This material was published in the second issue of the Jordanian Politics and Society magazine (JPS).

The concept of a national or regional role in analysing a country’s foreign policy is mated with other key central concepts, such as the concept of “status” and “sources of power,” general orientations of foreign policy, concepts of national interests, national security, sources of threat, alliances, and conflicts. Therefore, it is necessary to approach the definition of the “regional role” concept for Jordan based on a broader analytical framework that considers many factors and variables from one angle and international and regional transformations from a second angle. This task requires more than one article but rather an individual effort. It pushes for research and discussion seminars at the level of academics and experts that go beyond media debates and impressionistic discussions to build a broad analytical framework that helps the decision-maker develop different variables and factors and distinguish between them in explicit matrices—specifically, based on the distinction between causes, contexts, objectives, sources of power and capabilities possessed by the state.

This article does not claim to develop or build the desired analytical framework. However, it is a preliminary contribution to trying to approach scientifically and analytically the definition of the concept of the Jordanian regional role, its determinants, transformations, and historical turns in order to define the possibilities, areas, and spaces that could be a field for this role during the next stage, specifically in 2025, which represents a new stage at the level of “regional policies,” due to the fundamental changes witnessed by the last two years in the region, whether concerning the war on Gaza, or The collapse of the Syrian regime, the change of the US administration and the return of Donald Trump to the White House with a new team described as Zionist-right-wing tendencies and carrying an agenda of goals and policies that may constitute a factor of change in the regime or the regional situation in general and its future.

 

Regional role theory. Analytical framework

Kal Holsti (1970) is one of the most prominent theorists of the concept of the national or regional role in the analysis of foreign policy, and presented in a famous article his in-depth perceptions of the factors and variables that represent the source of this role, and the questions posed to define this role, and what interests us here is that he described the national role as the repeated patterns of positions, policies, and commitments made by the government at the level of foreign policy, and distinguished between the perception or perception of the role on the one hand and the performance of the role on the other. There are two critical issues in understanding and analysing the role. The first is related to the perceptions and perceptions held by decision-makers of the state’s status, role, and tasks in foreign policy and the status and roles of other countries. The second is the expectations or prescriptions other powers hold towards the state, its role, importance, and place on the regional or international stage.

Such self-perceptions of the decision-maker or the “external prescriptions” of other actors of this state are necessarily not based on a vacuum or without a strong basis in defining the sources of state power and capabilities, known in international relations, such as natural and technical resources, the size of the state, its geographical location, its military and economic capacity, and the position of social and political forces towards foreign policy. This matrix of variables and factors affecting the delineation and framing of the territorial role of the state can be summarized according to the following scheme (developed by Holsti):

Figure 1: Role Theory and Foreign Policy: National Role Conceptions and Prescriptions as Independent Variable[i]

Holsti distinguished between the eight main roles the state can play at the external level. In contrast, Sofiane Sekhri[ii] distinguished between 13 types of external roles of the state, including (supporter of freedom, regional leader, independent actor, anti-imperialist, mediator, defender of faith, model, peacemaker, security man, loyal ally, fighter of terrorism, etc.).Perhaps one of the most prominent factors that can be important in defining the regional role in the Jordanian case is the size of the state (large or small) and the state’s neighbourhood (stable/turbulent, friend/foe, conflict/cooperation).

Based on the above, several key questions can be included here that help frame and analyse the transformations of Jordan’s external-regional role over the past decades and define the parameters of the next stage.

• What are the perceptions of the decision-maker in Jordan (from King Abdullah I to King Abdullah II) of Jordan’s strategic position and the parameters of the required external role? Is it the role of a regional leader, an international-regional ally, a mediator, or a neutral role, and is it an expansionist or defensive role? Is military force the basis of diplomacy? Etc?
• How have international and regional contexts affected Jordan’s changing role from the perspective of political decision-makers?
• What are the sources of Jordan’s regional role, economic or military power, geostrategic location, political traditions, domestic public opinion, and international or regional alliances?
• What priorities have dominated Jordanian foreign policy over the past decades?

