The “Victory” of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and the “Post-Jihadism” Model

Despite Ahmad al-Shara’ (formerly Abu Muhammad al-Jolani) emphasizing the closure of past chapters and committing to a new methodology with a Syrian character—manifested in a wholly new ideological and political discourse distinct from that of global jihadist movements—the movement’s roots, context, and other facets represent a new model within jihadist movements. This is described by one of its most prominent theorists, Abdul Rahim Attoun, in an earlier lecture on the “third path” associated with “local jihadism” or what he terms moderate jihadism. He presented this path as a new model represented by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and the Taliban (particularly after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s return to power), including Hamas as a national jihadist movement.

HTS has remarkably severed its alliances with the two main branches of global Salafi jihadism. First, al-Jolani renounced his ties with ISIS and refused to pledge allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2013 when the latter declared the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (before it later became the caliphate), relying instead on Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of al-Qaeda (who strongly advocated ideologically on behalf of al-Jolani). Second, al-Jolani announced his split from al-Qaeda a few years later, claiming it was consensual. However, it was later revealed that al-Zawahiri was furious about this and that it led to another ideological and media war between the two men. This culminated in HTS dismantling al-Qaeda’s presence and leadership within its ranks, resulting in the splintering of Hurras al-Din, which became the last stronghold of al-Qaeda in the Middle East but was reduced to an isolated group in Idlib. HTS contributed to its downfall, and the remaining leaders of Hurras al-Din are reportedly under undeclared house arrest in Idlib.

In contrast to these splits and ideological divergences, HTS appears to admire and support an entirely different model: the Taliban in Afghanistan. Since its return to power, the “new Taliban” has declared its independence from al-Qaeda and global jihadism and undertaken a major shift in its global relations by agreeing with the Americans (in the Doha negotiations, before regaining power) not to use its territory against U.S. and Western interests. This commitment remains evident, as al-Qaeda’s operations from Afghanistan and elsewhere have nearly ceased since its resurgence, despite al-Zawahiri’s endorsement of the Taliban’s victory before his death in Kabul in a U.S. strike in 2022. Currently, al-Qaeda’s leadership (presumably under Saif al-Adel, based in Tehran) is in a state of near “ideological, political, and operational coma.”

In light of these contexts, transformations, and developments, what does the success of HTS in toppling the Assad regime and seizing power mean for global jihadism? To begin with, it is useful to examine the positions of other movements regarding this “victory.” The first party to criticize, accuse, and condemn HTS is ISIS, which previously engaged in ideological and armed confrontations with HTS, culminating in mutual excommunication and denouncement. ISIS’s official magazine Al-Naba (issue 1473) published an article titled “Domestication and Recruitment,” stating, “There is no longer a pressing need to recruit new militias to fight the mujahideen. Counterterrorism strategies have advanced to the point where former jihadists are domesticated and recruited to carry out the mission, serving the interests of the global infidel system and satisfying those infatuated with power.” The article claimed that HTS’s domestication involved a long, deliberate process conducted in intelligence basements and research centers, allowing HTS to overthrow the previous regime only after a new alternative had been tested, describing it as “combating Shara’ with Shara’.”

On the other hand, while al-Qaeda has not issued an official statement on HTS’s victory (or at least, nothing noteworthy has been found by the author), its position is clearly more complex and ambiguous than that of ISIS. HTS split from al-Qaeda and engaged in ideological confrontations, effectively eliminating al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria. However, al-Qaeda itself has undergone significant transformations and ideological adaptations, as revealed by the Abbottabad documents, which initially reflected these changes through Jabhat al-Nusra. Ultimately, the relationship between HTS and al-Qaeda ended in severance. Nonetheless, al-Qaeda refrained from criticizing the Taliban and supported its return to power, even though al-Zawahiri was aware that the price was the strategic separation between the Taliban and the new al-Qaeda.

Despite this, prominent Salafi jihadist theorist Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, considered the spiritual father of traditional jihadism and a supporter of Hurras al-Din (which split from HTS), harshly criticized HTS and its behavior post-victory through a secret account on X (formerly Twitter). While he expressed happiness over Assad’s defeat, he feared HTS would abandon the implementation of Sharia, jihad against Israel, and align itself with international and secular local powers. One post from the account said, “Do not think that by bowing to the Crusaders—both Western and Eastern—or by accommodating the supporters of the fallen regime, expanding to secularists, and softening your stance toward the Nusayris and Druze, they will respect or support you or secure your throne. If you believe so, you are utterly naive and have learned nothing from Morsi’s experience. Those who respect and support you are those who shed their blood when you promised to implement Sharia.”

Unsurprisingly, the Taliban is the main jihadist movement congratulating HTS. The Afghan foreign minister contacted Syria’s interim foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, to congratulate him and affirm support, as both belong to the same “ideological current,” according to HTS theorist Abdul Rahim Attoun. Nevertheless, HTS has clearly moved beyond the Taliban’s boundaries, breaking ideologically with jihadist movements altogether. Its current rhetoric on governance, international relations, minorities, and various domestic and foreign policy issues is entirely distinct from both old and new jihadism, including the Taliban. While the latter maintained its adherence to an Islamic state and Sharia, HTS has stated it seeks a system agreed upon by all Syrians rather than imposing a traditional Islamist regime.

At this critical juncture, Arab diplomatic circles report that Ahmad al-Shara’ views the Turkish model as more suitable for Syria. By “Turkish model”, he refers to the ideological shift of the Justice and Development Party at its inception, reconciling Islam and secularism into a political model akin to center-right or Christian democratic parties, or even religiously conservative ones like the U.S. neoconservatives.

Such credible leaks about al-Shara’s vision and his movement’s actions (from an ideological and political perspective, not their authority-driven behavior) highlight the importance of context in shaping the ideologies and narratives of all Islamic movements, whether jihadist, moderate, or otherwise. Should HTS’s political experiment succeed, it could inspire and serve as a learning model for other Islamic movements. Conversely, if it fails, the momentum may shift back to alternative Islamic narratives and ideologies.