The Identity of Iraq’s Next Prime Minister: Between Domestic Calculations and External Complications

There are entrenched “rules of the game” that Iraqi political forces have consistently sought to institutionalize with every electoral cycle—rules that have ultimately produced a political system some scholars classify as a form of competitive authoritarianism. Iraq’s political arena has thus become confined to a limited set of actors who continuously reproduce the status quo, reducing elections to little more than a test of each faction’s relative weight on the ground. In this context, no new actor is able to enter the political field without possessing the same assets held by most of the forces already embedded in the system—namely external backing, often accompanied by loyalty, financial resources, and, frequently, armed power.

Meanwhile, reports remain conflicting regarding whether an agreement has been reached on the identity of Iraq’s next prime minister, following the Sunnis’ decision to settle the speakership of parliament in favor of Haibat al-Halbousi, a member of the Taqaddum Alliance led by former parliament speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi. This outcome followed consultations within what has been termed the “Sunni Framework,” or the National Political Council. At the same time, another crisis is unfolding between the two main Kurdish parties, after the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Nechirvan Barzani, decided to compete for the presidency against a counter-alliance being formed by the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Pavel Talabani.

Yet it came as a surprise that Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani withdrew from the race, amid reports suggesting he may instead assume the post of foreign minister, leaving the premiership to Nouri al-Maliki—who served two consecutive terms (2006–2014) and currently leads the State of Law Coalition. Some observers interpret this move as a calculated maneuver by al-Sudani, who secured the highest number of votes and is viewed as acceptable to several regional actors, aimed at neutralizing al-Maliki’s ambitions by triggering anticipated rejection from both domestic and external stakeholders.

On the domestic front, such rejection could emerge from within the Coordination Framework itself, particularly from actors such as the National Wisdom Movement led by Ammar al-Hakim and the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq movement headed by Qais al-Khazali—despite recent reports citing consensus within the Framework on al-Maliki’s nomination. Opposition is also expected from the Sadrist Movement, which has long treated al-Maliki as both a rival and an adversary, as well as from segments of the Sunni political bloc that have signaled reservations about his candidacy, even as others have expressed support.

Externally, recent days have witnessed reports that the Supreme Leader of Iran has extended his blessing to al-Maliki’s nomination, despite attempts by some Coordination Framework factions to interpret Ali Khamenei’s message as referring to any candidate agreed upon by the Framework rather than to the leader of the State of Law Coalition specifically. This comes at a time when Iran itself is preoccupied with internal challenges and mounting external pressures. Perhaps the most complex variable, however, lies in interpreting the ambiguous position of the United States, and whether its stance will prove decisive in determining the final candidate—particularly in light of ongoing questions over whether Washington still views al-Maliki as part of the constellation of Iran-backed actors.

The significance of this question has grown in light of recent U.S. warnings directed at Iraqi politicians, threatening the imposition of sanctions against the Iraqi state that could extend to targeting Iraq’s oil revenues held through the U.S. Federal Reserve, should the next government include figures affiliated with Iran-backed armed groups. According to the Financial Times, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad has also requested the replacement of the First Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Adnan Fayhan, due to his affiliation with a sanctioned armed faction—Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq—which is listed under U.S. sanctions regimes.

It can be argued that the competition is now largely confined to two scenarios: either Nouri al-Maliki, or a consensus candidate imposed by “unexpected circumstances” in the final hours, one who can be agreed upon in line with the internal calculations of the Coordination Framework and the broader regional and international equations. Al-Maliki, who is often credited with having once managed a delicate balance between the United States and Iran and with attempting to confine arms to state control—notably through the “Charge of the Knights” operation against the Sadrist movement during his first term—is the same figure who pursued the opposite course during his second term. At that time, Iraq appeared to tilt openly toward the Iranian axis, while armed factions were empowered following the outbreak of the Syrian crisis in 2011. This period also coincided with deepening political paralysis and the rise of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), which went on to occupy nearly one-third of Iraqi territory. Nevertheless, the former prime minister seems to be betting—should he return to office—on his extensive influence within state institutions and his wide political and security networks, built over two consecutive terms in power.

By contrast, a more cautious current within the political elite views al-Maliki as a figure likely to monopolize authority, marginalize the role of the Coordination Framework—which functions as the de facto board of directors of the state—and weaken the gains of other political forces. His return could further exacerbate Iraq’s internal tensions, given unresolved conflicts with the Sadrist movement and the Sunni political base, while also risking renewed strain in Iraq’s external relations, which experienced a notable decline during his previous tenure. This camp thus places its hopes on regional and international rejection of al-Maliki as a candidate.

Ultimately, the decision over Iraq’s next prime minister is not an electoral one; it does not hinge on which bloc wins the most votes or seats, but rather on a complex interplay of domestic calculations and external equations. In recent years, the office of the prime minister has increasingly been reduced to that of a chief executive tasked with implementing directives and accommodating the orientations of the Coordination Framework, which retains control over major political decisions—despite repeated attempts by al-Sudani to push back against these constraints.

Beyond the immediate question of the premiership lies a broader inquiry into the future of Iraq’s political system itself. This future is closely tied to regional transformations, U.S. policy decisions toward Iran and the wider region, and the seriousness of Washington’s stated commitment to confronting armed factions and curbing Iranian influence in Iraq—as articulated by former U.S. Special Envoy to Iraq Mark Savaya under the Trump administration. These dynamics are capable of reshuffling the political deck at any moment, producing a new reality that diverges sharply from the status quo that Iraq’s political forces are currently striving to preserve.