Iraqi Parliamentary Elections 2025: Contexts and Key Alliances
The Iraqi context has always been “exceptional” by nature, with elections typically held under sensitive and pivotal circumstances in the life of the country and its political system in particular. The upcoming elections, scheduled for November 11, may not differ much from these descriptions; however, they come amid an extremely complex environment in which domestic dynamics intertwine with regional transformations that began on October 7. These developments have cast their shadow over the entire region-albeit to varying degrees-and have redrawn many of the existing balances and roles.
Despite attempts at neutrality, Iraq remains in the spotlight, facing ongoing threats of targeting armed factions and continued sanctions on several Iraqi banks accused of illegal activities, as well as on certain entities and individuals allegedly “linked” to the Iranian regime. Moreover, the current electoral context cannot be separated from the mounting pressures on Iran, especially following the Israeli and American strikes last June and the reimposition of sanctions after the recent activation of the “snapback” mechanism.
Under these shifts, Iraq is enveloped in a charged atmosphere marked by intense competition among political forces-a struggle that has intensified since the beginning of this year to define the contours of the coming stage. Some actors seek to preserve the status quo, others aim for modest adjustments to the traditional political equation to gain new advantages, while a third group declares ambitions to introduce fundamental reforms to the very structure of the political system.
Amid these dynamics, a central question arises regarding voter turnout. Iraq’s elections have witnessed a steady decline in participation, dropping from 76% in 2005 to 41% in 2021, according to official figures-numbers that are consistently met with skepticism from non-governmental organizations monitoring elections. These groups frequently criticize the methods used to calculate voter participation, often accusing the authorities of inflating the numbers.
What amplifies the importance of this question is the prevailing stagnation in achieving real political change since the early elections of 2021, which were initially held in response to the massive “Tishreen” protests that erupted in 2019. However, it can be argued that the post-election developments amounted to a reversal of those popular demands and a reproduction of the existing order. This began with the amendments to the electoral law in March 2023, which reinstated the Sainte-Laguë system and adopted a 1.7 electoral divisor-a formula that enables large and influential parties to maintain their dominance in parliament while reducing the chances of smaller or emerging parties to gain representation.
Moreover, over the past four years, Iraq has witnessed a deepening sense of public frustration, driven by the monopoly of representation and decision-making by established political forces, the absence of tangible reform, and the continued influence of armed factions, whether they are formally part of the ruling coalition or operating outside of it.
According to figures released by the Independent High Electoral Commission, the upcoming elections will witness the participation of 31 coalitions, 38 political parties, and 75 independent candidates. Contestants will compete for 320 general seats and 9 quota seats allocated to minority components. Based on the nature of the electoral alliances, slogans, and political rhetoric that have emerged since the launch of campaign activities on October 3, many traditional and major political forces have expressed their ambitions by adopting identity-based discourse, capitalizing on networks of interests and influence, and showcasing “service-oriented” achievements as political successes that qualify them to manage the state.
On the electoral alliance map, the most prominent Shiite bloc is the “Reconstruction and Development Coalition”, led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who seeks a second term in office. However, this ambition faces a Shiite veto opposing the idea of any prime minister serving two consecutive terms after Nouri al-Maliki, the leader of the State of Law Coalition. Al-Maliki, for his part, is working to increase his coalition’s share of parliamentary seats, relying on the historic base of the Islamic Dawa Party and the network of interests and influence within the public sector that he built during his premiership from 2006 to 2014.
Although often described as moderate, the National State Forces Alliance, led by the Wisdom Movement’s leader Ammar al-Hakim, has chosen to adopt the slogan “Don’t Waste It”, a phrase that carries sectarian undertones aimed at electoral mobilization. The alliance recently witnessed the withdrawal of the Victory Coalition, headed by former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, in protest against what he described as the absence of safeguards to prevent the misuse of political money.
Other Shiite formations are also emerging in the upcoming elections, including the Sadiqoun Movement, affiliated with Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and led by Qais al-Khazali; the Badr Organization list, headed by Hadi al-Amiri; the “Abshir Ya Iraq” coalition, led by Humam Hammoudi, Secretary-General of the Islamic Supreme Council; and the Iraqi Foundation Alliance, headed by Mohsen al-Mandalawi, the First Deputy Speaker of the Parliament.
On the Sunni front, the political arena is witnessing intense competition over the representation of the Sunni community. Many of these forces openly declare in their political rhetoric that their alliances are primarily dedicated to representing Sunnis in Iraq.
Notably, Mohammed al-Halbousi, leader of the Taqaddum (Progress) Alliance and former Speaker of Parliament, has shifted his electoral discourse from emphasizing reconstruction in the previous elections to adopting a more identity-centered slogan, “We Are a Nation”-a phrase that carries sectarian overtones, referring to Sunnis as a distinct “nation” while implicitly framing other groups as mere sects or minorities.
Another key player is the Siyada (Sovereignty) Alliance, led by Khamis al-Khanjar, who initially founded his party through an alliance with al-Halbousi and presents himself as a representative of the Sunni-majority provinces. Alongside this bloc are other major Sunni alliances that split from al-Khanjar, most prominently the Azm (Determination) Alliance led by Muthanna al-Samarrai, now considered a central Sunni political pole, as well as the Hasm (Decisiveness) Alliance, headed by Defense Minister Thabit al-Abbasi.
On the Kurdish front, the traditional equation remains largely intact, represented by the two historically dominant parties: the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), led by Masoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), headed by Bafel Talabani. Alongside them stands the New Generation Movement, which has often sought to disrupt this long-standing balance, particularly after securing nine seats in the most recent elections.
As for the civil and reformist forces, many of which emerged from the Tishreen (October) 2019 protests, some have chosen to align with ruling political powers, such as the “Nazil Haqqi” Movement, which decided to join the Reconstruction and Development Coalition. Others have opted to form new alliances-some of which boycotted previous elections, while others are seeking to re-enter the parliamentary race. Notably, the “Alternative” Alliance brings together civil and leftist groups, including the National Home Movement, the Independence Party led by MP Sajjad Salim, and the Iraqi Communist Party. The coalition is headed by Adnan al-Zurfi, the 2020 prime ministerial candidate, known for his critical stance toward armed factions.
In addition to the “Alternative” Alliance, the Civil Democratic Alliance also stands out, comprising several civil and democratic forces under the leadership of Ali al-Rifa’i, Secretary-General of the Social Democratic Current.
Given these alliances and figures, it can be said that the competitive equation of the elections has not changed significantly, as most political forces appear intent on reproducing the existing political order.
However, in terms of voter participation, beyond the previously mentioned factors, the boycott by the Sadrist Movement-often described as the “Shiite national current”-will likely have a profound impact on the upcoming elections. The movement, which secured the largest number of votes and seats in the previous elections, withdrew from parliament after failing to implement its so-called “National Majority Project.” It is no secret that the Sadrists enjoy a massive popular base unmatched by any other political force in Iraq. Consequently, their absence will inevitably affect voter turnout, further shaping the overall dynamics and legitimacy of the electoral process.