Jordan’s Regional Role in the Cold War Era

Going back a little during the Cold War and the rule of King Hussein bin clear policies framed Talal, Jordan’s role in the Cold War phase, alliance with the Western world and the United States globally, in the face of the communist pole, which was reflected in the failed attempt to enter (in the Baghdad Pact in 1955), and the collapse of a single party government in the history of the Kingdom from 1956 to 1957 (partly due to differences between the perceptions of King Hussein and the prime minister at the time on international and regional alliances).

At the regional level, the Jordanian role was more complex, and here four main dimensions can be interrogated about it: the first is to position itself within the so-called “ring countries” in the military and strategic conflict with Israel and to enter into military conflicts with it (for example, the ’67 war, in which Jordan lost a significant part of the Kingdom), and the second is an (unofficial) membership in the club of “Arab conservative kingdoms” on the other hand, within a process of regional polarization, which in some of its dangerous parts moved to domestic politics, and led to Cases of political instability and attempts at regime change in many cases (for example, the attempted military coup in 1957, and the regional dimensions of the September events in 1970), the third dimension is the competition with the Palestinian factions, represented by the Palestine Liberation Organization, for the representation of the West Bank, which is an internal regional issue at the same time, given the nature of the Jordanian demographic composition, and the fourth dimension is the concept of the “peace-seeking state”, a role in which secret and public diplomacy was intertwined during previous eras. It reflects a different perception of the Jordanian decision-maker (King Abdullah I and King Hussein bin Talal) of Arab and many local powers during that period.

In the “regional role” theory, many foreign policy theorists, led by K.J. Holsti, assert that the state may not have a single role in the international system. Still, it can play multiple roles, which applies to the “Jordanian model,” in which previous regional roles changed according to the political stage and the nature of the moment with which Jordan interacted. Still, we can observe a more significant shift since 1978: Egypt signed peace treaties with Israel and formed a Middle Eastern system. New, as Martin Indyk sees (in his important book The Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Diplomacy in the Middle East[iii]), as the idea of war with Israel no longer exists, as was the case previously, and the attitudes of the surrounding regional countries have changed, and Jordan’s alliances have changed significantly, so that “Iraq – Saddam Hussein’s regime” during the decade of the eighties became a significant ally, and Jordan entered into a new temporary and limited regional alliance, in 1988, with both Iraq and Egypt (which had just returned from the freeze on Arab relations). with it) and Yemen, but the regional winds soon changed and Jordan paid a heavy price for its position in the first Gulf War (1990-1991), and returned to engage in peace efforts to reach the signing of the peace agreement with Israel in 1994, after the Palestine Liberation Organization signed the Oslo Accords, and after King Hussein signed the decision to disengage from the West Bank in 1988, a decision that officially meant Jordan’s abandonment of the West Bank as part of its Kingdom (since the unification decision in year 1950).

The author assumes that the signing of the peace agreement with Israel is a significant shift in Jordan’s perception of its regional role-shifting, which was married in the nineties with the end of bipolarity at the global level, and Iraq’s exit from the space of rival regional powers, by intermarrying with a significant change in Jordan’s relationship with Iraq, and an implicit end to the concept of “ring countries” and the concept of “strategic depth”, which are concepts that formed during the era of the Arab-Israeli conflict important sources in understanding the Jordanian regional role, and this was reflected in Jordan’s national economy and strategic position in the region, whether in terms of the relationship with the great powers and the global conflict, as a member of the Western world, or in terms of the tremendous financial support that Jordan received from Iraq and the Gulf states for a double reason, the first is Jordan’s geographical location in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and on the northern borders of the Arab Gulf states, and the second is as a “friendly regime” of the Arabian Gulf and a source of trained labour and regional stability from the perspective of those countries.

Role Transformations in the Fourth Kingdom

If we go beyond that stage to the reign of King Abdullah II at the beginning of the new millennium, key concepts, as the author of these lines sees them, contributed to shaping the Jordanian decision-makers’ perception of the national role regionally and internationally.

