Who Has the Right to Shape the Region? The Turkish–Israeli Rivalry over the Future of Regional Security

1. The Turkish–Israeli rivalry reveals a form of power exercised through an effective security veto. Israel can seek to obstruct Syrian military capabilities it considers threatening, while Türkiye seeks to influence their development. Syria’s ability to make independent security decisions thus becomes a critical measure of its sovereignty.
2. Eight Israeli airstrikes on August 18, 2026, targeted an airbase approximately 70 kilometers from the Turkish border. The absence of advance notification to Ankara increased the risk of military miscalculation, according to US Special Envoy Tom Barrack.
3. Syria could face a security arrangement under which external powers exercise an effective veto over its weapons and defense partnerships, even as its government institutions continue to function.
4. The weakening of Iran expanded Israel’s freedom of action but also created opportunities for a broader Turkish military and political presence in Syria. The decline of one adversary may facilitate the emergence of another competitor with different resources and capabilities.
5. A comparison with the National Intelligence Academy’s May 2026 report demonstrates that Turkish concerns about Israeli expansion had already been articulated. The October report consolidated these concerns into a broader framework linking external threats to Ankara’s regional strategic choices.
6. Türkiye supports the reconstruction of Syrian state institutions while maintaining security demands that influence their organization, military deployments, and the future of armed groups. This tension tests the limits of Damascus’s autonomy.
7. Following the August 2026 announcement concerning the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the central question shifted to Damascus’s ability to command integrated units, determine their deployments and armament, and reduce external influence over these decisions.
8. An airstrike can temporarily disrupt a military facility, but repeated strikes may encourage Türkiye and Syria to develop alternative installations and defensive systems. Immediate military outcomes can therefore differ substantially from their longer-term political consequences.
9. According to the Turkish intelligence assessment, the integration of settler movements into Israeli state institutions has transformed ideological demands into legal and administrative policies, potentially making them more difficult to reverse even after changes of government.
10. The Baku talks, subsequent US mediation, and negotiations in Jordan demonstrated the importance of military deconfliction mechanisms. Yet their effectiveness remains limited while disagreements persist over Syria’s military capabilities and the foreign forces it may host.

On October 23, 2026, Türkiye’s National Intelligence Academy published a report titled The Anatomy of Israeli Expansionism (İsrail Yayılmacılığının Anatomisi).[1] The report examined Israeli policies through their historical and ideological foundations, their evolution within political and military institutions, and their geographic extension from the Palestinian territories to Syria, Lebanon, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Horn of Africa. Its foreword, written by Academy President Talha Köse, advanced the argument that Israel seeks to expand its capacity for intervention across its regional environment by capitalizing on American military and technological superiority, political and societal divisions, and institutional weaknesses in neighboring states.

The report identified three interconnected dimensions of expansionism: territorial control, the incorporation of territories under Israeli control into new legal and administrative arrangements, and demographic transformations affecting the future of conflicts and the boundaries of political settlement.[2] It also associated the rise of Israel’s religious and nationalist right with the institutionalization of expansionist demands within state structures and executive agencies. The report further argued that Israel’s ability to achieve short-term military superiority faces constraints associated with sustaining prolonged wars and its structural dependence on American support. Continued reliance on military force, it suggested, could encourage neighboring states to develop countervailing security arrangements.

The dimension most directly related to Turkish interests emerged in the report’s comparison of two competing approaches to regional security. According to the Academy’s interpretation, the Israeli approach benefits from keeping neighboring states weak, fragmented, and vulnerable to intervention. The Turkish approach, by contrast, regards stronger state institutions and territorial integrity as essential conditions for security and stability. Within this framework, the report assigned strategic significance to the initiative known as A Terror-Free Türkiye and a Terror-Free Region, connecting closer relations among Turkish, Kurdish, and Arab communities to a reduced capacity for external actors to exploit ethnic and security divisions.[3]

The report is particularly significant because it was issued by an institution affiliated with Türkiye’s National Intelligence Organization and because it combines an assessment of external threats with an articulation of the strategic choices Ankara should pursue in response. Yet its most revealing implications may concern Türkiye itself. Ankara presents the strengthening of the Syrian state as a prerequisite for stability while maintaining direct interests in determining that state’s military capabilities, the future of Kurdish armed groups, and the limits of security cooperation with external actors. Israel, meanwhile, justifies its interventions through the need to prevent emerging threats, using its military superiority to influence the Syrian government’s defense choices. Between these two positions lies a question that extends beyond conventional competition for influence: Who ultimately possesses the authority to determine which military capabilities Syria may develop and which defense alliances it may establish?

