This material was published in the second issue of the Jordanian Politics and Society magazine (JPS).

The Iranian regional strategy has raised many questions regarding the objectives it seeks to achieve in the Middle East. Are these objectives tied to Iran’s vision for the region, or are they more focused on countering adversaries and rivals? Regardless of the nature of these objectives, what remains certain is that Iran, through its actions in the region—particularly after 1979—has, in one way or another, reshaped regional balances. This shift has prompted regional states to seek alternative options, at times through temporary, regional alliances and at other times through pragmatic international arrangements, all aimed at curbing Iran and its regional strategy. This strategy is fundamentally based on establishing an Iranian strategic project that stretches from Tehran to the Mediterranean Sea.

This article aims to illuminate Iran’s current regional strategy, examine Jordan’s position within the context of this strategy, and explore its implications for Jordanian national security. It also seeks to identify Jordan’s requirements for implementing this strategy in the coming phase.

 

Analytical Dimensions of Iran’s Regional Strategy

Analyzing Iran’s regional strategy from the perspective of its geopolitical depth has garnered significant attention from decision-makers at both regional and international levels. This is particularly true regarding its approach to managing complex regional issues and selecting allies and friends. Iran has demonstrated a strategic commitment to supporting its allies, whether state or non-state actors, making it a formidable player in the region’s strategic equation.

First, Iran has successfully leveraged its regional strategy to serve its geopolitical project. Second, it has employed non-state regional actors to further this project, positioning itself as a major influential power in the region. This influence allows Iran to control the pathways of de-escalation and escalation. More importantly, it has positioned itself as a counterweight to the U.S. role in the region.

Today, after four decades since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, Iran’s regional strategy has been influenced by significant regional and international developments. This is particularly relevant as the region prepares to adapt to strategic balances that will emerge following the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and the return of Donald Trump to the White House. Such developments could also lead to complex international shifts impacting Iran’s strategic direction. Thus, analyzing and explaining Iran’s regional strategy naturally requires a systematic approach, as changes in the regional and international systems have shaped the external interactions of Iranian governments since 1979. This analysis addresses actors involved in Iran’s regional strategy and the variables influencing it.

Given Iran’s current geopolitical situation, it can be said that if its political system remains closed and resistant to change while its internal and international environment continues to evolve, it will gradually become increasingly disconnected from its regional surroundings. Remaining in a state of neither war nor peace will challenge Iran’s development capabilities and its diplomatic and strategic potential, particularly under the continued imposition of international sanctions following the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal in May 2018. Additionally, Iran has faced cumulative strategic setbacks, such as the assassination of Qassem Soleimani in January 2020, which have contributed to significant challenges for the “Axis of Resistance,” particularly in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. There is also the potential for these setbacks to extend to Iraq and Yemen.

In summary, Iran today faces a highly challenging strategic situation. It seeks a strategic solution to restore balance to its regional role post-Assad, particularly in light of the rise of other regional players, especially Turkey, which has become a key factor in reshaping new regional balances after Assad. Consequently, Iran strives for strategic outcomes that enable it to maintain its role in the region with the same level of effectiveness and influence. This pursuit is rooted in its central vision of the region, based on the belief that it possesses the historical, geographical, demographic, ideological, and political justifications to play a leading role. Iran’s self-perception of its power and natural capabilities, combined with its conviction in these justifications, has shaped the nature of its relationships with regional countries, including Jordan. Jordan is a significant example reflecting Iran’s ambition to assert a prominent regional role and its understanding of the boundaries and construction of this role.

 

Reformists and Iran’s Regional Role

President Masoud Bezshikian’s ability to establish stable relations with the United States in the region will significantly shape Iran’s role in the upcoming phase. The complex interplay between Iranian and American regional roles has created instability. Iran’s investment in supporting and funding allies in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen has often been met with harsh and unexpected American reactions. Furthermore, the two countries’ interactions in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria reveal a substantial gap in their regional security and stability perceptions.

Bezshikian’s presidency might provide a narrow window for Tehran to abandon its previous approach, amend its anti-Western policies, and adopt a pragmatic stance in the post-Assad era. The key challenge for Bezshikian will be balancing the Foreign Ministry and the Revolutionary Guard. Much of this balance will depend on the role played by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi. Araqchi, who previously served as deputy foreign minister under Rouhani and was a prominent figure in the nuclear negotiations with major powers, is a staunch advocate of securing and entrenching the Revolutionary Guard’s vision abroad. This duality in his character could assist Bezshikian in managing the balance with minimal losses.

Therefore, given the current regional circumstances, Iran’s regional role will largely remain under the Revolutionary Guard’s authority, particularly after the fall of the Assad regime. Through Araqchi, the Revolutionary Guard will likely focus on bolstering efforts in Iraq and Yemen, compensating for the setbacks faced by Quds Force commander General Esmail Qaani, and reorganizing Iran’s fragmented presence in Lebanon and Syria. This restructuring aims to restore the effectiveness of Iran’s regional role.

