Resolution 2803: Re-engineering Gaza and the Pathways of the Post-“War” Phase

Resolution 2803 represents a decisive moment in the trajectory of the war on Gaza-not merely as a framework for a ceasefire, but as an international mechanism aimed at politically and security-wise re-engineering the Strip. It does so through the creation of the Peace Council as a transitional body and the authorization of an international stabilization force endowed with broad powers, including disarmament, border control, and the securing of humanitarian corridors. This model closely echoes previous international administration experiences in Kosovo and East Timor[1].

The significance of the resolution stems from its role in redrawing the map of actors and responsibilities. It grants the United States a position of direct leadership over the transitional phase, offers Israel enhanced security arrangements contingent on disarmament prior to any meaningful withdrawal from Gaza, and places the Palestinian Authority (PA) before a difficult equation of deep reforms that may result in a parallel governance structure inside the Strip. Thus, the resolution appears as a mechanism that freezes the war without generating genuine stability, opening the door to a prolonged transitional phase governed by fragile legitimacy due to the absence of Palestinian–Israeli consensus, the predominance of U.S. influence over the process, and the entanglement of international rivalries that restrict the feasibility of implementing the proposed arrangements on the ground.

The resolution also emerges at a moment marked by intense global competition between the United States, Russia, and China over shaping the “day after” in Gaza, rendering it part of a broader reconfiguration of international influence in the Middle East rather than a mere step toward ending the war[2]. Notably, the resolution came at a time when the Trump administration perceived that prolonging the conflict without a political framework risked exacerbating four simultaneous dangers: an Israeli military impasse prolonging hostilities without decisive outcomes; a deepening humanitarian collapse threatening the United States’ image and inviting competing international interventions; mounting regional tensions that could ignite new fronts in Lebanon and the Red Sea; and the need for the incoming administration to demonstrate its ability to reassert American leadership in Middle Eastern affairs. Consequently, Washington pushed forward a broadly mandated resolution that would freeze the war and place it in charge of managing the “day after,” preempting any arrangements that might later be imposed contrary to its strategic vision or the interests of its allies.

The Peace Council and the International Stabilization Force

The Peace Council constitutes the central political pillar of Resolution 2803, functioning as a transitional authority with broad powers to administer Gaza until 2027. Its mandate encompasses security coordination, oversight of civil institutions, and the management of reconstruction efforts. This model follows earlier international precedents in Kosovo and East Timor, where international bodies temporarily administered conflict zones prior to reaching final political arrangements[3].

Meanwhile, the International Stabilization Force serves as the primary operational instrument of the resolution. The Security Council grants this force a mandate to use “necessary means” to maintain security, implement disarmament, protect humanitarian corridors, and train a new Palestinian police force-aligning it more closely with reinforced peacekeeping missions than with traditional observer forces, with direct coordination involving Egypt and Israel[4].

The pre-vote statement indicated the readiness of several Arab and Muslim states-including Egypt, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan-to participate in the force, contingent upon a clear mandate from the Security Council, which the resolution ultimately provided[5]. Various assessments suggest that the United States will provide the core logistical and technical support for the mission[6].

Nevertheless, this model faces substantial challenges: the complexity of the disarmament mandate; the potential for popular and factional rejection of an international force inside Gaza; divergent views among participating states regarding the nature of the mission; and the risk that the force might evolve into a de facto governing authority should the governance track falter. Experiences in Bosnia and Kosovo demonstrate that the success of such arrangements depends fundamentally on three pillars: local legitimacy, clarity of political mandate, and cohesion among the supporting international coalition[7].

Palestinian Legitimacy Between the PA and Hamas: A Struggle for Position or a Struggle Over the Political System?