This question gives the Turkish–Israeli rivalry its broader regional significance. A power capable of preventing another state from making a particular security decision may possess a form of influence that, under certain circumstances, exceeds the influence exercised by a power capable of persuading that state to take a particular course of action.

From Competition for Influence to Competition over the Right of Veto

Understanding the evolution of Türkiye’s perception of the Israeli threat requires revisiting the relationship between Ankara and Tel Aviv in the years preceding the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In March 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan welcomed Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Ankara,[4] marking an attempt to restore bilateral relations after years of political tension. That period demonstrated that even profound disagreements over the Palestinian question could leave room for economic rapprochement and diplomatic coordination. The war in Gaza after October 2023 reversed this trajectory, eventually leading Türkiye to suspend trade relations with Israel in May 2024.[5]

The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, however, introduced a factor that could prove considerably more difficult to contain through conventional diplomacy. Türkiye found an opportunity to establish closer relations with a new Syrian government and expand defense cooperation with Damascus, potentially addressing some of the threats that had shaped its security policy since the outbreak of the Syrian conflict in 2011. For Israel, the prospect of rebuilding the Syrian military with Turkish assistance generated new concerns, particularly if that assistance included air-defense systems, radar installations, and military infrastructure capable of restricting Israeli operational freedom within Syrian airspace.

This contradiction became evident in April 2025, when Reuters reported that Turkish military teams had examined the possibility of using three Syrian airbases as part of prospective defense cooperation with Damascus. Israel subsequently struck military facilities, including sites that had reportedly been considered for Turkish use.[6] On April 9, Turkish and Israeli officials met in Azerbaijan to discuss a mechanism designed to prevent military confrontation between the two countries.[7] Israeli representatives reportedly warned that establishing Turkish military bases near Palmyra would constitute a red line, while Ankara emphasized the importance of maintaining communication to avoid an unintended confrontation.

The discussions addressed the immediate risk of military engagement between two technologically advanced powers but left a more sensitive issue unresolved: how much freedom would Damascus retain in selecting its military partners? Israel regards certain forms of Turkish–Syrian defense cooperation as potential threats to its security, whereas Türkiye presents its cooperation with Damascus as a legitimate defense relationship between two sovereign states. From Syria’s perspective, this disagreement gives an external actor the capacity to challenge decisions that would ordinarily fall within the authority of its government.

More than a year later, the dispute escalated. On August 18, 2026, Israel carried out eight airstrikes targeting runways and facilities at the Abu al-Duhur airbase in northwestern Syria, according to Syrian sources cited by Reuters.[8] The Israeli Prime Minister’s Office stated that Damascus had been preparing to permit a Turkish military deployment at the facility, allegedly in violation of existing security understandings.[9] Ankara rejected the Israeli allegations, while Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani explained that Turkish military officers had visited the base as part of defense and training cooperation and that Damascus had informed Israel that there were no plans to establish a permanent Turkish base there.[10]

A significant dispute emerged over the nature of the military activity allegedly targeted by the attack. Israeli media cited security sources claiming that Ankara had been preparing to deploy radar and air-defense systems at Abu al-Duhur, whereas US Special Envoy Tom Barrack indicated that the intelligence available to Washington had not confirmed such a deployment. This disagreement matters because the assessment of an imminent military threat formed part of Israel’s justification for using force.[11] If the Israeli allegations were accurate, the objection concerned capabilities that could restrict Israeli freedom of aerial operations rather than the mere presence of Turkish personnel. The planned deployment nevertheless remains contested, making it essential to distinguish among the competing accounts when assessing the motives behind the strike.

The incident illustrates how security arrangements can become instruments for imposing restrictions on the military development of a neighboring state. Even when the Syrian government offers assurances regarding the nature of its defense cooperation, Israel retains the option of using force if it considers those assurances insufficient. Turkish military assistance to Damascus, meanwhile, may increase the costs associated with certain Syrian security decisions without necessarily expanding the country’s freedom of action.