The first concept is “Jordan First” launched by the new young king, who articulated his vision of a break with his father and grandfather’s legacy of thinking about expanding the geography of the Kingdom (King Abdullah I was thinking before his assassination of unity with Syria, King Hussein entered into union with Iraq in 1958, and remained attached for a long time to the West Bank despite the many internal and regional crises associated with this relationship) as an extension of the Hashemite legacy and dreams since the Great Arab Revolt, in contrast to that was a speech The King is clear by focusing on internal and economic files, and on redefining Jordan’s strategic interests in the position of establishing a Palestinian state as a Jordanian strategic interest, and the danger is in not establishing it, contrary to his father’s perceptions of that, and it can be said that the disengagement from the West Bank was for King Hussein as a dose of bitter medicine that he does not want, and does not reflect his convictions and perceptions, while King Abdullah II has such a decision with a firm strategic and mental conviction.

The second concept is “combating terrorism,” as the king’s accession to the throne coincided with the emergence of jihadist organisations in the international, regional, and even Jordanian internal arena, which was reflected in Jordan’s involvement in a vital and active role in global and regional efforts to combat terrorism. Jordan redefined its role as a “warrior of terrorism” state. This task has become close (until today) to the Jordanian role, whether in terms of exporting Jordanian security expertise or strengthening the relationship with Western powers in the global war against al-Qaeda and ISIS later, or This was manifested by focusing on Jordan’s role as a model in coexistence and religious dialogue. Many internal and external political orientations emerged from these perceptions and perceptions of decision-makers (the 2004 Amman Message represented a dedication to this mission as a significant milestone in the Jordanian national role).

Jordan’s relationship with the United States of America, the European Union, and many Western countries has strengthened. Its role has become a bridge between the Arab world, Islam, and the West, and it has good relations with the various parties. The peace settlement has become a significant pillar of Jordanian diplomacy. Jordan’s position in the box of peace-making, settlement, and regional stability, pushing for a peaceful settlement and confronting Israeli and radical policies in the region alike, which seek to shatter hopes. As a reliable ally in the West, Jordan began to see its role as capable of countering the Israeli narrative and promoting Arab-Israeli peace based on the Arab Peace Initiative (launched by Saudi Arabia in 2002, in which Jordan contributed significantly to its formulation and export).

Since 2006, Jordan has been part of the moderate Arab alliance (an informal but practical alliance based on coordination between moderate Arab states: Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain) in the face of what has become known as the Iran-led Resistance Alliance (which included Tehran, Damascus, Hezbollah, Shiite forces in the region, and Hamas in the West Bank), and this alliance has been an important source of understanding of the regional role. Jordan is a supporter and friend of Arab countries allied with them vis-à-vis other regional states and meets globally with Western policies, in general, in the region.

Since the Arab Spring 2011, Jordan’s relationship with this alliance has become more solid. However, in the face of another new coalition that has emerged on the regional scene, represented by the Turkish-Qatari axis in support of political Islam movements, which means a source of internal and external challenges for the realisation of “decision-making circles” in Amman, and this regional alliance represents a significant milestone of Jordan’s regional role until 2018, that is the stage of Donald Trump’s arrival to the White House in his first term, which witnessed new transformations at the international and regional levels. As the author assumes, both represent another turning point in defining Jordan’s regional role.

Since 2018, several international and regional transformations have combined to represent an essential and influential variable in Jordanian decision-makers’ perceptions of the regional role.

The first variable is the growing conviction of Jordanian decision-makers to move away from the option of the “two-state solution” and the entitlements that this imposes on the definition of Jordanian national security and to get closer to pressing outstanding questions regarding the Jordanian role in the Palestinian issue and the return of the American and Israeli right to talk in closed rooms about the “Jordanian option,” on the one hand, and the questions that this imposes on the Jordanian internal equation on the other hand.