Resolution 2803 exposes a multilayered crisis within the structure of the Palestinian political system, as both the PA and Hamas find themselves facing direct threats to their respective political positions and spheres of influence in Gaza. The resolution frames the PA as the “natural administrative partner” for the post-war phase, yet simultaneously binds it to a stringent set of political, administrative, and security reforms-reflecting persistent American and regional doubts about its ability to govern Gaza in its current form. The repeated references in the resolution to “restructuring,” “enhancing transparency,” and “developing institutions” suggest a possible push toward establishing a “modified authority,” or even creating a parallel administrative body linked directly to the Peace Council and the International Stabilization Force. Such an arrangement would, in effect, erode the PA’s traditional position as the sole official representative of the Palestinian people[8].

Conversely, Hamas views the resolution as a direct strategic threat-not only because it grants the international force a clear mandate for disarmament and security enforcement, but also because it redefines the governance architecture of Gaza in a manner that could ultimately marginalize or exclude the movement politically and militarily. From Hamas’s perspective, the Peace Council constitutes a form of “international trusteeship,” reminiscent of political models implemented in East Timor and Bosnia, where expansive international intervention curtailed the influence of local actors despite their objections[9].

Palestinian and international scholars warn that the tension between the PA and Hamas is not merely a dispute over “who governs Gaza,” but rather reflects a deeper crisis of legitimacy within the Palestinian political system: a governing authority struggling with profound public mistrust; an armed movement rejecting international arrangements; and an external axis seeking to reshape the governing environment from outside national institutions. Should decision-making power indeed shift toward an international council, the political divide may no longer be confined to “the West Bank versus Gaza,” but could evolve into a broader rift between a “local political system” and an “alternative international system.” This prospect is widely feared among Palestinian communities, who view it as a potential step toward a long-term political separation or externally engineered governance that overrides national will[10].

Thus, the core challenge in Resolution 2803 extends beyond the practicalities of implementing security and reconstruction arrangements. Rather, it lies in the ability to generate a viable political legitimacy capable of enduring amid deep internal fragmentation and amid regional and international competition over determining who holds the authority to shape Gaza’s “day after.”

The Position of Arab and Muslim States

Arab and Muslim states played a central role in advancing Resolution 2803. A coalition comprising Qatar, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia issued a joint statement calling for the “swift adoption” of the resolution in support of a ceasefire and to prevent a humanitarian collapse. However, this support was conditional: these states pressed for language referencing self-determination and the possibility of establishing a Palestinian state, prompting Washington to incorporate cautiously worded political formulations without making binding commitments[11].

This position reflects a broader Arab desire to prevent a political vacuum that Israel could exploit to impose unilateral arrangements or re-establish long-term security control over Gaza. As such, support for the resolution is regarded as the “least costly option” compared to a renewed war or leaving the Strip entirely to the geopolitical calculations of major powers[12]. Nonetheless, Arab and international analyses have expressed concerns that the broad mandate granted to the International Stabilization Force and the Peace Council could diminish the Arab role in managing Gaza or result in a new political architecture that sidelines the PA and deepens internal division.

Thus, the Arab position operates within a delicate equation: supporting arrangements that halt the fighting and protect civilians, while simultaneously working to prevent Gaza from being transformed into a purely international file detached from the Palestinian and Arab frameworks-at a moment requiring a careful balance between humanitarian imperatives and regional power considerations.

The Political Crisis Inside Israel

Resolution 2803 has intensified an already deep political crisis within Israel. Prime Minister Netanyahu welcomed the security-related components-particularly those concerning the disarmament of Gaza and the establishment of international arrangements that would ease the security burden on the Israeli military. However, he categorically rejected any language in the resolution that could be interpreted as advancing the notion of a Palestinian state or opening a new “political horizon.” This stance responds directly to pressure from religious-nationalist right-wing parties, which viewed even the resolution’s vague and nonbinding formulations as a direct threat to their ideological project of preventing any future political settlement[13].

In contrast, assessments within the military establishment reveal a clear divergence from the political leadership. Senior military officials argue that maintaining direct control over Gaza after the war is unsustainable, and that transitional international arrangements could allow the army to redeploy and reduce security costs. Meanwhile, the political right contends that any form of international presence-even a limited one-would ultimately pave the way for international pressure on final-status issues[14].