The location of Abu al-Duhur adds another dimension to the dispute. Situated in northwestern Syria, approximately 70 kilometers from the Turkish border, the base lies far from the traditional Syrian–Israeli front.[12] Israeli strikes reaching this area demonstrate the widening geographic scope of the territory Israel considers relevant to its security. They also increase the possibility of military friction with Turkish forces as cooperation between Ankara and Damascus extends toward installations near Türkiye’s southern border.

Has Türkiye’s Security Doctrine Actually Changed?

The October report might initially appear to signal a major shift in Turkish strategic thinking. Yet comparison with earlier Academy publications suggests a more gradual process. In May 2026, the National Intelligence Academy released a report titled The US/Israeli–Iranian War and Türkiye from Military and Geopolitical Perspectives,[13] examining the consequences of the war that began on February 28, 2026, including changes in the use of military force, technology, and the capacity to sustain military operations.

In its assessments concerning Türkiye, the report argued that declining Iranian regional capabilities could allow Israel to expand its operational reach in Syria, Lebanon, and the Eastern Mediterranean, thereby increasing the likelihood of strategic competition with Ankara. It also called for strengthening Türkiye’s role in balancing Israeli influence while maintaining communication channels, developing deterrence capabilities, and deepening regional coordination.[14]

This comparison suggests that the October report emerged from an analytical trajectory already underway. Its principal contribution lay in two developments. First, it connected domestic political changes in Israel, particularly the growing influence of the settler right, to patterns of external expansion. Second, it articulated an alternative Turkish vision centered on strengthening neighboring states and reducing their vulnerability to outside intervention.

Iran’s declining influence helps explain the timing. For years, the Iranian presence in Syria had constituted a central concern in Israel’s regional security calculations. Following the collapse of the Assad regime and the weakening of Tehran’s regional capabilities, the possibility of Turkish military involvement in Syrian installations became more prominent in Israeli strategic thinking. Israel may have gained greater operational freedom by weakening one of its principal traditional adversaries, but it also faced the prospect of new security arrangements led by a state possessing substantially greater military and industrial capabilities than those available to the former Syrian government.

This development illustrates a familiar paradox in balance-of-power politics. Weakening a major adversary may expand operational freedom in the short term while creating a vacuum that other powers seek to fill. The consequences depend on the characteristics and interests of the emerging actors, and on whether the parties involved can establish mutually acceptable limits to their influence.

The October report may therefore also serve a political function by providing greater strategic coherence to existing Turkish policies. It situates competition with Israel within a wider regional framework and presents Türkiye’s policies toward Syria, the Kurdish question, and relations with Arab states as interconnected elements of a broader strategic approach. This interpretation, however, requires critical examination. The publication of a report by a security institution does not, on its own, establish a transformation in official state doctrine, nor does it demonstrate that Israeli threats have become the organizing principle of every Turkish regional policy. The report may simultaneously express genuine security concerns and seek to strengthen regional acceptance of Ankara’s strategic choices.

Syrian Sovereignty between Security Partnership and External Dependence

Türkiye’s stated commitment to strengthening the sovereignty and institutions of neighboring states corresponds with its interest in a Syrian government capable of controlling its borders and preventing armed organizations from using Syrian territory to launch attacks against Türkiye. Turkish policy nevertheless raises a difficult question concerning the relationship between state sovereignty and the interests of a more powerful security partner.

Since 2016, Ankara has conducted military operations inside Syria and established a military and security presence directed against organizations it considers extensions of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). Following Assad’s fall, Türkiye supported the reconstruction of the Syrian army and central state institutions while continuing to advocate specific arrangements concerning the future, deployment, and integration of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

This issue acquired a different dimension on August 25, 2026, when SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi announced in Damascus that his forces had ended their mission and dissolved as an independent military formation following the integration of their units into Syrian army brigades.[15] The announcement followed a process that began with the March 2025 agreement and continued through the January 2026 understandings after government forces advanced in northeastern Syria. The appointment of Siban Hamo as Deputy Defense Minister for Eastern Affairs in March 2026 was an early indication that Kurdish military leaders were entering the institutions of the new Syrian state.[16] The August announcement represented an important institutional development for Damascus and Ankara, given that the SDF’s continued independent military structure had been a major source of disagreement over the future of authority and security in northeastern Syria.

