“The New Syria”: Religion, The State and Future of Islamism

The main question regarding Ahmad al-Shar’a and the controversial role of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria’s future goes beyond personal or partisan dimensions. In other words, it’s not the core issue. The main question is whether al-Julani or HTS (in whatever political form it may take – a political party or an ideological alliance) will be a dominant actor in the upcoming Syrian landscape.

The fundamental issue concerns shaping the relationship between religion and the state in Syria in the coming phase, whether at the constitutional level and framing the relationship between different actors or the concept of the state that will be formed through constitutional transcripts and various legislations. This matter related to Syria and a contentious issue that dominated discussions and debates among political elites in the post-Arab Spring 2011. This applies to both the committees drafting constitutions, legislation, and parliamentary elections, which are the most crucial aspects of internal conflicts related to cultural and value dominance within society.

The issue takes on different dimensions in Syria and is linked to the nature of the Syrian society and state and the contemporary historical contexts. The fear of establishing an Islamic fundamentalist state, similar to the Taliban movement, is unlikely for many reasons -as the writer of these lines views it-. These reasons include the openness and pragmatism shown by al-Jolani during the past period and the nature of the Syrian society, which tends to be open, moderate, and distant from religious extremism, as seen in Al-Qaeda and ISIS models. This explains how al-Jolani managed to rid himself of all the individuals and leaders who initially helped him establish the Al-Nusra Front, most of whom were Arabs, especially Jordanians (who later defected and formed the Hurras al-Din group in Idlib, which later then al-Jolani besieged it and facilitate the elimination of most of its leaders). Then, the group became predominantly composed of Syrians, with only a few jihadist factions remaining (mainly from Central Asia, and their fate is likely to be the same as the Arab jihadists in Bosnia in the mid-1990s: either leaving or abandoning arms and integrating into society).

Moreover, among the critical factors preventing the establishment of an Islamic state in Syria (similar to the Taliban or even Iran) are the international and regional constraints. It became evident in  “the Aqaba meeting on Syria”  that there is an international and regional consensus (despite significant disagreements over specific issues and the conflict over influence in Syria in the coming period) on a set of common principles: the unity of Syrian territory, religious, political cultural and ethnic pluralism, protection of minorities, and a rejection of religious extremism and terrorism. However, the international and regional community follows a step-by-step policy towards Ahmad al-Shar’a and his organisation, linking any steps to lifting sanctions and supporting Syria based on his realistic messages and commitments.

In light of this, there is undoubtedly full Turkish backing behind the scenes for al-Shar’a and his organisation. It is worth noting that Turkey attempted to rehabilitate al-Shar’a and present him to the international community years ago. Still, the international and regional stance at that time was rigid. Today, however, the balance of power and stances have shifted, and even the United States has acknowledged that it has started a dialogue with Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham. This might lead some people to develop a scenario where the inspiring model for Syrian political Islam in the coming phase could be the Turkish model, represented by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. This model could seem suitable for the Syrian context, especially given the distinctive urban religious style that developed in Syria over the past decades, which also produced a class of politicians, intellectuals, philosophers, scientists, and artists who do not align with political Islamism. A significant number of them joined the opposition or refused to participate in the former regime’s dictatorship. These individuals do not view Syria through the lens of political Islam but from a completely different perspective, seeking their right to live according to the culture they envision. Therefore, the “Turkish model,” which blends secularism with Islamism, might be able to offer convincing answers to a broad social segment.

The researcher and journalist Mohamed Turki Al-Rabi’o wrote on his social media account, warning that it is premature for many analysts and politicians to talk about the Turkish model as the most suitable for the Syrian situation, especially with Turkish influence that might facilitate such a similarity. He attributed this to the fact that the Turkish model has undergone transformations and lost its appeal in recent years. I partially agree with him (that there are still challenges and obstacles to this outcome). Still, on the other hand, the issues that afflicted the model (as mentioned by Al-Rabi’o) are not necessarily related to the idea itself but instead to power and personal interests. In any case, the Turkish model has proven its ability and effectiveness in overcoming a fundamental question related to drawing the lines of the relationship between religion and the state and finding a formula that satisfies both the Islamist and secular sides. The Turkish model has created a type of conservative secularism or acceptable liberal Islamism both domestically and internationally.

The first question relates to writing the constitution, forming the committee responsible for it, who will constitute the committee, and what articles will be agreed upon regarding the identity of the state and the relationship between religion and the state. Here, the biggest challenge may not come from Ahmad al-Shar’a but rather from the debate between the multiple Islamic currents on the one hand and the secular currents and other minorities on the other. Suppose everyone adheres to the Aqaba meeting declaration (made just days ago by the Arab Contact Group, in addition to Arab, European, and American countries, the United Nations, and the European Union). In that case, there are clear conditions and parameters for building and designing the new political system and transcribing the constitution. This is a key condition for accepting Al-Shar’a, HTS, and the new system in Syria within the regional environment and the international community. However, Al-Shar’a seems willing to cross many ideological and intellectual boundaries to achieve this, as evidenced by his previous career, his ability to adapt and his personal and political pragmatism.

Of course, the question of the new constitution is not limited to the relationship between religion and the state. Instead, there are many questions related to minorities, such as whether the upcoming system of governance will be federal or unified and the stance of minorities on this issue. However, what concerns us most in this article is primarily the issue of religion and the state due to its significant internal and external intellectual, political, societal, and cultural implications.

The next question -in the dialectic of religion and the state- concerns which political forces will dominate the new political system. Recent societal, cultural, and political transformations in Syria indicate that the degree of religiosity and the influence of various Islamic currents are increasing and expanding. This is causing concern among secular, sectarian, and minority groups about their cultural, social, and religious freedoms, as well as fear of the “Islamization of curricula”. It is well known that this concern has significantly contributed to the political polarisation and ideological struggles in other Arab political experiences, which ultimately led to the failure of democratic experiments.

Furthermore, democratic transition experiences, or the shift from an authoritarian system to an “uncertain democracy, ” as Guillermo O’Donnell and Schmitter described, remain in their infancy and have not settled on consensus answers between political and intellectual forces. Therefore, issues such as religion, society, the state, and civil and individual freedoms remain significant, problematic, and contentious in the Arab world, and the Syrian case is part of this historical phase.