Egypt is preoccupied with its internal economic crises, and Iraq and Syria are in the crosshairs of internal crises and at the mercy of regional and international influence, while Saudi Arabia’s power has begun to rise significantly with the new Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, which is unusual behaviour by Jordan’s southern neighbour, and carries with it the question of redesigning and demarcating the relationship between the two countries on new rules, based on granting larger countries to Saudi Arabia in Leadership of Arab allied countries, which means – On the other hand, the decline of Jordan’s “strategic position” in the ladder of international politics on the one hand, and in the Palestinian file on the other hand, and in an initial attempt (for the writer) to define the perspective of the Jordanian decision of the escalating Saudi role as a complex and complex perspective, on the one hand, Jordan wants a strong regional state that takes the Arab position to the stage of action and sitting at the table, and its vision in many files is compatible with the Jordanian position, and on the other hand, Jordan does not accept – Historically – by accepting the hegemony of an Arab country or its attempt to impose its vision on other countries, Jordan has always viewed its role and strategic position as a model of a moderate and critical state in the region with distinctive policies in alliance with Western countries, a mediator in a peaceful settlement and an actor in regional peace making, and such advantages can decline and wither in light of this new equation with Saudi Arabia.

Al-Aqsa flood. New Zigzag Milestones

The year 2023 and beyond constituted another turning point in regional and even international policies in the region, as for the first time, Iran and the forces of the “resistance alliance” entered a direct war with Israel. The Syrian regime, which represented a prominent geostrategic link in this alliance, collapsed. The ceasefire in Lebanon is taking place based on Security Council resolution 1701, which includes a significant limitation of Hezbollah’s military activity on the northern border. There are Israeli and American intentions supporting it to strike the Axis of resistance. The statements made by the adviser to the Iraqi Prime Minister, Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, indicate that there are secret negotiations to end the military role of the armed militias at the request of the United States and Israeli threats to target them, in conjunction with Israeli military operations against the Houthis.

These regional developments coincide with Trump’s return to the White House and expectations (linked to the nature of his new team) of a more biased American agenda towards Israel and even the Israeli right. There are more significant concerns about an Israeli project to expand settlements further in the West Bank, to restore momentum to the concept of “regional peace” that is based on the integration of Israel into the region and its regional alliances, and push for Saudi Arabia to sign normalisation and cooperation agreements with Israel.

These shifts in Jordan’s regional role in 2025 are significant and serious because they affect several international and regional policies.

First of all, at the level of the Palestinian cause, as it represents one of the most important pillars of the Jordanian regional role because of the historical and strategic dimensions of this issue related to the Jordanian geostrategic location, and it is also in contact with a set of basic issues and values, such as refugees and the right of return, the issue of Jerusalem and the Hashemite patronage and the symbolism and burden that this carries at the same time, borders and geography, the Jordanian internal equation, the question of political identity and social components, and finally Jordan’s regional position, of which the Palestinian cause has historically been a part.

At the level of regional policies, it is noted that Jordan adheres to its Arab alliances and plays a major role in coordinating the Arab position. – At the same time, it takes a secondary role in many files on the “political stage” and steps aside, leaving room for other Arab positions to be at the forefront, as is the case in the file of the war on Gaza, despite the active role of Jordanian diplomacy in the face of Israeli aggression, Jordan was not a party to the initiatives of settlement and mediation between Hamas and Israel. It can be said here that Jordan prefers the role of “loyal ally” to the role of mediation in many foreign files.

Jordan’s regional role will be at stake in engaging in regional peace projects and the Abraham Economic Agreements, which will often be one of the keys to the new regional order, with the administration of US President Donald Trump, if Jordan’s choice is to adhere to its conservative position on these projects and regional consensuses, this means “marginalizing Jordan” and weakening its regional presence, and perhaps being subjected to economic and political pressure, but from another angle, agreeing to engage in these projects will marginalize and weaken the status of the Palestinian cause, and perhaps The deterioration of the situation in the West Bank, whether due to settlement or annexation of areas of the West Bank, and the fear of the Israeli right’s agenda in Jerusalem and its Judaization, all of which creates severe internal political pressure on the political system from one angle, and limits the importance of Jordan and its regional status from a second angle, because of the significance of the Palestinian cause in the value of Jordanian diplomacy and Jordan’s regional position.

Regarding relations with Syria and Iraq, Jordan will have clear choices: either settle for a secondary role as part of a regional axis or take the initiative to move closer economically and politically and take diplomatic and political steps that give Jordan a greater role in the relationship with these governments.