The announced dissolution of the independent military organization, however, introduced a different test of Syrian sovereignty: the exercise of command and control within the newly integrated institution. The transfer of fighters into army brigades, the allocation of senior command positions, and the relationship between regular forces and local security agencies will determine the extent to which Damascus can unify military decision-making. The durability of integration will also depend on political and cultural guarantees for Kurdish communities and the capacity of the new institutions to incorporate former fighters and commanders into a coherent chain of command. Some questions concerning women’s military units and institutional representation remained unresolved after the announcement,[17] underscoring the need to distinguish between the formal completion of integration measures and an assessment of their practical consequences.

For Türkiye, ending the SDF’s independent military status reduces one of the perceived threats that shaped its Syria policy throughout the preceding decade. It also creates an opportunity to shift relations with northeastern Syria from managing border threats toward cooperation with central state institutions. Yet this development subjects the Turkish conception of Syrian sovereignty to a more precise test: can Damascus command the integrated units and determine their deployment and armament according to its own national calculations, or will some of these decisions remain tied to security understandings with Ankara and Washington? The answer depends on the military arrangements established after integration and the Syrian leadership’s capacity to exercise effective authority over the newly incorporated formations.

The Turkish claim that Israel seeks to exploit ethnic divisions requires similar scrutiny. Israel’s interest in limiting Turkish influence may overlap with the desire of certain local actors to preserve some degree of security or administrative autonomy. Such convergence, however, differs from operational coordination or a shared strategy and would require direct evidence to establish. Moreover, Kurdish and Druze political questions, along with other issues of identity and representation, have local and historical origins that cannot be fully explained through the policies of external powers.

A comparison of Turkish and Israeli positions reveals similarities in the mechanisms through which influence is exercised, alongside significant differences in methods and objectives. Türkiye seeks to shape the reconstruction of Syrian security capabilities through cooperation with the new government, while Israel seeks to prevent the emergence of capabilities that might restrict its military operations. External influence over armament, deployment, and alliance decisions can weaken Syrian political autonomy even when government institutions remain formally intact and operational.

Damascus consequently faces a difficult choice in diversifying its military partnerships while continuing to depend on external assistance. Its need for military aid, training, and equipment increases its reliance on foreign partners, while attempts to diversify those relationships encounter security objections from other actors. Rebuilding the state’s military capabilities may itself become a recurring source of conflict.

What Can Military Power Actually Decide?

The Turkish report presents a notable assessment of the limits of Israeli military power. The Academy argues that Israel possesses the capabilities required to achieve rapid military gains but faces constraints in sustaining prolonged, high-intensity wars, particularly because of its dependence on American support. This assessment draws on the confrontations with Iran, the consumption of offensive and interceptor munitions, and the economic and infrastructural costs of extended warfare.

Evaluating the argument requires distinguishing among different levels of military operations. A large-scale campaign against a state possessing substantial missile capabilities entails different costs and resource requirements from limited airstrikes against Syrian military installations. Israel may therefore be able to sustain the latter type of operation considerably longer, even if sustaining the former presents serious difficulties without extensive American assistance.

One of the principal constraints on Israeli policy in the short term may consequently be political and strategic rather than strictly military. An airstrike can temporarily disable an airbase, but it may also encourage Syria and Türkiye to identify alternative sites or develop new defensive systems. The use of force against installations associated with Turkish–Syrian defense cooperation also increases the need for US-facilitated communication mechanisms and creates possibilities for military miscalculation that are difficult to manage.

