Al-Safadi in Damascus: An Attempt to Evaluate

In an unannounced and surprising move, Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Al-Safadi visited to the Syrian capital, Damascus, carrying a verbal message from King Abdullah II. During his visit, he met with Bashar Al-Assad and several Syrian officials. This visit comes at a sensitive time amid a turbulent regional context in the Middle East, underscoring the importance of direct diplomatic engagement and exploring the positions of various parties, particularly Arab actors linked to Iran.

In this context, Al-Safadi’s visit perhaps goes beyond addressing Jordan’s primary concerns in Syria—namely, tackling the active drug illicit networks in southern Syria and discussing the future of the safe and voluntary repatriation of Syrian refugees currently in Jordan. On the contrary, the timing of the visit opens the door to discussions on more critical issues, particularly at this stage. This raises assumptions that could contribute to a broader understanding of Syria’s geopolitical landscape, closely tied to regional developments in the Middle East and the increasing probability of Syria’s soil becoming a new arena for the confrontation between Iran and Israel.

Al-Safadi’s visit could be seen as Jordan’s attempt to build an assessment of the Arab stance through direct communication with the Syrian regime and to evaluate the regime’s position in the upcoming phase. It provides an opportunity to understand whether Damascus is willing to gradually distance itself from Iran in order to survive amid regional shifts, which could pose an existential threat to the Syrian regime—especially with the looming threat of an imminent Israeli strike. However, some political circles and military assessments indicate that Israel is increasingly likely to target areas controlled by the Syrian regime. Recent Israeli military movements in the northern Golan Height indicate a potential Israeli intention to expand the buffer zone between Syria and Israel or even launch military operations, which might include a ground invasion in southern Syria.

It appears that the Israeli government no longer senseconstrained from opening a new front in southern Syria. These perceptions are potentially fueled by the ongoing obsession of the Israeli far-right with expanding the scope of the war in the Middle East and the desire of Israeli decision-makers to seize theenticing opportunity to restructure the regional landscape, especially concerning Iran’s presence in the surrounding area, thereby achieving Israel’s strategic objectives. All these indicators put the Syrian regime at risk of being the next target of the anticipated Israeli attack in response to Iran.

Meanwhile, the “Axis of Resistance” is aware that areas under Syrian regime control are turning into a direct battleground with Israel. The continued flow of fighters and military experts into Syria is notable in preparation for this. Recently, 25 leaders and experts from Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement (the Houthi) arrived in the Syrian city of Deir Ezzor via the Iraqi border. Reports indicate that these specialists are skilled in operating drones and missiles. In addition, many elements of Iran’s Quds Force and Iraqi military factions are also preparing for a potential confrontation on Syrian soil.

Thus, Amman is conscious of the immense challenges facing the Syrian regime, particularly if regime-controlled areas turn into an open battlefield for clashes between Iranian factions and Israel. Such a scenario would likely increase the risks and threats arising from the reactions of both sides and these implications for Jordan’s security and stability. Therefore, Jordan might seek to revive Arab diplomatic efforts with the Syrian regime and reactivate the “step-for-step” approach, which has often deadlocked due to the regime’s lack of seriousness in responding to Arab and Jordan’sdemands. In addition, Jordan’s approach is rooted in the realization, dating back to 2021, that the Syrian regime is the closest actor with whom it can interact to secure Jordan’s vital interests, especially in southern Syria.

The recent diplomatic engagement presents a “goldenopportunity” for the Syrian regime to reintegrate into the Arab depth if utilized effectively. This opportunity arises amidst growing resentment from Iran and the “Axis of Resistance” toward the regime for its non-involvement -even minimally- in supporting the Axis, particularly on the Golan Heights front, during the past year of the war on Gaza. Additionally, there is ongoing Russian dissatisfaction with the Syrian regime’s behavior, which closely aligns with Iran’s interests, especially in obstructing efforts to normalize relations with Turkey—a process that Russia has actively sought to promote in recent months.

In conclusion, as the future of the ongoing war in the Middle East remains uncertain and the potential for its expansion into Syrian territory grows, Al-Safadi’s visit to Damascus stands out as a significant diplomatic move. However, its underlying message remains an open question, particularly concerning the Syrian regime’s position amidst these transformations. From a realist perspective, a question arises about the regime’s ability to gradually disengage from Iranian influence and the extent of its maneuverability. Even if Damascus demonstrates a political will to do so, it faces the challenge of limited capacity due to the depth of Iranian influence within its military structures, as well as the presence of Iranian-affiliated factions, installations, and military sites—especially in southern Syria.

Thus, Syria’s challenges extend beyond the risk of Israeli military expansion into regime-controlled territory. The ongoing internal conflict, without a genuine political settlement, remains the primary dilemma, especially given the division of Syrian territory among major local actors, most notably the Syrian regime, which controls approximately 63% of Syria’s land. Additionally, international and regional polarization persists, leading to the direct involvement of foreign powers on Syria’s soil, alongside the proliferation of drug illicit networks and organized crime. Not to mention the possibility of the safe return of Syrian refugees. Accordingly, even if the Syrian regime manages to navigate the regional escalation between Israel and Iran, this will not resolve all of Syria’s complex and interwoven crises, which go far beyond these immediate concerns.