Bezshikian’s weak connections with Iran’s regional allies, especially within the “Axis of Resistance,” will make him heavily reliant on the Revolutionary Guard, particularly in critical matters affecting the Islamic Republic’s influence and the future of its allies. Today, numerous political and strategic imperatives surround Iran, requiring Bezshikian’s attention and decisive action. Supreme Leader Khamenei will likely place his complete confidence in this president and his accompanying team to manage the Islamic Republic’s internal and external affairs in the coming phase.

 

Iran and Jordan: The Dilemma of Building Trust

The Iranian-Jordanian relationship is one of the most notable outcomes of Iran’s regional strategy. It is fundamentally built upon the dilemma of trust-building between the two parties. In response to Iran’s “expansionist strategy” in the region, Jordan has adopted a counter-strategy of “deterrence and containment” to mitigate the effects of Iran’s regional maneuvers.

This tension in Iranian-Jordanian relations is not a recent phenomenon but rather the result of years of strain following the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. At that time, Iran championed the export of its revolution and opposition to monarchical systems in the region. Tensions were exacerbated by Jordan’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). After the events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military presence in the region became more pronounced. Contrary to the expectations of President George W. Bush’s administration, the U.S. invasion of Iraq resulted in increased Iranian regional influence. Consequently, the U.S., Israel, and Arab governments sought to counterbalance Iran’s growing power, unify Arab states with Israel, limit Iran’s influence in Iraq, protect Israel, maintain regional stability, and ensure energy supplies.

One of the key developments in the post-9/11 Middle East was the emergence of the so-called “Shia Crescent,” particularly after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. Milestones included the ascension of Shia leadership in Iraq in 2003, Hamas’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council elections, and Hezbollah’s rise as a military force following the 2006 Israeli-Lebanese war. These developments reshaped the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East, prompting Jordan’s King Abdullah II to describe the primary outcome of the Iraq War as the formation of a Shia-controlled geographic arc, referred to as the “Shia Crescent.” Although he later clarified that he had meant an “Iranian Crescent,” his initial remarks reflected a deep-seated concern.

King Abdullah II’s statement about Iran’s rise was not unfounded; it stemmed from the image of Iran ingrained in Jordanian political decision-makers, shaped by Iran’s regional roles. After 2003, Jordan became one of the primary targets of Iran’s regional strategy, a reality reflected in the strained relations between the two countries following the U.S. occupation of Iraq.

Iran views Jordan through a highly complex lens, complicating any efforts toward reconciliation. From Tehran’s perspective, Jordan is part of the “normalization axis” opposing the “Axis of Resistance” in the region. Furthermore, Jordan’s Hashemite custodianship of religious sites in Jerusalem undermines the Revolutionary Guard’s “liberation of Jerusalem” narrative, stripping it of complete legitimacy. Most significantly, Jordan represents a vulnerable flank in Iran’s strategic regional bridge toward the Mediterranean.

Therefore, Iran is attempting to forge a path that serves this vision. Despite its numerous efforts to establish connections with Jordan—whether through revitalizing diplomatic relations, leveraging economic incentives, promoting religious tourism, or utilizing regional mediation, particularly by Saudi Arabia and Iraq—Jordan remains hesitant to open up to Iran. This hesitation stems from the lack of a serious Iranian initiative addressing Jordanian concerns. Such reluctance is fundamentally rooted in Iran’s indirect actions toward Jordan, including the presence of armed groups loyal to Iran in western Iraq, its involvement in drug trafficking in the region, and, most importantly, its attempts to destabilize Jordan’s security and stability through its ongoing conflict with Israel.

The escalation between Iran and Israel following October 7, 2023, has deepened Jordan’s mistrust of Iran’s regional intentions, especially after Iran issued warnings to Jordan against intercepting any Iranian attacks on Israel. Although Jordan publicly declared that any such intervention would solely be to protect its sovereignty—a stance articulated by Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi during his visit to Tehran in August 2024—Iran and its regional allies, particularly Iraqi groups, launched a media campaign against Jordan. This was in response to Jordan’s role in intercepting some Iranian missiles heading toward Israel over Jordanian airspace in April 2024.

Iran’s actions alone did not create this trust deficit with Jordan. The activities of Iran’s proxies have also been a source of concern for the Hashemite Kingdom. These actions have had direct repercussions, such as the closure of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the disruption of commercial shipping in the Red Sea by the Houthis, which adversely impacted Jordan’s sole Red Sea port, the Port of Aqaba. Simultaneously, there has been a surge in illicit drug trafficking to Jordan from Syria. Before the fall of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, there was a significant increase in the number of “Captagon” shipments smuggled across Jordan’s northern border. The Jordanian army has increasingly intercepted drones carrying drugs from Syria and engaged in shootouts with drug smugglers along the border.