This risk emerged after the Abu al-Duhur strike, when US Special Envoy Tom Barrack stated that Türkiye had received no advance notification of the attack and that the northward movement of Israeli aircraft could have prompted Turkish forces to prepare a response. The episode illustrates how military superiority can expand the options available to the actor employing force while simultaneously raising the costs of crisis management when operations approach the forces of another state capable of retaliation.[18]

The Turkish–Russian crisis of November 2015 provides a useful comparison for assessing the limits of military deconfliction mechanisms. The downing of a Russian Su-24 aircraft by Turkish fighter jets near the Syrian border, amid disagreements over an alleged violation of Turkish airspace, triggered a severe diplomatic and economic crisis. Moscow responded by restricting commercial and tourism relations and strengthening its military presence in Syria.[19] The incident demonstrated how ambiguous rules of engagement, combined with conflicting threat assessments, can transform a limited military encounter into a wider political confrontation. Relations required a political normalization process during 2016 before the two countries developed more extensive arrangements for operational coordination inside Syria.

The Turkish–Israeli case differs in one crucial respect: the timing of deconfliction arrangements and the nature of the relationships among the actors involved. In the Russian case, the direct military incident preceded the development of more systematic coordination arrangements between Ankara and Moscow. Türkiye and Israel, by contrast, began discussing a mechanism to avoid military confrontation in April 2025, more than a year before the Abu al-Duhur strike. Nevertheless, disagreements over the nature of permissible military deployments inside Syria persisted.

The comparison highlights the limitations of technical mechanisms when the underlying political rules remain contested. Communication channels can reduce the risk of miscalculation, but preventing deliberate escalation requires understandings concerning legitimate security interests and acceptable restrictions on the use of force. The United States also occupies a different position in the Turkish–Israeli case, acting as Israel’s principal security partner and Türkiye’s NATO ally. This creates opportunities for mediation that differ from Washington’s position during the Turkish–Russian crisis, although American commitments and interests toward the two parties remain fundamentally asymmetrical.

The United States and the Limits of a Possible Settlement

Washington faces a complicated relationship with two partners whose ties to the United States differ considerably. Israel relies on extensive American support in armaments, defense, and strategic coordination, while Türkiye is a NATO member and an important regional power in the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Syria. The United States requires cooperation with both countries across distinct security issues, and a direct confrontation between them could force Washington to confront costly choices.

On August 23, 2026, Jordan hosted US-mediated Syrian–Israeli talks aimed at reducing tensions and reviving negotiations over security arrangements,[20] just days after the Abu al-Duhur strike. According to Reuters, citing the Syrian Arab News Agency, the discussions also addressed efforts to prevent Turkish–Israeli tensions from spilling over into Syrian territory. Damascus demanded an end to Israeli attacks and a withdrawal to positions held before Assad’s fall, while maintaining its right to develop its military capabilities and choose its external relationships.[21]

These demands suggest that the Syrian government is seeking to expand its negotiating room despite the substantial imbalance of power. Damascus recognizes that a security agreement ending the strikes could create an opportunity to rebuild its institutions. Yet such an agreement could also introduce new restrictions on its defense policy if it grants Israel an effective veto over particular forms of armament or military cooperation. This distinction separates an agreement establishing reciprocal security obligations from an arrangement in which one party acquires practical authority over the decisions of another.

The future of negotiations will therefore depend on Washington’s ability to develop a formula that addresses Israeli security concerns while preserving sufficient room for the Syrian government to develop its defense institutions and preventing Turkish–Syrian military cooperation from becoming a recurring source of escalation.

For Jordan, hosting Syrian–Israeli negotiations reflects a direct interest in preventing Syria from becoming an open arena of confrontation among regional powers. The stability of Syrian institutions affects border security, smuggling, and the recovery of economic activity. Conversely, security arrangements developed without meaningful Syrian and Arab participation could institutionalize Damascus’s dependence on agreements negotiated by external powers. Amman’s interests therefore favor a negotiating process that strengthens Syrian institutions’ ability to control their territory while establishing clear restrictions on cross-border military intervention.

Where Is the Rivalry Heading?

Turkish–Israeli relations appear likely to remain characterized by a pattern of managed military and political competition, with the possibility of unintended friction persisting. Direct confrontation would impose substantial costs on both parties, whereas continued indirect competition allows each to improve its strategic position without assuming the burdens of open warfare.

The nature of Turkish–Syrian defense cooperation will be one of the most consequential indicators. Training and military institutional restructuring carry different sensitivities from the deployment of air-defense systems or radar installations capable of altering Israel’s operational freedom. Should Damascus move toward developing such capabilities, renewed Israeli pressure could follow unless prior security understandings establish acceptable conditions for their deployment.