Debates within Israel’s governing institutions further reflect divisions over the question of “who should govern Gaza after the war?” While the security establishment increasingly leans toward accepting an international transitional administration to prevent a security vacuum and the rise of new factions, the hardline right insists on rejecting any non-Israeli governance model. This divide underscores a structural internal crisis: the political system’s inability to articulate a coherent vision for the day after.

The Russian–Chinese Position on Resolution 2803

Russia and China’s abstention from voting on Resolution 2803 revealed deep reservations about granting the United States an expansive mandate to oversee the transitional phase in Gaza. Although neither state exercised its veto power, Moscow argued that the resolution provides Washington with unchecked dominance over security and reconstruction mechanisms without parallel political guarantees-an approach that contradicts its vision of a multipolar international order. Beijing, meanwhile, focused on what it described as an imbalance within the text, criticizing the resolution’s failure to articulate a clear pathway toward a Palestinian state and stressing that any solution must address the “root causes of the conflict,” not merely its security dimensions. The two countries’ positions reflect a shared objection to allowing Washington exclusive authority over engineering the post-war political order and marginalizing other global powers at a moment of intensifying competition to reshape the Middle East’s role within the wider geopolitical landscape[15].

Comparing Resolution 2803 with the Oslo Process: A Prolonged Transitional Phase or a Fresh Reproduction of Ambiguity?

The Oslo Accords provide a vivid example of the dangers associated with open-ended transitional phases. The agreement-initially designed to lead to a Palestinian state within five years-ultimately evolved into an indefinite administrative-security framework, turning the “transition” into a permanent condition that generated deeper complexities rather than paving the way toward a political settlement. A close reading of Resolution 2803 suggests that several core elements of Oslo are being reproduced today: an expansive security mandate that precedes any political track; the creation of temporary governance structures for Gaza; and the linkage of political progress to security benchmarks and institutional restructuring within the PA. These dynamics create the possibility of a new “long transitional phase,” akin to the post-Oslo period, particularly in the absence of internal Palestinian consensus, a hardline Israeli government, and an American mandate that prioritizes security stability over engaging with the roots of the conflict[16].

The significance of this comparison lies in a central question: Can Resolution 2803 break the pattern of provisional governance that has defined the Palestinian experience since the 1990s? Or are we instead facing a new, security-enhanced variant of “Oslo 2.0”-one that risks prolonging the conflict rather than resolving it, especially given the lack of binding mechanisms or a clear timetable for ending the transitional period?

Gaza’s Post-War Economy: Between Reconstruction and the Constraints of Political Engineering

Gaza’s economy enters the post-war phase amid near-total infrastructural collapse and the shutdown of most productive sectors. Estimates by the World Bank and the UN Development Programme indicate massive losses potentially reaching tens of billions of dollars, rendering the Strip almost entirely dependent on international funding for years to come. Under Resolution 2803, the Peace Council and the International Stabilization Force are given a central role in overseeing reconstruction by managing financial inflows, determining project priorities, and establishing new economic oversight mechanisms. This may result in restructuring Gaza’s economic landscape according to the logic of “international administration” rather than local sovereignty[17].

Experiences from Kosovo and East Timor show that reconstruction under transitional international governance often produces fragile, aid-dependent economies with limited productive capacity and weak sovereign decision-making. Independent economic analyses suggest that Gaza’s economic recovery hinges on three conditions that Resolution 2803 does not fully guarantee: sustained opening of crossings; unification of Palestinian political authority; and freedom of movement for labor and goods. Consequently, the reconstruction file is likely to become a battleground of political and financial contestation among international actors, the PA, local factions, and Israel-making Gaza’s economy part of a broader political-engineering project rather than a straightforward recovery effort.

Scenarios: A Transitional Pathway or a New Wave of Instability?

A preliminary reading of the post–Resolution 2803 trajectories suggests three primary scenarios, each varying in its likelihood of materializing. The first is a scenario of relative success, in which the international transitional administration manages to impose a minimum level of security that allows for the reopening of crossings, the restoration of limited public services, and the commencement of reconstruction. Yet this scenario remains unlikely due to the absence of internal legitimacy and the divergent positions of local and regional actors.

