Jordan’s Intervention in Southern Syria: ASecurity Imperative or Strategic Risk?
Executive Summary:
- Debates in Jordan regarding direct intervention in southern Syria to raid drug trafficking networks raise fundamental questions about whether such a move is a necessary security imperative or a strategic risk that may place Jordan before heavy burdens and complex regional repercussions. Although there has been a notable decline in drug smuggling attempts across the Jordanian border since the fall of the Assad regime, the continued attempts indicate that the threat has not yet disappeared.
- The data points to a significant improvement in border security as a result of the collapse of the structures that once framed organised crime networks. However, southern Syria remains burdened by internal contradictions and operational constraints that prevent the new Syrian government from implementing decisive security operations and field raids in the southern provinces. These constraints include the Israeli invasion, tensions with the Druze component, the aftermath of the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade in Daraa, and the potential vacuum resulting from the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
- Jordan’s direct intervention in southern Syria, despite the validity of the goal of raiding drug networks, carries high human and strategic costs. It may impose field responsibilities on Jordan that do not belong to it, and it threatens to create a regional precedent for interventions. It may also bring the intervening security forces into contact with the local community, armed factions, or even the Israeli troops operating in the region. Furthermore, the idea of intervention may become intertwined with international protection initiatives in Syria, which could undermine Damascus’s ability to rehabilitate and assume its security responsibilities on its territory.
- Continuing to adopt a balanced approach based on enhancing bilateral security cooperation with the Syrian government, providing technical and training support, and dispatching experts when needed, while preserving Jordan’s interests without engaging in a complicated field adventure, may be the best alternative in the current situation especially since the stability of southern Syria remains a top Jordanian interest. Yet achieving such stability requires realistic tools and regional coordination that does not weaken the new Syria, but instead supports it on the path to restoring its security and sovereignty.
Introduction
Despite the noticeable decline in drug smuggling attempts across the Jordanian–Syrian border following the fall of the Assad regime, the issue remains present, albeit to a limited extent, due to the continued smuggling attempts along the border front. This raises questions about the necessity of direct Jordanian intervention in southern Syria.
The new Syrian government faces complex operational constraints resulting from the contradictions in the local scene in southern Syria. These include the Israeli invasion, the sensitive position of the Druze component, and the aftermath of the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade in Daraa. Despite these challenges, the Syrian government is showing a positive orientation towards combating narcotics, which forms a solid basis for strengthening security cooperation with Jordan.
In contrast, calls for direct Jordanian intervention are on the rise, even though it may represent a strategic risk on the field, legal, and political levels. Therefore, this position assessment paper seeks to address the question of the feasibility of direct intervention in southern Syria by analysing the security and political context in the new Syria and highlighting the cost–benefit calculations from a Jordanian perspective.
The Drug File on the Jordanian Border: A Marked Decline
To begin with, it is essential to examine the situation along the Jordanian–Syrian border prior to the fall of the Assad regime. One year earlier, Jordan had announced a change in the rules of military engagement along the border, which stretches for approximately 375 kilometres. This was accompanied by a set of local measures described by the author as part of Jordan’s deterrence approach[1]. By which Jordan deployed military capabilities along the border strip and enhanced internal security efforts to confront and dismantle these criminal networks.
By December 2024, the number of narcotic pills seized had reached 6.6 million, in addition to intercepting 1,700 smuggling attempts[2]. According to an equation, the Jordanian–Syrian border was effectively the scene of a continuous war against drug trafficking networks.
Since the fall of the Assad regime, which was regarded as the official sponsor of organised crime networks in Syria, the frequency and quantity of drug smuggling operations have dropped significantly.
Although there are no precise statistics regarding the smuggling attempts intercepted by the armed forces since the fall of the Syrian regime, the following equation provides a logical basis for estimating the scale of decline compared to the Assad era.
If we assume that ten smuggling attempts were intercepted between December 2024 and early May, at a rate of ten per month based on extrapolated data from the Jordanian Armed Forces, the total would be approximately 50 attempts. When compared to the period between 2021 and 2023, the overall decline approaches 90% percent. This can be considered a significant finding along a border that had previously seen prolonged confrontations with smugglers[3].
In addition, this approximate calculation illustrates the scale of the improvement in the operations of drug trafficking networks in Syria. The most crucial factor behind this progress is the fall of the Assad regime and the dismantling of the security structures that had enabled such networks. However, speaking of a complete elimination of these networks, particularly in southern Syria, requires more than observation. It calls on the Syrian government to launch a dedicated security campaign and field raids to track down those involved and uncover the remaining facilities likely still concealed in southern Syria.
The Reality of Southern Syria and Operational Constraints
The new Syrian government is facing multiple constraints and limitations that hinder the initiation of security operations and raids in southern Syria. These are a direct consequence of the post-regime phase and reflect the complex contradictions present in the southern Syrian provinces.