A second indicator concerns the American role. If mediation remains limited to preventing military incidents, it may succeed in containing individual crises while leaving their underlying causes unresolved. Reciprocal arrangements governing military deployments and the limits of aerial operations could create conditions for more durable stability, provided the Syrian government exercises meaningful influence over their negotiation.

The third indicator is the Syrian state’s ability to manage its external relationships without allowing each step in rebuilding its military capabilities to become a source of confrontation among partners and adversaries. Success will depend on the cohesion of domestic institutions, the nature of political settlements with local actors, and Damascus’s capacity to diversify its security and economic relations within realistic constraints.

Against this background, the Turkish National Intelligence Academy’s report offers an important perspective on Ankara’s understanding of the future regional security order. It reflects Türkiye’s desire to present the strengthening of neighboring states as a means of balancing Israeli influence. Developments in Syria, however, provide a more demanding test of that vision, since states advocating sovereignty may simultaneously seek to influence the decisions through which sovereignty is exercised.

If emerging security arrangements continue to allow external powers to determine which weapons Damascus may acquire, which foreign forces it may host, and which defense relationships it may establish, the result could be a form of stability in which state institutions operate within limits determined by the surrounding balance of power.

The future of Turkish–Israeli competition will therefore depend significantly on the rules established to govern the use of force inside Syria. The actor capable of obstructing Syrian security decisions may acquire greater influence than the actor assisting in the reconstruction of its institutions. Yet transforming such influence into a stable regional order will depend on those institutions’ ability to exercise effective authority and on the existence of security arrangements accepted and respected by the parties involved.

Ultimately, the trajectory of Turkish–Israeli rivalry will be shaped by the ability of the parties to reach security arrangements that regulate the use of force within Syria while preserving Damascus’s capacity to make meaningful defense decisions. Israel’s military superiority provides leverage to obstruct projects it considers threatening, while Türkiye’s influence enables it to contribute to the reconstruction and direction of Syrian military institutions. In both cases, the effective authority exercised by the Syrian state remains the central test of any sustainable settlement.

If external approval becomes a condition for arming the Syrian military or selecting its defense partners, the resulting stability will depend on continued agreement among those external powers. Any subsequent divergence in their interests or shift in their relative capabilities could expose the fragility of that arrangement.

