Shifting Public Trust in Jordanian Governments: Jaafar Hassan and Omar Razzaz Between Political Modernization and the “Technocratic Formula”

The findings of a survey conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan, two years after the formation of Prime Minister Dr. Jaafar Hassan’s government, raise questions that extend beyond the conventional assessment of government performance, the prime minister, and his ministerial team. They touch upon one of the most persistent challenges confronting Jordan’s political system over recent decades: the crisis of trust between citizens and governments. More fundamentally, they raise the question of whether this crisis can be overcome through improvements in executive and administrative performance, or whether its roots lie deeper, in the processes through which governments are formed, their relationship with society, and their place within the political decision-making system.

The significance of the latest findings lies in their apparent departure from the historical pattern observed in public opinion surveys of Jordanian governments. Governments typically begin their terms with considerable optimism and high expectations, only to experience a gradual decline in popularity as promises encounter economic and political realities. Over time, they become the focus of public criticism and demands. Hassan’s government, however, has managed to maintain a relatively high level of public trust after two years in office, while improving public assessments of its ability to discharge its responsibilities compared with its initial ratings.

Nevertheless, viewing this experience solely as an exception would provide an incomplete account. Hassan’s government was preceded by another experience worthy of comparison: that of Dr. Omar Razzaz, who also achieved high levels of popularity at certain stages of his premiership before experiencing a decline, followed by a renewed surge in public approval during the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite considerable differences in their personal backgrounds and professional trajectories, both leaders share a technocratic orientation, an emphasis on management and institutional reform, and an interest in establishing direct relationships with citizens. They differ, however, in the prominence of political discourse and the circumstances each confronted.

This comparison raises a more fundamental question: Do the experiences of Hassan and Razzaz reflect a growing Jordanian preference for an executive-oriented technocratic prime minister over a political or party-affiliated prime minister? If so, how can such a public inclination be reconciled with Jordan’s political modernization process, which is intended to lead gradually toward programmatic, party-based governments?

What Do the Public Trust Figures Reveal?

The Center for Strategic Studies conducted its survey between September 10 and 26, 2026, using a nationally representative sample of 2,012 citizens, alongside a separate sample of 424 opinion leaders. The national sample had a margin of error of 2.5 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

The findings indicate that 67% of citizens trust the current government, compared with 66% of opinion leaders. A closer examination of these figures, however, reveals an important distinction: only 24% of citizens express a high degree of trust in the government, while 43% report a moderate level of trust. In other words, the greater part of the government’s trust base consists of conditional rather than firmly established confidence, leaving it susceptible to improvement or deterioration depending on performance and outcomes.

This distinction is essential to avoid overstating the significance of the findings. The government does not enjoy an open-ended popular mandate, but it has succeeded in maintaining a level of public acceptance that was far from guaranteed after two years in office, particularly amid difficult economic and regional circumstances.

This interpretation is reinforced by the evolution of public assessments of the government’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities. At its formation in September 2024, the government received a rating of 54%, which declined to 51% after its first 100 days. The rating subsequently increased to 65% after 200 days, fell slightly to 61% after one year, rose to 62% after eighteen months, and reached 64% after two years.

Assessments of the prime minister himself followed a somewhat different trajectory. Hassan began with a rating of 57%, which declined to 55% after 100 days, before rising sharply to 71% after 200 days. It subsequently stabilized at 67% after one year, declined to 64% after eighteen months, and recovered to 66% after two years.

These trends suggest that the government has experienced neither uninterrupted progress nor a sustained rise in public approval. Rather, it has successfully overcome an early decline and maintained an overall performance assessment above its initial level. More importantly, a gap remains between evaluations of the prime minister and those of his ministerial team: Hassan received 66%, compared with 59% for the cabinet. This disparity highlights the role of the prime minister’s personal leadership in shaping public perceptions of the government.

The picture becomes more complex when examining opinion leaders. Among this group, the government’s performance rating declined from 69% after eighteen months to 59% after two years. The prime minister’s rating fell from 75% to 65%, while that of the ministerial team decreased from 60% to 53%. This decline, which is less evident in the national sample, suggests a widening gap between general public impressions and the more detailed assessments of government performance among those who follow political affairs more closely.

Another revealing paradox emerges from the figures: only 53% of citizens say they follow government performance, compared with 91% of opinion leaders. Yet overall levels of trust are remarkably similar across the two groups. This raises an important question about how political trust is formed: Does it derive from close scrutiny of government policies, or from the prime minister’s public image and accumulated impressions of stability, service delivery, and field visits?

Omar Razzaz: The Exception That Preceded Hassan

Hassan’s experience cannot be fully understood without revisiting that of Omar Razzaz, which offers an important comparative case, both because of their shared technocratic backgrounds and because of the considerable fluctuations in public assessments of Razzaz’s government over time.

