Intelligence and the Construction of Influence in the Middle East: The Turkish Experience

Introduction: Why Has Intelligence Become an Instrument of Regional Power?

The Middle East is no longer governed, as it was during the twentieth century, solely through the balance of conventional armies, the size of military arsenals, or formal diplomatic alliances. The deeper transformation witnessed across the region over the past two decades lies in the shift of the center of gravity from “military power” to the “management of the security environment,” where the ability to manage disorder increasingly outweighs the mere possession of hard power. In other words, influence now depends on the capacity to shape the political and security landscape before it evolves into a direct threat.

This transformation emerged from the interaction of three major structural variables:

1. The collapse of centralized state authority in several Arab arenas after 2011,
2. The rise of armed non-state actors,
3. The declining effectiveness of traditional borders in the face of transnational networks.

Within this context, intelligence has become the most flexible and effective instrument of power because it combines knowledge acquisition, infiltration, special operations, cyber warfare, and covert diplomacy without incurring the costs or political sensitivities associated with conventional warfare. In other words, intelligence has evolved from a defensive function aimed at “knowing what is happening” into a strategic institution designed to “prevent what may happen” or “redirect it.”

Regionally, Israel pioneered this model through the Mossad and Unit 8200, where national security is built upon preemptive strikes and technological penetration. For decades, Israel institutionalized a model of “security through intelligence superiority,” enabling it to target adversaries beyond its borders before they develop into direct threats. Iran, meanwhile, constructed a parallel but more network-based model centered on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its regional proxies. Turkey, however, pursued a third path: transforming the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) into a hybrid platform that integrates preventive security, defense industries, unmanned aerial systems, cyber security, and intelligence diplomacy.

This transformation was inseparable from Turkey’s broader rise as a regional power seeking to move beyond the role of a mere “border state” situated between Europe and the Middle East toward becoming a “central state” capable of shaping developments in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Gulf, the Caucasus, and even Africa. Here lies the core significance of the issue: Turkey did not merely develop a powerful intelligence apparatus; it redefined intelligence itself as an instrument for restructuring the regional environment, employing security, intelligence, technology, and covert diplomacy as integrated tools within a broader project of geopolitical repositioning.

According to Turkish budget data, actual spending on the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) increased from approximately 23.9 billion Turkish lira in 2024 to 28.9 billion in 2025, with projections indicating that it will reach nearly 39.5 billion lira in 2026. This represents growth exceeding 65% within only two years, including an annual increase of 37% between 2025 and 2026. The 2024 budget itself had already recorded an extraordinary surge of 125.7% compared to 2023. In dollar terms, annual spending on MIT now ranges between $1.15 and $1.25 billion, placing it among the most heavily funded intelligence services in the region.[1]

This expansion reflects a broader transition of the Turkish state toward a model of “centralized security,” in which intelligence becomes a core pillar of decision-making rather than merely a subordinate institution within it.

The Turkish Transformation: From a Security Apparatus to a Strategic Institution

To understand the Turkish transformation, it is necessary to distinguish between two phases: the Kemalist-era MIT and the post-Justice and Development Party (AKP) MIT.

Under the traditional Kemalist model, the organization was primarily concerned with internal security, protecting the republican order, monitoring coup attempts, and containing Kurdish, leftist, and Islamist movements. In other words, it functioned largely as a “guardian of the state,” focused on protecting the domestic sphere and monitoring threats associated with the military, coups, and ideological movements.

However, with the rise of the Justice and Development Party, the Turkish state gradually began redefining itself both internally and externally, a process that inevitably required a redefinition of the role of intelligence. After 2002, Turkey found itself pursuing a different political project aimed at expanding Turkish influence beyond its borders. Such a project could not be sustained through diplomacy alone, particularly within the highly unstable environment of the Middle East. As Kurdish threats intensified, the Islamic State emerged, parts of Syria and Iraq collapsed, and regional competition with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Israel escalated, Ankara recognized that building sustainable regional influence required the restructuring of the intelligence institution itself.

At this stage, Hakan Fidan emerged as the pivotal figure in this transformation. Under his leadership since 2010, MIT evolved from a largely supervisory body into a strategic institution. Drawing upon both security and diplomatic experience, Fidan understood that Turkey could not play an influential regional role through diplomacy alone. He therefore contributed to freeing MIT from many of its old bureaucratic constraints and linking it directly to the executive decision-making center.