References and Footnotes

1. Millî İstihbarat Akademisi, İsrail Yayılmacılığının Anatomisi [The Anatomy of Israeli Expansionism] (Ankara: Millî İstihbarat Akademisi, October 23, 2026), https://mia.edu.tr/uploads/f/23102026_1.pdf.
2. Utku Şimşek, “Milli İstihbarat Akademisi ‘İsrail Yayılmacılığının Anatomisi’ Raporunu Yayımladı,” Anadolu Ajansı, October 23, 2026, https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/milli-istihbarat-akademisi-israil-yayilmaciliginin-anatomisi-raporunu-yayimladi/4098136.
3. Şimşek, “Milli İstihbarat Akademisi ‘İsrail Yayılmacılığının Anatomisi’ Raporunu Yayımladı.”
4. Burak Dağ, “Israeli President Welcomed with Official Ceremony in Turkish Capital,” Anadolu Agency, March 9, 2022, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/israeli-president-welcomed-with-official-ceremony-in-turkish-capital/2529128.
5. Reuters, “Turkey Halts All Trade with Israel, Cites Worsening Palestinian Situation,” May 2, 2024, https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/turkey-halts-all-trade-with-israel-cites-worsening-palestinian-situation-3415911.
6. Suleiman Al-Khalidi and Jonathan Spicer, “Exclusive: Israel Hit Syrian Bases Scoped by Turkey, Hinting at Regional Showdown, Sources Say,” Reuters, April 4, 2025, https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/exclusiveisrael-hit-syrian-bases-scoped-by-turkey-hinting-at-regional-showdown-sources-say-3968592.
7. Reuters, “Turkey, Israel Have Begun Talks to Avoid Clashes in Syria, Sources Say,” April 10, 2025, https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/turkey-israel-have-begun-talks-to-avoid-clashes-in-syria-sources-say-3979496.
8. Feras Dalatey and Tuvan Gumrukcu, “Israeli Airstrikes Hit Syrian Airbase, Drawing Turkish Condemnation,” Reuters, August 18, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/eight-israeli-airstrikes-hit-syrias-abu-al-duhur-airbase-no-casualties-state-tv-2026-08-18/.
9. Ibid.
10. Barak Ravid, “Syrian Foreign Minister to Axios: Israeli Bombing of Airbase Was Unjustified,” Axios, August 19, 2026, https://www.axios.com/2026/08/19/syria-foreign-minister-israel-bombing-airbase.
11. Idan Kweller and Corinne Baum, “Israel Targeted Syria Airbase over Planned Turkish Troop, Radar Presence, Source Confirms to ‘Post,’” The Jerusalem Post, August 22, 2026, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-906261; The Times of Israel, “Report: Israel Told US Turkey Was Planning to Deploy Air Defense System at Targeted Syrian Base,” August 23, 2026, https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/report-israel-told-us-turkey-was-planning-to-deploy-air-defense-system-at-targeted-syrian-base/.
12. Reuters, report on Israeli strikes against Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase, August 18, 2026, republished by ThePrint, https://theprint.in/world/eight-israeli-airstrikes-hit-syrias-abu-al-duhur-airbase-no-casualties-state-tv-reports/3018065/.
13. Millî İstihbarat Akademisi, Askerî ve Jeopolitik Perspektiften ABD/İsrail-İran Savaşı ve Türkiye [The US/Israeli–Iranian War and Türkiye from Military and Geopolitical Perspectives] (Ankara: Millî İstihbarat Akademisi, May 2026), 9–10, https://mia.edu.tr/uploads/f/20052026_1.pdf.
14. Millî İstihbarat Akademisi, Askerî ve Jeopolitik Perspektiften ABD/İsrail-İran Savaşı ve Türkiye, 55–56.
15. Syrian Arab News Agency, “Comprehensive Agreement between Syrian Government and SDF for Full Integration,” January 30, 2026, https://sana.sy/en/politics/2293263/.
16. Reuters, “Syria’s Kurdish-Led SDF Dissolves as Part of Integration with Damascus,” August 25, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syrias-kurdish-led-sdf-dissolves-part-integration-with-damascus-2026-08-25/.
17. Ghaith Alsayed and Abby Sewell, “Kurdish-Led Syrian Democratic Forces Group Says It Has Dissolved after Merging with the Syrian Army,” Associated Press, August 25, 2026, https://apnews.com/article/syrian-democratic-forces-dissolution-mazloum-abdi-1b7d210c96d2c608007b0411db25f453.
18. Timour Azhari, “US Working on Deconfliction Mechanism among Turkey, Israel and Syria, US Envoy Says,” Reuters, August 18, 2026, https://www.investing.com/news/world-news/us-working-on-deconfliction-mechanism-among-turkey-israel-and-syria-us-envoy-says-4865929; Financial Times, “Israel’s Syria Strike May Have Been Bid to Provoke Turkey Conflict, US Envoy Says,” August 2026, https://www.ft.com/content/d770cdbf-46b1-4928-9ec7-e1155db679d2.
19. Jeffrey Mankoff and Olga Oliker, “Turkey’s Downing of a Russian Jet,” Critical Questions, Center for Strategic and International Studies, November 25, 2015, https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkeys-downing-russian-jet; Xenia Wickett and Jacob Parakilas, Transatlantic Rifts: Averting a Turkey/Russia Conflict (London: Chatham House, August 2016), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2016-08-05-transatlantic-rifts-turkey-russia-wickett-parakilas.pdf.
20. Feras Dalatey, “Syria, Israel Hold US-Mediated Talks to Ease Tensions, Syria News Agency Says,” Reuters, August 23, 2026, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-israel-hold-us-mediated-talks-ease-tensions-syria-news-agency-says-2026-08-23/.
21. Barak Ravid, “Scoop: Syria and Israel Move to Defuse Tensions after Airbase Bombing,” Axios, August 23, 2026, https://www.axios.com/2026/08/23/syria-israel-turkey-airbase-bombing; Dalatey, “Syria, Israel Hold US-Mediated Talks.”