Razzaz assumed office in June 2018 following widespread popular protests against the proposed income tax law and the policies of Hani Mulki’s government. The circumstances surrounding his appointment gave him an initial reservoir of public optimism, associated with his personality, academic and reformist background, and expectations that he would introduce a different approach to governance and relations with citizens.

That initial political capital, however, proved difficult to sustain. Surveys conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies showed that, one year after the formation of his government, the rating of Razzaz’s ability to fulfill his responsibilities had declined to 47%, compared with 41% for the government and 33% for the ministerial team.

The COVID-19 pandemic subsequently transformed relations between the government and society under exceptional circumstances. During the initial phase of the pandemic, public confidence in the government’s management of the crisis rose dramatically, reaching 91% in one survey conducted in March 2020. By June of the same year, however, that figure had declined to 58%, as the economic and social consequences of lockdown measures and crisis management became increasingly apparent.

It is important to distinguish between confidence in the management of a specific crisis and the broader assessment of a government’s ability to fulfill its responsibilities. These indicators measure different dimensions of public opinion and should be interpreted accordingly. Nevertheless, their political significance is clear: Razzaz demonstrated an ability to achieve exceptionally high levels of public approval at particular moments, indicating that Hassan’s experience is not entirely unprecedented in this respect.

From another perspective, the comparison reveals an important difference in the sources of popularity. The exceptional increase in Razzaz’s approval during the early pandemic was closely associated with the management of an unprecedented public health and security crisis. Hassan’s support, by contrast, appears to be distributed across executive and service-delivery performance, field visits, and a broader sense of stability amid a turbulent regional environment.

The two prime ministers also differ in their political discourse. Razzaz entered office with an emphasis on concepts such as the social contract, political reform, and renewing the relationship between the state and society. In this sense, he more closely resembled a technocrat with a reform-oriented political vision.

Hassan, by contrast, represents a model more explicitly focused on administration, implementation, and follow-up, with comparatively limited emphasis on overarching political concepts in his public discourse. Although he clearly embraces political modernization as a national Jordanian project initiated under royal leadership—and played a role in its formulation and oversight while serving as director of the Royal Court’s Office of His Majesty the King—political modernization has featured less prominently in the government’s activities, priorities, and much of its political discourse.

This distinction should not be exaggerated. Razzaz was unable to translate most of his political ambitions into far-reaching institutional reforms, whereas Hassan governs at a time when the political modernization process has already been launched, including new political party and electoral laws and a gradual transition toward party-based governments. Meanwhile, various reports and leaks suggest that he intends to bring party leaders into his cabinet during the anticipated reshuffle.

The Technocratic Formula: Why Does It Work?

Part of the public acceptance enjoyed by Hassan’s government can be explained through what may be termed the executive technocratic formula. This approach rests on three interconnected elements: a visible presence in the field, a focus on public services, and the projection of a prime minister who works, monitors implementation, and holds officials accountable.

Regarding field engagement, the survey found that 79% of citizens support the prime minister’s visits to governorates, institutions, and development projects, compared with 75% of opinion leaders. Among those who support these visits, the majority believe that they enable the prime minister to gain firsthand knowledge of citizens’ circumstances and problems.

The significance of these findings extends beyond field visits as a form of media activity. Such visits carry an important political symbolism. Citizens who perceive a substantial distance between themselves and public officials may interpret the prime minister’s presence on the ground as a sign that the government is attempting to overcome traditional bureaucratic barriers.

Nevertheless, widespread support for these visits does not imply universal confidence in their effectiveness. Among respondents who opposed them, 68.3% of the national sample cited the absence of tangible results as the principal problem. This establishes a clear limit to the effectiveness of field-oriented governance: visits may generate favorable impressions, but sustaining those impressions ultimately requires practical solutions.

The second element concerns the government’s emphasis on public services and projects whose effects citizens can experience directly. According to the survey, 91% of the national sample supported cancer treatment insurance for eligible age groups, 97% supported the government school transportation project, and 86% believed that constructing 86 new schools could help alleviate overcrowding. In the area of digital transformation, 89% of digital service users reported that these services had spared them the need to visit government institutions.

These findings suggest that citizens are willing to recognize and appreciate clear administrative and service-related initiatives, even as major economic challenges persist.

An important analytical distinction must nevertheless be maintained between public support for a government initiative and evidence of its actual success. Some survey questions measure attitudes toward announced or anticipated initiatives rather than their completed outcomes. Consequently, high levels of public support should not automatically be interpreted as proof that the intended achievements have been fully realized.

The third element of the technocratic formula concerns the personality of the prime minister and his working style. Despite their differences in cultural, social, and professional backgrounds, Hassan and Razzaz share an image of public officials who work long hours and pay close attention to administrative details.