What emerged was a profound philosophical transformation. The new doctrine became centered on the principle of “preventing the formation of threats” rather than waiting for threats to materialize. Consequently, Turkish national security expanded beyond Turkey’s territorial borders to encompass northern Syria, the Qandil Mountains, Tripoli, the Horn of Africa, and even the networks of adversaries operating across Europe and Central Asia. This shift accelerated particularly with the intensification of the Syrian war, the reemergence of the armed Kurdish question, and the widening Gulf–Iranian–Israeli regional competition.

As a result, four pivotal transformations took place.

First, the legal authorities of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) were significantly expanded, particularly following the 2014 amendments,[2] which granted the agency access to the Defense Industry Support Fund and provided it with greater financial and operational flexibility. This meant that intelligence was no longer merely a consumer of security but had become part of the very architecture of Turkey’s defense power structure.

Second, following the failed coup attempt of 2016, Ankara reconstructed the security system on a more centralized basis closely tied to the presidency. In this context, MIT evolved from a conventional security service into a cornerstone of state reconstruction after the most serious internal crisis Turkey had faced in decades. During the subsequent years, MIT’s external operations expanded in an unprecedented manner, whether through the rendition of wanted individuals from multiple countries, the execution of high-level operations against cadres of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or the penetration of hostile networks. In this sense, Turkish intelligence became both a direct instrument for rebuilding the state after the coup attempt and a mechanism for extending Turkish influence beyond its borders.

Third, external operations expanded dramatically. From northern Syria to Iraq, from Libya to the Balkans, and from pursuing Gülen Movement networks to constructing complex intelligence channels, MIT was transformed into a transnational operational arm.

Fourth, intelligence became increasingly integrated with the defense industry, particularly unmanned aerial systems. Turkey did not merely develop drones; it constructed an operational model linking intelligence surveillance directly to immediate military execution.

This integration was reflected in the remarkable growth of the Turkish defense sector. In 2024, Turkish defense exports exceeded $7.1 billion before rising to nearly $10 billion in 2025, representing an annual increase of 48%. At the same time, the revenues of Turkey’s five largest defense companies reached approximately $10.1 billion.[3]

Turkey’s rise in the defense industry, particularly in the field of unmanned aerial systems such as the Bayraktar TB2, Bayraktar Akıncı, and TAI Anka, formed part of a broader strategic architecture. These drones provided Turkey with the ability to transform intelligence information into direct operational action with unprecedented speed. In northern Iraq and Syria, intelligence became part of an integrated chain beginning with surveillance, followed by analysis, and culminating in immediate execution.

This capability reduced operational costs, enhanced deterrence effectiveness, and provided Ankara with a distinctive model combining operational flexibility with technological precision.

The “Ibrahim Kalın” Doctrine: Preventive Intelligence, the Cyber Homeland, and Covert Diplomacy

If Hakan Fidan represented the phase of “strategic operationalization,” then İbrahim Kalın represents the phase of “doctrinal theorization.” Coming from an intellectual and strategic background, Kalın seeks to establish an independent Turkish school of intelligence.

The essence of Turkey’s new intelligence doctrine, as outlined in “Stratcom 2026,” is structured around five interconnected pillars.

First: Preventive Intelligence – the transition from reacting to threats toward preventing their formation in the first place. This means that Turkish security is understood to begin in northern Aleppo, Sinjar, and Tripoli, rather than solely at Turkey’s physical borders.

Second: The Cyber Homeland – just as Turkey adopted the concept of the “Blue Homeland” in the maritime sphere, it is gradually embracing the notion of the “Cyber Homeland,” in which digital infrastructure becomes an integral component of national sovereignty. This is particularly significant in an era characterized by escalating data wars and cyberattacks. Servers, digital infrastructure, data systems, and communication networks are increasingly treated as elements of national security.

Third: Covert Diplomacy or “Intelligence Diplomacy” – Turkey has increasingly employed the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) as a platform for mediation and secret communications. Prisoner exchange agreements, mediation between rival intelligence services, and the management of backchannel communications in the Gaza, Ukraine, and Russia files all reflect the transformation of intelligence from a hidden activity into a mechanism for “managing regional balances.”

