Between the U.S. and Israeli Elections: The Calculus of War and the Prospects for a Deal

The Middle East is entering a new phase of shifting power dynamics, in which military calculations, electoral considerations, and geopolitical transformations are increasingly intertwined amid escalating tensions between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other. The prospect of renewed war is no longer tied exclusively to Iran’s nuclear program or mutual security threats. It has become part of a broader struggle to reshape the regional order, redefine the positions of its principal powers, and redraw political, military, and economic alliances.
At the center of these transformations, Israel has emerged as the actor most determined to alter the existing balance of power, while other regional powers are pursuing understandings and alliances aimed at preventing a strategic shift in Tel Aviv’s favor.
Israel’s approach views confrontation with Iran as an opportunity to reshape the region rather than merely a military operation intended to weaken Tehran’s nuclear and missile capabilities. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s political rhetoric reflects an ambition that goes beyond containing the Iranian threat. It points toward changing the nature of the ruling system in Tehran and diminishing the influence of Iran-aligned actors, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Under this vision, weakening Iran or removing it from the regional balance of power would give Israel greater room to expand its influence and impose new security and political arrangements. These could include expanding normalization agreements and redefining relations among regional states.
Yet this Israeli project is encountering countervailing shifts in the regional strategic environment. Recent developments have pointed to growing coordination among Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, and Pakistan under what is known as the Mecca Agreement, alongside the announcement of the Badr Defense Pact, bringing together Qatar, Türkiye, Pakistan, and Indonesia.
The significance of these arrangements lies in their attempt to move beyond political coordination toward cooperation in defense manufacturing, technology transfer, training, and military capability development, particularly in air defense systems and countering unconventional threats. Although these understandings do not necessarily amount to the formation of a unified military alliance, they reflect a growing recognition among the participating countries of the need to diversify defense partnerships and strengthen their capacity to respond to regional shifts without relying entirely on external security guarantees.
Türkiye occupies a central position in this emerging equation, given its expanding military and political presence in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Horn of Africa. Israel, meanwhile, is strengthening its relations with Greece, Cyprus, India, and the United Arab Emirates through a network of partnerships that provides additional instruments for balancing Turkish influence.
This rivalry is particularly evident in the Eastern Mediterranean, where Ankara is seeking to consolidate its position in maritime delimitation and energy arrangements, drawing on its understandings with Libya and its growing engagement with political and military actors in the country’s east.
The significance of these developments extends beyond natural gas to encompass energy transportation routes, electricity interconnections, submarine cables, and the long-term economic and strategic interests associated with them.
This competition suggests that the region is gradually moving toward a more multipolar distribution of power rather than settling into two rigidly opposing blocs. Saudi Arabia, for example, is seeking to strengthen its defense capabilities and regional partnerships while preserving its strategic relationship with the United States. Egypt is similarly attempting to avoid becoming entangled in open-ended military alignments while safeguarding its interests in the Red Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.
Qatar, for its part, continues to combine diplomatic mediation with the development of its defense partnerships. The emerging understandings should therefore not be interpreted as a definitive alignment against Israel, but rather as an effort to establish balancing mechanisms that prevent any single power from monopolizing regional security decision-making.
At the same time, the Israeli elections and the U.S. congressional midterm elections introduce another influential factor into the calculations surrounding war and diplomacy. Netanyahu is seeking to preserve his image as the leader best equipped to confront existential threats, while U.S. President Donald Trump faces a more complex equation involving the costs of war and its potential consequences for energy prices, global markets, and American electoral sentiment.
From this perspective, military escalation and increasingly confrontational rhetoric can be understood as instruments of pressure against Iran, while also serving domestic electoral purposes. Nevertheless, the coincidence of electoral contests and military mobilization is not sufficient evidence that a decision to go to war has already been made, or that its timing would be determined exclusively by Netanyahu’s electoral interests.
U.S.-Israeli military consultations reflect a high degree of coordination, particularly regarding potential scenarios for targeting Iranian nuclear facilities, infrastructure, and military capabilities. However, the transition from developing operational options to implementing them remains dependent on the White House’s calculations and its willingness to absorb the consequences of a confrontation that could extend well beyond Iran’s borders.
Iran retains the capacity to broaden its response by targeting American military and economic interests, as well as those of Washington’s allies, or by disrupting maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The involvement of Iran-aligned forces could also open additional fronts in Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq.
For this reason, ongoing negotiations and mediation efforts appear designed to manage the increasingly narrow space between deterrence and direct confrontation. Qatar, Pakistan, and Russia have emerged as relevant diplomatic actors in this context, alongside European and regional initiatives aimed at preventing a wider war.
The prospects for a negotiated settlement, however, remain dependent on the nature of the concessions demanded of Tehran and Washington’s willingness to accept an agreement that does not fulfill all of Israel’s objectives.
Iran, in turn, faces a strategic dilemma between preserving its negotiating leverage and military capabilities and avoiding a confrontation that could threaten the stability of its state institutions. Continued negotiations therefore do not eliminate the possibility of escalation, just as military preparations do not make war inevitable.
The Red Sea and the Bab el-Mandeb Strait have acquired particular importance in these calculations, as freedom of navigation and the security of energy supplies have become central dimensions of the confrontation. Any large-scale conflict in Yemen or the Gulf would have immediate consequences for international trade, oil prices, transportation costs, and insurance premiums. This helps explain the close attention European and Asian powers are paying to the evolving crisis.
An expansion of military operations along strategic maritime corridors could also push regional states into security arrangements that do not necessarily correspond to their political positions toward Iran or Israel.
Lebanon and Syria, meanwhile, represent the two arenas most directly exposed to the consequences of any fundamental change in Iran’s regional position. In Lebanon, Israel is seeking to translate its military superiority into long-term security arrangements by expanding its territorial control and increasing pressure on the Lebanese state over Hezbollah’s weapons.
These pressures intersect with domestic tensions surrounding security investigations and the state’s monopoly over the use of force, raising the risk that regional confrontation could spill over into Lebanon’s internal political and security environment.
The principal danger is that renewed Israeli escalation could confront Lebanese state institutions with simultaneous challenges involving internal security, military deployment, and political stability.
In Syria, Israel’s strategic competition is closely linked to the future of the country’s south, particularly Suwayda, Daraa, and Quneitra. Concerns over expanded Israeli intervention or the exploitation of local divisions are inseparable from efforts to constrain Damascus’s ability to restore its sovereignty and establish an independent regional role.
Continued instability in southern Syria could also create additional arenas of competition between Israel and Türkiye, while affecting trade routes, energy corridors, and regional connectivity projects.
Ultimately, the future of the Middle East will not be determined solely by whether another war with Iran takes place, but by the balance of power that emerges from this period of uncertainty. Should war break out, its outcome would be far from assured, and the resulting instability could extend well beyond the objectives its planners seek to achieve.
If diplomatic mediation succeeds in preventing a new conflict, competition over influence, alliances, and strategic corridors will nevertheless continue through political, economic, and security instruments.
In either scenario, the region appears to be undergoing a gradual transition away from a regional order structured primarily around American security guarantees and traditional alliances toward a more complex environment characterized by multiple centers of power and overlapping partnerships and rivalries.
The central challenge for regional states will be to translate their emerging understandings into durable strategic balances capable of preventing the imposition of unilateral arrangements and reducing the risk that geopolitical competition develops into open-ended military confrontation.