These include the continued Israeli incursion north and east of the 1974 armistice line, the unresolved Druze issue with Damascus, and the presence of outlaws in Daraa following the dissolution of the Eighth Brigade, along with rejection of that dissolution by groups affiliated with other actors, such as the Popular and Central Committees. Added to this is the potential impact of the U.S. military withdrawal from most of its bases in Syria and its effect on the security landscape in southern Syria.
As these contradictions remain prominent in the region, the restrictions on the Syrian government’s ability to deploy forces against security threats in the southern provinces become clear, especially given that these files are still unresolved. To avoid escalation with the involved parties at this stage, Damascus is adhering to a policy of “restraint” in dealing with both the Druze issue and the Israeli invasion.
This is intended to avoid slipping into open confrontations that could derail the trajectory of the new Syrian transitional phase. In particular, the perception of escalation with the Druze component may once again attract international attention to the events that occurred on the Syrian coast in March.
Regarding the Israeli invasion, it is apparent that Damascus is avoiding giving Prime Minister Netanyahu and the Israeli government any justification to continue their military presence in Syria where it realises that escalation at this point does not serve its interest—especially in light of the continued “war frenzy” within the Israeli government, which aims to sustain its grip on power.
Moreover, the Israeli presence in Syria is linked to regional balances involving Türkiye’s expected influence in the upcoming stage. Thus, the Syrian approach seems to rely on diplomatic channels, either direct, such as those between Türkiye and Israel in Baku, Azerbaijan, or indirect, as revealed by the interim Syrian president Ahmad Al-Sharaa during his visit to France, where he disclosed that indirect negotiations with Israel are ongoing.
Furthermore, the U.S. military withdrawal from the majority of its bases in Syria[4] May leave behind a military and security vacuum, which could be exploited by organised crime networks or even terrorist organisations to establish new areas of control.
In terms of the Syrian government’s willingness to combat organised crime and drug networks, the indicators suggest a positive intention in Damascus, particularly after the continued uncovering of drug production facilities and the seizure of shipments bound for neighbouring countries, including Jordan.
Moreover, the positive and constructive tone observed in Jordan’s outlook towards the new Syria. For the first time in five decades, Jordan sees in its northern neighbour a rational and moderate approach.
Jordan’s Desired Role: Between Calls for Direct Intervention and Security Cooperation
In light of the complexity of the situation in southern Syria and the operational constraints facing any security efforts—and with smuggling attempts across the Jordanian–Syrian border continuing—some views in Jordan are calling for “a declared security agreement to enhance security cooperation between the two countries, and for the Jordanian army to enter areas of suspicion and encircle the drug threat”[5].
Supporters of this proposal base their argument on what they describe as the complexity of the security landscape in southern Syria and the current Syrian government’s inability to extend its complete control over the region. From their perspective, this justifies a direct Jordanian intervention in the name of national security protection.
While recognising the legitimacy of combating organised crime and drug networks—and acknowledging the noble goal and the high priority of Jordan’s efforts to eliminate smuggling networks, especially with the stability of southern Syria defined as a vital national security interest—this proposal carries with it implications and risks, both for Jordanian national interests and for the new Syrian government. So why is direct Jordanian intervention in Syria considered a strategic gamble?
- The Human, Material, and Moral Costs of Direct Intervention: Although direct security intervention aims to protect Jordan and the broader region in the face of the continuing threat posed by drug networks, it involves high risks and costs at both the strategic and security levels from a Jordanian perspective. The entry of Jordanian security forces into Syrian territory would significantly increase the human and economic burdens placed on those forces, as anticipated. It could potentially lead to new military and security complications, turning the operation into a prolonged crisis of attrition. This is particularly relevant given the complex current security situation in southern Syria, as previously outlined. One must also bear in mind that cross-border security operations require substantial resources and considerable logistical capacity.
- Passing Security Responsibility: The proposed direct Jordanian security intervention would, at least in part, shift security responsibility in southern Syria onto Jordan, particularly concerning organised crime networks. This would constitute an abdication of responsibility by the relevant parties, especially the Syrian government, should it agree to such a proposal. However, such an agreement is unlikely due to considerations related to national sovereignty.
- Reinforcing the Idea of International Protection in Syria: The model of prospective intervention could open the door to similar calls from other countries, potentially leading to overlapping roles, blurred responsibilities, and power struggles in the region. Neighbouring states such as Iraq or Lebanon, whose borders are also affected by comparable issues, might demand similar agreements. Such developments would risk further complicating, rather than simplifying, the regional landscape. Moreover, this could establish a dangerous precedent that might drag the entire region into uncalculated security and military arrangements. In this context, it would be more appropriate to strengthen security cooperation in a balanced manner—by providing logistical and training support to the Syrian Ministry of Defence and security agencies—without engaging in direct field operations.