This approach has provided Turkey with a distinctive advantage compared to Iran, whose strategy relies more heavily on proxy networks, and Israel, which places greater emphasis on precision strikes. Turkey, by contrast, seeks to position itself as a “regional intelligence hub”; that is, a state possessing not only the capacity to strike adversaries but also the ability to bring rivals to a covert negotiating table whenever its interests require it.

Fourth, the environment of espionage itself has undergone a qualitative transformation in operational patterns. Intelligence activity is no longer limited to traditional agents or officers operating under diplomatic cover. Instead, it increasingly depends on more complex structures involving front companies, organized crime networks, and private investigators operating through informal arrangements that are difficult to trace through conventional means.

This transformation reflects the evolution of espionage from a direct individual model into a multilayered network-based model in which operations are managed through civilian and commercial fronts, thereby increasing the degree of concealment and complicating detection efforts.

Within this context, the Turkish counterintelligence approach has also evolved beyond traditional surveillance-based methods toward more flexible models centered on dismantling networks, analyzing behavioral patterns, and penetrating intermediary structures. This demonstrates a clear adaptation to a more complex threat environment in which the challenge no longer lies merely in identifying an individual agent, but in dismantling the broader system within which that agent operates.

Fifth: Building an Independent Turkish Conceptual Framework – the “Turkish School.” This is perhaps the most strategically significant pillar of all. The objective is not merely to improve operational performance, but to establish a distinct Turkish intelligence doctrine rather than relying on Western, Russian, or conventional models. In essence, Turkey seeks to construct its own “theory of national security” tailored specifically to the Turkish and regional geopolitical sphere.

Here, an extremely important point emerges in strategic assessment: if Ankara succeeds in effectively integrating these five pillars, it will not merely be seeking to protect its national security, but rather to produce a competing regional model positioned between:

• the Israeli school (qualitative and technological superiority),
• the Iranian school (networks and proxy structures),
• and the Western school (institutional and transnational security governance).

From this perspective, the most accurate reading of the Turkish project is that it operates on two interconnected levels. The first is operational, encompassing preventive intelligence, cyber security, and artificial intelligence – namely, the tools that enhance efficiency, speed, preemption, and control. The second is strategic, encompassing intelligence diplomacy and the Turkish conceptual school – that is, the instruments that transform the intelligence apparatus from a security institution into a producer of influence and strategic knowledge.

This distinction is highly significant because it demonstrates that Turkey is not merely attempting to build a more effective intelligence service, but rather seeking to construct a state model in which intelligence functions as a mechanism for redefining the country’s position within the regional order.

Lessons Derived from the Turkish Experience

The lessons derived from the Turkish experience lie primarily in the manner through which Ankara redefined the very concept of regional power. The Turkish case offers a practical model of how a state can transition from merely reacting to threats toward actively shaping its surrounding strategic environment. This transformation carries profound implications for Middle Eastern states, particularly medium and smaller powers operating within volatile regional environments without possessing overwhelming conventional military capabilities.

The first lesson is that modern intelligence is no longer merely an informational apparatus; it has become a strategic institution for decision-making and environmental management. Turkey succeeded not simply because it improved intelligence collection, but because it connected intelligence directly to rapid executive decision-making, technology, the defense industry, and diplomacy.

In other words, power today lies not only in identifying threats, but in the ability to transform knowledge into a multidimensional response employing multiple instruments simultaneously. This raises a fundamental question for regional states: do their intelligence services still operate according to the logic of “security archiving,” or according to the logic of “strategic engineering”?

The second lesson concerns the centrality of institutional integration. The Turkish experience demonstrates that intelligence effectiveness increases substantially when intelligence institutions are no longer isolated from the broader state apparatus. The integration between MIT, the defense industry, unmanned aerial systems, cyber security, and foreign policy created what can be described as an “integrated national security ecosystem.”

Many Arab states continue to suffer from fragmented security structures in which institutions often operate within separate or even competing bureaucratic frameworks. The Turkish model suggests that the future lies not in the expansion of security agencies themselves, but in the integration between them.

The third lesson is linked to the concept of “preventive security.” Rather than waiting for threats to reach its borders, Turkey developed an approach centered on neutralizing threats within their original environment. Although this concept carries significant costs and complexities, it reflects a transition from passive defense toward the management of strategic depth.

For states such as Jordan or the Gulf countries, this does not necessarily mean replicating the Turkish model in its entirety. Rather, it highlights the importance of building proactive capabilities in dealing with border-related challenges, transnational networks, and the digital sphere instead of relying solely on reactive responses.

