possess the capacity to form the nucleus of a framework capable of reshaping the regional balance of power. To date, however, engagement with Iran has remained largely bilateral, with each country managing its relationship with Tehran independently. Even within the Gulf, Iran’s ties with individual states differ substantially in both character and priorities.
Against this backdrop, Jordan should develop a coherent and clearly articulated strategy for engaging Iran in the coming period. If Jordanian policymakers remain concerned that official dialogue could simply reproduce previous rounds of inconclusive negotiations, an alternative avenue would be to expand the role of think tanks and research institutions through Track Two diplomacy. Such an approach is particularly relevant in the Iranian context, where policy experts, academic institutions, and research centers play a significant role in shaping strategic debates. Many of these institutions maintain close links with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Office of the Supreme Leader, and the Presidency, making them valuable interlocutors for fostering dialogue, exploring areas of mutual interest, and gradually building the confidence necessary for more substantive official engagement.