Such perceptions would require more objective indicators before being adopted as a scientific explanation for their popularity. Nevertheless, it is plausible that Jordanian citizens, having experienced successive governments and repeated promises, have become increasingly inclined to value administrative seriousness and effective follow-up, while attaching less importance to political discourse that produces few tangible improvements in everyday life.

Regional Stability: A Factor That Cannot Be Overlooked

Explaining public acceptance of Hassan’s government exclusively through its executive performance would overlook a central contextual factor. The government operates amid one of the most turbulent periods in the region, marked by the war in Gaza, escalating threats in the West Bank, the widening scope of regional confrontations, and growing concerns about Jordan’s security and stability.

The survey reveals that 56% of Jordanians believe the country is moving in the right direction, compared with 33% who believe it is moving in the wrong direction.

More revealing than the overall percentages, however, are the reasons respondents provide for their assessments. Among those who believe the country is moving in a positive direction, 48.2% attribute this to security and stability, while 20.4% point to development and reform.

These figures carry substantial political significance. Amid regional crises, stability has become more than one factor among many in the assessment of overall conditions; it has emerged as a central determinant of public sentiment.

Such circumstances may have provided Hassan’s government with an opportunity to benefit from the heightened importance attached to stability in the public consciousness, much as the COVID-19 pandemic offered Razzaz’s government an opportunity to strengthen its public image during a particular phase.

There is, however, a crucial distinction. Maintaining stability in Jordan is not the responsibility of the government alone. It reflects the collective efforts of state institutions, foremost among them the monarchy and the security, military, and diplomatic establishments.

Accordingly, attributing the entirety of this public confidence to the prime minister would be analytically misleading. At the same time, an assessment of the government’s popularity must take account of the positive effects that perceptions of stability may have on its public standing.

High Trust Amid Persistent Economic Difficulties

The most striking paradox in the survey emerges when indicators of political trust are compared with assessments of economic and living conditions.

While the government maintains a relatively high level of public acceptance, 44% of citizens report that their economic circumstances have deteriorated compared with the previous year, 43% say their circumstances have remained unchanged, and only 12% report an improvement.

The proportion reporting deterioration has declined from 51% in the April 2026 survey to 44% in the latest findings. Nevertheless, the overwhelming majority of citizens have yet to experience a direct improvement in their economic circumstances.

This finding becomes more significant when examining the issues citizens believe require immediate government intervention. Unemployment, limited job opportunities, and low incomes rank first, cited by 49.1% of respondents. Poverty and the rising cost of living follow at 18.6%, while broader economic issues, investment, and public finances account for 7.1%.

Together, these figures suggest that the government has succeeded in building a reservoir of public trust despite having yet to produce a tangible improvement in the economic conditions experienced by most citizens.

Several possible explanations may account for this apparent contradiction.

Citizens may have developed more realistic expectations of governments, recognizing that addressing unemployment and poverty requires longer periods than the tenure of any single administration. They may also distinguish between accumulated structural economic problems and the efforts undertaken by the current government to address them.

Alternatively, heightened perceptions of security and stability amid regional turbulence may have moderated the negative effects of economic frustration on assessments of government performance.

These explanations, however, remain hypotheses requiring independent examination. The survey establishes the coexistence of relatively high trust and unfavorable economic assessments, but it does not conclusively identify the causal mechanisms underlying that relationship.

More importantly, the persistence of this paradox could become a significant challenge for the government. Trust grounded in favorable impressions and perceived administrative effort may prove resilient for a period, but it will face a more demanding test if economic conditions continue without tangible improvement.

Are Technocrats Prevailing Over Politicians?

The comparison between Hassan and Razzaz leads to a question extending beyond their individual experiences: Which model of government appears more acceptable to Jordanian citizens?

The two cases may suggest that a technocratic prime minister who emphasizes management, services, and practical achievements has greater opportunities to build public confidence than one whose identity is primarily political or party-based.

This conclusion, however, requires considerable caution. The survey did not directly ask citizens whether they prefer technocratic or party-based governments. Moreover, Jordan has yet to experience a fully developed programmatic party government that would allow for a balanced comparison with technocratic administrations.

The fundamental issue is not technocracy itself, understood as a model that values expertise and competence. Rather, it is the possibility that administrative competence may come to be treated as a substitute for politics.

Regardless of its executive effectiveness, a government is more than an administrative mechanism for delivering services and implementing projects. It is a political institution that makes decisions concerning resource allocation, economic priorities, taxation, and public expenditure. It must navigate competing social interests and determine policy choices that affect citizens’ lives and the state’s future.

Such decisions cannot be reduced to technical competence alone. They involve political and normative choices that should remain open to public debate and institutional accountability.