The fourth lesson is that technology is no longer a supporting element; it has become an integral component of security doctrine itself. Unmanned aerial systems, artificial intelligence, electronic warfare, and data security are not merely technical tools, but strategic factors reshaping regional balances of power.

One of Turkey’s most notable achievements lies in the fact that it did not merely import technological security capabilities, but invested heavily in localizing them domestically, thereby reducing dependency and increasing its margin of strategic autonomy. The lesson here is clear: security in the emerging Middle East will no longer be measured solely by the number of soldiers a state possesses, but by its ability to control sovereign technological infrastructure.

The fifth lesson concerns the importance of “intelligence diplomacy.” Turkey recognized that intelligence is not limited to covert operations or targeted eliminations; it can also function as a channel for mediation, crisis management, and the opening of backchannel negotiations. This dimension is particularly important for states seeking to maximize their regional role without becoming directly involved in open conflicts. In other words, intelligence can serve as an instrument of political influence rather than merely a security tool.

The sixth lesson, and perhaps the most sensitive, is that expanding the role of intelligence simultaneously creates opportunities and risks. The further an intelligence apparatus expands beyond national borders, the greater its capacity to shape events – but also the greater the risks of overstretch, entanglement, and confrontation with regional and international powers.

The Turkish experience demonstrates that intelligence success always requires a solid economic foundation, internal legitimacy, and careful management of regional balances; otherwise, expansion itself may become a strategic burden. This is a particularly important lesson for regional states: effective security cannot be separated from domestic political and economic stability.

The seventh lesson, particularly relevant for Jordan, is that the regional environment is evolving from a conflict over borders into a conflict over networks. The rise of Turkey, Iran, and Israel is measured not only by the strength of their militaries, but also by their ability to build influence through information networks, cyber capabilities, local actors, and security diplomacy.

This means that preserving Jordan’s regional role requires strengthening its ability to interpret and navigate regional networks rather than focusing exclusively on conventional military movements, particularly in relation to Syria, Palestine, and the broader religious-political sphere.

The eighth lesson is that building a “national school” in security and intelligence is more sustainable than merely replicating external models. One of the defining strengths of the Turkish experience lies in its attempt to develop its own conceptual vocabulary rather than relying entirely on Western or Russian schools of thought. This does not imply isolation from international expertise, but rather adapting external experiences to fit national particularities. Many Middle Eastern states still operate within imported security frameworks more than within approaches rooted in their own strategic environments.

The most important conclusion is that the Turkish experience demonstrates that regional influence in the new Middle East is built through a complex equation: information + technology + operational flexibility + diplomacy + economic capacity + strategic narrative. This constitutes the essence of the transformation.

In other words, the ultimate lesson is not simply “how can a state become stronger in intelligence capabilities?” but rather: how can a state build the capacity to transform its security into influence, and its influence into a sustainable regional position, without losing its internal balance? This is the real challenge – not only for Turkey, but for most Middle Eastern states in the coming decade.

[1] Nordic Monitor, “Turkey’s Intelligence Agency Expands as Budget Surges and Powers Grow.” January 7, 2026 https://nordicmonitor.com/2026/01/turkeys-intelligence-agency-expands-as-budgets-surge-and-powers-grow/ and Middle East Forum, “Turkey’s Intelligence Agency Expands as Erdoğan Centralizes Power,” January 8, 2026 https://www.meforum.org/mef-online/turkeys-intelligence-agency-expands-as-erdogan-centralizes-power

[2] The 2014 amendments to the MIT Law constituted a pivotal turning point in the structure of Turkish intelligence. They expanded the agency’s authority in external operations, granted it broader capabilities in data collection and surveillance, and provided wider legal immunity for its personnel. The amendments also established a legal framework for covert communications with armed groups within the context of national security. As a result, MIT evolved from a traditional security apparatus into a multidimensional strategic institution integrating intelligence, cyber security, external operations, and covert diplomacy. https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2014/04/17/turkish-parliament-approves-national-intelligence-bill

[3] See: https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2025/02/04/turkeys-defense-exports-hit-record-high-of-71-billion-in-2024/ and https://defenceturkey.com/news/general-assessment-of-the-turkish-defense-and-aerospace-industry-in-2025-and-targets-for-2026