Where Will the Crisis Between the State and Islamists in Jordan End?

The relationship between the Jordanian state and the original, now-banned Muslim Brotherhood has been a focal point of elite discussions and social media debates for several weeks. These debates often explicitly or implicitly take dangerous turns that affect internal cohesion. Critics of the Brotherhood sometimes generalise the discussion to broader national identity and unity themes. At the same time, Brotherhood supporters launch intense propaganda campaigns accusing the state of following American and Zionist agendas, effectively questioning its loyalty.

This controversy has extended beyond Jordan to Arab media outlets, both traditional and digital. The Brotherhood, which enjoys substantial online presence and widespread Arab support, is opposed by Arab media outlets that are hostile to it. These outlets portray Jordanian decisions as efforts aimed at eliminating political Islam from Jordan’s national landscape, drawing parallels with other Arab countries where the group has been labelled a terrorist, and its members arrested and imprisoned.

Jordan’s conservative faction has actively participated in this debate from the outset, leveraging the issues of weapons and the militarised cells to advocate for dissolving Parliament, dissolving the Islamic Action Front (IAF) party, which currently holds 31 parliamentary seats, and reversing the entire political modernisation initiative. This stance has been maintained consistently by conservatives since the establishment of the Political System Modernisation Committee in 2020, during which they launched an aggressive campaign against it, viewing the shift towards party-based democracy as harmful to Jordanian national identity.

Furthermore, this complex debate has created confusion within Jordanian society, causing considerable anxiety even among groups generally disengaged from politics. Discussions about nationalism, citizenship, and the state’s role have extended beyond the political sphere, becoming social and communal concerns.

Against this backdrop, it is crucial to address three key questions. First, concerning the weapons and cells issue: what is the reality behind it, and how seriously did these pose threats to Jordan’s national security? Was there political exaggeration intended to diminish the Brotherhood’s influence? The second question explores the deep-rooted reasons behind the strained state-Brotherhood relations, asking why tensions have escalated to this critical juncture. The third, and most crucial question is: where will this situation ultimately lead? Will it result in the complete exclusion of political Islam, including the IAF and the Muslim Brotherhood, as their opponents desire? Or is this a temporary crisis, eventually subsiding, allowing the Brotherhood to operate quietly and implicitly, as hoped by some conservative leaders within the group?

The Issue of Cells: State and Brotherhood Perspectives

Jordan’s General Intelligence Department (GID) announced that 16 individuals accused of manufacturing weapons and undermining national security had been referred to the State Security Court. Four were sentenced to 20 years of hard labour last Wednesday, with other cases still pending in military courts.

This isn’t the first incident involving the discovery or smuggling of weapons or infiltration attempts into Israeli territory by Islamists and non-Islamists to conduct military operations. Historically, Jordanian authorities have handled such cases with minimal political and media attention, a “low profile”. Why has this case taken on such political dimensions, connecting independent cells and groups to the Muslim Brotherhood?

Several considerations are behind this escalation. First, these groups are transnational rather than purely local, with regional connections and training by external leaders, including Hamas figures. Investigations cited an individual named “Abu Ahmed,” identified as Azzam Al-Aqra, who was killed alongside Saleh Al-Arouri by Israel in Beirut in early 2024. According to official accounts narratives, planning for these groups and operations began in 2021, following Hamas’s decision to activate regional fronts, then in collaboration with the Axis of Resistance. For Jordanian decision-makers, this transnational connection represents an unprecedented and dangerous development within the Brotherhood’s circles.

The second consideration relates to weapons and drone manufacturing plans, marking a significant shift in thinking among groups linked to the Brotherhood. This represents a radical departure from established dynamics and poses new challenges for dealing with the organisation, reflecting ideological shifts towards revolutionary or radical stances hostile to the state.

The third consideration stems from Jordanian political fears that Hamas aims to significantly increase its activities and presence in Jordanian society, especially after the Gaza war, capitalising on its substantial popularity among broad social segments, particularly within Brotherhood-affiliated circles. The state believes leniency towards these groups now could result in greater threats later.

Longstanding mistrust between the Brotherhood and the state has undoubtedly exacerbated the situation. This mutual suspicion has deepened due to the Brotherhood’s perceived provocations during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation, involving mobilisation and incitement efforts by its supporters.

From the Brotherhood’s perspective, their lawyers, family members, and some leaders have acknowledged the validity of the charges, attributing them to individual emotions rather than organisational directives. Previously, the Brotherhood publicly celebrated two youths who crossed borders and confronted Israeli forces before being killed. This time, however, the group maintained cautious silence, emphasising the personal nature of these acts.

The IAF suspended three implicated members’ party memberships. While party representatives and Brotherhood leaders faced intense media criticism, they cautiously avoided confrontations, limiting their response to general statements condemning weapons use and reaffirming the state’s exclusive right to bear arms.

Notably, statements advocating revolutionary actions diverged from those issued by Jordan’s Brotherhood and the IAF emerged from Hamas and the global Brotherhood’s “Change Stream”. Jordanian Islamists refrained from responding directly to these more confrontational statements.

Following these developments, the Interior Minister announced in a press conference that the Brotherhood had been banned by judicial decree since 2020, officially prohibiting its activities entirely—a significant escalation in the ongoing crisis. Although this enforcement is based on earlier judicial rulings classifying the Brotherhood as unlicensed and sanctioning the government’s seizure of its properties, the group previously ignored this ruling, continuing its activities covertly and unofficially.

This escalation had been anticipated, given the rising trajectory of tensions. Key historical turning points include deepening mistrust during the Arab Spring, conflicts over the 2019 teachers’ strike, and severe tensions during the “Al-Aqsa Flood” and Gaza war, intensified by the Brotherhood’s substantial electoral gains in 2024. This has entrenched the crisis into a zero-sum political conflict between state institutions and the Brotherhood, the strongest political opposition group.

Future Scenarios and Mutual Options

In this respect, the state’s institutions face three primary scenarios. The most likely scenario involves upholding the current stance by enforcing the Brotherhood’s ban while allowing the IAF to remain the sole Islamist representative and negotiating new political rules accordingly. The second scenario involves banning the IAF, entirely excluding political Islam from Jordanian politics, raising significant questions about political modernisation, national unity, and youth radicalisation. The third scenario returns to previous tolerance policies, allowing both the party and group to resume activities, which currently seems improbable.

For the Brotherhood and IAF, the choices are equally complex. One option involves accepting new rules, shifting entirely toward structured party politics, abandoning broader organisational frameworks. Though rational, this option faces internal resistance from hardliners and disillusionment among the youth. The alternative is a return to underground operations, maintaining secretive organisational activities—a scenario resisted by moderates due to the group’s parliamentary representation.

A strategic dialogue between state institutions and the IAF is essential to addressing the crisis, managing transformations, and redefining political interactions for the coming period.