From this perspective, Razzaz’s experience differs somewhat from Hassan’s. The former placed greater emphasis on political reform in his public discourse but failed to translate much of that discourse into substantial institutional transformation. The latter presents a more clearly defined executive model during a period that is supposed to lay the foundations for a transition toward party-based governments.

This produces a noteworthy paradox: a technocratic prime minister may succeed in improving government performance and strengthening public trust, yet that very success may reinforce the perception that party-based governments are not an urgent necessity and that the country can continue relying on competent executive figures without transitioning to a different political model.

Political Modernization and the Test of Competence and Representation

This paradox cannot be separated from the political modernization project launched by King Abdullah II, one of whose principal dimensions is the development of political parties and parliamentary life, with the longer-term objective of establishing governments grounded in political constituencies and programmatic commitments.

This process envisions a gradual transformation of political parties from electoral organizations with limited influence into actors capable of formulating political and economic programs, participating in government formation, and assuming responsibility for policy decisions and their consequences.

Yet the success of an executive-oriented model in securing public acceptance presents a dual challenge.

On the one hand, political parties cannot credibly demand a greater role in government solely on the basis of electoral legitimacy without also demonstrating their capacity to offer qualified personnel and realistic, persuasive programs.

On the other hand, the success of a technocratic prime minister should not become a justification for postponing institutional development toward governments that are more representative and accountable.

There is no inherent contradiction, theoretically or practically, between technocratic competence and party-based government.

A successful party government requires competent experts and administrators, just as a technocratic government requires a political vision capable of defining priorities and explaining policy choices to citizens.

The difficulty emerges when technocracy substitutes for political representation, or when party-based governance degenerates into the distribution of positions according to partisan quotas at the expense of competence.

In Jordan’s case, the central challenge may therefore lie in developing a hybrid model that combines both dimensions: a government supported by a political base and a clear program, staffed by individuals with expertise and executive capabilities, and subject to parliamentary and public accountability for its policy outcomes.

From Personal Trust to Institutional Trust

The comparison between Hassan and Razzaz reveals a deeper challenge in the relationship between Jordanian citizens and their governments.

A substantial part of public trust appears to be associated with the prime minister’s personality, background, management style, and communication approach, rather than with a stable governmental institution or a political program capable of continuing beyond changes in leadership.

This pattern is not new to Jordan’s political experience. The country has witnessed several prime ministers who enjoyed considerable popularity and public acceptance without that support necessarily translating into sustained institutional trust in governments as accountable public institutions.

This dimension is reflected in the consistently higher assessments of prime ministers compared with their ministerial teams, as well as in the ability of certain leaders to improve their government’s public image without corresponding fundamental changes in citizens’ assessments of their economic circumstances or public services.

The central challenge, therefore, extends beyond producing a successful prime minister. It involves establishing institutional mechanisms that make effective governance reproducible, ensure the continuity of successful policies, and hold governments accountable for shortcomings.

Personal trust, however high, remains vulnerable to erosion as circumstances and leaders change. Institutional trust, by contrast, is grounded in clearly defined responsibilities and programs, meaningful mechanisms of accountability, and citizens’ ability to influence public choices through representative institutions.

Conclusion: What Does Hassan’s Experience Tell Us?

The significance of Hassan’s government’s performance in the Center for Strategic Studies survey should not be underestimated.

After two years in office, the government has managed to maintain a relatively strong level of public trust, improve assessments of its ability to fulfill its responsibilities, and cultivate a positive image of the prime minister as an executive leader who monitors details and maintains a visible presence in the field.

Nevertheless, the experience does not constitute a complete break with the history of Jordanian governments. It was preceded by Omar Razzaz’s premiership, which also witnessed exceptional peaks in public approval, albeit under different circumstances and through different political trajectories.

The two experiences support the hypothesis that Jordanians attach considerable importance to executive competence, administrative seriousness, and proximity to their everyday concerns.

They may also suggest an increasing tendency to evaluate governments according to what they accomplish rather than what they say about themselves.

Yet this does not necessarily indicate the triumph of technocracy over politics, nor does it constitute a popular rejection of party-based governments. Instead, it may reveal the weakness of the existing party experience and its limited ability thus far to offer a convincing and competitive model of governance.

This leads to the central paradox: Hassan’s success may demonstrate the importance of executive competence, but it should not be interpreted as evidence that political development is unnecessary.

Jordan’s challenge is not to choose between a government that manages effectively and one that possesses a political base. Rather, it is to move toward governments capable of combining both.

Ultimately, the so-called “curse of governments” will not be definitively broken simply because a prime minister manages to retain public popularity for two years or longer.

It will be overcome when trust in government becomes the natural outcome of a clear political program, executive competence, political representation, and institutional accountability—rather than an exception associated with the personality of a particular prime minister or the temporary effects of regional circumstances.