On the other hand, Jordan’s enjoyment of a state of political stability amid a turbulent regional environment gives it an important advantage at the regional level: it has become a regional centre for many international and regional institutions. It has military cooperation and military bases for many Western countries. There are ideas and plans to develop some industries and military logistics services to serve these institutions and bases, including the features of a new regional role and the various economic opportunities it provides.

Conclusion: future questions

Returning to the patterns of Jordanian foreign policy, it is noted that expansionist ideas, in their multiple forms, have declined among the Jordanian decision-makers since the stage of the emirate to the fourth Kingdom. There is apparent stability in the definition of political geography and framing of attempts to unite with other Arab countries; in the stage of Prince Abdullah I, the ambition of geopolitical expansion was evident in his perceptions of the Jordanian regional role, then during the reign of King Hussein, he retreated towards the dialectic of the relationship with the West Bank, and then in the political withdrawal from the file of the relationship with the West Bank. During the reign of King Abdullah II, the Jordan First slogan was an important framework for expressing his ideas and projects.

During the Syrian war from one angle, and the American offers of a Jordanian role in the West Bank from a second angle, it was clear that there was a conservative tendency towards expansion among the Jordanian “decision-maker”, and Jordan clearly defined its strategic interests within its current national-geographical borders, but this does not negate that there are new conditions in a turbulent regional environment that may push the decision-maker to review this concept again, if we impose a state of chaos and division in Syria, if the peaceful transition process fails, or occurs Jordan, due to its reputation for political stability and its network of international and regional alliances, can have roles related to what is happening in the neighbourhood, and such a scenario is necessarily linked to regional scenarios.

Jordan’s regional role is organically linked to Jordan’s international alliances. It is clear that since the establishment of the Kingdom, Jordan has chosen to align itself with the Western camp, whether the relationship with Britain in the emirate stage or the United States since the Cold War until today. A remarkable development can be observed that strengthened Jordan’s relationship with many European countries. It invests in these relations with countries such as Germany, Britain, Scandinavia, Spain, Japan, etc. Jordan can be a regional centre for many international and regional institutions.

Based on the above, one of Jordan’s important roles in the coming period is the logistical, service, and technological aspects at the level of the geographical neighbourhood, especially in the field of reconstruction in Syria and economic relations with Iraq, and engagement in the field of relief and charitable work at the regional level.

This may lead us to an important question related to Jordanian soft power. Soft Power is one of the pillars of this model, historically represented by the famous phrase launched by King Hussein, “People are our most precious asset,” and it is based on investment in education and human resources. Moreover, some Arab politicians called Jordan the “Harvard of the Arab East,” and although skilled Jordanian labour is still a registered mark of Jordan, especially in the Gulf countries, the development that occurs there and the tendency of governments there to develop university education and human development pushes Jordan to one of these critical trends is Jordan’s reputation in the field of regional stability, tolerance, pluralism, experience in the field of refugees, geographical location in the field of reconstruction, and the provision of services to neighbouring countries, such as electrical interconnection, land and maritime transport sector, and medical services. Etc.

One of the main questions in the coming stage is the formulation of Jordan’s relationship with Saudi Arabia, which, as we said, is characterized by a complex and complex nature, and there seems to be great American and European interest in the role of Saudi Arabia as a regional power in the next stage, and Jordan must determine its position in this field; the role of a close ally with Saudi Arabia, or the neutral or the balancer in its relationship with other regional powers, but it is necessary to note that the Jordanian regional role has historically been associated with a network of alliances and the concept of “big brother”, whether with Gamal Abdel Nasser, despite the stages of discord and conflict with him, and with Saddam Hussein, which is the question posed in the nature of the relationship and its features with Saudi Arabia in the coming stage, which in turn changed its vision of itself and the world and its role as a hegemonic regional power and not only an Arab country supporting other Arab countries.

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[i] K. J. Holsti, ‘National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly 14, no. 3 (September 1970): fig. 2, https://doi.org/10.2307/3013584.

[ii] Sofiane Sekhri, ‘The Role Approach as a Theoretical Framework for the Analysis of Foreign Policy in Third World Countries’, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 3, no. 10 (2009): 423.

[iii] Martin Indyk, Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2021).