The second scenario is one of failure-marked by the breakdown of the international stabilization force and the collapse of the transitional process. This could result from Palestinian factional rejection of international oversight, friction with local communities, and conflicting agendas among participating states, thereby reproducing a political and security vacuum reminiscent of the experiences of Bosnia or Iraq.

By contrast, the third scenario-structural complexity-appears the most plausible. Under this trajectory, Gaza remains in a state of “no war, no peace,” shaped by deep Palestinian fragmentation, an unstable Israeli political landscape dominated by the right, and U.S.–Russian–Chinese competition over the design of transitional arrangements. In this scenario, the resolution succeeds in freezing the conflict but fails to generate genuine stability, making the coming phase closer to the management of a chronic crisis than to a real political settlement.

Conclusion

Resolution 2803 reveals that what has been proposed for Gaza is not a pathway toward a political settlement, but rather an international transitional framework designed to freeze the war without establishing long-term stability. The resolution reshapes the balance of roles through clear American leadership and security arrangements that grant Israel direct gains, while placing the PA under pressure to implement deep reforms that may produce an alternative governance structure. At the same time, it marginalizes Hamas through an international mandate for disarmament and governance restructuring.

For Israel, the resolution constitutes a strategic windfall-achieving through diplomacy what it failed to secure through war. It transfers the burden of disarming Gaza from the Israeli military to a broad international mandate, shifts day-to-day security management to a multinational stabilization force, alleviates pressure on the army, and provides a way out of field-level attrition. It also places responsibility for addressing the humanitarian crisis on the international community, relieving Israel of its political and moral liabilities while granting it far-reaching security arrangements without any commitment to a political process for the Palestinians.

Most significantly, the resolution offers Israel a solution to the dilemma of “who governs Gaza?” by establishing a transitional international administration that distances it from the costs of governance while allowing it to preserve its security priorities at minimal cost. In doing so, the resolution provides Israel with strategic outcomes that the war itself did not produce, restructuring Gaza’s environment in a manner aligned with Israeli interests and without significant domestic repercussions.

Against the backdrop of internal Palestinian division, political fractures within Israel, and great-power competition among the United States, Russia, and China to shape the “day after,” Gaza appears headed toward a prolonged, fragile transitional phase vulnerable to regional and international power shifts. Moreover, the linkage of reconstruction to an expansive international mandate renders Gaza’s economy part of a broader external political-engineering process rather than a sovereign recovery effort.

[1] United Nations Security Council, Reports on Kosovo & Timor-Leste (UNMIK / UNTAET).

[2] The US and Gulf should not get distracted by grand visions: peace in Gaza must come first2025

[3] United Nations Security Council, Reports on Kosovo & Timor-Leste (UNMIK / UNTAET).

[4] United Nations Security Council – Official Documents (Resolution 2803)

[5] Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Qatar, Jordan, UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt (Non-UN Document)

[6] Brookings Prevailing in an era of comprehensive conflict

[7] International Crisis Group – Lessons from International Transitional Administrations.

[8] International Crisis Group. The Future of Palestinian Governance.

[9] Reuters – Hamas rejects international force & guardianship.

[10] Chatham House – Fragmentation of Palestinian Governance.

[11] Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministers of Qatar, Jordan, UAE, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt (Non-UN Document)

[12] Carnegie Middle East Center:Governing Gaza After the War: The Regional Perspectives

[13]  International Crisis Group, Israel/Palestine: Political Dynamics After the War, 2024.

[14] Carnegie Middle East Center: Israeli Policy Is Divided Into Two Main Camps. Neither One Offers a Realistic Path Forward  2025

[15] Al Jazeera – UN Security Council passes US resolution backing international Gaza force

[16] Carnegie Middle East Center –The Illusion of Oslo 2023

[17]  Gaza War: Expected Socio-Economic Impacts on the State of Palestine October 2024