- The Risk of Friction with the Local Community in Southern Syria: According to the intervention proposal, the anticipated raids would likely involve the arrest of individuals wanted for involvement in these networks, as well as raids on facilities or homes used to store narcotics. As a result, clashes with the local Syrian community cannot be ruled out, whether out of solidarity with those affected or simply due to rejection of the Jordanian presence, which may be perceived as a foreign or external security force. There is also the potential for confrontation with remnants of armed factions in Daraa, Druze factions in As Suwayda, or even with the Israeli army in the event of direct contact. Any of these scenarios would necessitate an immediate Jordanian response, which could escalate into an ongoing cycle of action and counteraction. Such escalation would repeatedly place Jordan in the position of having to respond, something that could be entirely avoided by refraining from direct intervention in the first place.
- Legal and Political Dimensions: The Adana Agreement as a Comparison: From a legal and political perspective, international security agreements—such as the Adana Agreement between Syria and Türkiye, which permitted Ankara to confront the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)—were built upon clear political foundations related to Türkiye’s direct strategic concerns, particularly the threat of establishing a Kurdish state that would partly lie within Turkish territory. At the time, the matter was viewed as a “political project” that required confrontation. In contrast, the issue of drug trafficking—despite its profound security implications—remains, at its core, an international criminal matter. It, therefore, cannot be equated with political or strategic threats of the kind that justify direct military intervention under major international accords.
The Most Suitable Alternative for Jordan
On the other hand, there are alternative approaches within Jordanian strategic thinking that could yield greater effectiveness in combating drug trafficking, without the need for direct intervention in Syria. Chief among these is the strengthening of joint regional and bilateral security cooperation with the Syrian government. This includes offering training, transferring expertise, and sharing sensitive information with the Syrian side.
Jordan can provide technical support and necessary training to Syrian security forces tasked with combating drug smuggling, as well as supply expertise and potentially the equipment required to enhance their ability to secure the southern regions and borders.
This approach maintains the primary responsibility on the Syrian side, while also offering necessary support in the spirit of solidarity with Damascus. Such support may include sending Jordanian experts and advisers, in advanced cases, to work alongside their Syrian counterparts in analysing smuggling networks and devising plans to raid and dismantle them. This would contribute to the transfer of expertise without incurring the high costs associated with direct Jordanian intervention—costs that would heavily weigh in Jordan’s own cost–benefit considerations.
At the same time, Jordan continues to affirm that the stability of southern Syria and the eradication of remnants of organised crime networks are a top national security interest. Amman also demonstrates a constant readiness to cooperate with all concerned parties—whether it be the Syrian government or other regional actors, such as Syria’s neighbouring countries[6]—thereby advancing the cooperative formula that Jordan advocates to contain regional security threats.
Conclusion
The issue of drug trafficking networks remains, first and foremost, a Syrian responsibility. It must be addressed within a framework of regional and international cooperation that complements the rehabilitation and empowerment of the new Syria, in a way that serves the shared interest of ensuring its stability. It is essential to avoid placing the burden of confronting these complex security challenges solely on Jordan.
The current climate of international openness towards Damascus paves the way for a new reality—one that could enhance the latest Syrian government’s ability to address security concerns such as terrorism and organised crime. In this context, time becomes a crucial factor in the decline of such illicit activities in the “New Syria.”
[1] Jaber, Hasan, “The Northern War: Drug Networks in Syria, the Jordanian response and Regional Options,” Institute for Politics and Society and the Omran Centre for Strategic Studies, 17-12-2024, pp. 82-86. Retrieved from https://wp.me/pdsiuf-2ks
[2] Kamal, Mwaffak, Carmen Karim, Rasha Qandeel, Daham Alassad, and Hadeel Rawabdeh. 2023. “A ‘Drug War’: Syria’s Neighbors Fight a Flood of Captagon Across Their Borders.” OCCRP, 27-6-2023. Retrieved from https://bitly.cx/o78d
[3] Jordan News Agency (Petra), “Armed clashes on the northern border of the Kingdom,” 19-12-2023, retrieved from: https://bitly.cx/cMbZ
[4] Al-Attiyah, Attiyah, “the US Army begins to withdraw its forces from its bases in Deir Ezzor province in preparation for a full exit from Syria,” Monte Carlo International, 19-4-2025, retrieved from: https://bitly.cx/fhad
[5] Al-Mammlaka Chenel Website, “Experts calling for a Jordanian-Syrian Agreement that allows Jordan to invade the Drug threat in Southern Syria,” 12-5-2025, retrieved from: https://www.almamlakatv.com/news/168694
[6] Al Sharq News Agency, “Terrorism, Drugs, and Weapons: Syria’s neighbouring countries discuss common challenges”, 9-3-2025. Retrieved from: https://bitly.cx/RGpE