These activities underscore the scale of Iran’s troubling roles toward Jordan, which extend beyond drug trafficking to include smuggling weapons such as small arms, anti-tank missiles, rocket launchers, explosives, and anti-personnel mines. While some of these weapons, transported by Iran-affiliated agents, remain in Jordan, the majority transit through the country en route to the West Bank. There, Iran seeks to flood the area with weapons in hopes of undermining Israeli security.[1]

Requirements for Jordan’s National Security in the Context of Iran’s Role

Jordan currently faces an exceptionally challenging regional reality, especially following the fall of the Assad regime and the uncertain landscape in a new Syria now governed by jihadist/opposition factions. Jordan finds itself surrounded by a geographic environment marked by armed conflicts: war in Gaza, a fragile ceasefire agreement in Lebanon, the growing possibility of conflict spilling over into Iraq and Yemen, and the complex relationship between Iran and Trump. These developments necessitate Jordan’s adoption of proactive security strategies to manage risks and mitigate the regional security repercussions on its domestic stability.

Challenges persist despite Jordan’s measured actions toward Iran—such as the moderate rhetoric of Jordanian leadership and the ongoing diplomatic efforts spearheaded by Jordan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to reduce the strategic consequences of Assad’s fall on the region. Jordan hosted a regional and international meeting in Aqaba on December 14, 2024, to discuss Syria’s situation and manage the transitional phase post-Assad. However, such efforts are likely to have only short-term strategic effects, particularly with the return of President Donald Trump to the White House and Iran’s absence from this meeting. These developments suggest the region, and Jordan in particular, may face a new wave of escalation, necessitating the adoption of preventive strategies in the coming period.

Given Iran’s multifaceted approach in the region, Jordan’s ability to address Iran’s regional strategy remains relative rather than absolute. Regarding Jordan, Iran has employed various measures to penetrate Jordan’s domestic landscape, ranging from political to religious avenues and both formal and informal channels.

Considering these realities, Jordan faces a strategic dilemma in taming Iran’s behavior. While current regional circumstances may offer an opportunity to reshape Iran’s role toward Jordan—especially with Iran’s reduced influence on Jordan, notably in Syria and Lebanon—Jordan’s ability to free itself from specific regional commitments remains a decisive factor in determining the success or failure of this opportunity.

A simple review of Jordan’s approach toward Iran in recent years reveals evident hesitation in formulating a clear and consistent policy toward Tehran. This is not due to shortcomings in Jordanian political decision-making but rather the parallel pressures exerted on Jordan by Gulf states, Israel, and the United States. These influences have, directly or indirectly, impacted Jordan’s national options regarding Iran. Overcoming these threefold pressures could provide Jordan with an opportunity to address the strategic risks posed by Iran’s role and contribute to curbing the behavior of Iran’s proxies toward Jordan.

Jordan’s diplomatic outreach to Iraq and its efforts to build bridges with Iran’s allies there, specifically the “Coordination Framework” (FQ) factions, could be a coherent approach for recalibrating its strategic orientation toward Iran.

The current regional decline in Iran’s strategic influence and the return of President Donald Trump to the White House present Jordan with an opportunity to construct a clear strategy toward Iran. This would involve adopting a diplomacy that balances Iran’s need to secure its regional position with Jordan’s need to ensure domestic stability. By encouraging Iran to reshape the roles of its allies in neighboring countries, Jordan could engage in regional diplomacy to reduce the risks of sustained regional escalation. This strategy would depend on leveraging “trans-regional conflict diplomacy.”

Jordan’s lack of a clear history of direct conflict with Iran positions it as one of the Arab states most capable of advancing such initiatives. Jordan could shift regional relations from a zero-sum framework to a non-zero-sum equation, making changes in Iran’s regional behavior a domestic matter shaped by internal Iranian developments. This approach aligns with the desire of major powers, particularly the United States, to sustain the current Iranian regime while attempting to alter its behavior. As such, adopting confrontation strategies against Iran appears unrealistic, given the ongoing efforts of some regional and international actors to engage in dialogue with Tehran. Therefore, Jordan’s national interest, rather than broader regional considerations, should be the primary driver of its diplomacy toward Iran in the coming period.

Conclusion

Numerous internal and external factors have shaped Iranian-Jordanian relations since 1979. Over the years, these relations have fluctuated, ranging from cautious openness to persistent tension. However, in the current context—especially following the fall of the Assad regime—Jordan must allow political maneuvering, diversify its economic benefits, and mitigate security concerns emanating from Iran.

Despite some optimism surrounding the potential for improved relations between the two countries, their ties remain in a phase of testing intentions. This is due to a complex interplay of internal and external factors and the multidimensional nature of their relationship, making it susceptible to disruption at any moment. Jordan’s behavior toward Iran thus far has shown no significant reservations about engaging positively with Tehran. However, this will largely depend on Iran’s actions, particularly in avoiding behaviors that could destabilize the kingdom. This dynamic will subject Iranian-Jordanian relations to genuine testing in the coming period.

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[1] David Schenker, Iran Targets Jordan: The Kingdom Joins the Theocracy’s List of Enemies, The Washington Institute, Jun 5, 2024. https://shorturl.at/E6Qvu.